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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the dynamics of the police decision to invoke deadly force in 
a particular situation called encounters, using the Mumbai police as a case study. 
Police encounters in India are officially portrayed as spontaneous, unplanned 
‘shoot-outs’ between the police and alleged criminals, in which the criminal 
almost invariably is killed but there are hardly any injuries on the part of the 
police. However the ‘cover story’ is always the same raising the suspicion that it 
is a cover up for facts that might not be legally defensible or permissible.
The core of this study is to understand why in a free and democratic society like 
India, such abuse of police use of deadly force is not only tolerated, but also in 
many ways (both overtly and tacitly) encouraged. The study adopts a qualitative 
approach to understand police officers’ perspectives of the issues surrounding the 
use of deadly force and compares it with the perspectives of a few influential 
opinion makers via in-depth semi-structured interviews. A broader examination 
of media, social, organisational and governmental responses towards police use 
of deadly force helps contextualize police justifications within the Denial Theory 
framework and the study draws upon wider policing literature in the UK, USA, 
South Africa and certain Latin American countries to explain why this form of 
police violence occurs.
The abuse of deadly force has to be understood as not only a social problem, but 
also a sociological one. It gives rise to fundamental questions such as -  what 
makes ordinary, ‘decent’ human beings do horrible things? What motivational 
techniques and justifications are used to override social norms governing moral 
conduct? This problem has received little attention in the Indian context, to that 
extent the research will fill a gap in the existing criminological literature and 
allow for a more comprehensive understanding of these issues. Also, by drawing 
lessons from the experience of other countries who have tackled similar 
problems, it will provide broad guidelines and recommendations for reforms in 
policing policy and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Police encounters are a peculiar feature of Indian policing. An encounter is a
spontaneous, unplanned ‘shoot-out’ between the police and alleged criminals, in
which the criminal is usually killed, with few or no police injuries. However the
police ‘cover story’ (Hunt & Manning 1991) from official sources and cited in
the media is always the same raising the suspicion that it is a cover up for facts
that might not be legally defensible or permissible. The term encounter is not just
police jargon but is part of everyday discourse in Mumbai, where my research
was conducted and in the rest of India and is used by police officers, media and
public to refer to police use of deadly force in circumstances described by one
newspaper report as follows:
“‘Mumbai Police pats itself as encounter deaths double ’
The Mumbai police call it ‘proactive policing’. In everyday parlance, 
it is referred to as an ‘encounter’ between policemen and gangsters 
that always results in the death of these gangsters.
That these encounters do not have a surprise element, instead are 
planned, to a large extent, by the police, no longer raises eyebrows.
But even by their own standards, Mumbai police have been far too 
‘proactive’ in 2001 compared to the past few years...In 2000, the 
total number of alleged gangsters killed in encounters was 49, and the 
year before that it was 60. The quantum leap to 94 has certainly sent 
shockwaves through the underworld. Extremely pleased at this leap,
Police Commissioner M.N. Singh said: “Organised crime is well 
under check. This is the final blow”. (The Indian Express, Mumbai, 
December 29, 2001)
Of all types of force used by the police, deadly force is cause of most concern, 
not only because its consequences are irreversible and irreparable, but because it 
‘affects citizens’ attitude toward the police and toward the government in 
general’ (Geller & Scott 1991), as does all inappropriate use of force. The core of 
my study is to understand why it is that in a free and democratic society like 
India, the abuse of deadly force is not only tolerated, but in many ways (both 
overtly and tacitly) encouraged. I set out to answer the question that has been 
asked by others - what makes ordinary, ‘decent’ human beings do horrible
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things?; and how are such ‘wrongdoings’ on the part of state actors justified in a 
democratic society?
I worked as an officer of the Indian Police Service (IPS) in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, which is one of the more backward, illiterate, densely populated, and 
crime-infested regions of the country. My experience, during training and 
subsequently in the field, led me to believe that the influence of the occupational 
subculture1 is ubiquitous and tangible. There is formal emphasis on the rule of 
law and due process, but these are viewed by police officers more as obstacles to 
be overcome in the ultimate quest to tackle crime and law & order problems. The 
‘heroes’ or ‘model cops’ to be emulated are those who have proved their 
‘bravery’ or ‘toughness’ in the field through dealing with one or more ‘dreaded 
criminals’ in encounters. These messages are rarely articulated explicitly, but are 
disseminated in more subtle ways, that are nonetheless very powerful. A few 
young officers even join the police with the aim of joining the ranks of encounter 
‘heroes’ and tend to use deadly force with less reservation than is mandatory2.
This pattern is not replicated across India as some states have a much better 
record on the use of deadly force than others. Areas facing serious challenges 
from Naxalites (communist rebel groups), organised gangs, very high levels of 
serious crime (for e.g. dacoit3 infested areas), and separatist groups or terrorist 
operations, have a greater tendency to engage in encounters than others. 
Furthermore, the context and circumstances in which encounters happen are very 
different in all these different situations.
Certain states in India that were and some that continue to be affected by 
counterinsurgency, like Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and other North Eastern states 
have different experiences as compared to those affected by militant Maoist
1 Several studies have shown that the police organisation has a particular occupational culture, 
which is shared by almost all police forces across the world. It is characterised by mission, action, 
cynicism, suspicion, pragmatism, machismo, solidarity, isolation etc. ( Reiner 2000a).
2 Studies by Van Maanen (1973), Hunt (1985) and Hams (1978) found that a similar process of 
‘indoctrination’ of new police recruits into the ‘masculine ethic’ and the regaling of war stories 
featuring violence by instructors was a feature of police training in the US.
3 Dacoity is defined under section 391 of the Indian Penal Code as robbery committed conjointly 
by five or more persons.
12
rebels. Gossman (2002) describes types of ‘death squads’ that operate in various 
parts of India, differentiating between out-of-uniform police officers who form 
death squads in insurgency ridden Punjab; security forces (army, paramilitary 
forces, and the police) operating in Kashmir and in Assam, threatening and 
assassinating militant leaders and other opposition figures; and special police 
squads operating in Naxal infested areas. The Naxalite movement began in India 
in 1969 formed by radical Maoists, who believe that the enemy of class struggle, 
defined as power-wielders in the existing social order, have to be eliminated even 
if that enemy (state agents) may not have directly harmed them. States affected 
by the Naxal movement include Bihar, Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, parts of 
Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and is spreading to Uttar Pradesh. In these 
states, especially Andhra Pradesh, special police squads have executed suspected 
militants and prominent activists in custody and “claim that they have been killed 
in armed ‘encounters’; for most of these routine killings, no elaborate cover-up 
was considered necessary” (Gossman 2002: 262).
Another pattern of encounter killings was well established in Punjab (during the 
days of insurgency in the 1980s and early 90s) where the ‘victim’ was detained, 
and tortured for several days before being killed. Gossman (2002: 268) suggests, 
“government practice of providing cash rewards for police who eliminated 
wanted militants encouraged the police to engage in extrajudicial killings”.
Encounters may be considered by the police to be natural fallout of routine 
policing in these ‘difficult’ areas. However, it is my belief that in other parts of 
the country, especially in some large cities like New Delhi and Mumbai, 
encounters are used more as a deliberate, short cut method to bypass the delays 
and uncertainties of processing ‘criminals’ through the criminal justice system 
rather than being spontaneous shootouts between organised criminals and the 
police.
Police encounters are not only ‘prized’ internally by the police organisation and 
are sometimes rewarded by the government (either with one-rank-promotions, or 
bravery medals, and/or other privileges), but also enjoy some societal approval in 
Mumbai. There have been several examples when the police have been publicly
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congratulated for ‘acts of bravery’ that have ridden society of a ‘menace’. Most 
police officers4 consider their work to be not just a job, but to be a ‘way of life 
with a worthwhile mission’ (Reiner 2000a; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993) - to serve 
the public and protect society against the forces of evil. Public adulation is a 
heady stimulant and combined with positive press ratings and organisational 
approval in the form of allowing such actions to continue unquestioned, can 
serve to demolish any moral compunctions that the police have towards 
depriving another person of life. All police officers are recruited from among 
ordinary citizens, (albeit at different levels and ranks) and are not inherently evil 
or natural ‘killers’. The question that arises is how and why do ordinary people 
kill fellow citizens? The explanations might lie in their difficult working 
conditions, the demands of the socio-political milieu within which they operate, 
combined with a spiralling crime problem that have led to a situation where 
‘criminals’ are seen to deserve executions. Or could it be the case that since most 
police encounters are not subject to detailed scrutiny, the decision to invoke 
deadly force maybe undertaken lightly, or without considering the full impact of 
the moral and legal aspects involved? The research focuses on these issues.
There is growing human rights awareness in India and a number of Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and pressure groups have over the past few 
years questioned some of these more dubious police tactics and actions. Over the 
past decade there has been some public outcry against encounters and criminal 
action has been initiated against some well-intentioned but misguided policemen 
who have been involved in encounters.
The main reason I chose to study the police use of deadly force is not only 
because it has a very significant impact on the right to life of the victim, but it 
also affects the life of the police officer involved, in many far-reaching ways - 
from being involved in criminal or departmental proceedings and inquiries to 
maintaining their moral well-being. Solving the moral dilemma of using ‘dirty
4 In India a distinction is drawn between the subordinate ranks (men) and officers (called 
Gazetted Officers and are of the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police or Deputy 
Superintendent of Police and above). However, I shall be using the term ‘police officers’ to cover 
all ranks of police personnel.
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means to achieve good ends’ (Klockars 1991) is something every police officer 
has to confront during his/her career in some form or the other. By undertaking 
this research I hope to explore the issues that contribute to encounters in a non- 
judgemental manner to enable other police officers, as well as myself, to better 
understand the truly complex nature of the issues that surround the police 
decision to invoke deadly force. This study is important in providing sociological 
insight into an area that has profound ramifications for policing, police 
malpractice, and the social and cultural context in which it takes place.
The aim of my research is not merely to uncover or describe police use of deadly
force, but in order to understand the use of force,
“One must evaluate them [police accounts] from the point of view of 
the cops who succumb to these moral hazards of their occupation. 
Doing so requires that the cops themselves be permitted to speak at 
length and in intimate detail about these issues. As they do, they 
often advance extremely complex and sometimes highly seductive 
moral and psychological arguments for their behaviour.” (Klockars 
and Mastrofski 1991: 396)
Therefore, an important part of the research is to explore the different ways in 
which police officers and people whom I call ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed 
perceived and talked about issues around encounters. Various justificatory 
arguments used by officers and described in the following chapters clearly 
indicate that they used a discourse of denial to account for encounters, arguments 
that not only neutralised their actions but also served useful functions for the 
audience they were intended for. Thus the discourse of denial served two 
purposes: first, ameliorating guilt or culpability about the action itself; and 
second, enabled the public to respond to encounters not as cold-blooded police 
killings but as part of a justified war on crime.
Encounters have not yet been publicly perceived as a ‘social problem’ - ‘a social 
condition that has been found to be harmful to individual and /or societal well 
being’ (Bassis et al 1982: 2) - in India. It is therefore imperative to understand 
how the phenomenon of encounters is socially constructed by ‘claimsmakers’ 
asking the sorts of questions that Best (1995) explores: what sorts of claims get 
made; when do claims get made, and by whom; how are these claims received by
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the intended audiences and under what conditions? By adopting a form of 
contextual constructionism in the research, I explore the claims made by those 
interviewed (officers and ‘claimsmakers’) in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. In the final 
Chapter I reconcile the subjective construction of these claims about the social 
condition of encounters with my own evaluation of whether objective reality 
corresponds to claims made by the actors interviewed, drawing upon available 
literature and similar studies in other countries. This final chapter will use 'their' 
(interviewees’) reasons to extrapolate 'the' (structural) reasons for why 
encounters happen (Cohen 2001:58), why they are tolerated, and identifies 
agendas for future research.
The Thesis is organised in the following manner:
I begin by reviewing the literature on police violence in chapter 1, concentrating 
on studies of police violence in some western democracies, especially the US, the 
UK, Canada and Australia; as well as in other less developed democratic 
countries, in Latin America and Africa. I situate the Mumbai police within this 
wider literature and discuss the various models (individual, situational, 
organisational and structural) put forward by criminologists and sociologists to 
explain the causes of police violence, that are relevant to the Mumbai situation. I 
then explore the ‘moral dilemma’ that arises in situations that call for solutions to 
a ‘means-and-ends’ problem. The content and nature of policing is intrinsically 
linked to the use of force, and in many countries has been associated with some 
form of racial discrimination. The situation in India, and Mumbai, in particular, 
is slightly different, in that, the use of deadly force by the police is allegedly not 
necessarily directed against members of a minority ethnic community or group, 
but against ‘hardened criminals’, who are not distinguishable as a visibly distinct 
group of victims.
In Chapter 2 I discuss the methods adopted to examine police encounters and 
discuss the methodological issues arising from this research including the ethical 
issues involved in researching a sensitive topic, as well as situating myself in the 
research process. The research is primarily qualitative as I was interested in 
understanding issues around encounters from the perspective of the police 
officers as well as ‘claimsmakers’ who were responsible for the public discourse.
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The richness of the material is derived from delving into the individual’s 
perspective and justifications of encounters. The question - how do ‘they’ 
explain these issues to themselves and to other public audiences could only be 
answered by adopting a qualitative approach based on semi-structured 
interviews.
In Chapter 3 ,1 introduce Mumbai city and its socio-economic and cultural place 
in Indian life. The city, its size, population, ethnic composition, importance as a 
commercial trade centre, its manufacturing and service industries, and its special 
position as the capital of the film industry in India (Bollywood) all demonstrate 
that Mumbai is unlike any other city in India and has a unique social, cultural and 
economic position. The city’s contemporary police force has grown out of a 
colonial legacy of policing based on the model of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
I describe the structure of the police service, as well as the administrative 
framework that provided the context within which encounters emerged and 
different power structures operated and influenced the politics of day-to-day 
policing. I also describe the growth of organised crime in Mumbai since the 
1970s that led to the use of deadly force by the police, in scenarios constructed as 
encounters. I describe the growth and development of some of the leading gangs, 
and how their activities impacted on citizens of Mumbai. The twin processes of 
the politicalization of organised crime and the criminalization of politics in 
Mumbai are also discussed with reference to organised crime.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on police officers’ perspectives of encounters, their 
understanding of the term, and attitude towards the legality, morality, desirability 
and acceptability of encounters, individually and organisationally. Police 
officers’ perception of their role and responsibilities are vital in shaping their 
attitude towards encounters and whether they are willing to adopt or condone 
these actions. Their perception of how the public respond to the use of deadly 
force is also important in understanding their justifications for encounters.
In Chapter 6, I put perceptions of police officers’ perspectives on encounters 
together with Stan Cohen’s Theory of Denial to demonstrate how officers use 
denial and justificatory accounts to explain the necessity and importance of
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encounters in Mumbai. Police officers have to live with the fact that they used or 
condoned the use of deadly force as perpetrators or bystanders and that they act 
as judge, jury and executioners against alleged criminals. I suggest that classic 
denial mechanisms are used to justify their actions to themselves and to their 
audiences.
In Chapter 7 I explore the themes around encounters that emerged out of the 
interviews with ‘claimsmakers’ in Mumbai. I call the group of people I 
interviewed ‘claimsmakers’ because these particular individuals - lawyers, 
journalists, judges, politicians, Human Rights activists and representatives from 
the industrial associations - actually had made public claims about encounters 
over the period of study (1993-2003). These interviews were used to 
contextualize the conviction of police officers that society not only approved of 
and encouraged their actions in encounters, but that there actually was a vocal 
social demand for such proactive action. I describe that while there was no 
consensus on the moral or legal rectitude of police encounters, there was a 
common belief that encounters were very effective as a short-term measure to 
control spiralling organised crime. There was also a belief that even though 
police actions were suspect, there was very little anyone could do to prevent or 
punish ‘wrongdoing’. Furthermore, a striking feature of these interviews was the 
lack of consternation or protest that the police were involved in executing alleged 
criminals and this appeared to provide the moral impetus to police justifications 
of encounters.
In Chapter 8, I take one step back from these stories and explore ‘the’ reasons 
why police actions were not challenged. I look at the wider structural and 
systemic factors that create conditions where killing ‘hardened’ criminals seems 
to be the last resort for the police to gain some control in the fight against crime. 
I also examine the social and political situation in a commercial, crime-ridden 
city, preoccupied with protecting its businesses, manufacturing units and service 
industry as well as safeguarding the life and property of its citizens. I discuss the 
wider cultural and specifically police subcultural factors that made encounters 
both feasible and acceptable. Janet Chan’s use of Bourdieu’s concepts of field  
and habitus to provide a cultural explanation for the existence of police deviance
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is explored in this context. I also compare and contrast factors accounting for 
police abuse of force in Mumbai with prevailing conditions in some other 
democratic societies where police executions feature prominently and examine 
how criminologists have accounted for police killings in these societies. I 
examine how different police forces and policy makers in other countries have 
sought to control police use of deadly force by introducing legal, procedural, 
cultural, and/or structural changes and whether these have proved to be effective 
in limiting that use. I also suggest possible ways in which favourable conditions 
could be developed in Mumbai to curb excessive use of deadly force by the 
police and protect the right to life of every citizen. The final part of this chapter 
summarises the findings of the research and draws conclusions about - what 
makes ordinary human beings abuse deadly force and how is such abuse justified 
in a democratic society.
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CHAPTER 1: POLICING AND THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE: A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1.1 Introduction
The use of force has always been an integral aspect of policing. Distinguishing 
between the use of justified, legitimate force and illegitimate force raises many 
complex and delicate moral, legal and sociological conundrums. Explaining 
variations in the use of force, legitimate or not, also requires understanding 
police actions and the exercise of discretion that have been at the heart of 
empirical and theoretical research on policing as it has developed in the Western 
world over the last half century.
Sociologists who have studied the police in various parts of the world have 
suggested that police work is characterised by similar features, such as danger, 
authority, and the mandate to use coercive force that is non-negotiable (Skolnick 
& Fyfe 1993, Bittner 1975). As the law enforcement agency of the government, 
the police see themselves as the ‘thin blue line’ that separates anarchy from order 
(Skolnick 1975). It is often when police act idealistically, with a ‘sense of 
mission’ (Reiner 2000a) to control a dangerous and unruly underclass, that the 
most shocking abuses of police power take place (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993). The 
police are armed and potentially dangerous in most countries and while 
protection by the police is generally assumed theoretically, protection from  their 
misdeeds and mistakes is more problematic and less well-defined (Manning 
2003). Studying police use of force is important not only because its proper 
execution is essential for maintaining state order and legitimacy, but also as it 
affects the public’s perception, attitude and behaviour towards the police and the 
government (Friedrich 1980).
In this chapter I discuss relevant theoretical precepts that have guided the study 
of police use of force in the literature, beginning with studies of policing in India. 
I then review the broader literature on the police use of force, especially the use 
of deadly force.
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1.2 Review of Literature: The Indian Police
Research on the modem (i.e. post independence5) Indian police begins with 
Bayley’s (1969) pioneering work that looks at the relationship between the police 
and political development in India. Its insights are largely valid even today and 
inform my research in mapping out the structure and role of the police 
organisation in India (Chapter 3). Since Bayley’s study, there has been little 
rigorous academic research on the Indian police, especially on the use of force. 
Many books written on the Indian police are either personal accounts of senior 
and retired police officers about their own experiences (for e.g. Nath 1981; 
Rebeiro 1998; Singh 1999; Rajagopalan 2000; Vaikunth 2000; Subramanium 
2000; Bedi 1998, 2003; Khan 2004) or mainly descriptive studies or work 
located within the structural-functional theoretical school written by public 
administration scholars and criminologists (Mukhopadhyaya 1997). Most of the 
discussions appear to be armchair theorizing, that may be valuable but lack 
empirical grounding and there is very little written about the police from a 
critical sociological viewpoint (Verma 2005). This body of literature based on 
police officers’ reflections on their own experiences and understanding of the 
socio-political situation is not necessarily either biased or inauthentic, but does 
lack a certain objectivity and appreciation of the complex dynamics of police 
decision making and actions. While there have been no studies directly related to 
the police use of force or deadly force, the studies referred to above and other 
studies identify problems with the Indian police (Mehra 1985, Ghosh 1993).
One of the most systematic and authoritative analysis in the field of policing and 
human rights is Krishnamurthy’s (1996) study. Although his focus is mainly on 
the rights of the accused in pre-trial processes, he identifies some of the factors 
that are commonly used to ‘explain’ abuses of police power in India, many of 
which would apply to the abuse of deadly force too. These include: ego 
gratification of officers; corruption; police sub-culture; perception (of the officers 
and public alike) that the police have to be bmtal to be effective; political and
5 India gained independence from British colonial rule on 15th August 1947 and became a 
Republic on 26th January 1950.
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other group pressures; work overload; lack of scientific approach and training; 
lack of infrastructure and resources; lack of openness in police working; poor 
treatment of subordinate staff by supervising officers; and the belief that ‘bad’ 
means to achieve ‘good’ ends are justified. Nonetheless, after identifying these 
serious institutional and organisational problems, Krishnamurthy then dismisses 
them as being no justification for ‘lawless actions’. However, some of the points 
raised by him recurred in my interviews with police officers and were part of 
their discourse on justifications for the use of deadly force.
There have been a variety of National and State Police Commissions set up since 
the early 1960s looking into the question of police reforms. The reports of the 
National Police Commission (1978-81) identify numerous structural and 
organisational problems faced by the police and have made recommendations to 
improve working practices and service conditions, including training, 
administration, and accountability structures. Even though the recommended 
reforms are comprehensive, Verma (2005) is critical of the recommendations of 
the National Police Commission for not proposing change incrementally, but 
because they advocated overhauling the entire system. The result would have 
tilted the balance of power away from the politicians and bureaucrats and in 
favour of the police and this, naturally met with severe resistance from the 
government machinery. Also, despite its sweeping mandate, the National Police 
Commission did not open its discussions to social scientists, other external 
consultants, and activists; did not involve the media or initiate a public 
discussion; and also did not take into account sweeping changes in policing 
around the world, failing to go beyond managerial changes (Verma 2005). 
Recommendations of subsequent committees, the Rebeiro Committee (1997), the 
Padmanabhaiah Committee (2000), the Soli Sorabjee Committee (2006), and 
various other proposals of expert bodies, outcomes of seminars, conferences, 
police workshops and State Police Commissions have all remained exercises in 
futility (Dhillon 2005) because they mainly recommend operational and 
administrative independence from political control. As a result, there has been 
little or no attempt made by any of the governments since India’s Independence 
to introduce legal and administrative reforms, or training improvements, that are 
long overdue.
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Given the little relevant research on police violence in the India, I have relied on 
accounts of police violence in countries as diverse as the USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Guyana, South Africa, and Jamaica, to inform this 
study. Issues of police violence in Latin America and South Africa and some 
other third world countries are similar to those in India given a common 
background of colonial imperialism, a culture of violence, developing 
economies, class inequalities, and widespread poverty that the they share, though 
there are also admittedly some crucial differences between these countries (see 
Chapter 8).
I find that a lot of my work resonates with early studies on policing in both the 
USA and the UK. This could be due to two reasons: first, there are certain 
similarities between the conditions under which the police described in these 
studies were operating, especially as described by Bittner (1975), Skolnick 
(1963), Westley (1970), Holdaway (1983) and others on policing in the 1960s 
and 70s in the US and UK and those of the Mumbai police. The level of 
awareness on issues such as human rights and due process and rule of law are, if 
not identical, at least, comparable. The second reason could be that these studies 
are among pioneering works commenting on the working of the police. Thus, the 
methods used by these scholars to arrive at their analysis - primarily 
ethnographic, and incorporating qualitative methods such as participant 
observation and interviews - are similar to the ones used in this study. My study 
makes the modest claim of being one of the first qualitative studies on policing 
and use of deadly force in one city in India.
1.3 Police Use of Force
Manning (1977: 40) suggests that British policing is synonymous with “legal 
monopoly on violence and is protected to the point of legal sanctioning for the 
use of fatal force”. There might be disagreements about the view, especially 
since the British police do not have a legal monopoly of violence -  they have 
greater legal powers than ordinary citizens, but anyone is entitled to use violence 
in certain circumstances e.g. self-defence. Also the police are not necessarily 
protected for use of fatal force but their immunity is dependant on the
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circumstances surrounding the particular incident. This is just one illustration of 
how issues around police use of force are fraught with complexities. However, 
the concept of ‘the capacity to use force as the core of police role’ (Bittner 1991: 
42) is central to understanding police work. Police use of coercive force could be 
conceived as a continuum, “consisting of a range of control tactics commencing 
from body language and oral communication, through weaponless physical 
control, to non-lethal weapons, and finally to lethal measures” (McKenzie 
2000:182). One way of defining force is, “acts that threaten or inflict physical 
harm on citizens”, which could be measured according to the “severity of harm it 
imposes on a citizen” from least to most harmful (Terrill 2001: 2). The terms 
‘police use of force’, ‘police violence’ and ‘police brutality’ are often used 
interchangeably in the literature, though they could imply use of force that is 
either justified and/or unjustified, legally and/or morally. Public understanding of 
the words police brutality mean anything from the use of abusive language, 
commands to move on or go home, stop and search, threats to use force, 
prodding with a stick or approaching with a pistol or actual use of physical force 
(Reiss 1968). Bayley (1996) suggests an eight-point classification of ‘police 
brutality’: arrest related assaults, torture (or third degree), deaths in custody 
under suspicious circumstances, police shootings, police raids, riot and crowd 
control, intimidation and revenge, and non-physical brutality. However, police 
brutality is not necessarily synonymous with use of excessive force - it has more 
to do with perception of the observer of what is considered unacceptable 
behaviour. Thus, some of what may be considered police brutality (for e.g. use of 
abusive language) is not necessarily excessive force and in certain circumstances 
use of what the law defines as excessive force may be perceived by the observer 
as justified and thus not an instance of police brutality.
The term ‘excessive’ is problematic, and defining it involves value judgements. 
Various criteria could be applied to an instance of use of force depending upon 
who is making this judgement, for example, “Judges apply legal standards; 
police administrators apply professional standards; and citizens apply ‘common 
sense’ standards” (Adams 1999: 62) and human rights activists apply ethical 
standards. There is also the distinction between excessive use of force (‘using 
force in too many incidents’) and use of excessive force (‘more force than
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needed to gain compliance in any given incident’) (Terrill 2001: 22, citing 
Adams 1995).
Klockars (1996) suggests that the conventional understanding of the term 
excessive use of force (in the sense of being either a criminal offence, a civil 
liability, or a public scandal) is inadequate for identifying instances where 
excessive force has been used. Instead he proposes a new standard to judge 
extent of force used, “Excessive force should be defined as the use of more force 
than a highly skilled police officer would find necessary to use in that particular 
situation” (Klockars 1996: 8). Klockars (1996: 10-11) offers 5 arguments in 
favour of this definition over others: ontological (force that a highly skilled 
officer would not find necessary to employ in a given situation is not necessary 
force); personal (no citizen would like force used against them that a highly 
professional officer would not find necessary to use); professional (highest 
possible standard of skill acts as the benchmark); administrative (reduce 
criminal, civil liability and scandals); and utility (not its ability to punish officers 
criminally, civilly, administratively or politically, but its potential to help control 
abuses of authority by imposing the highest possible standard for measuring its 
necessity).
Police use of force is often not wrong or uncalled for. Policing engenders 
situations when the use of force or violence may become inevitable. For 
example, when confronted with situations they are unable to control through 
other alternative means, such as a riot situation, the police can be left with no 
choice but to resort to the use of force to disperse rioters and bring public 
violence under control. However, the amount and mode of violence used by the 
police in any situation is subject to debate. There will be conflicting viewpoints 
on the advisability and efficacy of police actions in such circumstances and 
whether the police did all that was necessary to avoid the use of force to control a 
situation. It is therefore difficult to predict whether a particular incident of use of 
force would be perceived as legitimate or as police brutality. As Bayley (1996: 
277) notes, “brutality is in the eye of the beholder”. This subjectivity makes 
defining the concept fairly contentious. In general, the only principled
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justification for the use of force is that it is proportionate, i.e. necessary and 
minimal.
There has been little or no effort made to define what is meant by ‘excessive 
force’, although the police are accused of using it frequently. Bittner (1975) 
comments, “our expectation that policemen will use force, coupled by our 
refusals to state clearly what we mean by it (aside from sanctimonious homilies) 
smacks of more than a bit of perversity” (cited in Klockars 1996: 1) reiterates 
this point. Assuming, at least conceptually, that some police use of force is 
necessary and justified, Fyfe suggests there are two other kinds of force, which 
appear to be based on the mens rea of the police - extralegal and unnecessary; 
“Extralegal violence involves the wilful and wrongful use of force by officers 
who knowingly exceed the bounds of their office. Unnecessary violence occurs 
when well-meaning officers prove incapable of dealing with the situations they 
encounter without needless or too hasty resort to force” (1986: 207).
1.4 Deadly Force
This study focuses on police shootings, specifically shootings in a situation of 
direct confrontation between the police and ‘criminals’ (termed encounters in 
India) and not in a riot control or public disorder situation, where the 
circumstantial and situational factors precipitating the use of deadly force, are 
quite different. Whether such shootings are instances of legitimate use of force, 
or of abuse, or excessive, or illegal use of force is analysed in this study.
The fascination of police brutality or violence for criminological research in the 
USA goes back thirty or forty years when anyone doing research on the police, 
was assumed to be studying either police brutality or police corruption (Klockars 
and Mastrofski 1991: 394). Deadly force as the most extreme form of police 
violence has attracted its fair share of attention. Deadly force can be employed 
either through the use of firearms, other lethal and non-lethal weapons, or the 
improper use of holds or restraining techniques, in this research we limit it to the 
use of firearms. Police use of deadly force in a public order context 
(Waddington 1987, 1991; Jefferson 1987, 1990) is somewhat different from that 
used against alleged criminals. For example, Waddington suggests that the
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policing strategy in most public disorder cases is ‘to maintain or restore order’ 
and the particular strategy adopted depends on the ‘nature of the disorder, whom 
it involves, and where and when it occurs’ (Waddington 1991: 145). In most riot 
situations the police primarily aim to disperse, or arrest, or (more rarely) 
incapacitate offenders (Waddington 1991) not just in the UK, but even in India. 
Maximum effort is made to issue warnings to the crowd and to give them ample 
opportunity to disperse on their own without a show of force. In the UK, police 
are deployed in public order situations, not as an assembly of individuals but in 
squad formation under a hierarchy of command similar to that in the military, 
theoretically making them a more formidable force (Waddington 1991). Policing 
civil disorders often engenders fear, anger and frustration; heightening anxiety 
for police officers who are too close to the action to be objective, and the 
heightened emotions on the part of the public makes the situation more volatile. 
Therefore stricter supervision, command and control of such operations are 
required (Waddington 1991: 137). Only when the mob is very violent or in an 
uncontrollable frenzy do the police resort legitimately to the use of deadly force, 
ideally, in a controlled, precisely targeted and methodical manner. This is the 
theory: in practice force may be misused. In contrast to this, a sudden 
confrontation between police and ‘criminals’ can be more fluid, with greater 
discretion on the part of individual officers to use deadly force, though 
admittedly some riot situations may flare up and some confrontations with 
criminals may be planned operations. However, principles that ought to govern 
the use of deadly force by the police are universal and not contingent upon the 
situation under which it has to be employed. Lessons can be learned from those 
police forces that have constructed policies and structured training promoting 
good practice in order to avoid excessive or unnecessary use of force (see 
Chapter 8).
In terms of deadly force that results from the use of firearms, Geller and Scott 
(1991) examine police shootings of civilians, and shootings of police officers by 
civilians and other police officers in the USA. They too acknowledge definitional 
problems associated with deadly force, such as: whether it refers exclusively to 
use of firearms or includes all force capable of causing death; whether incidents 
occurred while an officer was on duty or off duty; and whether they were
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officially or personally motivated. If seen as deviant behaviour, then use of force 
can be perceived either as police crimes or state crimes (Green & Ward 2004). 
Geller and Scott’s (1991) review of studies on police use of deadly force find that 
these focused on one or more of the following: counting (identify the incidence 
of police involved shootings); describing (characteristics of shooting incidents 
and their participants); explaining (why certain shooting patterns emerge); 
controlling (identification and assessment of strategies to reduce police 
shootings). Studies that describe and/ or explain the use of deadly force by the 
police are of particular relevance to my study as the aim is to explore whether 
there are any similarities or universal features that characterise the dynamics of 
such use. Green and Ward (2004) suggest that theories that explain police 
violence in the context of western countries such as the USA, the UK, Australia 
and Canada, seek common fundamental and apparently universal features of 
policing as the cause for police deviance, despite key differences in policing 
histories and styles. They should thus, be applicable in “widely different cultures, 
economies and political systems” (2004: 69). In the discussion below I discuss 
how these explanations apply in the Indian context.
1.5 Police Deviance or State Crime
Of the four frameworks offered by Kappeler et al (1998) to understand police 
deviance (the statistical, the absolutist, the reactivist, and the normative) the 
normative definition comes closest to explaining the dynamics of the process by 
which behaviour is perceived as being deviant. The labelling perspective says 
“whether an act is labelled deviant depends on the response of others to the 
particular act” and is ‘not the quality of the act itself but the consequence of if  
(Becker 1964: 9). However, the normative definition goes further in suggesting 
that it is not just behaviour, but the social context in which the behaviour occurs, 
the formal and informal rules of conduct, and the perception of the behaviour as 
violating existing social norms that explains why an act is considered deviant. 
Therefore behaviour is deviant when it is perceived as such either by the victims, 
or because it outrages the public and its morality, or when the police cannot 
account for it in a court of law or inquiry. Behaviour that may be perfectly 
acceptable in terms of police culture and their codes of acceptable behaviour may 
be seen as deviant from the perspective of the outsider. Deviance can also be
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addressed only when there are demands for change and greater accountability in 
police actions. Until such an acknowledgement is made and the desire for change 
is felt, either organisationally or socially, particular police behaviours cannot be 
addressed.
Punch (1996: 56) defines organisational deviance as one kind of deviance where 
“serious and deliberate practices conducted with a measure of deception, stealth 
and cunning...in order to achieve formal or informal organisational goals. These 
can be acts of commission or omission and they are frequently supported, overtly 
or covertly, by senior management”. Thus when the police organisation supports 
and promotes abuse of deadly force, it is a form of organisational deviance where 
job-related criminal activities during the course of their work are possible 
because the very nature of police work (individual discretion and low level 
visibility) supports it (Sutherland 1939).
In Mumbai, it will be shown, police use of deadly force in encounters was not 
widely perceived as a form of deviance, either by the police officers, the media 
or public discourse. Nor was it recognized as a state crime in the sense of being 
acts that are mala in se or mala prohibita. Although, encounters were not seen as 
a social problem, they are problematic in many ways and therefore need further 
analysis. Any analysis of police deviance involves distinguishing between actual 
misconduct and mere appearance of wrongdoing (Kappeler et al 1998). This 
would involve making a judgement about the apparent merits of the police action 
in every instance. However, my research concentrates on understanding the 
police and public’s perception of deviance and not on providing evidence of 
actual police misconduct in encounter situations. Making any judgement or 
accusations of actual police misconduct in particular cases would have to be 
based on a greater degree of proof about each one than was accessible to me. 
Given that there was little independent evidence to substantiate claims of actual 
deviance, I avoided travelling down that particular slippery slope. Besides, public 
perception of what was acceptable deviance in police conduct was of greater 
fascination in the Mumbai context. People appeared to know, or it was common 
knowledge, that the police used excessive deadly force against criminals. This 
was evident in public discourse, in the interviews conducted during the research,
29
and in the way that media portrayed such events, even bearing in mind the 
warning that “we have an obligation to guard against sensationalism and 
distortion often present in media accounts of police activities” (Kapperler et al 
1998: 3). Evidently either people were unaware or did not want to know the 
actual extent and nature of the deviance involved in such encounters - and this 
study investigates why.
Ross (2000) defines state crime to include cover-ups, corruption, disinformation, 
lack of accountability and violations of domestic and/or international laws, 
carried out by the state or by any state agency on its behalf (Friedrichs 2000). 
The fact that the police in their capacity as state personnel violate the laws that 
are supposed to bind them in the pursuit of their job as representatives of the 
state makes abuse of deadly force a state crime (Chambliss 1989, Menzies 2000, 
Green & Ward 2004). My research suggested encounters incorporated all the 
elements described as state crime, though this was neither widely recognized nor 
condemned in official or public discourse. The research revealed that even when 
police killings in cold blood were deemed to be illegal and undesirable by those 
interviewed, this recognition did not prompt a public response decrying it. There 
were a few incidents when police actions were questioned by the media and even 
in the courts of law, but encounters were not seen as a social problem. Exploring 
whether a form of socio-political complicity existed in what appeared to be a 
state crime that sustained and encouraged encounters was a major object of my 
research. However, recognizing that encounters are state crimes would benefit 
the police organisation in reassessing their own actions and policies, especially in 
a climate of growing awareness of human rights issues. One of the officers 
interviewed recognized the proliferation of the use of deadly force as, “a ticking 
time bomb waiting to explode” and that it would cause a lot of damage (in terms 
of legal action against, as well as loss of public confidence in, the police) if 
allowed to continue unchecked (T 33: Senior Management Officer).
The main causes for a sustained pattern of excessive violence in the Americas 
appear to be corruption and political interference in the police (Chevigny 1995). 
According to Chevigny (1995) a particular kind of corruption in which predatory 
crime, being ‘bent as a job’ (predatory corruption- Punch 1985), fused with a
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distorted sense of ‘mission’, being ‘bent for the job’ (combative or strategic 
corruption- Punch 1985), was responsible for most police violence not only in 
New York, but other cities he studied in the Americas. Instances where police 
abuse of force did not cause political ripples, but rather was the outcome of 
political directives, underline the importance of political backing for such abuse 
of force to be sustained and continue unpunished.
The police are often in effect allowed to get away with blatant abuse of force. 
Prosecutions of officers may be rare even in cases of excessive use of deadly 
force in many countries, and convictions rarer still (Blumberg 1989, Uldricks and 
van Mastrigt 1991, Geller & Scott 1992). Factors responsible for low rates of 
culpability for police officers in many instances of excessive use of force are: 
frustration with the criminal justice system which appears to provide a magical 
cloak of immunity for police officers; the relatively small number of complaints 
made against the police; difficulties in substantiating complaints; complete 
control of investigation by the police themselves; the ‘code’ of silence that 
ensures officers go to great lengths to protect fellow officers; the greater 
credibility commonly attached to a police officer’s account of events as opposed 
to that of an accused criminal; jurors frequently feeling more sympathetic to an 
officer than the complainant, and sometimes even intimidation of witnesses, 
lawyers, magistrates. Thus there is often a lack of public accountability for police 
actions, (Muir 1977, Box 1983, Chevigny 1995, Klockars 1996, Cheh 1996). In 
Mumbai, the Srikrishna Commission inquiring into the police response to 
religious riots in 1992-3 found 31 police officers guilty of malpractice and 
excessive use of force but action was only initiated against a few (for further 
discussion see Chapter 3). Also no serious criminal sentence has been passed 
(until very recently, see page 205) against any officer in an encounter case so far, 
another instance where the police have been allowed to get away with excessive 
use of force.
1.6 Police Shootings
Reviewing the literature on police shootings in the USA, Geller and Scott (1991: 
453) suggest that, “the most common type of incident in which police and 
civilians shoot one another in urban America involves an on-duty, uniformed,
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white, male officer and an unarmed black, male civilian between the ages of 17 
and 30 in a public location within a high-crime precinct at night in connection 
with a suspected armed robbery or a ‘man with a gun’ call” (Geller & Karales 
1981a). Clearly therefore gender, race and age of the police officer and of the 
‘suspect’, as well as the situational factors and circumstances that lead up to the 
incident appear to be important. Also important are structures of race and class 
inequality and the culture of racial antagonism that flows from this.
That the police use violence as a type of informal punishment for defying police 
authority, or as a form of ‘street justice’ or vigilante justice has been reported by 
researchers in several places (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993, Chevigny 1995, van 
Maanen 1978, Westley 1970). Geller and Scott (1991) found that the most 
common reason given by police officers for shooting (ranging from 65 to 73 per 
cent) was self-defence or defence of another person’s life because that is the only 
way of making it legally acceptable (they cite Fyfe 1978, Geller & Karales 
1981a, Horvath 1987). However, while there have been substantial number of 
shootings when the victim was unarmed, this does not mean that the officers 
necessarily knew or believed that he was unarmed. Fyfe (1981a) describes a 
continuum from elective (the officer decides whether he wants to shoot or not) to 
non-elective shootings (where the officer has no choice but to shoot). Research 
also suggests that police have used deadly force in situations such as flight 
without resistance, warning shots, shots to summon assistance and felonious 
shootings (Geller & Scott 1991 citing Geller & Karales 1981a, 1981b; Meyer 
1980). Geller’s (1989) study found that officers’ reasons for shooting ranged 
from gun use threat, to use of threat of other deadly weapons, fight without other 
resistance, other reasons for intentionally shooting, accidents, mistaken identity, 
and a stray bullet. However, Chevigny’s (1995: 213) conclusion that the worst 
abuses occur when “the police, impatient with the workings of the courts, simply 
dispose of suspects in bogus ‘shootouts’” comes closest to describing the actual 
prime motivation behind police encounters in Mumbai (See Chapter 6) though 
officers cited many of the other reasons stated above for shooting.
Studies of police shootings also found that virtually all the civilians shot at by the 
police were male (Geller & Scott 1991), but Geller & Scott do not mention
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whether all the officers doing the shooting were predominantly male. Though 
they found that shootings seemed to occur “predominantly in public locations” 
this did not ensure that they were always witnessed by the public (1991: 462). 
Fyfe’s study of New York shootings found that uninvolved witnesses were rarely 
present at public locations when deadly force was used, perhaps in part because 
most of the shootings occur at night (Fyfe 1981a). Location was of interest in my 
research as often officers justified the legitimacy of and encounter by saying that 
it occurred in a public place, either in daylight or even if, as Fyfe’s research 
found, it was in the middle of the night.
Researchers have found that race was a crucial element in shooting incidents and 
that black people were more likely than their white counterparts to be involved in 
police related shootings (Geller & Karales 1981a, Fyfe 1981b, Robin 1963). 
Some research studies found this to be rooted in systematic racism (Takagi 
1974). Others suggest the possibility that blacks and Hispanic minorities were 
disproportionately involved in violent crimes and therefore were represented in 
higher numbers in police shootings (Matulia 1985, Fyfe 1978, 1981b, Alpert 
1989). They also were disproportionately more unemployed and likely to spend 
their time on the streets exposing them to confrontation with the police and 
involvement in shootings (Milton et al 1977). All these factors reflect wider 
structures of racial inequality. Other studies led researchers to observe that race 
was not a controlling factor in a patrol officer’s decision to shoot, nor were there 
significant differences in the race of the victim given similar situational factors 
(Brown 1984, Binder et al. 1982). Various findings regarding the connection 
between police shootings and race are highly contradictory and do not 
conclusively show any correlation between the two. I explore why research 
concerning race and police shootings is important to my research in the next 
section (also see Chapter 3).
1.7 Mumbai Police and Deadly Force
Police use of deadly force through encounters in Mumbai is a special case. Not 
only do they seem to be cases of arbitrary street justice where the police act as 
judge, jury and executioner, deciding to do something about the ‘crime problem’ 
by eliminating alleged criminals, but they appear to do so with the blessing of the
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general public, the media, and the political leadership. However, Mumbai is not
unique. Chevigny (1995) and Mars (2002) found similar situations in cities in
Brazil, Argentina, Jamaica and Guyana. Chevigny’s (1995) research was
conducted during a time when parent countries had (at least nominally)
democratic elections; possessed a free press, but faced problems of immigration
-  forced or voluntary; rapid urbanization and industrialization; the after-effects of
colonialism and serious problems of crime; which provoked outcries for
repressive police action. He found that the fear of crime had become a governing
political issue in these countries and there was a talk of a ‘war on crime’ with a
corresponding conception of the police as combatants. There was universal
lamentation about the courts not being tough enough and the need for tougher
measures to control crime (rhetoric that also has resonance in many western
industrialised countries). Chevigny calculated what he called ‘disproportionate
violence ratios’ on three counts:
“If the number of killings by police is a large percentage of all 
homicides, that suggests that the police may be using a 
disproportionate amount of deadly force in relation to the actual 
hazards of their work and of life in the city; if the number of civilians 
killed is enormously larger than the number of police killed, that 
suggests that the police may not be using their weapons exclusively 
in response to threats from gunmen, as is so often claimed in official 
accounts of police shootings. Lastly, if the police kill many more 
than they wound, that suggests the use of deliberate violence against 
some of the victims” (Chevigny 1995: 15).
However, the city police in the countries studied by Chevigny (Brazil, Argentina 
and Jamaica) had emerged from serving under or still functioned under strong 
dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. Unlike these countries, India, though a 
former colony, has been a viable and functioning democracy for the past 60 
years. Police killings have not been at the explicit political behest of dictatorial or 
authoritarian regimes. Indeed the dynamics of encounters have more in common 
with the way Skolnick & Fyfe (1993) describe the functioning of the Special 
Investigation Section (SIS) of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 
between 1965 and 1992: a period in which its tally reached twenty eight dead and 
twenty seven wounded in forty five separate shooting incidents. The targets or 
‘clientele’ of this squad were an outgroup - robbers and burglars who had no 
defenders in the public. Descriptions of the detailed surveillance operations,
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stories not tallying with forensic evidence, weapons planted on the suspects after 
the incident, excessive use of lethal force, bungled investigation reports, missing 
radio communication etc, seem to indicate that the main intention of the officers 
of this unit was to eliminate the suspects from the very beginning and to cover-up 
their mistakes or errors in the operations (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993). This is similar 
to the Indian and the Mumbai context. Just as officers in the LAPD, no officer in 
Mumbai has been criminally convicted for encounters.
Despite similarities between Mumbai and the LAPD a variety of differences are 
also apparent: police in the USA based studies usually targeted victims belonging 
to a distinct ethnic minority or a lower social class. Chevigny (1995) concludes 
that racism was well and alive in LAPD in the aftermath of the Rodney King 
incident in 1991 and a majority of the city’s populace had the police it wanted. 
Thus police violence has been held to be disproportionately racially oriented in 
Los Angeles than would appear at first glance in Mumbai. The population in 
India is largely undistinguishable in terms of racial characteristics, but is deeply 
divided on the basis of religion, caste and region. However, since information on 
the ethnicity or religious identity of the victims of police encounters in Mumbai 
is not openly available, it is difficult to arrive at any conclusions about their 
religious affiliations or social status. There appears to be a popular perception 
even in Mumbai that the police target youths belonging to the minority religious 
community (Muslim) and those who are socially disadvantaged (see Chapter 3). 
There is little available statistical evidence backing such perception, thus broader 
trends about the police organisation’s tendencies to use lethal coercive power 
against socially, ethnically and politically disadvantaged groups remains 
relatively unexplored.
The situation in Mumbai was a complex matrix of factors, involving ‘encounter 
specialists’ who had celebrity status, a permissive police organisation, and a 
larger permissive culture that accepted and even encouraged violence. Making 
sense of this world required a combination of various theoretical approaches to 
understand this particular form of police use of deadly force. These are discussed 
in the following section.
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1.8 Explaining Police Violence
I found that explaining police violence was like fitting together pieces of a jigsaw 
with various theories accounting for one or the other aspect of the phenomenon. I 
classify the various approaches to explain police violence as macro, meso and 
micro theories. Figure 1.1 diagrammatically represents the interrelationships 
between them and their place in explanations for police violence:
Figure 2.1: Theories Explaining Police Violence
POLICE VIOLENCE
MICRO THEORIES 
Individual and 
Situational Theories
MESO THEORIES 
Organisational and 
Sub-cultural Theories
MACRO THEORIES 
Sociological and 
Structural Theories FIELD
HABITUS
The interconnections between the various theories put forward to explain police 
violence are such that macro-level theories which comprise of sociological and 
structural explanations take into account social, political, economic and cultural 
factors that create circumstances that allow the police to use force and legitimise 
such use. These factors, in turn have an impact on the development and ethos of 
the organisation and the subculture of the police institution, which though 
universal in some sense, is also influenced by local factors and conditions. These 
meso-level theories explain police violence in terms of the organisational culture 
that encourages and/or tolerates such use. In turn, the organisation, its culture, 
rules, procedures and allegiance to rule of law and accountability affect an 
individual officer’s attitudes and ‘dispositions’ to act in certain ways, which have
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a varied impact on the personality of the officer that he brings with him/her to the 
job. The officer then has to make a decision about whether or not to use force, 
given the immediate nature and factors present in each police citizen interaction. 
Thus, micro-level theories explain police violence in terms of individual officers’ 
psychological make-up, and/ or the situational exigencies in which they have to 
exercise their judgement.
I discuss the three main types of explanations for police violence - individual and 
situational; organisational and subcultural; and sociological and structural (Green 
& Ward 2004, Terrill 2001, Worden 1996, Uldricks & van Mastrigt 1991) which 
form the building blocks for a fully social theory of police violence to account 
for encounters. As a synthesis of these theoretical approaches I finally discuss 
Chan’s (1996, 1997) exposition of the theory of field  and habitus, where she 
suggests that the interaction between the habitus and the field  encompasses 
factors affecting police decision to use violence at all three levels, and is one 
among other approaches that provides a more rounded explanation.
1.8.1 Individual and Situational Theories
There are two types of individual theories. The ‘rotten apple theory’ states that 
the attitudes and personal characteristics of some officers make them prone to 
use more violence than others, and it rests on the assumption that a majority of 
police officers are not violence prone but work within the limitations of law. The 
other strand of individual theories, the ‘fascist pigs theory’, suggests that only 
people with certain dispositions, such as authoritarian personalities, are attracted 
to police work due to its nature so that a majority of officers are violence prone 
(Uldricks & van Mastrigt 1991).
As an explanation, the individual theory which espouses that ‘violence prone’ or 
‘problem’ officers who manifest a propensity to use force, and who could be 
expected to continue to manifest this propensity given invariant conditions are 
responsible for a ‘lion’s share of the use of excessive force’, found empirical 
resonance in the findings of the Christopher Commission (1991) in diverse 
contexts as Los Angeles (Toch 1996), Newark (Scharf & Binder 1983), Jamaica 
(Chevigny 1995), and in Israel (Herzog 2000). In Mumbai also there were a few
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officers, referred to as ‘encounter specialists’, who accounted for a 
disproportionately large number of encounter deaths (see Chapter 4).
Whether only a few officers can be blamed for using excessive force remains 
questionable. However, individualistic explanations find favour with the police 
and politicians as they enable them to narrow the focus on a few officers and 
obfuscate other more serious organisational and larger social issues that feed into 
the situation. It allows them the possibility of being seen as doing something 
about the problem (should it be socially desirable to do so) by either eliminating 
or retraining a handful of ‘problem’ officers - solutions that are economical, 
instantaneous and populist. In Mumbai, it was no surprise that some police 
officers were singled out as being ‘bad apples’ or ‘bent’, drawing away 
responsibility for the use of violence from the police organisation and structural, 
social factors that might encourage such behaviour. It also allowed senior 
management to be seen as doing something by disciplining and/ or punishing a 
few officers via departmental proceedings.
Huggins et al’s (2002) study of violence workers in Brazil identified three types 
of masculinities amongst officers - maculinities they term ‘personalistic’, 
‘bureaucratic’ and ‘blended’. While they do not suggest that “masculinity itself 
caused violence or it structured certain kinds of atrocities”, they felt that it had a 
place in police atrocity studies (2002: 85). Officers possessing ‘personalistic’ 
masculinity saw themselves as passionate true believers, whose mission in life 
was bettering society and protecting it from criminals. They possessed an internal 
commitment to civilian communities but their feminine, caring side was balanced 
by their self-image as macho policemen who abhorred physical and mental 
weakness. Officers possessing ‘bureaucratic’ masculinity operated as if their 
masculinity was subordinate to and an extension of the needs and prerogatives of 
the internal security organisation. As ‘institutional functionaries’ they sought to 
compartmentalize work and self into separate categories and valued violence 
merely for its instrumentality in achieving the most appropriate and efficient 
social control ends. Such officers felt ‘good’ police were ‘professionals’ who 
know how to employ torture within proper bounds. Those officers who possessed 
a ‘blended’ masculinity showed signs of personalistic cops but did not identify
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positively with the communities they policed, nor with the organisation. They 
shifted loyalties and were available for purchase. Such officers carried out off- 
duty executions, which they sought to present in terms of professional legalisms. 
A confusion of roles led these officers to believe that off-duty executions were 
legal acts of bravery and not illegal vigilantism at all. Huggins et al (2002) felt 
that the personalistic policeman epitomised by ‘Dirty Harry’ (see page 46) 
presents himself as acting independently of the police organisation and taking the 
law in his own hands to do ‘good’. By taking personal responsibility he excludes 
the police institution, and by extension the state, from atrocities. The 
‘institutional functionary’ erases personal responsibility by embedding violence 
within a complicated bureaucracy. His discourse about violence makes his role in 
the violence and his organisation’s relationship to it, invisible by making it 
inevitable in achieving desired goals. Blended personalities drew upon first one 
and then the other kind of legitimation for their violence, switching easily 
between formal and informal control systems. As an explanation this approach to 
masculinity appears logical and I discuss it further in Chapter 8, but what 
remains unclear from this study is how much of this masculinity is brought into 
the job by the officer and how much of it develops as a result of the nature of the 
job and the organisational as well as social context within which the officer 
operates.
Situational theories examine the characteristics of the situation in which the use 
of force has taken place, concentrating on the age, race, gender, class, of the 
‘suspect’ and the officers involved. In some cases the demeanour, status and 
behaviour of the suspect, seriousness of the offence, the experience level, 
attitudes and disposition of the officer, visibility of the encounters, numbers of 
officers present at the scene, characteristics of the neighbourhood where the 
interaction takes place, also play an important role in analysing the outcome of 
instances where police have used of force (Sherman 1980). Force is used “in 
accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies” 
(Bittner 1991: 48). These theories deal with the issue of who is more likely to be 
at the receiving end of police violence (minorities and people of lower class and 
status), under which conditions violence is more likely to be used (the nature of 
the encounter and the presence or otherwise of witnesses). Terrill & Mastrofski’s
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(2002) research found that situational aspects of the police-citizen encounter 
along with other factors such as who the citizen is, and the officer’s background 
characteristics influence police behaviour. Officers with higher education and or 
more experience were less likely to employ violence. However, poor, non-white, 
young males were treated more harshly, despite their demeanour during the 
encounter.
Many studies involving empirical research on deadly force concentrate either on 
the ‘split second decision’ (Geller & Karales 1981) or ‘exit’ decisions (Bayley 
1986) made by police officers, analysing the entire nature of the police-citizen 
interaction in five phases (Scharf & Binder’s 1983)6. Fyfe (1986) describes the 
‘split-second’ syndrome that affects police decision making in crisis, which 
provides an after-the-fact justification for unnecessary police violence, and by its 
very nature and assumptions inhibits development of better techniques and 
expertise to take such decisions. The split-second syndrome is based on certain 
assumptions: no two police problems are alike, hence there are no general 
principles that can be applied to specific situations; given the stressful and time 
constrained nature of the problem, certain inappropriate decisions are to be 
expected, for which officers cannot be criticised, especially by outsiders who 
have no appreciation of the burdens upon officers; if the citizen intentionally or 
otherwise provokes a police officer, he and not the officer, should be held 
responsible for any resulting violence. Some of these were forms of post-facto 
justifications used by police officers who maintained that encounters were 
spontaneous shoot-outs and therefore some mistakes were to be expected (see 
Chapters 4 & 6).
Another way of looking at situational theories is by focusing on the victim, 
which rest on the presumption that certain individuals are more prone to be at the 
receiving end of police violence than others. Green and Ward (2004: 70) draw 
upon the work of Muir (1977) to explain that three of the four paradoxes of 
coercive power that frame Muir’s analysis of policing revolve round the premise 
that “the harder it is for the police to threaten a person with some kind of non­
6 Also see Fridell &Binder (1992).
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physical harm, the greater the likelihood that they will resort to physical force”. 
Thus when confronted with the ‘dispossessed’ (nothing to lose), the ‘detached’ 
(who don’t care about what they have to lose) and the ‘irrational’ (those who 
don’t understand the threats they face) the police do not have to invoke violence, 
but they often do. Thus the paradox of dispossession means that the police 
believe that for people described as ‘police property’ (Lee 1981) ‘persons of 
marginal status or credibility’ (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993), ‘marginais’ in Brazil who 
are both socially marginal and outlaws (Chevigny 1996), violence is the only 
language they are said to understand. The fact that they are disempowered and 
lack the credibility or the ‘political’ clout to mobilise the media or petition the 
courts and challenge police actions, makes them more vulnerable to police 
violence (Chambliss 1994, Kappeler et al 1998). Officers’ detachment and 
cynicism towards van Maanen’s (1985) ‘assholes’ or Choongh’s (1997) ‘local 
dross’ means that such individuals are perceived as beneath contempt where 
complaints made by them are not a cause for concern, thus making them the 
subject of greater violence than necessary. The paradox of irrationality means 
that not only are the police more likely to use force against those who resist their 
authority due to drugs, alcohol or mental illness, but also use of excess force or 
fatal shootings can be attributed to a temporary loss of control, adrenalin, 
heightened emotions or a ‘combat high’ (Chan 2000, Warren & James 2000, 
Hunt 1985).
In Mumbai, the ‘victims’ of police encounters were rarely top ranking bosses of 
organised criminal gangs, but tended to be mainly disempowered small ranking 
operators in the hierarchy, whose families rarely had the economic or political 
clout to question police actions. Such ‘victims’ were therefore, legitimate ‘police 
property’.
Green and Ward (2004) suggest that another reason why police officers tend to 
use more force than is necessary for restraint or self defence is Muir’s fourth 
‘paradox of face’, where the nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one has to 
be’ (Muir 1977: 41). Defiance of police authority, especially in the presence of 
onlookers, provokes punishment, sometimes despite the threat of complaints 
(Chevigny 1995, Friedrich 1980). This contest over ‘face’ is presented in the
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literature as not just a masculine phenomenon but as Hunt (1985) and 
Westmarland (2002) found, even women officers had to deal with it. In Mumbai, 
‘encounter specialists’ thrived on cultivating a reputation for ruthless 
employment of deadly force in order to consolidate their self-image (see Chapter 
6).
On the whole, situational theories are of limited value to my research, apart from 
being part of the justification put forward by some officers to explain use of force 
decisions. I do not explore the situational nature of the citizen-police encounter, 
especially as encounters took place, usually shrouded in secrecy, in 
circumstances where it was either not possible or not feasible to observe them, 
and also because they appeared to be pre-planned and pre-determined operations 
rather than the spontaneous result situational determinants.
1.8.2 Organisational and Subcultural Theories
These theories are grounded in the explanation that the police, like other 
organisations, have their own subculture, which on the one hand can create a 
‘violent’ officer, and on the other protect the officer’s actions from external 
censure. Several police scholars have identified key cultural characteristics -  
mission, action, cynicism, suspicion, machismo, isolation, solidarity, loyalty, 
pragmatism, and conservatism (summarised in Waddington 1999a, Reiner 
2000a). These characteristics are core elements of the central police culture, 
caused by the structural features of police work such as authority, danger, 
pressure for results, which gives rise to a certain ‘working personality’ (Skolnick 
1966). It is the nature of the organisation and the emphasis on factors such as 
loyalty and secrecy that protects officers who are violence prone. ‘Closing ranks’ 
or erecting a ‘blue wall of silence’ are techniques by which the organisation 
protects its officers from being under scrutiny or being prosecuted or punished by 
outside investigating agencies. It can also be argued that certain police 
organisations appear to have either an overt or tacit policy, or have specialist 
units that support the use of force by police officers in certain situations, which 
would ordinarily be disallowed. Chevigny’s (1995) study on use of deadly force 
by the police in parts of the USA, Brazil and Argentina is an illustrative example.
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Chan (1997) suggests officers use a body of ‘organisational knowledge’, 
identifying four types, to help carry out their day-to-day activities. ‘Dictionary 
knowledge’, (schemas to rapidly classify people and situations), ‘directory 
knowledge’ (how such people and events are normally dealt with), ‘recipe 
knowledge’ (combining informal moral code of the police and pragmatic 
recommendations and strategies to stay out of trouble), and ‘axiomatic 
knowledge’ (operative goals and values of the organisation, which may differ for 
the senior and rank-and-file officers) are part of the occupational subculture. 
These ‘simplified summaries of information about the social world’ termed
<7
‘typifications’ by Holdaway (1996) can often harden into stereotypes. The fact 
that the police act on the basis of such knowledge is not unique to any particular 
organisation, but is part of a universal cop culture (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993, 
Waddington 1999b, Reiner 2000a). There may be such common themes in police 
culture in liberal democracies, but they vary in intensity and analyses have also 
found many intra- and inter-organisational and situational differences (Bowling
6  Foster 2002, Reiner 2000a, Waddington 1999a, Chan 1996). However, 
officers can choose for themselves how they resist or adapt to the culture up to a 
point. Like all actors, police have a degree of autonomy but act in structured 
situations and with particular predispositions (Chan 1996). Norms of the ‘canteen 
culture’ are not necessarily translated into operational practice (Waddington 
1999b) but permit the use of force by providing techniques of neutralization to 
explain their conduct (Kappeller et al 1998), and the emphasis on solidarity and 
silence ensures that officers feel obliged to cover up and protect colleagues 
whose conduct they may otherwise disapprove of (see Worden 1996, Punch 
1979, Holdaway 1983). The ‘operational code’ (Reisman 1979) that evolves in 
the police organisation enables officers to resolve dilemmas of this sort by 
constructing and reconstructing their daily reality with ‘guile, craft and 
craftiness’ (Punch 1985).
A systematic understanding of the organisation’s operating code - a powerful 
normative order embodied in an “unwritten set of rules and procedures that 
prescribe what can or must be done and which are enforced by informal peer
7 A concept originally put forward by Sudnow (1965) to describe typical features of ‘normal 
crimes’, which provide some form of ‘proverbial characterization’ for the police.
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sanctions and control” and how it subverts organisational goals and sanctions 
(Reiss 1977: Foreword) would be essential in understanding how it operates 
amidst the prevailing political culture to encourage deviant practices such as 
encounters. Police subculture, while not universal and monolithic (Reiner 
2000a), was nevertheless ubiquitous in that “core elements of police talk remain 
recognizably the same” across jurisdictions (Waddington 1999a: 111). Countries 
that are socially, politically and culturally diverse, share significant features of 
the subculture for “what unites officers across so many jurisdictions is the 
experience of wielding coercive authority over fellow citizens and that...entails 
taking actions that would otherwise be considered exceptional, exceptionable or 
illegal” (Waddington 1999a: 112). My research indicates the presence of such a 
subculture in Mumbai, which to some extent not only valued police use of deadly 
force as a solution to the crime problem, but also the organisational ethos 
protected officers involved in encounters.
1.8.3 Sociological and Structural Theories
Sociological theories aim to develop understanding of the problem of police 
violence beyond the micro processes of individual action and organisational 
culture that are limited to the question: ‘Why do the police do it?’ These theorists 
aim to answer the question ‘why are they allowed to do it?’ by referring to a 
broader socio-historical framework.
Box (1983) suggests that acts of violence or brutality cannot be carried out in 
isolation by officers, but by their very nature can be carried out (and concealed) 
with the active or passive support of peers and superiors. Also when officers’ 
acts of violence are seen as ‘defending society against bad elements’, it provides 
immunity from prosecution, or a ‘not guilty’ verdict in many cases. Box (1983: 
85) goes on to say that a break-up of the victims’ social characteristics revealed 
that “the ‘target’ population is not random, but it is drawn from the economically 
marginalized, politically radical, and ethnically oppressed”. Thus, police 
violence according to Box (1983) tends to increase in proportion to the elite’s 
fear of disorder, and the more fearful the elite, the more likely they are to tolerate 
illegal violence against potentially dangerous groups. Thus societies with 
extremely unequal social structures, such as those in some Latin American
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countries, the fate of the socially marginal (children, homeless people) is 
regarded with indifference by the state and the middle class public alike 
(Chevigny 1995, Green & Ward 2004). Even in strong democracies like the UK, 
Scraton (1987) and Jefferson (1990) found that dehumanisation and 
demonisation of dissident and marginal groups seeks to construct an 
‘authoritarian consensus’ among the ‘respectable majority’, which allows them 
and the government to authorise or condone certain coercive measures.
Another social trend in some western democracies has been the growth of 
paramilitary policing to control social disorders. The demand for and the 
subsequent creation of specialist elite units, whose training and culture 
“heightens the very features of the police culture that are most conducive to 
violence: the perception of danger, fear of outsiders, isolation, secrecy, intense 
group loyalty and pleasure in ‘warrior fantasies’” (Green and Ward 2004: 80, 
citing Jefferson 1990, Kraska & Kappeller 1997, McCulloch 2001). The 
increased threat of terrorism globally has meant that this trend has intensified. 
Historically it has been demonstrated that measures originally justified on the 
basis of countering terrorism are quickly absorbed and translated into everyday 
policing (Green & Ward 2004).
On the other hand, weak democracies (like Brazil, Argentina and Jamaica) are 
states that do not have an effective monopoly of violence. In such states 
corruption, combined with the public fear of high levels of crime resulting from 
desperate poverty and impatience with the criminal justice system “makes an 
explosive brew of state power and vigilantism”. This results in police often 
acting like vigilantes themselves, using “violence, including deadly force against 
the merest petty criminals and those who are poorest in an effort to intimidate 
and deter crime and thus to create a semblance of order” (Chevigny 1995: 143). 
Skolnick & Fyfe (1993) also trace the source of police brutality in the United 
States to the American vigilante tradition. Bowden (1978) strikes at the heart of 
the matter when he suggests that “what might appear on the surface to be 
spontaneous acts of police vigilantism are often in effect managed, supervised, or 
condoned by governments for their ulterior political motives” (1978: 94). 
Bowden feels that the promise of a rapid return to equilibrium as the attractive
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outcome of instant justice enables policemen to bypass the legal restraints upon 
them and rationalize the act of dispensing justice to “those whose guilt the police 
are sure o f’ as upholding the law (1978: 94).
Chevigny (1995) found in his study of police use of deadly force in the Americas 
that the police were aware of the illegitimacy of their actions and the 
international norms that bar it except as a last resort. The authorities invariably 
claimed all shootings were justified on the basis of self-defence or at least the 
suspect possessing a deadly weapon.
Mars’ (2002: 174) research on police violence in Guyana found that “the 
enduring influence of colonial rule remained a cogent factor in terms of 
understanding what appears to be a police occupational subculture of violence”. 
As a quasi-military arm of the state, the police force was encouraged and 
rewarded for the use of violence to quash internal disturbances. Even after 
independence in Guyana, the culture of violence was strengthened and 
legitimised by the state to further its political tyranny, preventing the 
development of the police as a public service. Brogden (1987) found that a 
colonial style of policing can be employed in cases of internal colonialism, 
implying that policing of particular ethnic or national minority groups within a 
society are subjected to policies similar to colonial exploitation and subjugation. 
Thus, minorities often experience harassment, intimidation, oppression and brute 
force, a situation that could be said to have arisen in the Deep South in the US, in 
Catholic ghettos in Northern Ireland, and in Britain’s inner cities (Brewer 1994). 
In India, Dhillon (2005: 45) suggests that post-colonial policing is different from 
the colonial version only ‘in design not in character’ (see Chapters 3 & 8).
1.9 Use of Force - A Moral Dilemma
Another way of approaching the problem of understanding use of force decisions 
is by viewing it as a ‘classic police dilemma’- the ‘Dirty Harry Problem’ 
(Klockars 1991). The Dirty Harry problem originates from the film Dirty Harry 
(1971) where Inspector Harry ‘Dirty Harry’ Callahan is placed in a series of 
situations where he has to make decisions about whether ‘bad’ means can be 
justifiably used to achieve ‘good’ ends. The troublesome aspect of this problem
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is not “whether under some utilitarian calculus a right choice can be made, but 
that the choice must always be made between at least two wrongs and in 
choosing either the policeman inevitably taints or tarnishes himself’ (Klockars 
1991: 415). Thus by choosing either to act or not act, the police officer is guilty 
of wrongdoing.
Policing involves situations where the use of force is legitimate and necessary, 
not only in the eyes of the police officer employing it, but approved of by the on 
looking public: legitimate means employed to achieve approved goals. However, 
there are other situations that call for the use of dirty means, including the use of 
force as a last resort in order to achieve a good end. A genuine moral dilemma 
results - genuine because it “is a situation from which one cannot emerge 
innocent, no matter what one does- employ a dirty means, employ an 
insufficiently dirty means, or walk away” (Klockars 1991: 413). Such a moral 
dilemma is a familiar and recurring one to police officers the world over, and the 
danger, according to Klockars (1991) lies not in being wrong (that will be the 
inevitable result), but in deluding oneself that one has found a way to escape an 
inescapable dilemma. The consequences for police officers could be: loss of 
sense of moral proportion, failing to care, turning cynical, or allowing their 
passions to lead them to employ force indiscriminately, crudely, or too readily.
If we say that the police in Mumbai were facing what they perceived to be a 
Dirty Harry problem, then what is actually implied is: given the perceived 
limitations of the criminal justice system in Mumbai and the wide-spread 
perception that organised crime groups were operating rampantly, the police 
were left with the choice of either taking drastic measures like encounters, or 
making ineffectual stabs at processing criminals through the criminal justice 
system. The latter would not impact on crime figures, and be widely seen as not 
addressing the crime situation at all. Whether their chosen method of adopting 
encounters as a dirty means has left them tainted or tarnished remains to be 
assessed. The problem of ‘means versus ends’ is the same in Mumbai as that 
described in the classic version of the dilemma, only the nature and scale of 
urgency is different. In Mumbai, officers’ decision to shoot did not appear to be
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based on the need for immediate information to save other lives, but was done 
presumably in order to prevent potential loss of life in the future.
Another difficult aspect of the Dirty Harry problem is whether the ‘dirty means’ 
in fact work, and in what sense. In Mumbai, at least in the perception of the 
police, a majority of the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed, and public opinion as 
gauged from media reports, encounters appear to have ‘worked’, in that the 
experience of fear of organised crime groups in the city apparently reduced. 
However, the danger of ‘dirty means’ becoming an end in themselves - a source 
of instant retributive justice to punish guilty people - is very real and cannot be 
discounted as not having occurred in Mumbai. Klockars (1991) comments that 
the occurrence of such a situation would eliminate the moral dilemma because it 
would no longer remain a question of bad means justifying good ends. However, 
if there were no public consensus that instant retribution as an end was good in 
itself, populist overtones to the debate would ensure that the moral dilemma did 
not disappear quite so conveniently.
The other dimensions that make the Dirty Harry problem more seductive, i.e.: 
that only dirty means will work and that the ends are unquestionably and urgently 
good, are questionable in Mumbai. Other effective ‘means’ (i.e. reforms in the 
legal and criminal justice systems) have not been explored fully to test their 
efficacy. Besides, the ‘end’ of controlling organised crime at the expense of 
violating a person’s basic human right to life is debatable.
Skolnick’s (1966) policeman as craftsman, who sees himself as a master of his 
trade, tries to solve the dilemma by denying the dirtiness of its means, justifying 
its use for achieving good means. This worrisome aspect of Skolnick’s 
craftsman (Klockars 1991: 422) was what appeared to have been adopted by the 
police officers in Mumbai. The only way to put an end to the moral problem is 
by punishing officers who adopt dirty means regardless of the ends they aim to 
achieve. However, even while putting forward this solution, Klockars admits that 
insisting that policemen should be punished for having employed dirty means, 
which appears to be the only way to discourage inappropriate behaviour, creates
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a Dirty Harry problem for ourselves and for those we urge to effect such 
punishments (1991: 422).
According to Miller & Blackler (2005), police use of deadly force in the USA 
may be morally justified under three conditions: self-defence; in defence of 
others; and to uphold the law (in cases of the fleeing felon or the armed suspect). 
However, they feel that while police use of deadly force to ensure that the law 
against serious crime is upheld may be morally justified in American society, it is 
problematic because the issue of which crimes are sufficiently serious to warrant 
police use of deadly force if the law is to be upheld has to be decided. Besides, it 
places a great deal of responsibility, not to speak of the opportunity for abuse, on 
individual members of the police to dispense punishment of death - a sort of 
justice without a trial. For these reasons Miller & Blackler (2005) feel that 
‘upholding the law’ has neither moral nor legal justification for use of deadly 
force. Although the US Supreme Court decided in 1985 that shooting a fleeing 
felon who posed no immediate danger was unconstitutional (Chevigny 1995), it 
appears as if the moral justification for the same has led to the police perhaps 
continuing the practice, only now disguising or presenting it as self-defence.
1.10 Synthesis
While the literature outlined above goes some way towards explaining police 
violence, most explanations provide a partial picture of why police violence 
exists and is tolerated in any society. It is difficult to separate the personality 
traits of individual officers from the situational and organisational influences that 
contribute towards creating ‘dispositions’ to act in certain characteristic ways in 
similar situations (Toch 1986). Just as it is difficult to separate out the impact of 
situational or sociological factors on the organisational subculture, it is also 
difficult to distinguish between factors that motivate behaviour, and those that 
are permissive and promote such behaviour, as well as help in justifying or 
rationalising it. Therefore a theory that combines all three approaches to explain 
police violence would be welcome for being more well-rounded and complete.
Chan’s exposition of Bourdieu’s theory of field  and habitus (1996, 1997), 
drawing on Skolnick’s (1975) work and building on the ‘fully social’ theory of
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deviance (Taylor, Walton & Young 1973), provides a reformulated explanation 
for police violence. Chan (1996: 115) borrows Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, “a 
set of ‘dispositions’ which integrate past experience and enable individuals to 
cope with a diversity of unforeseen situations” (citing Wacquant 1992:18). It is 
the ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu 1990:11) that enables social actors to act as i f  
they were calculating rationally, even when lack of time, information etc make 
rational calculation impossible, as they typically do in police decisions to use 
force (Manning 1997). The context within which officers act as if they were 
calculating rationally constitute what Chan, following Bourdieu, calls the field  of 
policing: the structure of social relations within which officers struggle to 
exercise power and authority, stay out of trouble with their superiors, and remain 
on good terms with their peers. The field  includes “historical relations between 
certain social groups and the police, anchored in the legal powers and discretion 
the police are authorised to exercise and the distribution of power and material 
resources within the community” (Chan 1996: 115).
Chan (2000) describes police occupational culture as a ‘penal culture’ (Garland 
1991) that constructs and supports a notion of justice that legitimates violence as 
a form of punishment. Garland (2001: 163) discusses the culture of control of 
‘high crime’ societies (mainly the UK and the USA) and the ‘crime complex’ - a 
“distinctive cluster of attitudes, beliefs and assumptions” which produces a series 
of psychological and social effects that influence politics and policy. In such 
‘high crime’ societies people exhibit high levels of fear and anxiety about crime 
and their irritation, frustration, and aggravation and the criminal justice’s 
inability to deal with criminals appropriately prompts the demand for action and 
for greater punitiveness. Garland accepts that the instrumental and expressive 
nature of these punitive strategies differ according to national, historical, and 
cultural differences (also Sutherland 1939). Thus, allowing us to extend his 
explanation to account for the populist and politicized ‘approval’ accorded to 
encounters as punitive sanctions against hardened ‘criminals’ in Mumbai. 
However, Melossi (2004) argues that the cultural embeddedness of the discourse 
on penality is confirmed by his analysis in the Italian (Catholicism) and North 
American (Protestant ethic) cultures, but in a way that appears different from any
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cultural determinism, making this a more complicated argument than would 
appear at first glance.
Chan (2000: 105) suggests, “the three social dimensions - position {field), 
disposition (habitus) and interaction - combine to provide an explanatory 
framework for understanding police violence”. Adapting her approach, I suggest 
that police violence arises out of a combination of factors: at the conjunction 
between the point of interaction (situational factors), the police officer’s 
dispositions (a combination of personal traits and attitudes cultivated within the 
police subculture) and the context (structural, political and historical factors) 
within which they operate. This thesis is primarily an empirical analysis of the 
habitus of police violence in Mumbai, though it also considers the field that made 
this possible.
1.11 Summary
In this chapter I have described the theoretical background to the study of police 
use of deadly force. Having reviewed the policing literature in India and its 
deficiencies in adequately addressing issues of police use of force, of deadly 
force, related issues of police brutality and police violence as a state crime, I 
discussed policing literature from other countries, especially the USA, UK, 
Australia and Canada. A review of research on police use of deadly force 
revealed three major approaches to explain police violence: individual and 
situational theories; organisational and subcultural theories; and sociological and 
structural theories. I explore the nature of police violence as a moral dilemma of 
the ends and means variety. I then argue that Chan’s (1996, 1997) use of field  
and habitus would help address the question of why police violence occurs.
In the next chapter I discuss the methods and methodological issues involved in 
my research.
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2 CHAPTER 2: METHODS
2.1 Introduction
My research began in 2001, the year in which police encounters peaked in 
Mumbai, and police use of deadly force was in the forefront of media reports. 
Although encounters were not a new phenomenon in Mumbai, there was no deep 
examination into the issues involved in either police or public circles. Their 
existence appeared to be socially accepted and there was little or no impetus to 
explore their dynamics or impact. This research is an attempt to do just that, 
drawing on the accounts of some of the actors involved in encounters, those 
bystanders to them and those who influenced the social processes that 
contributed to making encounters both acceptable and desirable.
In this chapter I discuss the methods I used and the methodological issues 
involved in the research. I begin by reflecting on my own motivations and 
interest in the police use of deadly force and how I came to be involved in this 
research, and touch upon the various methodological and ethical dilemmas that 
arose as a result of researching an organisation like the police from the inside 
(i.e. as a serving officer). I then discuss the qualitative nature of the research, 
focusing on the process of conducting interviews with police officers and other 
‘claimsmakers’ in Mumbai. I also discuss how the field data gathered were 
analysed and the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. The concluding section 
of the chapter outlines ethical issues involved in the research process.
2.2 Reflexive Ruminations
At the outset, it is essential to discuss why I chose to study encounters and 
indeed why I chose to pursue an academic path in the first place. The reasons are 
embedded in my experiences as a police officer in the North Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh. The state police were notorious for ‘encounters ' of ‘dreaded’ dacoits 
and bandits, who had plagued the populace in the late 70’s and 80’s. At the time 
of the research, the Uttar Pradesh police held the dubious distinction of having
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Qconducted the highest number of ‘fake’ encounters in the country in 2001 . At 
the National Police Academy and in the first few years of service the implicit 
values in the organisation stressed on machismo; hailing officers who had been 
involved in encounters as heroes or ‘real officers’, worth emulating9. Having 
faced the realities of the field, the inadequacies of Criminal Justice System, the 
lack of scientific training and infrastructure made available to the police, and the 
sheer volume of crime- I gradually came to believe that encounters were a 
legitimate way of eliminating hardened criminals suspected of having committed 
gruesome crimes.
However having observed in close proximity what actually went on behind the 
scenes in encounters, made me rethink my attitude towards them and their place 
in policing policy. I wondered whether other officers were also troubled by 
similar moral dilemmas. I felt certain that I, like many of my colleagues, had 
unconsciously and unthinkingly accepted the values that were upheld by the 
police culture and had moulded my attitude and work ethics around them. Given 
the cool response I received from the most senior officer in the state I was 
working in when I went to inform him of my decision to do a PhD here, he said 
‘Why do you want Study Leave? Don’t you want to work? You should be out 
there, working, getting some more experience’- a refrain echoed by other senior 
officers, and an experience shared by other police officer researchers (Young 
1991: 32). This response only strengthened my conviction that the best way 
forward to finding some solutions to the numerous problems facing the police 
was through research and reflection. Encounters, I was convinced, required 
deeper understanding and it was evident that there were some very strong forces 
at work- if they could turn an ordinary, middle class, idealistic, liberal individual 
(as I would like to think of myself) into condoning and even encouraging
8 National Human Rights Commission’s annual Report for 2000-2001, indicates that “for several 
years Uttar Pradesh has outstripped every other state in the numbers of custodial deaths and 
extra-judicial executions with a total of 940 reported cases so far. During 2000-2001, the state 
topped the list of fake encounter deaths with 68 out of a 109 reported to the NHRC across the 
countiy” (Voice of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights network: 
www.hrdc.net/shrdc/hrfeatures/HRF82.htm)
9 Studies by Van Maanen (1973), Hunt (1985) and Harris (1978) found that a similar process of 
‘indoctrination’ of new police recruits into the ‘masculine ethic’ and the regaling of war stories 
featuring violence by instructors is a feature of police training in the US.
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encounters as an acceptable means of dealing with fellow citizens. Standing 
back a little from the world of day-to-day policing, I was a little shocked at my 
unquestioning acceptance of the ‘herd mentality’- one which had serious life- 
and-death consequences and compelled me to want to understand the dynamics 
of encounters at various levels- individual, organisational and society-wide. I felt 
that broadening my understanding of how other officers perceived the situation 
and dealt with it would prove to be a fruitful starting point.
As a serving officer, I felt the need to seek a ‘deep understanding’ of the topic by 
speaking to other officers, in order to explore or check my understandings and 
whether they were shared by other members or participants; “to check, stimulate, 
or inspire” my own self-reflections and to “go beyond commonsense 
explanations”; in order to “grasp and articulate the multiple views of, 
perspectives on, and meanings of some activity, event, place or cultural object” 
(Johnson 2002: 106). In order to do so a qualitative approach to the topic seemed 
most relevant for the research. The focus of this research was on officers’ 
perceptions and accounts of encounters, ways in which they explained, excused, 
or justified their conduct, official and personal discourses through which they 
reconciled the arbitrary use of deadly force with their moral conscience and 
professional ethics. Only a qualitative account could reveal the richness and 
depth of the police and public discourse and how it contributed to making 
encounters a socially acceptable phenomenon.
Having such a strong personal and emotional motive for undertaking this 
research proved to be a great incentive to do the research itself, but at the same 
time created the potential for a flawed study. I needed to guard against what 
Lawrence (2000: 4-5) calls ‘selective observation’ and ‘premature closure’ 
during the course of conducting the interviews. I had to beware that I did not 
selectively focus on material that suited my hypothesis or shy away from 
exploring complex opinions and attitudes in greater depth. In order for the 
research to be credible, I had to adopt a stance of ‘empathic neutrality’ with a 
“commitment to understand the world as it unfolds, be true to complexities and 
multiple perspectives as they emerge, and be balanced in reporting both 
confirmatory and discontinuing evidence with regard to any conclusions
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offered”, as well as be careful of avoiding “selective perception, personal biases, 
and theoretical predispositions” (Patton, 2002: 51). This was not particularly easy 
and the most difficult aspect of the research was writing about a world that I 
knew very well and took for granted but was probably very different from the 
experience of the audience it was intended for.
I had to think about the ‘interviewer effect’, and resolve issues around what 
Schwalbe & Wolkomir (2002:206) call ‘interview as threat’ situation, that is, 
baseline threat posed by the interview situation (giving up control) and surplus 
threat that arises because of who is asking whom about what. In my research, I, 
the researcher, was a senior ranking woman police officer and my interviewees 
were police officers of various ranks (subordinate, colleagues and senior ranks), 
as well as ‘claimsmakers’ who varied in the status and power they enjoyed in 
society. Thus each interview was unique in the personal dynamics and power 
relations that set its parameters. It was important to have the “awareness of the 
threat potential, alertness for problems arising because of the threat, and ability to 
respond in a way that makes the interview successful” (Schwalbe & Wolkomir 
2002: 206). Apart from being aware that “gender filters knowledge; that is, the 
sex of the interviewer and that of the respondent do make a difference, as the 
interview takes place within the cultural boundaries of a paternalistic social 
system in which masculine identities are differentiated from feminine ones” 
(Fontana & Frey 2000: 658), I also had to be aware of the impact my being an 
Indian Police Service officer had on the respondents - police officers and others. 
I needed to be aware that this might constitute a barrier when I interviewed them 
(see Johnson 2002: 107). There was always a danger that respondents would 
tailor their responses to what they thought would suit my purpose. In practice, I 
had to face and negotiate around these issues that arose by basically trying to set 
the tone of the interview, especially with police officers such that it did not 
become one of interrogation, where the interviewees felt the need to be defensive 
about their actions but one of friendly discussion on difficult issues that people 
generally avoided introspecting upon. Most officers were flattered on being 
asked their opinion on a variety of issues and did not hesitate to speak out. 
However, there were a few officers who remained on guard, preferring not to 
have an open discussion. How these different responses informed my research is
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discussed in Chapter 3. The ‘claimsmakers’ too felt flattered that their opinion 
was sought on important matters by such a high ranking officer, who also 
happened to be a woman.
2.3 Access
Before I went into the field I had to make a decision about how to present myself 
because I wanted to do overt research and was unwilling to undergo the stress 
involved in researching a manifestly sensitive topic covertly similar to that 
Holdaway (1983) discusses in his work. However, I wanted to use Punch’s 
(1986) tactic of accepting the institution to be investigated as legitimate, with 
reservations, and openly seek access through the formal channels, with all the 
mazes and obstacles of research proposals, gatekeepers access issues, etc. While 
there were disadvantages of revealing my identity as an Indian Police Service 
officer, the option of presenting myself only as a student researcher was rejected 
at the outset for various reasons- primarily because it would be dishonest, 
unethical, and unfair to my respondents. I was also sure (and my hunch paid off, 
several times over) that my status as an officer would make access to 
organisation and to various individuals that much easier. And so it proved to be. I 
was given instant and unconditional access by the Commissioner (although this 
created its own set of ethical problems, see page 72). However, the disadvantage 
of this approach was the problem of not being treated as a ‘naive’ researcher. 
There were occasions when officers said, “You know about [the issue under 
discussion], you are a police officer”. I had to specifically counter this response 
with a request that they explain their viewpoint as I were a layperson. Most 
officers obliged, but some were more patronising.
Initial contact was made with the Commissioner’s office in the form of an 
introductory letter explaining who I was and the purpose of the research. I was 
asked to meet the Commissioner the same day I contacted his office. This 
response was a result of professional courtesy as I had introduced myself as an 
Indian Police Service officer who was planning to do some research. The 
meeting with the Commissioner was formal, yet informal, in that it was 
characterised by a certain protocol and deference on my part and a kind of 
patronising indulgence on his. He listened to me as I described what the research
56
was about, glanced at the research proposal and agreed that the research could be 
done, no conditions or guarantees demanded. Once access was negotiated, I was 
asked to stay a few minutes while the regular evening meeting of senior officers 
present in the Headquarters was convened and he introduced me to them, 
requesting their full co-operation for the research. The entire organisation was to 
be accessible, including any statistics and information that would be required. 
This opened all sorts of doors for me as my work was seen to have received 
official sanction of the leader and there were no bureaucratic obstacles thereafter. 
However, once this access had been successfully negotiated, it was necessary to 
constantly “renegotiate access to the...individual members of the organisation” 
(Buchanan, Boddy & McCalman 1988: 59). Once the Commissioner had granted 
access, no officer refused to be interviewed, but their willingness to be open and 
honest during the interviews, depended heavily upon how well I was able to 
develop an interpersonal relationship with them. In most cases, my being a police 
officer provided a common ground for building these bridges. As there have been 
no ethnographic studies of the Mumbai police (to my knowledge), there was no 
evidence of suspicion towards research (either overtly or manifestly) by any of 
the officers, that I might be a ‘management spy’ or that the research had any 
hidden agenda.
It was almost as if my rank automatically established my legitimacy and 
credibility and I was viewed as ‘one of them’ and not as a potentially threatening 
outsider. The fact that the organisation and the force were virgin research 
territory meant that I was not asked any questions (in fact no one even read my 
research synopsis). I will never know what was being held back in the 
interviews, however, my opening remarks in interviews about confidentiality and 
anonymity were waved aside and most people seemed to take it for granted that 
since I was one of them, I would ensure that no embarrassing disclosures would 
affect them personally. This put me in a morally ambiguous position- while on 
the one hand it was enriching for the research to have frank opinions and 
perceptions revealed - but on the other, not having given any concrete 
undertaking about how the research material would be used made me feel even 
more obliged to treat the material with care. Throughout the research I have 
struggled with finding the right balance between revealing enough to make the
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research unique and illuminating, yet at the same time being protective of the 
force’s reputation and disclosing the involvement of officers in potentially illegal 
actions. Some of the officers interviewed were well known and it has been 
difficult to disguise their identity sufficiently, but I have done what I can to 
anonymize names, places and references to particular incidents.
I faced some of the classic problems of researching an institution - problems of 
negotiating proximity and distance from the interviewee; disclosure, 
transparency and negotiation of mutual expectations, aims, and interests (Flick 
2002: 59); and in particular problems associated with researching the police as an 
organisation. My position as a researcher was what Reiner (2000b: 221) using 
Brown’s (1996) original categorisation, calls the ‘outside insider’, but unlike his 
conceptualisation of this category, I was not an ex-officer researching his or her 
force, but was a serving officer, researching another force, through a foreign 
university. Jones (1980: 168) describes five problems of being an ‘inside’ 
researcher and serving police officer, i.e., difficulty in maintaining distance and 
objectivity from the organisational subculture, status problems within the 
organisation; resisting moral pressures to maintain the internal code of secrecy; 
avoiding threat to access during the research to sensitive material; and finally 
managing legislative controls placed on disclosing organisational information. 
Holdaway (1983) and Young (1991) suggested the main issues with being an 
inside researcher were around exposing the processes behind the ‘secrecy’ that 
shrouds police work and the apprehension of causing damage to people who had 
co-operated during the research if the findings were made public. These insider 
officer-tumed-researchers had to contend with red-tape and restrictions on the 
publication of their work and Young (1991:33) cites other officers’ experiences 
of facing the prospect of leaving the service in order to have their research 
published. The All India Service Rules place restrictions on the sort of material a 
serving police officer may publish, but places works of art or academic interest 
outside its purview. As an ‘insider’ I had my experience and knowledge of the 
culture to give me deeper insight into the topic, on the other hand, I was worried 
about accusations of whistle blowing, and betraying my fellow officers by 
discussing information revealed by them on the assumption that I would always 
protect them and the organisation. Ethical issues about which type of information
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could be revealed and which were better left uncovered had to be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis10. Though I have made every effort to protect individuals, the 
fact that there have been abuses of deadly force by the police is something that 
cannot be brushed out of sight.
The other major issue that I struggled with during the field work and 
subsequently while analysing the interviews, has been detaching myself 
emotionally from the Tot’ of the police and guarding against the seductive pull of 
agreeing with some of the more contentious viewpoints of a majority of the 
officers as I shared many of their cultural assumptions. Having experienced the 
all-pervading frustrations and pressures of delivering results in a demanding 
socio-political milieu, it was only too easy to get carried away and lose any kind 
of objectivity in the face of some of the more ‘legitimate’ arguments’, made by 
the officers about the acceptability of encounters.. These were arguments I had 
previously unthinkingly considered and accepted as legitimate -  mainly in terms 
of the ‘ends justify means’ variety.
2.4 Interviews
The interviews were conducted against a background of ‘contextualism’ 
(Bryman, 1988), that is, the attempt was made to understand events and people’s 
perspectives as they are situated in the wider social and historical context. 
Qualitative in-depth interviews seemed the obvious choice as the main aim of the 
research was “to derive interpretations, not facts or laws, from respondent talks”; 
and also “establishing common patterns and themes between particular types of 
respondents” (Warren, 2002: 84-85). Through the interviews, I was mainly 
interested in understanding how actors perceived the situation and constructed 
accounts about the issues around encounters; and not primarily in ascertaining 
facts or veracity of the opinions espoused.
The field research was divided into two sections: interviews with police officers 
conducted during the summer of 2002 and interviews with a group of people I
10 Reiner (2000b: 223) reveals his dilemma when in possession of politically sensitive 
information divulged to him during his work with Chief Constables and admits that “the likely 
sacrifice of the research, and the career of the chief constable who had confided in me (not to 
speak of my own) was too high a price to pay for the act of whistle blowing”.
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call ‘claimsmakers’ conducted over the summer of 2003. The interviews were 
semi-structured and open ended (See Appendices 1 and 2), generally ranging 
between 45 minutes to two hours. While the interview questions were used to 
structure the interview, in most cases the order of the questions was reshuffled, 
some additional questions were asked in some interviews and some questions 
were dropped in others. More often than not, the flow of the conversation guided 
the interview process as I was not keen to appear too intrusive and wanted to 
engender as much naturalness in the discussion of what were very sensitive and 
private issues, especially for police officers and public officials.
2.4.1 Police Officers
In-depth interviews were carried out with thirty-eight police officers (33 men and 
5 women) from the Mumbai Police. These included 4 Senior Management 
(including the Commissioner and Joint Commissioners of Police); 8 Upper 
Middle Management (Additional and Deputy Commissioners of Police); 5 Lower 
Middle Management (Assistant Commissioners of Police); 10 Inspectors ; and 
11 Sub-Inspectors.
10 Upper Middle Management (UMM) and all Senior Management (SM) 
belonged to the Indian Police Service, 2 officers (one each from the Upper 
Middle Management (UMM) and Lower Middle Management (LMM) levels) 
belonged to the Maharashtra State Police Service, and the others were recruited 
as Constables or Sub-Inspectors (SI) and had risen to their present ranks through 
promotion. The 5 women officers interviewed were mainly from the ranks of Sub 
Inspector, Inspector and Deputy Commissioner of Police.
The police interviews were geared towards understanding how they perceived 
their own particular place and role within the hierarchy; and how they felt the 
outside ‘world’ perceived it. Interviews included the following themes-
• What was understood by the term ‘encounter’ and how was it defined?
• What were the general and personal justifications the police put forward 
to explain the use (or abuse) of deadly force?
• Perception of societal reaction (i.e. media, pressure groups, political 
actors) to ‘encounters’.
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•  Perceptions of government attitudes towards police use of deadly force.
•  Perceptions of rules, regulations, and review mechanisms that governed 
the use of deadly force -  whether these were fair and adequate or 
otherwise.
•  Did they personally resolve the dialectical values of ‘professionalism’ 
(what they think as doing their job efficiently and effectively) and the 
protection of individual rights with the use of deadly force?
The initial and subsequent response I received from all officers was 
overwhelmingly positive. Useful as this was, I continually reflected on “ethical 
concerns over ‘consent’ to participating in a research study, (and).... how far 
those ‘volunteered’ by such gatekeepers can resist participation” (Miller & Bell, 
2002:67). Access had to be negotiated with individual officers by explaining the 
purpose and aims of the research. A few appeared wary (body language and 
nature of responses) and questioned the purpose of my research, how and where 
it was to be submitted, who would have access to it etc. With the exception of 
one senior officer who avoided rather than outright refused being interviewed, 
every officer agreed to be part of the research. The interviews were conducted in 
their offices and police stations and though this meant there were some 
interruptions during the course of the interviews, most officers tried to reduce 
these to a minimum.
I also had to overcome formalities and barriers that are a natural outcome of the 
hierarchical nature of the police organisation - I spoke to officers of different 
ranks and this raised a number of issues about how they and I would respond to 
the interview situation. I made a conscious effort to create, a “relationship 
between two people where both parties behave as though they are of equal status 
for its duration, whether or not this is actually so” (Benney & Hughes 1984: 
221).
2.4.2 ‘Claimsmakers’
18 in-depth interviews (14 men and 4 women) were conducted with a group of 
persons I call ‘claimsmakers’. Best (1991) calls promoters, activists, professional 
experts and spokespersons involved in forwarding specific claims about a
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phenomenon ‘claimsmakers’, who do more than “draw attention to particular 
social conditions, they shape our sense of what the problem is” (Surette 1998). I 
have used the term because people interviewed ought to be critics, or ‘social 
conscience keepers’ on the issue (of encounters) and could potentially influence 
policy (‘policing policy shapers’). My sample included 4 journalists 
(representing the English broadsheets, Marathi broadsheets and the tabloid press) 
3 retired judges of the Mumbai High Court and the Supreme Court of India, 2 
lawyers (a public prosecutor and one representing the ‘encountered victim’), 2 
political leaders (from the Ruling Party and the Opposition), 2 representatives of 
Industrial Associations, 3 Human Rights activists (representing Non 
Governmental Organisations), 1 Criminologist, and 1 Academic who was a 
member of the State Human Rights Commission. This group can be called 
‘claimsmakers’ because the individuals interviewed had in some forum or other 
been part of the public discourse on police encounters.
These interviews were conducted as a sample of the formal articulation of public 
opinion on police encounters. I recognize that this sample is not representative of 
the general public, in fact they may be quite the opposite as they represent the 
opinions of ‘elite’ groups also called the ‘chattering classes’ or the 
‘intelligentsia’ in India. Most of the ‘claimsmakers’ I interviewed were 
significant players in the political and social life in Mumbai and could be said to 
create, influence, as well as reflect the general public’s opinion. While I am 
aware that like any qualitative research it is difficult to make an authoritative 
generalised statement about what the public in Mumbai think about encounters, 
the interviews certainly gave a flavour of and in some cases, reaffirmed opinions 
that I had heard expressed in ordinary everyday conversations with friends, 
neighbours, shopkeepers, domestic help, doctors, taxi drivers etc. My interactions 
with citizens were also an informal way of triangulating and validating the 
interview data of this group.
Interview questions with influential opinion makers followed the pattern of the 
police interviews, including themes such as-
• How did individuals perceive the issues around encounters!
• How did they explain the occurrence of encounters ?
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• What did they think were the public and political reactions to encounters?
• What did they think of the police force’s image and performance?
• How and where did Human Rights (specifically the Right to Life) fit in
within the discourse on encounters?
2.5 Sample Selection
The sample of police interviewees was selected using quota (various ranks), 
purposeful (those who had some experience of encounters) and snowball (being 
referred on to meet other officers who were considered ‘experts’ on some of the 
issues being researched) sampling (see for e.g.Lawrence 2000, Patton 2002, 
Warren 2002). Of the nine zones in the city (see Chapter 3), four were selected 
randomly and interviews were carried out with officers of different ranks, along 
with officers from the Crime Branch; added to these were senior officers in the 
Commissioner’s office, as well as senior officers who had in previous capacities, 
been closely associated with police encounters.
Snowball sampling was used to contact most of the interviews with 
‘claimsmakers’ interviewed. I started out with one contact (who was not an 
interviewee) and was directed on to others, and from then on other contacts 
flowed smoothly. I had an ideal list of people I would like to include in the 
sample and at the end of every interview, in the general discussion about the 
research that ensued, I would seek the interviewer’s opinion about the people I 
wanted to meet and inevitably most individuals would give some contacts or 
leads as to whom I could approach and how to go about it. Interviewing 
‘claimsmakers’ was a fascinating and very rewarding experience (see Chapter 7) 
and I was pleasantly surprised at how willing people were to co-operate with the 
interviews. Most interviews were conducted in the residences or offices of the 
interviewees (the choice was theirs).
2.6 Taping and Transcribing
At the beginning of every interview, permission was sought to tape record the 
interview. Only two police officers refused, and in another the recorder 
malfunctioned. Some interviewees said during the interview that they would 
prefer that the material they were just about to disclose was not used; others
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asked me to switch off the tape for a few minutes while they said something 
which they thought was ‘unsafe’; while others would reveal quite a lot of 
confidential information after the interview had officially terminated and the tape 
recorder was switched off. Notes were made both during the interview and 
during the informal discussions, with the permission of the interviewee. This 
‘unrecorded’ data was as important as that derived from the tape recordings 
(Warren 2002: 91-2). Bulmer (1988: 154) also talks about the possibility of more 
interesting material being revealed when the machine is switched off. I found this 
was true in some cases, when interviewees visibly relaxed once the machine was 
switched off and were more open to discussion. There were times when 
interviewees were saying something, but their facial expression or body language 
was sending other messages. It was therefore important to note down in these 
situations what I thought interviewees were trying to convey along with the 
actual words being used by them. For example, when I asked police officers 
whether they thought that other agencies co-operated with the police in their 
investigation of encounter cases, one said, “Yes, other departments co-operate”, 
(T 8: Sub Inspector) but he rubbed his fingers to symbolise payment, indicating 
that when the right price is paid, other agencies co-operate with the police.
Sensitive information including direct admission of police illegalities and 
discussion of the processes by which these were kept hidden from the public eye 
were revealed during interviews. It was understandable that some officers were 
concerned about the evidential value of what they were saying as well as the 
possibility that some of the research findings might be traced back to them and 
feared the consequences of whistle blowing. While some interviewees appeared 
to be aware of and uncomfortable with the taping as they spoke, others were 
quite unconcerned about the fact that they were revealing some very damaging 
and potentially dangerous information and opinions (for them personally and for 
the organisation at large). Taping did have some impact on the interviews. It 
made some officers self-conscious and close lipped; however, it did not pose as 
much of a problem as I had anticipated, mainly because as police officers, they
64
knew that the material could not be legally used against them in a court of law11 
and also did not think the I would actually pose any kind of threat to them. I 
cannot say with complete certainty whether this was because they ‘trusted’ me 
and thought that as a police officer I would not harm them, or thought my work 
completely inconsequential - so great was their contempt for, or lack of 
experience and knowledge of academic research.
The interviews were mainly conducted in English, however, some officers were
more comfortable speaking in Marathi, and others interspersed Hindi in their
comments. I transcribed all the interview data (a rewarding though painfully
time-consuming process) and translated the original words used as accurately as
possible - trying to avoid the temptation to smoothen the edges, neaten and
correct the grammar, and to make it sound more self assured and clear (Alldred
& Gillies 2002). This has sometimes resulted in slightly strange phrases and
metaphors that are alien to the English language, but make perfect sense given
their vernacular origin and context. I wanted to preserve their original flavour
because when interviewees used such metaphors and told stories describing past
events they were performing what Coffey and Atkinson call:
“particular kinds of speech acts....locating their own and others’ 
actions or evaluations within particular frames of reference. They 
may use vocabularies o f  motive [a phrase they attribute to Mills,
1940] to account for social actions. They may be using kinds of 
accounting devices to produce coherent and plausible constructions 
of their world of experience.” (1996: 84)
Deconstmction of these stories and metaphors gives a better idea of what the
interviewees’ world was about and how they saw themselves located within it.
2.7 Analysis
This study is a qualitative exploration of how officers understand the issues 
surrounding the use of deadly force and how they justify its use, either to 
themselves or to others, at an individual and organisational level. Having had 
some experience of these issues and having reflected on them for several years
11 Section 25, Indian Evidence Act 1872: Confession to police officer not to be proved - No 
confession made to police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
Since officers were aware that though I was interviewing them as a researcher and not as a police 
officer, the fact that I was a police officer meant that their statements had no evidentiary value. 
There are also several restrictions on the use and admissibility of tape recorded evidence.
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before starting this research, I already had some hypotheses and assumptions 
about how officers and the organisation might feel about encounters. However, I 
did not want this to affect the way I analysed and interpreted the material and this 
presented me with considerable difficulty. It took a determined effort to let the 
theory evolve out of the interviews rather than selectively (albeit unconsciously) 
concentrate on those that fitted into my own preconceived framework and 
explanations.
Although the study is not intended to be a comparative one, the research outlined 
in this thesis is compared with studies on police use of deadly force in other 
countries, particularly the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, 
Jamaica, Guyana and South Africa. However desirable, a systematic international 
comparison between the Mumbai police and any other force was not possible on 
methodological grounds as well as due to time and resource constraints. 
However, the comparative policing literature from other countries was a useful 
background and I refer to them to have a clearer understanding how other 
countries have grappled with and tried to solve the problem of police violence 
and the lessons drawn from their experience.
There were three main phases of the analysis: classifying the interview material 
into relevant codes or categories; identifying and exploring the links between 
interrelated categories; and, interpreting and analysing emerging links, 
generating explanations at a more abstract and generalised level.
The analysis was done mainly within the ‘constructivist-interpretivist paradigm’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln 1994: Introduction), which recognizes that social reality is 
constructed by social actors and in order to understand the world of meanings, 
one must interpret it. Thus the goal is to “understand the complex world of lived 
experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Schwandt 1994: 118). 
‘Reality’ is socially constructed and those in power both create and can control 
perspectives on phenomena. “By exercising control over language, and therefore 
control over the very categories of reality,...those in power are served” (Patton, 
2002: 99). Since the word/metaphor/euphemism encounter was at the heart of the 
phenomenon, I wanted to study the language and symbols being used in specific
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and particular ways that conveyed a shared cultural meaning. Patton (2002: 98) 
citing Guba and Lincoln’s (1988) primary assumptions of constructivism 
suggests that phenomena can be only understood in the context in which they are 
studied, and neither the problem nor solutions can be generalized across time and 
space. While this is true to a large extent, I also believe that there can be 
generalisations across contexts and countries and it would be possible to learn 
from the experiences of others.
To further explore these shared cultural meanings around language, ‘domain 
analysis’ was used. This analytic strategy, according to Coffey and Atkinson 
(1996:90) “explore[s] the linguistic symbols or ‘folk terms’ used by social actors, 
both individually and collectively”. The aim is to identify “patterns and systems 
of folk terms as a mechanism for understanding the cultural knowledge of a 
particular social group.” Spradley (1979, 1980) describes a domain structure as 
having four characteristics- a core term or overall category title; two or more 
included folk terms that belong to the category; a semantic relationship that links 
the core term to the included terms; and a boundary or parameter, the terms of 
which should be defined by the native informant/social actor (Coffey & Atkinson 
1996: 91). Coffey and Atkinson also suggest that Spradley’s concept of the 
linguistic symbol having a triad of elements - the actual symbol, the referent, and 
the relationship between the symbol and the referent -  helps in trying to explain 
the relationship between different labels attached to encounters, and how they are 
understood by different actors. In this case, encounter, is the symbol, 
representing police killing of criminals in self defence; the referent is the 
recognition of the fact that these killings are actually deliberate; and the 
relationship between the symbol and referent are the conditions under which a 
particular encounter would be accepted or rejected as justifiable by the one 
making this judgement. Thus according to Spradley’s (1979, 1980) domain 
structure, the core term encounter includes three folk terms such as ‘genuine’ 
encounters and ‘fake’ encounters that are in common usage by the police and 
members of the public alike, as well as my own term ‘bona fide’ encounters. 
One of the aims of the research was to explore how these terms were 
semantically related in the perception of the police and of the public, and to 
determine the parameters by which the terms were defined by these social actors.
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Further Coffey and Atkinson explain that, the symbols may be thought of as 
organizing schemes (Tesch 1990:139), and the analysis aims to identify the rules 
and relationships among the symbols. In this context a domain refers to a set of 
symbols that share meaning in some way.
Lyman and Scott (1970: 112) suggest that the construction of accounts as part of 
everyday talk is done by actors to explain unanticipated, untoward and 
unexpected behaviour - these explanations are situated accounts, dependent upon 
the status of the actors and the physical and social location, and are standardized 
within cultures and subgroups; hence, accounts can be useful in exploring the 
situated culture within which they are embedded. The discourses of various 
actors (officers and ‘claimsmakers’) and how they understood the issues 
surrounding encounters:; their own, and the police organisation’s role in the 
action involved; the overall responsibility society has towards the creation of this 
phenomenon; and the obligation to protect the Right to Life will be discussed in 
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.
An exploration of interview accounts would help get a better insight into not only 
how police culture engenders, but also how societal values and norms create 
conditions for the tolerance and acceptance of repeated occurrences of 
encounters in India. The ultimate aim of my analysis was to move from the level 
of distilling a ‘substantive theory’ (using Glaser and Strauss’ (1968) distinction) 
accounting for the police use of deadly force in Mumbai, to linking this with the 
more generic ‘formal theory’ of the police use or abuse of force in a wider 
context.
The main theoretical orientation of my analysis was the grounded theory 
approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Bottoms 2000). This enabled me to draw my 
theory from the evidence I gathered in the field and it evolved through an 
inductive process, rather than either proving or disproving any pre-existing 
hypothesis that led the research process. (Creswell 1998: 241)
Reisman (1979) advocates that research into deviant behaviour should not be 
undertaken from a taken-for-granted worldview as this would involve implicit
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judgements about the legitimacy of behaviour and would influence the types of 
questions asked. He feels that researchers should study deviant behaviour in a 
value-neutral manner because what appears deviant may actually be very rational 
or necessary to those being studied. Many officers in my study explained that the 
main reason why many police officers indulged in petty corruption was because 
there were many ‘hidden expenses’ that had to be incurred during the course of a 
normal working day, for example, paying the taxi fare while transporting a traffic 
accident victim to the hospital, paying the (paltry, but nonetheless, non 
reimbursed) hospital admission fee of 10 Rupees (equivalent to 13 pence) per 
victim, photocopying legal documents, paying for translation of these documents 
in many cases, funeral expenses of an unclaimed body, etc which are all 
technically liable to be reimbursed by the state, but due to practical difficulties, 
official sanction of inadequate amounts, and lack of state funds for the purpose 
these sums had to paid by officers out of their own pockets. They could scarcely 
be expected to do so out of their own resources and thus had to recuperate their 
losses by other means. By assuming a taken-for-granted world view (that all 
police are corrupt) and supporting prevailing social norms, scientific objectivity 
is lost and one is liable to miss the point that the deviance may be symptomatic 
of a deeper social, systemic malaise that needs attention (financial mis­
management of working costs). While there could be another argument that 
scientific objectivity might neither be desirable nor achievable in social sciences 
research, it is true that by labelling police encounters as deviant at the outset, one 
may miss the fundamental point that there is a mismatch between society’s 
expectations from the police force, legal provisions and the capacity of the police 
to deliver, given their limited resources and powers. Throughout the research I 
tried to approach the interviews and their analysis in a value- neutral way, i.e. 
trying to understand the perspective of the respondent without being judgemental 
or biased. However, it was not possible to view police abuse of deadly force as 
anything other than undesirable. The issues being studied are intrinsically linked 
up with one of the most fundamental of all rights -  the right to life, and it is not 
possible to make any claim to value neutrality on my part. However I prefer a 
medical analogy here to explain the situation. The abuse of deadly force is like a 
disease that has to be studied and understood, in order to be cured. To that extent 
I have tried to record the viewpoint of interviewees without allowing my
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personal convictions to interfere, and then trying to draw conclusions about how 
‘deviant’ behaviour might be controlled or corrected.
2.8 Reliability and Validity
Reliability and validity are important issues in any research. Following 
Silverman (1993: 146-149) reliability was addressed in this qualitative study in 
three ways. First, accepting Spradley’s (1989) suggestion of systematising field 
notes, by distinguishing between etic analysis (based on the researcher’s concept) 
and emic analysis (deriving from the conceptual framework of those being 
studied). During the entire course of the field work, notes were kept about the 
conditions under which the interview took place, the attitude and demeanour of 
the interviewees, their willingness or otherwise to discuss some of the more 
sensitive issues openly. While I shared a large portion of the conceptual 
framework of the police officers I spoke to, (after all I was indoctrinated and 
encultured in the same way as all of them), it was important for me to separate 
my personal attitudes towards issues related to encounters from those of the 
officers being interviewed. Awareness that ‘claimsmakers’ in the sample 
possessed varying world views and conceptual frameworks, and understanding 
the ways in which how these influenced their perception of police work was also 
important.
Secondly, reliability in interviews was ensured by asking broadly the same set of 
questions to the respondents. Most of the interviews were taped and in those rare 
cases when they were not, notes were taken meticulously to ensure that the 
respondent’s views were recorded verbatim. Finally, transcripts for all the 
interviews were made and while these may not be perfect; the attempt was made 
to keep the translations and transcription as close to the exact words used by the 
respondents, as possible.
Reliability and validity were perennial problems as I recognized that the study 
could not be replicated and that other researchers in the field may not have the 
same access or response from the field. Undoubtedly the analysis was influenced 
to a large extent by personal experience and observation during my service. 
However I have tried to avoid the typical pitfalls that can be detrimental to the
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validity of a study, i.e. a tendency to select field data to fit preconceptions of the 
phenomenon and a tendency to select field data which are conspicuous because 
they are exotic, at the expense of less dramatic (but possibly indicative) data 
(Fielding & Fielding 1986). I accept that encounters in themselves are a 
sensational and sensitive issue, and the more exotic data have been retained (but 
accepted as being exceptions) to give a flavour of the whole spectrum of 
perspectives on it.
Validation of the research findings has been attempted through the methods of 
triangulation and reflexivity (Silverman 1993, Sapsford 1996). Triangulation 
was sought through collecting data from several sources- interviews with police 
officers and with ‘claimsmakers’, media reports, official statistics, personal 
experience, observation and introspection. The broader conclusions that have 
been arrived at as a result of the analysis are based on representative patterns 
emerging from the data, and not on stray remarks or anecdotal evidence. 
However, anecdotal evidence has been used to illustrate points that have a wider 
consensus among those interviewed.
An important part of the research process was: reflecting on my personal 
experience that brought me to this topic; what I learned about myself and my 
emotional responses in the course of the interview; and/or how I used knowledge 
of the self or the topic at hand to understand what the interviewee was saying 
(Ellis & Berger 2002). Reflexivity reminded me to “be attentive to and conscious 
of the cultural, political, social, linguistic, and ideological origins of (my) 
perspective and voice- as well as- and often in contrast to- the perspectives and 
voices of those (I) observe and talk to during field work” (Patton 2002: 299). It 
therefore follows that, “the final product includes the cognitive and emotional 
reflections of the researcher, which add context and layers to the story being told 
about participants.” (Ellis & Berger 2002: 854)
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2.9 Ethical Issues
There were numerous ethical dilemmas in my research including: consent, 
deception, privacy, identification, confidentiality and spoiling the field Punch 
(1986: 35).
2.9.1 Confidentiality and Anonymity
One of the first ethical dilemmas I needed to confront was preserving the 
anonymity of the force and my interviewees. Given the fact that the subject under 
scrutiny was so local and specific to the city of Mumbai, it would have been 
nearly impossible to disguise the identity of the city and the force. Also it has 
been very difficult to cloak the identity of various officers, who might be easily 
recognizable by insiders (either correctly or mistakenly), or are such public 
figures that their identity might have been inadvertently revealed (Punch 1998: 
176). Also troubling was the amount of very sensitive material that had been 
divulged during the interviews, with little or no demands for guarantees of 
confidentiality or anonymity by police officers. I was aware that my ‘insider 
status’, of being perceived as belonging to the community, being a part of the 
force, were factors that demanded the “constant re-negotiation and re-mapping of 
ethical judgements... when researching familiar, intimate and sensitive areas of 
social life.” (Birch & Miller, 2002:102).
2.9.2 Power and Consent
Although issues of consent, access and power with respect to police officers did 
not trouble me initially because I felt that though the ‘gatekeeper’ had left 
subordinate officers with little choice about participating in the research and in 
some cases officers were coerced into speaking with me- they still retained the 
power to talk as little or as much as they wanted to. Most of the officers I 
interviewed were not weak and powerless, on the contrary- while they were 
expected to be subservient to authority vis-a-vis their position in the hierarchy, 
they were still capable of retaining power in the interview situation. For example, 
there were instances when officers chose not to reply to a question; or their 
answers were quite unrelated to the question posed; or by focusing on issues they 
were comfortable with, they managed to control the direction of the questions. In 
most cases, I was aware of the diversionary tactics being employed by officers
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and chose not to challenge them or pursue the line of questioning too intently. I 
was also aware that those who did want to talk and discuss very sensitive issues 
openly had their own agendas for doing so (see Chapter 4). Adler & Adler (2002: 
523) discuss respondents they call- the nouveau-statused, the frustrated, the 
outsiders, malcontents, people out of power but still in the ‘know’, hostile 
subordinates - there were examples of almost all these types in my research. 
While a few interviewees were motivated by the prospect of contributing to 
academic enrichment, a few interviewees were terse and generally 
uncommunicative, yet a wealth of inferences could be drawn from what they 
didn’t say or chose to leave out, as from what they did.
While I was more than happy to let officers who were defensive and hesitant to 
direct the course of the interview to make them feel more at ease, I was more 
challenging and demanding in the interviews with other officers who seemed 
willing to rise to the challenge. I was however, constantly aware of 
considerations of data collection boundaries (Patton 2002) - how hard should one 
push for data? The solution I arrived at was do a risk assessment and to push just 
a little more, those who were able to handle the pressure and were in a position 
of power to draw their own boundaries. Some of the Upper Middle and Senior 
Management officers were asked tough questions, for example, I asked one 
Senior Manager, who had admitted that the police sometimes went beyond the 
mandate given to them by the law in encounters, why he had not done anything 
to prevent this, since he was in a position to influence policy. He replied frankly 
that there was lack of political will as well as conviction and courage on the part 
of officers to undertake comprehensive reforms and address the situation. I 
decided to ask confrontational questions to those officers who had the ‘power’ to 
either make it clear that they thought my line of questioning was impertinent, or 
chose not to answer; and/or had the ‘ability’ to evade or avoid contentious issues.
2.9.3 Trust
Researching the police is generally problematic, as the experience of past 
researchers has indicated (Reiner 2000b). This appeared to be true in the Indian 
context- “In general, Indian police officers are reluctant to be formally 
interviewed on matters pertaining to policing practices and strategies for
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academic research purposes. This is because policing is seen as a matter of state 
security that may be compromised by revelations” (Mukhopadhyaya, 1997: 5). 
The culture of secrecy, distrust of outsiders, suspicion, and cynicism, (Reiner 
2000a; Bowling & Foster 2002) are difficult barriers to overcome in any type of 
research, but when the issues under discussion were as sensitive as the use of 
deadly force I was aware that I would be given the standard, official views by the 
interviewees, and would have an extra hurdle to cross in trying to overcome their 
natural suspicions and get any kind of insight beyond the ‘official line’. 
However, my experience with the Mumbai police was in total contrast to what I 
had been led to expect, and as mentioned, being an ‘outsider-insider’ (Reiner 
2000b) proved to be very useful in bringing down the barriers to some extent, 
with the officers and others.
All interviews raised a common ethical problem of creating a ‘real’ or ‘faked’ 
empathic relationship with the respondent, following which, the latter is 
encouraged or persuaded “ to explore and disclose experiences and emotions 
which- on reflection- they may have preferred to keep to themselves or even ‘not 
know’” (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002: 120). This research did generate feelings of 
guilt and betrayal in me until I realized at the end of the second phase of the 
field-work, that a lot of the ‘sensitive’ information was known to the public in its 
essence if not in the details, as there were open discussions in the public domain 
and media discourse12. I realized that nothing I talked about would reveal 
hitherto unknown scandals or shock the delicate sensibilities of the public at 
large in Mumbai.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the methods employed in my study and the 
methodological issues that related to my research. I began by reflecting on the 
reasons why I undertook this research and discussed why I chose a qualitative 
approach and used a grounded theory approach to the analysis of my data. I also 
discussed issues linked with sample selection and police officers and
12 The latest example is a popular television programme ‘We the People’ (NDTV), which ran a 
feature on “Licence to Kill?”, (www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/videos) aired on 6th May 2007, 
which discussed whether popular opinion sanctioned encounter killings.
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‘claimsmakers’ interviews, as well as issues of reliability and validity of the 
research and ethical issues.
The guiding principle of my research was not to shock or reveal ‘dark and 
murky’ deeds of the police, but to explore an issue that is of social and 
sociological significance: i.e. how police use of deadly force goes unchallenged 
and is even tacitly encouraged in an open and democratic state like India, that 
would like to be seen as a champion of Human Rights in the international arena. 
In the next chapter I outline the history of the Mumbai police, to place its 
colonial antecedents in context and discuss how encounters emerged as a 
response to combating organised crime in the city. This ‘sets the scene’ for the 
following 4 chapters where the interview data is explored in depth.
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3 CHAPTER 3: THE CITY OF MUMBAI AND ITS POLICE
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I briefly trace the history of the Mumbai police and its 
organisational and administrative set up. I situate the Mumbai police within the 
city that makes a unique contribution to the economic and national character of 
India. Like other major cities in the world, rapid growth in Mumbai was 
accompanied by a burgeoning in organised and other kinds of crime. Organised 
crime’s pervasive grip on life in the city according to my interview data and 
anecdotal evidence in the mid to late 1990s appeared to be such that decisions 
such as the scale and opulence of wedding celebrations, the purchase of a new 
flat, a car, or even redecorating one’s house were overshadowed by fears of 
threatening extortion calls from gangs operating in the city. In order to 
understand how this situation developed, I trace the growth of organised crime in 
Mumbai and the efforts made by the police since the early 1980s to combat it. 
This discussion provides the background for understanding how encounters 
employing deadly force were a particular form of police response dealing with 
organised crime that came to seem accepted in Mumbai.
3.2 The City of Mumbai
The city of Mumbai has a unique socio-economic status in India. It was 
originally an archipelago of seven islands whose inhabitants were mainly tribal 
fishermen. In the 16th century Portugal invaded India and seized control of the 
deep natural harbour “Bom Bahia” (Good Bay). In 1661, the island was given 
over to King Charles II of England in the dowry of the King of Portugal’s sister 
Catherine of Braganza. From 1675, when the British East India Company moved 
its headquarters to Bombay, it became an important port and trading centre. With
t l ithe introduction of the railways in the 19 century and the growth of the textile 
industry, Bombay also became an important industrial and financial centre. Since 
then, the city has generated immense wealth and has rapidly expanded, with 
migrants moving to the city in the thousands every day to seek their fortune. The
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current population of Greater Mumbai is estimated to be around 18 million13. 
The city was officially renamed Mumbai (as it was always known in Marathi, the 
local language of the state) in 1995, a political move to ‘return to their roots’ on 
the part of the incumbent government. Despite the renaming, many residents 
including most of my interviewees use either Mumbai or Bombay to refer to the 
city.
Today, Mumbai is the financial hub of India and also the base for India’s leading 
companies, its largest banks, financial institutions and the National Stock 
Exchange. The textile industry as the engine of growth has given way to financial 
services, call centres, other business outsourcing services, information 
technology, and entertainment companies, and is home to the largest film 
industry in the world (‘Bollywood’). The construction boom has created a new 
skyline of high-rise buildings, shopping complexes, office complexes, and 
hotels14. However, rapid expansion of the city has brought in its wake, “blatant 
contrasts in housing and all other forms of consumption, the difficulty of 
maintaining services with an infrastructure that has become altogether 
inadequate, and the sordid nature of the city’s civic politics [which] add up to a 
situation of acute urban crisis” (Patel 1995: xii). This is the background within 
which organised crime thrived and came to dominate public consciousness in the 
city, inducing the police to devise innovative measures to deal with it.
3.3 Policing in India
Early reference to the police in India is contained in “The Laws of Manu” (about 
2000 B.C.), and through subsequent centuries in philosophical and economic 
treatises, travellers’ accounts, plays, classical texts, and records maintained by 
ministers of Moghul rulers (in the 16th century) and administrators of the British 
East India Company (Nigam 1963). Indigenous policing throughout Indian 
history has displayed two distinct systems: a rural village-based system organised 
on the basis of land tenure, and a more elaborate system for the towns and cities 
closely associated with the successive imperial powers that dominated. The rural
13 Source: The National Geographic website
http://www3.nationalgeographic.com/places/cities/city_mumbai.html
14 See Cities Guide at www.economist.com/cities , Harris (1995)
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village based policing, where responsibility lay primarily with the headman, 
assisted by a watchman and sometimes by a police helper, continued unchanged 
by “the tides of conquest, consolidation, and anarchy that have swept over India 
in the past millennia” (Bayley 1969). City policing was headed by the kotwal, 
who was responsible for raising and maintaining a police force as well as 
carrying out all policing activities such as patrolling, surveillance, arrests, 
controlling prostitution, gambling, alcohol consumption etc15 (Cox n.d).
Bayley’s (1969) account of the political context within which the Indian police 
operate remains the most comprehensive and relevant account of Indian policing. 
It traces the impact of British rule on Indian policing, dividing the history of its 
administrative development into two periods 1757 to 1858 (under the East India 
Company) and 1858 to 1947 (as a colony of the British Empire). According to 
Bayley, the first 100-year period was one of experimentation, with successive 
attempts to find a solution to the twin problems of law and order and revenue 
collection. It yielded systems that enjoyed limited success. However, the Indian 
Mutiny of 1857 jolted the British government into enacting the great Indian legal 
codes (The Code of Civil Procedure 1859, The Indian Penal Code in 1860 and 
the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861), and the creation of a police 
commission to study the policing needs of the country for the British government 
in 1860. The result of the Commission’s deliberations was the Indian Police Act 
of (1861), which reorganised the police and introduced a uniform system 
throughout India and is the basis of the structure of the Indian police today 
(Nigam 1963). Recognizing that city policing had its own special requirements, a 
policing model influenced by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was introduced in 
the three presidency towns of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta (Bayley 1969). This 
‘Commissioner System of Policing’ was different from policing in rural districts, 
in that - the Commissioner of Police combined for law and order purposes the 
powers of the district magistrate (the administrative head of a district) and the 
Superintendent of police. These police forces were independent and the 
Commissioner reported to the provincial government directly, not through the 
Inspector General of Police of the state or province.
15 The clearest description of city policing can be found in the Ain-e-Akbari (Diary of Akbar, 
1556-1605), though it was a system that dated back many centuries (Bayley 1969)
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After Independence in 1947, India became a democracy with a parliamentary 
form of government with federal features. The Minister for Home Affairs at the 
centre and the Minister in charge of the Home Department of each of the 28 
different states that comprise the federation, are responsible for police affairs16. 
The Commissioner of Police is accountable to the minister holding the Home 
department portfolio and ultimately to the chief minister of the state.
Bayley (1969) highlights three distinguishing features of the Indian police 
system:
Firstly, since they are “organised, maintained and directed by the several states of 
the India union”, they avoid the fragmentation of police under a system of local 
control into a number of tiny local units (for example, the USA) and the rigidity 
of a national police force (for example, continental police forces in France or 
Germany). Secondly, the Indian police are ‘horizontally stratified’, which affects 
not only the organisation of ranks and the distribution of power among them 
(called gazetted officers, non-gazetted officers, and the ranks) but also 
determines the relation between the state and central government with respect to 
police administration. Entry to the police service is at 4 levels- as a constable, as 
a sub-inspector (via competitive exams held at the state level); as deputy 
superintendent of police (via competitive exams held by the state public service 
commission as part of the State Civil Services); and as an assistant 
superintendent of police (via all-India competitive exams conducted by the union 
public service commission as part of the All India Civil Services). The latter 
officer cadre, also known as the Indian Police Service is recruited, organised, 
trained and disciplined according to national legislation and subject to central 
government authority for matters other than operational control when on duty. 
Movement within ranks is restricted and promotions are time-bound not merit 
oriented. So unlike the British police, where everyone is recruited as a constable, 
and theoretically anyone can rise to be a top-ranking police official, in the Indian
16 There is no national police force but there are several central police agencies, such as the 
Border Security Force, the Regional Armed Forces, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the 
Intelligence Bureau, Central Industrial Security Force, and the Indo-Tibetian Border Police. 
These are under the purview of the Ministry of Home Affairs at the Center.
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police, officers can only rise up to a certain rank depending upon the rank they 
enter the system. Top ranks are reserved mainly for officers of the Indian Police 
Service. Thirdly, each state police are divided vertically into an armed and an 
unarmed branch. The unarmed branch or the civil police are responsible for day- 
to-day policing in the police stations and the armed branch assists the civil police 
in maintaining peace. Each state police also has battalions of armed paramilitary 
forces primarily to assist in law and order duties17. However, all officers above 
the rank of sub-inspector are trained in the use of and are entitled to carry 
firearms.
Bayley (1969:50-1)) suggests that apart from leaving behind the colonial legacy 
of the structure of the police forces, the British also “bequeathed a concept of the 
role police should play in Indian society. That is ‘proper’ police duties today are 
very much what were considered ‘proper’ police duties under the British”. While 
he does not explicitly say so, I presume he means that the ethos that drives 
policing in India is the same as that of the erstwhile colonial force, where 
‘suppression of the ‘natives” was its primary concern. Dhillon (2005: 23) 
describes the Indian police as being “tied irrevocably with long pre-colonial and 
colonial traditions of servility to the rulers and oppressive behaviour towards the 
masses” and suggests that because the Indian police have been unable to re­
invent itself or keep in step with the pace of societal changes, they are faced with 
a “credibility gap and a performance crisis... creating a serious mismatch 
between police practices and people’s expectations” (Dhillon 2005: 26). Since 
Independence, there is a general feeling in India that the civil administration (of 
which the police are a part) consists of ‘brown sahibs’ replacing ‘white sahibs’, 
where “the IPS are the inheritors of the baton passed down by their British 
predecessors and the gulf between the ‘rulers’ and the ruled continues” (Verma 
2005: 48). Thus a feeling of ‘us’ (police) versus ‘them’ (the ‘others’) appears to 
dominate administrative and policy decision-making. Whether this was actually 
the case in Mumbai will be examined when police perceptions of their role are 
discussed in Chapter 5.
17 These have different names in different states, for e.g. the paramilitary police in Maharashtra is 
called the State Reserve Police, but is called the Provincial Armed Constabulary in my cadre state 
of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal.
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3.4 Organisation of the Mumbai Police
When the East India Company acquired Bombay in 1669, Gerald Aungier 
became the Governor of the City. He also founded the city's police force, the 
Bhandari Militia. The Commissioner system of policing was introduced in 
Bombay in 1861 and the first Commissioner of Police Frank Souter was 
appointed in 1864. After Independence from British colonial rule the Indian 
Police Act (1861) was adopted as the structural basis for the police in 
independent India and the Bombay Police Act (1951) reaffirmed the 
organisational and structural configuration of the Police Commissioner system in 
the city of Bombay.
The total strength of the present-day Mumbai police force is 40,967 officers, 
responsible for the safety and security of the 14 million people. Table 1 below 
illustrates the profile of the force. As is illustrated by the table, the number of 
women officers at all ranks is very low and like policing worldwide, Mumbai 
police is a male dominated organisation.
The rank structure and strength of the force is shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Rank Structure of the Mumbai Police
Rank Male Officers Women
Officers
Total Percentage o f  
Total
CP 1 - 1 0.002%
JOINT CP 4 1 5 0.01%
ADDITIONAL
CP
12 12 0.03%
DEPUTY CP 37 1 38 0.1%
ASSISTANT CP 121 3 124 0.3%
INSPECTOR 966 11 977 2%
ASSISTANT
INSPECTOR
743 13 756 2%
SUB
INSPECTOR
2,751 99 2,850 7%
ASSISTANT
SUB
INSPECTOR
3,324 5 3,329 8%
HEAD
CONSTABLE
8,018 128 8,146 20%
CONSTABLES 23,944 785 24,729 60%
TOTAL 39,921 1046 40,967 100%
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police
83 police stations, grouped into 39 divisions and 5 policing zones manage day- 
to-day operational policing in Mumbai. The average police station has one Senior 
Police Inspector in charge of the station, 4 Police Inspectors, 6-9 Assistant Police 
Inspectors, approximately 20 Sub -Inspectors, 10 Assistant Sub-Inspectors, and 
approximately 300 Head Constables and Constables (Interview with Police 
Inspector, Tl). There are also 15 special units, including the Anti Terrorist Squad 
and the Crime Branch. Figure 1 depicts the chain of command that facilitates 
day-to-day policing of Mumbai.
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Figure 3.1: Mumbai Police -- Chain of Command
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Joint CP Joint CP Joint CP Joint CP Joint CP
(Administration) (Crime) (Law & Order) (Traffic) (ATS)
Additional CP Additional CP Additional CP Additional CP
(5 Regions) (Protection & Security) (SB, CID) (Operations)
Zonal DCP 
(including Port): 13
Divisional ACP: 39  
1
DCP
(Security)
DCP
(Protection)
ACP
(Security)
ACP
(Protection)
DCP 
(SB -I)
ACP
Police Stations: 83
DCP 
(SB -II)
ACP
ACP (Control Room)
Source: official website o f the Mumbai Police: http://www.mumbaipolice.org/special/
(ATS: Anti Terrorist Squad, SB.CID: Special Branch, Criminal Investigation Dept.)
In order to give a sense of perspective for a reader in the UK, the London 
Metropolitan Police (the Met) compares with the Mumbai police as follows: The 
Met employs 48,000 police officers, staff, traffic wardens and community 
support officers to police an area of 620 square miles and a population of 7.2 
million people. The basic street-level policing of London is carried out by 138 
police stations grouped into 32 London Boroughs, and one operational unit at 
Heathrow Airport. They have 23 listed specialist branches and departments.
3.4.1 The Crime Branch
The Crime Branch’s motto is ‘Excellence in crime prevention, detection and 
investigation’. It is headed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) 
(Detection) and is under the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioner of Police 
(Jt.CP) (Crime). There are 6 Assistant Commissioners of Police (ACP) in charge 
of various regions (south, central, east, west, north) and a special ACP in charge 
of various units: extortion, MCOCA (Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime 
Act), central intelligence, property, computer, statistics, and anti­
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1 ftrobbery/dacoity . Each regional Assistant Commissioner of Police is in charge 
of two or three units individually headed by an officer of the rank of Inspector. 
The Crime Branch, headed by the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) is the 
hub of the crime fighting activities of the Mumbai police (see Figure 2). The 
DCP (Detection) is in overall charge of detection of crime, monitoring the 
investigation of serious crime and for formulating new strategies for combating 
organised crime. Inspectors head the various units and cells. Some of these 
officers along with their Sub-Inspectors were responsible for the majority of 
encounters conducted by the Crime Branch and have been labelled ‘encounter 
specialists’ by the media and the public.
Despite similarities, according to police officers interviewed, these cells were not 
styled along the lines of the ‘death squads’ that emerged in as many as 10 states 
in Latin America (Sluka 2000), but were mainly involved in intelligence 
collection, surveillance and monitoring organised gang activities. While involved 
in encounters especially in the decade between 1993-2003, these cells not only 
specialized in killing criminals but operated largely as intelligence gathering and 
crime fighting units. However, the numbers and frequency of encounters differed 
over these years (see Table 3.7).
18 Dacoity is armed robbery committed by 5 or more persons.
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Figure 3.2: Crime Branch -- Chain of Command
ACP
(Special)
ACP
(East)
ACP
(W est)
ACP
(South)
ACP
(Central)
Units I to XII
ACP
(North)
Additional CP (Crime) Deputy CP (Detection)
ACP (Administration) 
ACP (Public Relations)
Additional CP 
(Econom ic Offences 
W ing)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Joint Com m issioner o f  Police (Crime)
DCP (Enforcement) 
DCP (Preventive) 
DCP (Anti-Narcotics) 
DCP (Special Task Force)
Extortion, MCOC, Central Intelligence 
Unit, Property, Computer, Statistics, 
Anti-Robbery, Dacoity
Source: official website o f the Mumbai Police: http://www.mumbaipolice.org/
Since the police consider crime fighting to be their prime task (Reiner 2000a, 
Waddington 1999a), and dealing with organised crime was a primary reason for 
encounters Table 2 outlines the Mumbai crime figures. Crimes are registered 
under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as under special 
local laws such as Arms Act, Gambling Act, Excise Act, Indian Railways Act, 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Prevention of Immoral Traffic 
Act, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. For 
example in the year 2002 crimes registered under the special local laws 
accounted for 67.8% of all crimes as against 32.2% registered under the Indian 
Penal Code in India (Crime in India 2002).
Table 3.2 outlines the crime figures recorded under the provisions of the Indian 
Penal Code for Mumbai between 1993 and 2003.
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Table 3.2: Annual Crime Statistics for M umbai City — 1993-2003
Year Murder Robbery Burglary Theft Rape Extortion All
IPC
Crimes
1993 687 759 2852 9773 131 Not available 35687
1994 354 718 2707 9927 150 Not available 35375
1995 357 704 2,955 11,611 210 535 40,289
1996 327 584 2,554 9,924 153 333 32,484
1997 288 495 2,602 10,033 130 230 32,609
1998 365 470 2,472 8,020 118 341 29,869
1999 340 501 2,761 7,641 141 297 29,354
2000 311 569 2,838 7,561 124 309 29,238
2001 295 406 2,861 7,535 127 269 25,686
2002 252 291 2,596 6,181 128 175 26,275
2003 242 239 2,542 5,919 133 142 25,686
Source: Mumbai Police Website and Crime Branch, Mumba; Crime in India
Table 3.2 suggests that overall the number of crimes registered under the Indian 
Penal Code peaked in 1995, and thereafter have been steadily declining - a fact 
that has not been adequately explained or discussed either in sociological or 
criminological terms in Mumbai.
Again, for a sense of perspective, comparing these with the annual crime figures 
for the financial years 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 recorded by the London Met 
Police reveals that there are wide discrepancies in the number of crimes 
registered by the two police forces. Even taking into account that the figure for 
total IPC crimes registered in Mumbai is only a portion (assuming it is only
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32.2% of the total crimes registered) of all crimes registered, the discrepancy 
between the crime statistics of the two cities is remarkable.
Table 3.3: Annual Crime Statistics for London — 2000 and 2003
Year Murder Robbery Burglary Theft Rape Extortion Total
Crimes
1999-
2000
180 36,317 129,145 426,235 2,270 Not
available
1,052,047
2002-
2003
189 42,496 113,427 463,710 2,731 Not
available
1,080,741
Source: The Metropolitan Police website
Making any judgements about crime, its overall incidence, patterns and trends 
based on the official crime figures is fraught with problems, even within one 
police jurisdiction. Cross-country comparison is even more difficult given that 
the recording of crime occurs in several different contexts: social, political, 
organisational and situational (Coleman & Moynihan 1996). Factors such as 
citizen willingness to report crimes, police decisions as to which kinds of 
offences to include in the official statistics, what counting rules apply, and police 
discretion about whether or how to record crimes contribute to the construction 
of official crime statistics (Maguire 2002, Farrington & Dowds 1985). To 
illustrate, the column showing figures for murder in Table 2 does not include 
encounter killings, which are not recorded as murder, but are generally registered 
as a crime under sections 307, 353, 34 Indian Penal Code, registered along with 
sections 3, 25, and 27 of the Arms Act19. An encounter case is usually registered 
on behalf of the police officer involved in the encounter against the alleged 
criminals who are accused of acting in furtherance of common intention 
(conspiracy to commit crime), attempting to murder the officer, and assaulting or 
using criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty 
(arresting the criminal), as well as illegal possession and use of unregistered 
firearms. Thus no criminal case is lodged against the police officers involved in 
encounter deaths in the first instance, rather the dead ‘criminal’ is accused of 
attacking with the intention to kill a police officer fulfilling his official duty.
19 Source: Mumbai Police Crime Branch.
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Another problem, especially in the Indian context, identified by Verma (2005: 
93) was the practice of correcting statistics at a later date, upon the receipt of 
new information (changing ‘attempt to murder’ to murder) is rarely undertaken 
in most police organisations, but can minimize crime and distort the picture.
Official police crime figures do not include those crimes recorded by other 
agencies and are sometimes ‘cuffed’ to avoid work or improve the overall clear- 
up rates (Maguire 2002) and other practical techniques such as ‘creating’, 
‘keepy-backs’ ‘juggling’, ‘fiddling’, ‘bending’ (Young 1991), what is known as 
‘burking’ in India (Raghavan 2004) are adopted while recording crime statistics. 
However, in keeping with Bottomley & Pease’s findings (1986) the general 
public’s understanding of crime even in Mumbai was not so much influenced by 
the ‘hard’ data derived from governmental statistical sources, rather it was 
moulded and maybe distorted by the powerful messages sent out by the news 
media and political rhetoric, as well as by personal experience, anecdote and 
gossip, and fictional representation in books and films (Maguire 2002).
The Metropolitan Police website suggests that in 2007 for the fourth year in a
onrow, overall crime was down . The British Crime Survey 2005-6 shows that
crime is stabilising after long periods of reduction. Police crime figures show a
1% reduction in crime figures recorded during 2005-6 following increases after
the introduction the National Crime Recording Standards in 2002 and taking a
more victim oriented approach to crime recording (Simmons et al 2003).
However, these surveys report changing trends but do not explain why crime has
been falling in England and Wales. The Home Office website suggests that
focussing on specific problem areas such as drugs and alcohol related crimes,
gun crime and youth crime via a multi-agency approach and by taking measures
91to improve community safety has led to crime reduction . In contrast, there 
appears to be no official coherent policy or multi-agency approach in Mumbai to 
account for declining crime figures. When asked about declining crime figures in 
Mumbai, police officers felt it was the result of their efficient work and effective 
crime control measures.
20 www.met.police.uk/crimestatistics
21 Source: Home Office Website; www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/
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3.5 Organised Crime
In the United States, and in popular discourse the term organised crime is 
“generally applied to describe a group of people who act together on a long-term 
basis to commit crimes for gain using the threat of violence” (Levi 2002). 
However, as Levi (2002: 879) recognizes, it is problematic to discuss organised 
crime as if it were “a coherent common noun describing a well-understood set of 
arrangements to commit crimes” because it covers many different kinds of 
arrangements: a hierarchical organisation; an oligarchy of firms competing in 
action but in tandem; or, a network of arrangements to commit certain kinds of 
crime for gain. The form organised crime takes in the USA is different from that 
in the UK, Italy, Germany or the Netherlands, Russia, and other countries around 
the world (Hobbs 2004, Albanese et al 2003, Levi 2002, Rawlinson 1998, Fijnaut 
1991).
In the UK context, Hobbs (2004: 421) suggests that traditional organised crime 
networks were “deeply entrenched in the locations, working practices, 
occupational cultures and very occasionally, oppositional strategies of the 
industrial working class” (citing Samuel 1981). However, Hobbs (2004) suggests 
that the impact of de-industrialisation in the UK has led to the disintegration of 
this community, with the result that “contemporary organised crime has become 
located within ad hoc trade based loose collectivities” that are unstable and even 
self destructive (2004: 421), but could be said to be anchored in local social 
systems that are not feudalistic. Though empirical evidence suggests that the 
traditional family firm has adapted to the contemporary cultural, economic, and 
geographic terrain, Hobbs (2004) suggests that the success of organised crime 
depends on the connectivity established between groups and individuals rather 
than the traditional familial or corporate connectedness that ensured success in 
the early 1950s and 1960s.
In the USA, organised crime was mainly associated with an Italian-American 
crime syndicate called the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra or Cosa Nostra, and was 
defined by Jacobs & Panarella (1998: 160) as referring “not to the conduct but to 
a crime syndicate: a type of criminal formation with an organisational structure, 
rules, history, division of labour, reputation, capacity for ruthless violence,
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capacity to corrupt law enforcement and the political system, and the power to 
infiltrate labour unions and legitimate business” as well as “ the ability to 
become a significant political force through control of grassroots party 
organisation and campaign contributions”. While originally considered to be an 
un-American phenomenon that was confined to immigrants and outsiders, a 
version of the alien conspiracy theory (Hobbs 1997, Block & Chambliss 1981, 
Ianni & Reuss-Ianni 1972), since the 1970s, studies have demonstrated that 
organised crime fits completely into the American social, political and economic 
structures (Fijnaut 1991).
Though organised crime does not necessarily exhibit identical features across the 
world (Fijnaut 1991), the definition employed by Jacobs and Panarella (1998) to 
describe the American Cosa Nostra could apply to organised crime gangs known 
as “companies” in Mumbai. Kelly (1986: 25) suggests that indigenous groups 
similar to the Sicilian mafia that emerged in the rural, oppressed regions of 
southern Italy, have been identified in other countries and states, “where the 
processes of economic development and modernization have produced socially 
and culturally chaotic conditions for sizeable segments of the population”. He 
identifies conditions that provide ideal breeding ground for ‘mafias’ to proliferate 
such as: “the expansion of the economy; the criminalization of some of its 
products; and improvements in the technological base of the society which 
contribute to the efficient organisation of criminal enterprises” (Kelly 1986: 26). 
Similar conditions prevailed in Mumbai, which continues to be a rapidly 
expanding city, with a daily influx of migrants, deepening divisions within 
society, liberalisation of the economy, combined with improved means of 
communication. These have provided fertile ground for organised crime groups 
to develop and flourish. Besides, of the various factors that characterize 
organised crime in any country according to Bovenkerk (1991), the first three 
identified by him apply to the Indian context in general and pave the way for 
organised crime groups: the political system (one that emphasizes personalized 
election campaigns and ethnic group affiliations); the role of violence in society 
(spirit of vigilantism; unwillingness to co-operate with local authorities and 
resort to violence at the slightest pretext); and the appreciation of prominent
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crime figures (mafia dons and master criminals glorified and romanticized by the 
media and films).
Deuskar (1999: 7) defines organised crime in India as “a business or an industry 
dealing in the supply of goods and services which are barred by law. The crime 
part is a by-product which is necessary to carry on the business profitably. The 
main aim of the business is to earn the maximum profits in the shortest possible 
time span”. In the 1960s and 1970s goods smuggled into India were gold, illicit 
liquor, and electronic items; and organised gangs provided services such as 
illegal evictions, protection rackets, money laundering, and loan sharking. 
Deuskar (1999) suggests that organised crime is associated with terror, violence 
and brutality, and he sees these as comer stones of any effective organised gang. 
The success and survival of a gang depends on its efficiency and ability to 
deliver the goods without failure. It is by employing terror that gangs are able to 
maintain control over their own men, deter competitors, and ensure compliance 
from their victims.
Verma & Tiwari (2003: 243) further suggest that, “organised crime in India may 
be defined as a group of criminals that are closely aligned with legitimate 
business, corrupt bureaucracy, and political leadership and are designed to make 
money or achieve power through violence, illegal means, bribery and / or 
extortion”. This definition introduces the political element in organised crime. 
The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (1999) outlines the legal 
definition of organised crime as any continuing unlawful activity by an 
individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate 
or on behalf of such a syndicate by use of violence or threat of violence or 
intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means with the objective of gaining 
primary benefits or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or 
any other person promoting insurgency. This definition includes insurgency and 
terrorist activities within the purview of organised crime.
Hobbs (2000) highlights the difficulties of conducting research on serious and 
organised crime. He describes how “archive data, such as police and judicial 
reports, economic evidence, pamphlets, diaries and biographies” were used by
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historians to study the origins, growth and development of organised crimes 
(Hobbs 1998: 154). However, as he acknowledges such evidence presents one 
side of the story and may be biased in favour of the dominant narrative of the 
control agencies. Despite these difficulties the mentioned sources are major 
secondary sources for studying the rise of organised crime. Ethnographic work 
with criminals, let alone organised criminals, is generally difficult and in some 
cases impractical, involving issues of access, objectivity, and anonymity and 
confidentiality (Ianni & Reuss-Ianni 1972). Kelly (1986: 13) suggests research 
on organised crime groups is also made more difficult because police and law 
enforcers are inhibited by the law (especially if cases are sub-judice) and 
necessities of operational requirements that makes them reluctant to disseminate 
information; and the fact that organised crime groups are not easily penetrable. 
The fact also remains that what is known by the police, as a reactive institution, 
will always lag behind what is happening on the streets.
There is little official information about the nature and extent of organised crime 
groups in Mumbai (Verma & Tiwari 2003). However, newspaper reports, police 
stories, reminiscences of retired police officers, films, fiction and non-fiction 
accounts, and police records and statistics (which were not as detailed and 
informative as I would have liked them to be) help trace the history and 
development of organised crime groups.
Bollywood films, a popular source of information about gangs and gangsters 
have proliferated myths, but also attempted to treat the subject with some degree 
of seriousness, which doesn’t necessarily make them accurate, but useful, 
nonetheless. Since there are very few in-depth studies of the subject (Deuskar 
1999, Saraf 1999, Sarkar & Tiwari 2002, Verma & Tiwari 2003), there is little to 
cross check the ‘authenticity’ of these filmed depictions. However, since most of 
the popular representations of organised gangs in the media, via interviews with 
gang leaders, non-fictional and fictional accounts are roughly similar, and to a 
large extent reflect official perspectives on the topic, there is need for caution 
before accepting them as ‘reality’. On the other hand, close nexus between 
gangsters and the film industry (see Chapter 7) could imply that Bollywood films 
may have an element of authenticity in presenting the story of the rise and spread
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of organised crime in Mumbai (Thevar 2006). The film Company (2002), traces 
the rise and growth of a gang in Mumbai and the genesis of the term ‘company’ 
that came to characterize an organised criminal group or mafia gang, essentially 
because it allegedly operates like a company - demanding loyalty of its 
‘employees’, possessing a hierarchical order, organised on the principles of 
division of labour, and having protection policies (good legal representation) and 
compensation (for the families) for its ‘employees’ should they be injured, 
arrested or sentenced in the course of ‘company’ business. Mehta (2005) in his 
non-fiction study of the city of Mumbai has also recorded the recognizably 
‘corporate’ nature of these gangs and the fact that there are specialists storing 
weapons, supplying them, threatening witnesses, an elaborate support structure 
for gang members in jail, and the fact that there are “doctors, lawyers, 
sympathizers, foot soldiers, scouts and people who run safe houses” (Mehta 
2005: 155). The main point is that there simply is no reliable information about 
‘organised’ crime: only varying accounts of it, all of problematic accuracy.
3.6 Composition of Organised Criminal Gangs
My research is focused on police perception of organised crime and their attitude 
towards encounters. My interest in organised gangs relates to the kinds of people 
(who happen to be predominantly young men) attracted towards a life of crime 
and in the process sometimes, becoming ‘victims’ of police use of deadly force. 
There have been very few studies on the composition and actual dynamics of 
Mumbai gangs. One reference I was able to find was Saraf s unpublished study 
(1999) tracing the origin of organised criminal gangs in the city, their criminal 
activities and the inter-gang warfare. Saraf (1999: cited in Sarkar & Tiwari 2002: 
10) drew a profile of organised criminal gangs:
• Two thirds of the gangsters in his sample were in the age group 19-28 
years and only 6.5 % were above 40 years of age.
• A third had received primary education, less than half had received 
secondary schooling, and 5% were university educated.
• A majority of the gangsters came from outside Mumbai and 
approximately just less than a third came from outside the state of 
Maharashtra (mainly from other parts of India).
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• The gangs were not based on region or religion, but after the 1993 serial 
bomb blasts, Hindu gangsters have largely dissociated themselves from 
the Dawood Ibrahim gang (known to be a Muslim gang).
• The gang leader has a caring attitude towards members and their families 
are well looked after when members are in jail or killed.
• The gang leader is not an autocrat and tends to consult his experienced 
lieutenants.
• There are no initiation ceremonies, but gangsters are expected to display 
unflinching loyalty to the boss, lack of which could mean death.
• There is a loose confederation of gangs, with a smaller gang/s merging 
with a bigger one, but not losing its identity altogether, and which is also 
free to indulge in its own activities as long as these do not clash with the 
interests of the bigger gang.
• Gangsters are divided into three categories; sharp shooters, money 
collectors, and liaison agents who deal with criminal justice agents. There 
are also a number of auxiliary members who provide shelter, safeguard 
weapons, and facilitate operations in other ways.
Sarkar and Tiwari (2002) reach similar conclusions about the type of young men
who get sucked into criminality and violence in Mumbai in the 1990s, based on
Sarkar’s field work, observations, interviews with ‘criminals’ and expert police
officers on “Youth Anomie” exploring the role of youth in organised crimes in
Mumbai city as part of her doctoral thesis. Pendse (2003) while discussing the
film Satya, (Truth) which deals with the induction of a young man into the world
of organised crime in Mumbai, comments that the film depicts what has been
happening in the city, the reality of existence in Mumbai in the 1990s, where,
“An unorganised, unemployed insecure mass of youth in an ethical 
vacuum and cultural confusion constantly lured by consumerist 
glitter caught in the trap of a speculative economy is an explosive 
force. A vague discontent, a well-obscured system, indirect 
exploitation, and unfocused anger provide a congenial atmosphere 
for ideologies and movements of violence, direct action, spurious 
identity politics, and fundamental social irresponsibility. 
Communalisation22 of society and politics then becomes quite easy in
22 Communalisation: a term used to mean deepening divisions based on religions- especially 
between Hindus and Muslims.
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Indian conditions,... The Hindutva23 of the communalised 
sections...is a socio-political position that seeks easy and visible 
(though imaginary) enemies and targets as an outlet for its envy” 
(Pendse 2003: 326).
The 1990s saw a large number of unemployed and unorganized young men who 
were attracted to a life of crime. The film subtly illustrates almost all the factors 
that encourage criminality and how they came together in Mumbai to create a 
cocktail of circumstances that were fertile breeding ground for organised crime 
groups to flourish.
3.7 The Rise of Organised Crime in Mumbai
Hobbs (2004) suggests that organised crime is a ‘wraithlike entity’ that exists 
mainly as a loose conglomeration of criminals that sometimes operate in 
isolation and at others co-operatively. While this characterisation may be 
partially representative of the organised crime groups in Mumbai, the popular 
perception is one of individual ‘dons’ around whom gangs have evolved, who are 
a law unto themselves, and have certain distinct styles of operation and areas of 
domination. Thus, while smaller groups might be involved in independent 
operations, there is a sense that they owe allegiance (and perhaps a share in the 
spoils) to one or other of the larger organised crime groups and to whom they can 
appeal to for succour and support in case of trouble.
The growth of organised gangster operations in Mumbai began in the 1970s 
dominated by Haji Mastan and Varadaraj Mudaliar and to some extent Yusuf 
Lala, who were involved in bootlegging activities and large scale smuggling 
operations, mainly gold, electronic items and drugs ( Ghosh 1991, Singh 2000, 
Blom Hansen 2001). Since the 1980s Mumbai witnessed the growth and 
proliferation of various gangs emanating from and branching out of these
23 The concept of Hindutva as elucidated by Savarkar (1923) stands for the quality of being a 
Hindu and is contrasted to Hinduism which is interpreted to mean Hindu dharma and as relating 
to Vedic dharma, the latter being a limited, sectarian term representing religious dogma (Lele 
1995: 92). Lele (1995: xix) suggests that the modem project of hindutva is based on successfully 
persuading people to believe in two main premises:”(a) die anxiety and uncertainty that engulf 
their lives today ... is the product of a conspiracy of subtle and overt enemy forces which have 
been at work internally, regionally and globally and (b) that these forces have emerged not just in 
the recent past, but have been active for centuries, and against which the Hindu nation has waged 
heroic battles through its many heroes”.
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original organised criminal groups. During the period I am interested in (1993- 
2003) media accounts and the officers I interviewed said that there were 5 or 6 
major gangs in operation in Mumbai. Most of these gangs were known by the 
names of their gang leader. These were the Dawood Ibrahim gang (D Company), 
the Chota Rajan gang (Nana24 Company), the Arun Gawli gang (‘Chaddi’25 
Company), the Amar Naik gang, and the Manchhekar gang. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000, factions of the Dawood gang, led by Chhota Shakeel and Abu Salem 
became more active.
In the early 1980s Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, the son of a Head Constable in the 
CID (Criminal Investigation Department) of the Bombay police, mobilised a 
group of essentially Muslim youth and engaged in activities of the older 
generation of mafia leaders primarily smuggling, bootlegging, and protection 
rackets (Nair 2002). The police officers I interviewed did not think his 
background gave him any special status or power, apart from perhaps insider 
knowledge of police working practices, but mentioned it as an example of how 
criminal gangs could attract youngsters from all sections of society. The gang 
emerged as the most dreaded in the city with Chota Shakeel and Chota Rajan as 
its lieutenants. In 1984 Dawood, pursued by rival gangs and charged with serious 
offences, fled the country when the threat of strong police action became 
significant. He continued to direct his smuggling and other operations in Mumbai 
from Dubai (Sarkar & Tiwari 2002), and was shortly joined by his lieutenants 
Chota Rajan and Chota Shakeel in directing gang operations from Dubai and 
later via remote control from destinations as varied as Malaysia, Singapore and 
Karachi. According to police officers I interviewed, the fear of police encounters 
prompted the flight of these gang leaders from Mumbai.
The nature of organised crime changed from the early 1990s onwards, when the 
Indian economy was liberalised and markets thrown open to goods and services. 
When gold and electronic items were no longer subject to import restrictions, the 
black market dwindled and ceased to be profitable for gangs. Smuggling drugs
24 So called because Chhota Rajan is ‘nana’ or elder brother to his troops (Mehta 2005: 144)
25 Meaning either underpants or shorts; the gang is called so because of their preference for 
wearing shorts. (Mehta 2005: 153)
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and arms and ammunition became the new sources of revenue. Extortion {hafta 
vasooli), kidnapping for ransom and contract killings (supari killings) spiralled. 
Increased gang activity in protection rackets, gambling, money laundering 
(hawala), and upscale prostitution, along with involvement in the building 
industry and the film industry became the primary profit earners for gangs, 
deprived of their traditional sources of profit (Ghosh 1991; Mehta 2005: 154).
Around the early 1990s events in Mumbai and elsewhere in India had a profound 
impact, both on life in the city, and the nature of organised crime. The demolition
th  Ofiof the Babri masjid on the 6 of December 1992 in Ayodhya by a crowd of 
Hindu activists and the subsequent waves of religious violence and riots in 
December 1992 and January 1993 shocked Mumbai and left hundreds dead and
7 7several hundred others injured . This event caused a clear divide between the 
Hindu and Muslim communities who had hitherto lived in relative peace and 
harmony. Police action during these riots was perceived by many to be biased 
against the minority Muslim community (Blom Hansen 2001, Punwani 2003, 
Mehta 2005) with not only police control room communication recorded as clear 
proof of their contempt for and their unwillingness to provide adequate 
protection to Muslims (Agnes 1996) but also 31 officers (including some very 
senior officers) were indicted by the Srikrishna Commission that was established 
subsequently to inquire into the riots, “for killing innocent people, acting in a 
communal manner, being negligent, or rioting themselves” (Mehta 2005: 117). In 
India the term ‘communal’ is used to denote bias towards a particular religion, 
for example religious violence or religious riots are referred to as ‘communal’ 
violence or ‘communal’ riots and usually refer to tensions between Hindu and 
Muslim communities. In fact, the commission found that “the Shiv Sainiks and 
Hindu rioters had acted with the collusion and participation of officers in the
26 The masjid or mosque was allegedly built by the Moghul ruler Babar by demolishing an earlier 
temple which marked the birthplace of Lord Rama (Hindu deity) in Ayodhya, and was 
subsequently under dispute since 1850. The Bharatiya Janata Party and the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh, following their Hindutva agenda reclaimed what they considered to be a 
holy birthplace and revived the controversy by beginning the construction of the 
Ramjanmabhoomi temple in 1990 (Engineer 1995). This set off a wave of religious riots and 
disturbances in various parts of the country in the period leading up to and culminating in the 
massive riots that followed the demolition of the mosque in December 1992.
27 Official figures reported 900 people dead and 2036 injured in the riots. (Srikrishna 
Commission Report, Chapter 1, para. 1.24)
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Bombay and state police. This included police murders of Muslims” (Srikrishna 
Commission Report: Section 1.30). The city police force remains
overwhelmingly dominated by Hindu officers (Blom Hansen 2001), a mere 4.2% 
of the Maharashtra state police (including Mumbai police), and only 3.65 % of 
IPS officers were Muslim in 2002 (Kalidi 2003, also citing Rai 1998). Referring 
to the Mumbai police, the Srikrishna report confirmed “an alarming pattern of 
police indifference to, collusion with and active participation during Hindutva 
attacks on Muslim (and latterly Christian) communities.” (Bhatt 2001: 196-7). 
Whether as a result of the ‘politics of discreditability’ and/ or because the 
Mumbai police were indicted for being partisan in the communal conflicts that 
occurred in 1992-3, this image tainted the media’s perception of subsequent 
police actions against organised gangs.
On March 12, 1993 a series of bombs went off in Mumbai, killing 317 people in 
the city, in revenge for the anti- Muslim ‘pogroms’ that had taken place a few 
months earlier. The police subsequently charged Dawood’s Muslim criminal 
syndicate of masterminding and carrying out this deed with the help of Pakistan’s 
Inter Services Intelligence Agency. Punwani (2003: 253) who recorded the 
voices of those affected by the riots and bomb blasts suggests that Muslims in the 
city felt vindicated after the blasts, because “even the most communal Hindu 
began to realize that the Muslims cannot be beaten indefinitely”. Punwani 
suggests the police and the state reacted with vengeance and retaliated with 
arrests, clampdown on all illegal and unlicensed businesses (mostly small 
Muslim businessmen) allegedly engaged in custodial torture, and there were 
large-scale seizures of illegal arms and weapons. It is not certain whether police 
actions in all these cases were justified or necessary, but they were certainly 
perceived as being retributive and retaliatory by members of the Muslim 
community.
From then on the organisation of various gangs began to be drawn around 
religious lines and the underworld, which was perceived to be completely secular 
until then, was said to become communalised after the blasts. However, though 
many of the large gangs had Muslim leaders, they still did not appear to be
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organised around religious communities, but rather on “criminal talent and 
ability” (Masselos 1996: 119).
In the early 1990s apart from concentrating on criminal activities for economic 
gains, gang activities extended into financing, arming, and facilitating terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai and other parts of the country, thus fanning communal hatred 
and inciting violence and reprisals. Masselos (1996:121) reports evidence 
suggesting Dawood and others planned a number of killings to provoke a 
communal reaction, and that the Shiv Sena (a Hindu political party) by 
responding in like to these killings unknowingly played into the hands of the 
provocateurs. Masselos (1996: 121) suggests, “the evidence seems to be 
sufficient to justify the idea of an extensive criminal gang conspiracy although 
support for the Pakistan connection is far less compelling”. The theory behind 
this allegation was that in the early 1990s Dawood was forced to flee Dubai and 
seek shelter in Karachi. Beholden to the Pakistani government Dawood 
presumably engaged in anti-Indian acts because it was essential for receiving 
continued shelter in Pakistan and also because it was financially profitable. He is 
said to have used his local contacts and knowledge of the city to mastermind the 
terrorist attack on the Bombay stock exchange and other important locations in 
the city in March 1993. Allegedly backed by the Pakistani ISI agency, the 
Dawood gang was believed to be responsible by the investigating authority for 
planning and executing the bombings and supplying arms and ammunition that 
caused the destruction to avenge the demolition of the disputed Babri Mosque 29 
(Deuskar 1999, Nair 2002).
Another explanation for the involvement of organised crime gangs in the riots 
related to the structures of power that operated with respect to unauthorised land 
ownership of shanties and slums throughout Mumbai. Masselos (1996) suggests 
that legal landowners and developers employed organised gangs to set fire to 
shanty settlements during the riots when the law and order machinery had broken
28 The Bombay blast cases were investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the 
premier investigative agency in the country.
See for example, ‘ 1993 Mumbai Blasts: Four Memons convicted’, The Times o f India, Mumbai 
edition, 12 September 2006.
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down in order to gain possession of such lands. While in some cases, the attacks 
were directed against particular religious groups by means of selective targeting 
of their dwellings, in other cases clearing occurred regardless of the religion of 
the occupants. The picture is unclear because there were several loci of power in 
these slums with interests that colluded or collided at times: the Sena branches, 
other politicised or active groups, slum landlords and bosses, the gangs, and the 
developers. Masselos (1996: 120) suggests that “when the attacks occurred there 
was not necessarily any clear communal antagonism at work, rather the 
communal situation was manipulated for ends that were not communal but 
economic”. This explanation puts the intervention of organised gangs in the 
communal riots in a different perspective by adding another economic dimension 
to their alleged communal activities.
Around 1994 Chota Raj an, a Hindu drug dealer and contract killer, broke away 
from the Dawood gang and created his own faction. He allegedly joined with the 
Hindu Arun Gawli gang and was said to be responsible for many retaliatory 
killings of Dawood’s chief men involved in the blasts. The Arun Gawli gang was 
organised by his predecessor Ramya Naik (Hindu)- who primarily amalgamated 
several smaller gangs with similar interests that were in opposition to the 
Dawood gang. The gang was composed predominantly of local Maharashtrian 
boys and its stronghold was concentrated locally around a particular area in 
Mumbai. Even after the arrest of Arun Gawli, the activities of the gang continued 
unabated, and in fact after the police encounter of Amar Naik (Hindu), his gang 
was also absorbed into the Gawli gang.
Another lieutenant of the Dawood gang, Abu Salem (Muslim), who went on to 
create his own gang, was considered a prime suspect for the Bombay blasts of 
1993, and was wanted in more than 60 cases of murder, attempted murder, 
extortion and abduction. When he broke up with the Dawood gang over sharing 
the underworld earnings from the Mumbai film industry in the mid 1990s, he fled 
from Dubai to the United States and then later to Lisbon (Portugal). From there 
he continued to conduct his extortion campaign in the Mumbai film industry. His 
group was said to have been responsible for the murders of several film 
personalities and was a source of terror and fear in the film world (Katakam
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2005). Involved in financing and distribution of films, his virtual presence in the 
film industry continued to be a source of threat and impediment to the autonomy 
of several filmmakers. He was also allegedly involved in the killing of several 
Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party (both Hindu parties) leaders (IPCS Report: 
4). Suspected of being a part of the A1 Qaeda network by Indian agencies as well 
as the FBI, Abu Salem was extradited from Lisbon in 2005 and was brought to 
India for questioning and prosecution (Katakam 2005). At the time of the 
research, the Chota Shakeel (Muslim) gang, that used to be a wing of D 
Company, was operating independently, though not in dispute with the bigger 
gang.
Apart from these major players, there were a host of other small, local gangs who 
specialized in terrorizing local residents, extorting money, and settling disputes 
by brute force who were constantly engaged in power tussles to protect their 
‘tu rf from other gangs. As interviews with police officers and ‘claimsmakers’ 
revealed, most of the extortion demands or threats were made via the telephone, 
with the ‘gangster’ often claiming to be part of some larger organised gang. 
Ordinary residents could in no way ascertain whether the threat posed to them 
was by an actual organised gang or a small time operator. It appeared to the 
public as if there was an open season for anyone who wished to reap the benefits 
of society’s fear of organised crime groups. This was how not just the rich and 
famous, but even ordinary, middle class people felt the widespread impact of 
organised crime.
3.8 Political Involvement in Organised Crime
As in many other cities beset with organised crime groups (see for e.g. 
Anechiarico 1991), it can at least be surmised that these could not have existed, 
flourished, and operated relatively unhindered without some co-operation from 
the law enforcement agencies and political patronage. Verma & Tiwari (2003) 
describe the relationship between business, the bureaucracy and politicians in 
India as being one of reciprocity and mutual benefit: business people provide the 
capital in return for enhanced profits; bureaucrats misuse their authority in favour 
of racketeers, neutralize or enfeeble authority of official agents, and accept part 
of the profits as bribes; politicians, whose major motive is capturing power, act
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as godfathers diverting attention from the criminal activities of these gangs and 
ensure that arrested gangsters are treated leniently by the state. “The results of 
such a powerful combination are deadly: the state stands compromised, the 
official agencies are demoralized and made ineffective, and the public exchequer 
is looted of huge sums of money” (Verma & Tiwari 2003: 243).
The connection between politics and crime is reciprocal - on the one hand, 
criminals are associated (overt participation and covert support via funds or 
muscle power) in the business of politics; and on the other, politics influences 
criminological discourse, affecting both perception of the ‘crime problem’, and 
the techniques developed to control it (Cohen 1996). The ‘criminalization of 
politics’ and ‘politicization of crime’ in this sense were in evidence in Mumbai 
as the following discussion illustrates.
The political location of organised crime in Mumbai was influenced by what 
Cohen describes as “the actual incidence, severity and risk of criminal 
victimization.. .the public perception of the seriousness of the crime problem... 
and the rhetorical manipulation of the crime problem and public anxiety in media 
and political discourse” (1996: 8). Embedding the crime problem into political 
discourse in Mumbai became more pronounced from the late 1980s when 
organised crime began to soar and its impact was perceived to be more widely 
felt. The power struggles between the major political parties in Mumbai may 
have been responsible for this development.
Indian multi-party democracy has given rise to a proliferation of parties at the 
national, regional and local levels. In Maharashtra, the Congress Party was the 
dominant political force till the mid nineties. Factions of this party jostled for 
power at the state level. This party calls itself secular but has had to defend itself 
against general allegations that it appeased Muslim voters. Since the formation of 
the State of Maharashtra in 1960, the Congress Party, or one of its factions has 
been in power at the State level except when it was out of power for the brief 
period between 1995 and 2000 when the Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) won the State elections (Purandare 1999). However, it returned to power in 
2004.
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The other major political party was the Shiv Sena (‘Army of Shiva’), set up in 
1966 by Balasaheb Thackeray to promote local and regional interests. It also 
promised to wipe out gangsters and tried to gain sympathy from the middle 
classes. Lele (1995: 3) suggests that by the sixties “while publicly attacking the 
underworld, it [the Shiv Sena] managed to create within itself a strong and 
dedicated following that gave the organisation its muscle power and in return 
gave those in the underworld the benefit of its organisation and discipline”. Thus 
the roots of their association with organised crime were sown in the slums and 
‘bastis’ of Mumbai where scores of dedicated young men formed the cadres of 
the Sainiks, as it gave them a sense of power and masculinity (Mehta 2005). The 
Shiv Sena joined the Hindutva brigade (comprising of the Jan Sangh, the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1984, at a time 
when its popularity was waning and its regional appeal had dramatically 
weakened. This led the Shiv Sena to look upon militant Hinduism as a possible 
alternate ideology to win back popularity with the masses (Lele 1995). Its 
association with Hindu dominated gangs meant that rival Muslim gangs were 
kept under check, especially in the years the Sena was in power.
Political involvement in gang wars appeared to be communal, with the Hindu 
Shiv Sena Party providing open support to the Arun Gawli gang in the early part 
of the 1990s. However, when Gawli floated his own political party in 1997, 
posing a threat to the Sena, it is said that Thackeray directed the police to come 
down hard on Gawli (Mehta 2005). A closer examination of the break up of 
encounters shows that in the years after the BJP-Shiv Sena government went out 
of power in 2000, the number of members of the Dawood gang who died in 
police encounters dwindled drastically.
Table 3.4 gives the gang affiliations of criminals killed in encounters in Mumbai.
30 Shanty towns.
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Table 3.4: Gang Affiliation of Criminals Killed in Encounters ~  1993-2003
Year Dawood
Ibrahim
Chota
Rajart
Chota
Shakil
Arun
Gawli
Ashwin
Naik
Others
1993 15 0 0 0 1 21
1994 7 0 0 5 12 6
1995 3 0 0 1 2 1
1996 15 11 0 5 6 21
1997 20 22 0 12 3 11
1998 13 16 0 4 6 9
1999 35 7 0 10 12 19
2000 36 5 0 5 2 13
2001 0 44 20 0 7 23
2002 1 21 7 0 1 17
2003
(31.07.03)
0 14 2 3 0 18
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police
It appears that while in the years when the Sena government was in power there 
were many more casualties in Muslim dominated gangs. Since then the focus of 
police encounters has perhaps shifted to rival gangs since 2000. However, 
drawing conclusions on the basis these figures is not without skepticism, for 
there are no independent methods to confirm or verify police statistics 
concerning gang affiliations. Mehta (2005) reports a conversation with Chota 
Shakeel, where the latter alleged that the police reported that all Muslim 
criminals killed or arrested belonged to Dawood’s gang, regardless of their actual 
affiliation with any gang. Furthermore, the police have not made public the 
religious affiliations of the ‘criminals’ killed by them, it cannot be assumed that 
all those encountered and said to belong to a Muslim gang were actually 
Muslims themselves and vice versa. Whether the police maintain such records 
was unclear, as these were not made available to me.
Most of the media and public discourse (see Chapter 7) revolved around the 
communal nature of organised crime gangs and the fact that the police took 
discriminatory action against particular communities in the course of dealing 
with organised gangs. In the USA it was earlier thought that ethnic or racial 
identity were key factors in determining organised group membership, but
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empirical research had shown that “although preference may be given to kinship 
in some crime organisations, recruitment of and interaction with ‘outgroup’ 
criminals is based primarily on need, availability, and cost effectiveness” (Potter 
1994:16). Similarly, in Mumbai organised group affiliations were perceived by 
the public to be based on communal grounds (not ethnicity or race). But there 
was a noticeable absence of such a discourse in either the police or criminal 
milieu. In fact leaders of organised gangs have asserted that their organisations 
did not make distinctions between Hindu and Muslim members in interviews 
given to the media. For example, Chota Shakeel was reported denying that gangs 
are formed along communal lines, “ ‘Many Hindu boys are with us’, he says, 
putting the ratio as high as fifty-fifty... ‘Our motto’, he declares, ‘is 
insaaniyat31’ ” (Mehta 2005: 265).
One of the main reasons why criminal organisations would emphasize the 
‘secular’ nature of their gang would be to disassociate themselves from 
accusations of terrorism, which they realized would be less tolerated than their 
criminal activities. In fact one gang leader recently claimed in an interview to a 
newspaper that they were gangsters, and not terrorists, and that Dawood or his 
gang had no involvement in the bomb blasts either in 1993 or in July 2006 
(Balakrishnan 2006). On the other hand, the police alleged that they had evidence 
of definite involvement of criminal organised gangs in the terror attacks, and 
clearly felt that ‘Muslim’ gangs had aided and abetted the terrorists. However, 
police officers in their interviews and in public statements, maintained that their 
war was against criminals and organised crime in general, not against members 
of particular communities. A few officers who referred to the communal aspect 
seemed to suggest that if it appeared that stricter action was being taken against 
some gangs (which happen to be dominated by ‘Muslims’) as opposed to others, 
it was because of the heightened activities of Islamic terrorism that had 
threatened the democratic world since 2001. It was interesting to note that the 
rhetoric against war on organised crime had changed to the rhetoric justifying 
war on terrorism, with the defining lines between the two becoming blurred in 
the process. There were two aspects to differentiating between gangs based on
31 Ironically- Insaaniyat means humanity or humanism
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religion: the first was to link certain gangs (Muslim) with anti-national activities; 
and the second was to underscore the speculation that some gangs with a 
majority of their members belonging to one particular community received 
political patronage from particular political parties. Thus, it appeared as if the 
gangs that supported the party in power got some form of limited immunity from 
police actions.
The increasing inclusion of the ‘crime problem’ in political discourse meant that 
successive governments as social control agents tried to come down hard on 
these organised crime groups (by encouraging encounters) or at least appeared to 
do so. While criminological discourse has recognized that crime control is 
beyond the state (Garland 1996) in Mumbai (as in other places) there was no 
acceptance of this ‘well known’ fact in either police or government circles and as 
my interviews revealed. In fact Cohen (1996) recognized “the short-term 
political costs of admitting the futility of these [crime control] methods are 
unacceptable”, as a result, governments continued to persist in devising newer, 
more punitive sanctions against criminals, which, in Mumbai included 
encounters. Rustamji (1992) comments that traditionally in India the wrong tests 
are applied to policing - if crime figures rise, it is not as a result of good 
registration practices, but because the police are ineffective; if a few murders 
occur, crime is said to be out of control and police are urged to stop it with stem 
measures; if an officer wants to use legal methods only, he is considered weak 
and inefficient. Denying the state’s systemic inability to control crime, especially 
more complex organised crime, political and media discourse hailed police 
efforts as being masterful and effective in the ‘war on crime’, even if as a result 
“we [Indians] have come to believe is that the country needs a police force that is 
dreaded by the people, with officers on the top who have been selected for their 
ability to wink at brutality and corruption” (Rustamji 1992: 48). This formal 
crime control oriented discourse is just as evident in media and political 
discussions here and elsewhere. Cohen’s (1996: 8) question whether, “Is this 
public discourse really ‘about’ crime or rather a metaphor for expressing a wider 
sense of social dislocation and disorder?” appears apposite in the Mumbai 
situation.
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Political machinations in Mumbai were not restricted to the politicization of 
crime, that is political patronage to criminal activities, but the trend was 
increasingly changing towards criminalization of politics. The democratic 
process has turned violent where virtually every political party has encouraged 
an active role of known ‘mafia dons’ and criminals with long police records in 
the elected offices of the state. Also elections to municipal bodies, state 
assemblies, even the parliament have been marred by ‘booth capturing and 
intimidation of voters by every political party. The criminalization of politics has 
been recognized but “none of this information gets officially recorded in any 
systematic manner” (Verma & Tiwari 2003: 246). Gangsters such as Arun 
Gawli have not only contested local elections, but actually won. This situation 
created a unique dilemma for the police, who were then obliged to provide 
security for the very man they were hunting, as the greatest threat Gawli 
allegedly faced was from police encounters . Other reputed criminals such as 
Pappu Kalani (who is said to lead his own mafia group) and Ibrahim Kaskar 
(Dawood’s brother) have also contested elections, sometimes while 
incarcerated34. This situation caused considerable pressure on the police and the 
criminal justice system as the very elements they were supposed to fight could 
become their political masters and to whom they would be accountable.
3.9 Policing Organised Crime in Mumbai
Policing a large city like Mumbai is challenging, but dealing with large-scale 
organised crime groups involved in terrorism along with a host of other criminal 
activities, adds another dimension of difficulty to this task. Levi & Maguire 
(2004) have identified that the lack of ‘systematic before-and-after comparisons- 
based studies’ makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the impact of law 
enforcement measures on organised crime even in Europe. In Mumbai, the task 
of measuring the efficacy of policing organised crime is made even more 
difficult given the lack of officially published coherent government policies to 
tackle the problem as well as lack of official statistics on the impact of strategies
32 This refers to the process whereby thugs acting on behalf of a political party actually take over 
an entire election centre and forcibly stamp all the ballot papers in favour of their own party or 
destroy ballot boxes if they feel the majority of voters might have voted against their party.
33 The Times o f India: (2004), ‘Arun Gawli shoots down encounter fears’, October 19th 2004
34 See for e.g. The Times of India: (2004), ‘City gangs enter political fray’, September 21st 2004; 
and The Times of India: (2004), ‘Dawood brother to fight polls’, September 21st 2004
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other than encounters (even if ad-hoc) adopted by the police. Law enforcement 
rather than prevention has dominated crime reduction strategies and practical 
responses of the police in most countries, as in Mumbai. A move from a 
“reactive and repressive approach towards long term preventative strategies is a 
paradigm shift for law enforcement that is very much a ‘work in progress’” in 
Europe (Levi & Maguire 2004: 457), but has a long way to go before it is made 
in Mumbai, where the police, it would appear, still prefer short-cut, instant 
solutions to the problem of organised crime.
The following account of policing organised crime in Mumbai is based on print 
media reports, interviews conducted during the research, memoirs of police 
officers (Khan 2004) and other secondary sources (Mehta 2005, Davis 2001, 
Virani 1999).
In the early 1970s and 1980s, the police had to deal with gangsters who used 
knives and daggers as their weapons of choice and police officers I interviewed 
said deadly force was not that common, (relevant statistics were not maintained 
by the department during those years). Officers mentioned that the first officially 
recognized encounter occurred in 1982. However, the entry of smuggled 
sophisticated weapons especially since the early 1990s changed the scenario 
dramatically. Table 3.5, for example, shows the number of arms recovered by the 
police after the bomb blasts in 1993. Not only were arms smuggled illegally in 
the country in large quantities, but the types of weapons used by organised 
groups became more sophisticated and dangerous and posed a greater threat than 
before.
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Table 3.5: Arms Recovered by the Police in the Immediate Aftermath of the 
Mumbai Bomb Blasts of 1993
Types o f Arms Amount
RDX (explosive) 3.5 tonnes
Hand Grenades 459
AK 56 Rifles 63
9 mm Pistols 12
Detonators 1,150
Delay Switch No. 10 03
Ammunition 49,000 rounds
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police, cited in Sarkar & Tiwari (2002: 16)
Comparative statistics for weapons and ammunition recovered for earlier years 
are not available, but police officers assured me that this haul was the largest 
recovered in Mumbai. It could be the case that prior to the bomb blasts, the 
extent of the terrorist threat, and the stock-piling of weapons and arsenal had 
escaped intelligence analysts and was not a police priority. Since 1993 the 
Mumbai police have recovered large quantities of firearms from ‘criminals’, for 
example, over a three-year period (1998-2000) the police seized 1662 illegal 
weapons (Sarkar & Tiwari 2002). The influx of sophisticated arms made the task 
of policing organised crime groups far more difficult and dangerous according to 
the officers interviewed. It was their opinion that emboldened by the possession 
of better weapons, ‘criminals’ were more likely to attack police officers or shoot 
their way out of a tight comer when confronted with the possibility of being 
arrested. However, the official statistics in table 3.6 do not support this 
contention. The fact that so few police personnel are killed or even injured in 
raids or by criminals does raise a few questions about police assertions that the 
job has become more dangerous over the years.
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Table 3.6: Police Personnel Killed on Duty in Mumbai
Year In Dacoity 
Operations 
or Other 
Raids
By Riotous 
Mob
By Other 
Criminals
On Border 
Duties
In
Accidents
Total
1993 1 0 0 0 2 3
1994 0 1 0 0 1 2
1995 0 0 0 0 3 3
1996 0 0 2 0 0 2
1997 2 0 0 0 1 3
1998 0 0 3 0 3 6
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Crime in India 1993-2000. From 2001 onwards figures were not reported fo r  individual 
cities
According to the police version, encounters were occurring regularly in Mumbai 
by 1993 mainly out of self-defence. Officers felt they were already overburdened 
with everyday policing activities, including narcotics, anti-piracy, protection of 
Very Important Persons and sensitive installations, crowd management, ensuring 
peace during numerous religious festivals and processions, and were working 12- 
hour shifts without regular days off. A very senior police officer writes, “no 
western country places such a tall order or expects so much from its police force” 
(Khan 2004: 108). The criminal justice system was also dangerously overloaded. 
In 2001 nearly 5,117,864 cases were pending trial in the higher courts, 
amounting nearly 82.3% of the total caseload for the country (Crime in India 
2001). As crimes committed by organised gangs allegedly rose sharply, the 
procedures for processing ‘gangsters’ through the criminal justice system: arrest, 
investigation, charging the accused under appropriate sections of the law, 
prosecution and finally sentencing, began to be by-passed more often in favour 
of quick and instant ‘disposals’ in the form of encounters (see Chapters 4 & 5). 
There were no ostensible public protests or demands for accountability and the 
media appeared to applaud and encourage these police actions. There were even 
public calls for felicitation of ‘encounter specialists’ on occasions.
How did such a situation arise? The answer could lie in the fact that crimes 
purportedly committed by organised gangs were spiralling rapidly upwards, and
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people were feeling increasingly insecure. The number of registered crimes 
committed by organised gangs, (apart from smuggling of arms and ammunition 
that are registered separately under the Arms Act), extortion (hafta or protection 
money), shootouts as part of contract killings, and kidnapping for ransom (shown 
in Table 3.7) reveal an interesting story.
Table 3.7: Registered Indian Penal Code Crimes Suspected to be the Work 
of Organised Gangs
Year Shootouts Extortion Kidnapping for  
Ransom
TOTAL
1993 34 728 Not available 762
1994 28 588 Not available 616
1995 24 535 16 575
1996 48 333 17 398
1997 38 230 10 278
1998 93 341 16 450
1999 41 297 11 349
2000 24 309 25 358
2001 18 269 25 312
2002 13 175 14 202
2003 10 142 12 164
TOTAL 371 3,947 146 4,464
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police.
Statistics show that organised gangs were very active in 1993, the beginning of 
the period I am interested in. Thereafter, crimes committed by these gangs 
steadily declined because, as officers explained, encounters, the main weapon in 
their arsenal, were effective. However, these figures and trends are based on 
police recorded statistics, which carry all the attendant problems associated with 
them. Table 3.8 shows that there was a steady increase in encounters between 
1993-7. In 1998 there was a sudden drop in the number encounters, followed by 
a sharp rise in their numbers 1999, 2000 and 2001, when they reached a pinnacle 
and the police acknowledged killing 94 criminals in one year. Since then the 
figures have declined.
I l l
Table 3.8: Official Figures for Police Encounters
Year Number o f  
Incidents
Police Stations Crime Branch Number o f  
criminals killed
1993 28 Not available Not Available 37
1994 26 u t( 30
1995 10 c< (t 07
1996 45 34 11 58
1997 49 21 28 72
1998 39 25 14 48
1999 65 35 30 83
2000 59 23 36 73
2001 70 09 61 94
2002 35 04 31 47
2003 27 07 20 40
TOTAL 453 158 231 589
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police
I have distinguished encounters in which officers posted in police stations were 
engaged, from those the Crime Branch officers were involved in to highlight my 
point that encounters were not only done by ‘death squads’, but emerged out of a 
more widespread practice within the organisation. However, it is interesting that 
officers involved in encounters had at some point in their career been associated 
with or posted in the Crime Branch. Thus, while encounter squads or ‘special 
operations’ squads did not have a monopoly on using deadly force in encounter 
situations, the Crime Branch played a major role in these incidents. Interestingly, 
while the number of encounters by officers posted in regular police stations 
generally declined over the period of study, the number of Crime Branch 
encounters increased, with the exception of 1998, when a judicial enquiry into 
two encounter cases found Crime Branch officers responsible for fake 
encounters. At that time, the entire department was under tremendous stress and 
anxiety as the actions of some of their officers were under scrutiny.
The above-mentioned judicial inquiry into two separate encounter cases 
(involving Javed Fawda in one case, and Vijay Tandel and Sada Pawle in 
another) created considerable controversy and led to a temporary hiatus in police 
encounters. The Mumbai police later appealed against the conclusions of this
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inquiry to the High Court, which returned a verdict in favour of the police. (See 
following section).
The reduction in police encounters in 1998, according to officers, caused a 
sudden and sharp rise in organised crime activities. Emboldened by the self- 
imposed shackles on the Mumbai police, the number of shootouts (non-police 
involved shootings) and other crimes increased dramatically35, creating a panic 
situation in Mumbai. Media accounts suggested increased feelings of insecurity 
among public and industry alike (see Chapter 7). Faced with growing pressure, 
the government and the police appeared to be under tremendous strain to take 
drastic measures in controlling sensational crimes. Innes and Jones (2006) 
suggest that certain ‘signal crimes’ and ‘signal disorders’ like violent muggings 
or vandalism of public property are indicative of presence of other risks and 
threats which have a particular potent impact on local perceptions of 
neighbourhood security, and generate feelings of insecurity about people, places 
and events. Their research on ‘Neighbourhood security and urban change’ in the 
UK found ‘signal crimes’ aroused fear and alarm even amongst those who were 
unlikely to be their victims. Similarly, in Mumbai extortion threats, shootings, 
and kidnapping for ransom could be considered ‘signal crimes’ indicative of the 
presence of the increased threat and risk posed by organised criminal gangs. 
Innes and Jones (2006: vii) suggest that “perceptions and beliefs about disorder 
and crime may be as important as actual crime and disorder rates in terms of how 
they function as risk factors”. Therefore managing people’s perception about 
such ‘signal crimes’, as well as actually trying to control them became a priority 
for social control agents and the government in Mumbai.
In 1997-8 there was increasing pressure to change the law to enable the police to 
tackle organised crime more effectively. New legislation, the Maharashtra 
Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) was passed by the State Legislature
35 Figures range from the official figure of 93 cases (see Table 6) to 150 people killed in 
shootouts as reported in the media. See for example Shrivastava S.: ‘Bombay Gets tough on 
gangsters’, BBC News, 4 November 1998. There is no way of estimating which figures are closer 
to the ‘truth’, and the discrepancy in reported figures only adds to the controversial perception of 
encounters.
113
in 1999. This Act provided for special courts; speedy trials of those charged with 
offences related to organised crime syndicates; special public prosecutors to try 
these cases; and more stringent powers to the prosecuting agency under the law. 
Additionally, whereas under the Indian Evidence Act (1872) confessions to a 
police officer are not admissible in a court of law, under the MCOCA 
confessions made before an officer of the rank of Deputy Commissioner of 
Police were made admissible as evidence. Other special rules of evidence such as 
authorized interception of wire, electronic or oral communications were also 
made admissible as evidence. Provision for forfeiture of property of the accused 
in case of conviction was another feature of this Act. In their interviews, police 
officers said they approved of this new Act as it addressed some of the original 
problems officers faced when trying to process ‘organised criminals’ through the 
usual channels of the criminal justice system.
Statistics reveal that the MCOCA may have been effective to a certain extent in 
enabling more criminals to be tried and for speedier disposals than through the 
regular channels of the criminal justice process.
Table 3.9: Cases Registered and Gangsters Arrested Under MCOCA 1999
Year Total cases 
registered
Dawood Chota
Rajan
Arun
Gawli
Ash win 
Naik
Others TOTAL
1999 19 33 13 6 0 12 64
2000 14 54 4 0 0 7 65
2001 20 51 18 0 4 11 84
TOTAL 53 138 35 6 4 30 213
Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police.
Between 1999 and 2001, 53 cases were registered against 213 ‘criminals’ and 
over half of these, i.e. 27 cases were finally disposed of by the special courts 
within this period, a remarkable achievement, considering that if these cases had 
been tried in the regular courts they would have been under trial for anywhere up 
to 12 years. It is interesting however, that 84 ‘criminals’ were charged and tried 
under the MCOCA in 2001, but 94 were killed in police encounters, perhaps 
implying that the police preferred a speedier version of justice than the special 
courts.
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Speedier justice of the kind the police preferred, was facilitated by the High 
Court’s ruling in late 1999 that Javed Fawda’s death was not a false encounter, 
but there were procedural inadequacies. The High Court laid down guidelines for 
police actions in encounters that have been used ever since as a checklist by the 
police to ensure that at least the paperwork conforms to them. Cleared of the 
charges of conducting false encounters, the Mumbai police appeared to have 
been given a free hand to conduct encounters and indulged in a spree eliminating 
alleged criminals in larger numbers than ever before (Zaidi 1999). Since 2003 the 
number of encounter cases and media reports sensationalising them have 
dwindled. Perhaps the disenchantment with encounters was linked to the 
influence of new police leadership on the use of deadly force as a policy 
objective (see Chapter 8).
3.10 The Case of Javed Fawda
In 1997, alarmed with a growing number of encounters two civil rights bodies, 
the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Committee for the 
Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR), along with the Samajwadi Party36, 
petitioned the Mumbai High Court to conduct an inquiry into these encounters. 
The High Court found prima facie evidence of a disturbing pattern in police 
actions in encounters and ordered an inquiry into two of them (the killings of 
Javed Fawda, and Sada Pawle and Vijay Tandel in 1997). Judge A.S. Aguiar, 
carried out the inquiry in 1998. His report was made public in September 1998. 
The Judge found the encounters to be fake. One of them, he said, may never have 
taken place in the way described by the police, and in the other, the victims 
appeared to have been unarmed.
Javed Fawda’s case is pertinent to the discussion in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. There 
were two parts to the case of Javed Fawda: first, of mistaken identity, and 
second, deliberate police murder. It was alleged that the police killed Abu 
Sayama, alias Javed Abu Talib Shaikh, a humble peanut vendor, mistaking him 
for some other notorious gangster Javed Fawda; and that the police in a stage-
36 A political party that purports to promote interests of the Muslim community, but which does 
not have a very strong support base in the state of Maharashtra or in Mumbai.
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managed encounter deliberately killed Javed. The judge ruled that there was no 
case of mistaken identity and that the person killed, Abu Sayama, was also 
perhaps known as Javed Fawda (The Aguiar Commission Report 1998, 
paragraph 68: 16). However, the inquiry into this allegation and its subsequent 
dismissal makes interesting reading as it showed the complex conditions in 
which the police had to, and continue to, operate in establishing the identity of a 
person under difficult circumstances. Circumstances such as absence of 
centralised personal criminal or DNA records, a huge city characterised by a 
large floating population where fake identities can be purchased easily, where 
births and deaths are not necessarily registered in the municipal offices, where 
ration cards of dubious authenticity (the main document establishing identity 
and residence, especially amongst the poorer and illiterate classes and slums) 
proliferate unchecked, where no social security records are maintained for the 
population, where enrolment in compulsory education is not enforced, and where 
police registration of criminal cases is often haphazard and misleading at times.
However, the inquiry found adversely against the police that “the deceased Javed 
Fawda, alias Abu Sayama, alias Javed Abu Talib Shaikh was not killed in the 
encounter as claimed by the police. It is doubtful whether any such encounter 
took place” (The Aguiar Commission Report 1998, paragraph 148: 30). The 
commission found several weaknesses in both the documentary and forensic 
evidence, raising serious doubts about the authenticity of the police account. The 
police claimed Javed Fawda was killed when the police fired at him in self- 
defence at a deserted spot, around midnight, where they had gone to arrest him. 
They had acted on a tip-off that Javed Fawda and his associates were likely to 
visit the spot for committing some crime. Cross examination of the police 
officers revealed that when they went to allegedly arrest Javed Fawda, they were 
unaware that he was a known gangster or dangerous criminal, which meant that 
there was no reason for them to be waiting at that spot for the deceased. 
Examination of the subsequent police investigation revealed that the officers had 
not taken steps to preserve the fingerprints on the pistol allegedly recovered from
37 These were issued to families to enable them to purchase government subsidised essential 
commodities such as sugar, kerosene, oil, rice etc in the years after Independence when such 
commodities were in short supply.
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him, raising doubts whether Javed Fawda had actually fired at the officers, or 
indeed whether it was in his possession at all. Though several rounds were 
allegedly fired, only two empties were recovered from the spot, and none from 
the vehicle whose windshield was supposedly shattered by one of the shots fired 
by Javed. The windshield itself had been replaced and the car put to use without 
facts having been recorded satisfactorily. The vehicle in which Javed Fawda was 
said to have arrived was allowed to get away despite the fact that the police had 
prior information and its description. The most damaging fact for the police case, 
however was the absence of blood stains or pool or blood at the scene of offence 
where the injured and profusely bleeding Javed Fawda was lying and also the 
absence of blood in the car by which the injured was take to the hospital. There 
were no independent witnesses to support the police version and one of the 
officers involved in the incident who had a previous history of violence, was 
described by the report as “a trigger happy cop” which lent strength to the 
commission’s conclusion that Javed Fawda was killed in cold blood.
The matter did not end there, shattered by the adverse finding of the Aguiar 
commission, the Mumbai police then sought to appeal against this finding by 
applying to the High Court. A division bench of the High Court consisting of two 
judges not only ruled that the police encounter of Javed Fawda was true and 
genuine and took place in the exercise of the right to private defence of the 
officers concerned, but also criticised Judge Aguiar’s earlier report and findings. 
This bench felt that the police had not questioned any independent witnesses 
during the subsequent investigation because there could not have been anybody 
present as the encounter had taken place at midnight and at a deserted spot, to 
substantiate the police version. Also since a lot of blood had been found in the 
chest cavity and pericardium area, it was clear that the deceased had bled 
internally and there was very little oozing which accounted for not much blood 
being reported on the spot. The evidence provided by the post mortem and 
ballistic experts on behalf of the police were also found to be acceptable. The 
Judge was also criticised for calling one of the officers involved, a ‘trigger happy 
cop’, as the latter had been acquitted by the High Court and the appeal against
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the acquittal was still sub-judice in the Supreme Court . The High Court bench 
proceeded to lay down guidelines for good practice to be followed by the police 
in all future instances of encounters (See Appendix 3).
3.11 Summary
In this chapter I have described the context for my research on the use of deadly 
force in encounter situations. Understanding the nature of Mumbai, the history 
and organisation of its police force, the socio-political milieu, and the growth and 
interplay of various organised criminal groups and how the police sought to 
tackle organised crime over the decade between 1993 and 2003 is vital in 
understanding police perspectives on encounters.
The emerging picture of Mumbai was that of a prosperous megapolis, where the 
pace of life was hectic, where people were drawn in thousands every year to 
make their fortune, and which was a rapidly expanding financial and 
infotainment growth centre. The growth of various organised crime syndicates 
and their inter-rivalry for supremacy as well as their criminal activities spread 
panic and insecurity through different sections of society. The growing menace 
of organised crime syndicates provided one of the biggest challenges for the 
police force, which sought to counter it with the use or abuse of deadly force in 
the form of encounters of alleged hardened criminals, as one form of rough and 
ready justice. However, the story was just not a simple case of cops-and-robbers. 
The injection of the politics of Hindutva, growing communalism, terrorism and 
associated violence, and alleged interference from outside forces into Mumbai’s 
socio-political landscape, combined with an already overburdened criminal 
justice system to make the task of policing organised crime groups far more 
complicated.
In the next 3 chapters I analyse police perceptions of encounters and how they 
accounted for and justified the use of deadly force in Mumbai.
38 ‘HC gives police clean chit in Javed Fawda shootout case’, The Times o f India, Bombay 
edition, 25 February 1999.
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4 CHAPTER 4: OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF ENCOUNTERS
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 I traced the growth of organised crime in Mumbai from the early 
1980’s. I also examined evidence showing a growing conviction in the collective 
social conscience of a clear cause-and-effect relationship between increased gang 
activity and rising police encounters in response. In the 1990s there was a 
proliferation of shootouts, extortion cases, kidnapping for ransom cases and this 
was accompanied by rising number of encounters. While encounters 
unquestionably exist; how an act, which appears from many accounts to be 
suspect and arbitrary, has escaped demands for greater scrutiny or accountability 
remains unexplained. Part of the answer involves police officers’ explanation of 
why deadly force is acceptable and public perceptions of the issues involved.
This chapter examines how police officers understand the phenomenon of 
encounters and the legal, moral and humanitarian issues related to it: exploring 
questions such as ‘How do ordinary, decent people commit such acts?’; ‘Why do 
ordinary men torture and murder for their state?’; and ‘How do they justify their 
deeds to themselves, their colleagues, the organisation, the criminal justice 
system and, society as a whole?’ (Cohen 2001, Huggins et al 2002, Browning 
1993).
The chapter is divided into three parts: the first focuses on the definition of 
encounters and its associated terms. I distinguish between ‘bona fide’ encounters 
and ‘fake’ as opposed to ‘genuine’ encounters using the Human Rights and 
legalistic perspectives and the perspective of officers. In the second part of the 
chapter I explore officers’ definition of encounters. I discuss the role and extent 
of involvement in the encounter process of individual officers in my sample. In 
the third section I focus on officers’ views on the legality of encounters, the 
effectiveness of encounters, and their personal attitudes towards encounters.
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4.2 What is an Encounter?
In India, the term encounter is generally used by the police, the media and the 
public to describe a particular type of police use of deadly force. The focus of my 
research is encounters in the city of Mumbai; where encounters were seen as a 
police response to deal with a perceived problem of increasing organised crime. 
In the official reports and media versions an encounter is described as an 
exchange of fire between the police and alleged criminals, where the police shoot 
to kill in self-defence. While this was the ideal-type and widely accepted 
meaning of the term by all those I interviewed and in the media accounts, it was 
also generally believed that the reality of an encounter might be different. As a 
result of my own experience - as an officer, as a resident of the city, and during 
the course of my research, it became evident that the word encounter was a 
legitimised cover-up for what were essentially police killings of alleged hardcore 
criminals. There was also varying recognition of the existence of ‘genuine’ 
encounters as opposed to ‘fake’ encounters in police and popular discourse.
There are three angles from which encounters are described: the police officers’ 
perception of what encounters are and the differences between ‘genuine’ and 
‘fake’ encounters:; officers’ perception of how the public understands this 
difference; and finally, perception of members of the public, which includes the 
media and other ‘claimsmakers’. This chapter deals with the first, Chapter 5 
deals with the second, and Chapter 7 explores the last set of perceptions.
Although the meaning of the term encounter is somewhat negatively loaded, the 
addition of the label ‘genuine’ or ‘fake’ in routine use could only imply that the 
person suggesting such a distinction is actually making a value judgement about 
whether a particular encounter is considered justified or not. Thus, it is the label 
that demands a positive or negative response to the act - a ‘genuine’ encounter is 
to be lauded and a ‘fake’ one is to be criticised. As with deviance generally, 
‘genuineness’ is not a quality that lies in the act itself, but in the interaction 
between those who commit the act and those who respond to it (Becker 1963:14).
Perception of encounters differs subtly when described with the terms ‘justified’ 
or ‘legitimate’. While these are generally used interchangeably, I use them to
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convey slightly different meanings - a ‘justified’ encounter is one that is 
acceptable to the person making the judgement, and involves subjective 
interpretation of the situation, which may have legal and or moral referents. On 
the other hand, ‘legitimate’ means that the encounter is acceptable on objective 
criteria, which include both legal and moral elements in it.
My own perception, which incorporates the legal, human rights and ethical 
viewpoints of what is justified and legitimate police use of deadly force needs to 
be articulated; the construction of an ‘ideal type’, invoking Max Weber’s 
argument that such ‘purely mental constructs’ enhance our ‘conceptual precision 
about meaningful action’ (Whimster 2004: 305). This is also essential as “all 
knowledge of cultural reality is always knowledge from a specific point o f  view” 
and since value-freedom or objectivity is never possible for a person, it is 
necessary to make one’s standpoint explicit so that readers can interpret one’s 
arguments in the light of it (Weber 1904, reprinted 2004: 381). It is important to 
acknowledge that there are incidents where the police have actually fired in self- 
defence and this has resulted in the death of an alleged criminal. I term this a 
‘bona fide’ encounter, to distinguish it from the terms ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ that are 
in common usage. Thus a ‘bona fide’ encounter is an ‘ideal type’ where police 
use of deadly force is, in some abstract and impersonal sense, legitimate. 
However, even ‘bona fide’ encounters are deeply problematic because those 
incidents, which in my perception and/or in an abstract, pure sense (what accords 
with law, ethics and human rights) are ‘bona fide’, may not be universally 
regarded as such. . Even more acutely, as I show, police and others often see as 
‘genuine’ encounters that are not ‘bona fide’ in the sense I understand the term.
It could be possible that an incident which is ‘bona fide’ (in my perception) may 
be perceived as being ‘genuine’ by both public and police; or it may be perceived 
as being ‘genuine’ by the police but ‘fake’ by the public; or vice versa; or both 
the public and the police might perceive it to be ‘fake’. Since there is so much 
secrecy, lack of credible information and even misinformation surrounding 
encounters, it becomes difficult to ascertain how particular incidents would be 
perceived by different audiences. The secrecy that normally surrounds police 
work was taken to an extreme in cases of encounters especially since it aimed at
121
self-protection. By keeping the public at a distance to maintain their power, the 
police aimed to retain the “mystification” that sustains “respect and awe” 
(Manning 1997: 125) with respect to encounters by strictly controlling the flow 
of information. How far they succeeded is debatable.
A diagrammatic representation of the various terms associated with encounters 
and their relationship to the people making a judgement about them would look 
somewhat like this:
Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic Representation of Terms
OTHERSBONA FIDE FAKE FAKEGENUINE GENUINE
Understanding of
Understanding of
ENCOUNTERS
Filtered through perceptions of
CLAIMSMAKERS
(Subjective/Legal/Human)
RESEARCHER 
(Legal and Human Rights)
POLICE OFFICERS 
(Subjective/Legal)
4.2.1 Definition of a ‘Bona fide* Encounter
My conception of a ‘bona fide’ encounter is encapsulated in this officer’s 
definition,
“Police encounter means- when the criminal has come in order to 
commit a crime and at that time police get definite information - and 
on this definite information, police lay a trap and then we try as far as 
possible to arrest him. But while arresting, the criminal fires in the 
direction of the police, to avoid his arrest, and with the intention of 
killing the police. At that time for our own defence, even after giving 
him a warning the criminal does not heed it, then there is cross firing 
and he gets injured and dies in the hospital, or even before that.”
(T20: Inspector)
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This definition includes all the requirements of a legitimate encounter in both the 
legal and moral senses, covering all aspects that could be questioned or examined 
in an inquiry or by a court of law. I therefore call it, ‘bona fide’, and when 
broken down, its elements include -
• The ‘criminal’ had every intention of committing a crime at the point of 
contact.
• The police had authentic and reliable information about the activities of 
the ‘criminal’ to counteract any accusations of mistaken identity.
• The main intention of the police in laying a trap was to arrest the 
‘criminal’.
• The attack was initiated by the ‘criminal’ with the twin intentions of 
escaping and killing the police (thus laying the grounds for self defence 
on the part of the police).
• In spite of this provocation, the police gave due warning to the ‘criminal’, 
which was not heeded and the police were forced to fire back in self 
defence. (The police are thus protected under section 100 of the Indian 
Penal Code, which refers to ‘when the right of private defence of the 
body extends to causing death’).
• The fact that the person died in the resulting cross fire allays suspicions 
that there was any preplanning or targeting of the ‘criminal’ in order to 
shoot him dead.
• The ‘criminal’ was injured and died either on the spot, or on the way to 
the hospital, despite the police having made every effort to provide 
immediate medical assistance.
This is a ‘textbook version’ of a bona fide encounter, which may, or may not 
coincide with what individuals or institutions choose to consider a ‘genuine’ 
encounter. The reasons why this particular encounter story is constructed for the 
consumption of all audiences will be analysed in detail in the following sections.
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4.2.2 Distinction between ‘Fake’ and ‘Genuine’ Encounters
There are three main interpretive frameworks through which the different 
meanings of the term ‘genuine’ encounter can be understood. The first is the 
Human Rights interpretation where an encounter could be considered ‘genuine’ 
if it is enacted in self-defence, as a last resort, and without impinging arbitrarily 
on the Right to Life of the ‘criminal’. This is an essentialist viewpoint that 
considers the actual circumstances of an encounter situation and comes closest to 
the ‘bona fide’ encounter. In India the National Human Rights Commission 
oversees matters pertaining to human rights violations by state agencies, 
including the police. However, this quasi-judicial body bases its findings 
primarily on legalistic grounds.
From a legalistic interpretation, an encounter would be ‘genuine’ when it is 
presented as having fulfilled all the legal requirements that justify the use of 
deadly force by the police; and/or met the exacting standards of required 
paperwork; and/or which had been adjudicated as being genuine in a court of 
law. However, since this study is not based on observation of actual encounters 
but on perceptions of them, I chose to adopt a formalistic legal perspective, 
whereby the interpretative framework limits itself to an examination of whether 
the formal records show that all actions and procedures in an encounter are in 
accordance with the law.
The final interpretive framework adopts a more subjective, individualistic value 
judgement of whether the encounter is justifiable, and therefore ‘genuine’. This 
framework suggests that it is for individuals to perceive a particular incident as a 
‘genuine’ encounter, based on subjective criteria that are relevant to the 
individual making the evaluation. For example, ‘necessary evil’ may be a 
rational justification for some in order to consider an encounter to be ‘genuine’, 
but may not appeal to others.
The three approaches outlined above use different criteria for establishing 
whether an encounter is evaluated as being ‘genuine’. What may be a ‘genuine’ 
encounter in a Human Rights framework (i.e. actually done in self defence, after 
all due care and consideration has been taken by the police) may not be
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considered to be legally ‘genuine’ if there are shortcomings in the paperwork or 
procedural formalities (for e.g. if there are problems in the way the panchanama39 
was drawn up; or if the mandatory hand wash40 of the criminal was not taken on 
the spot; or if a witness turned hostile). An individual applying subjective criteria 
may not perceive an encounter as being ‘genuine’ if the encountered person did 
not have an established criminal record. My research cannot ascertain whether 
encounters are actually ‘genuine’ or not from either the Human Rights or the 
legalistic perspective. It is concerned with understanding police and other 
people’s perceptions (individually and collectively) of what constitutes an 
encounter, and how they distinguish between a ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ encounter.
4.3 Police Officers’ Definition of Encounters,
All officers were asked, ‘What do you understand by the term encounter?’ The 
answers I received could be broadly classified as: Standard; Incident Specific; 
Unusual; and Definitions that elaborated upon the distinctions between ‘genuine’ 
and ‘fake’ encounters.
A ‘standard’ definition is the classic, textbook definition. One officer, for 
example said, “Encounter means we go to catch him, he fires, and in self-defence 
we kill him” (T 26: Upper Middle Management). On being asked what they 
understood by the term encounter, a majority of officers (28 of the 38 officers) 
responded by giving the standard, almost textbook definition. These officers 
stressed that self-defence was the main factor for legally justifying encounters. 
(Chapter 6 discusses other justifying factors).
The stories given out to the press, and the First Information Reports (FIR) lodged 
at the police station, largely followed this standard format of police firing in self­
39 A ‘panchanama’ is a legal requirement to be filled in by the police at the scene of a crime in the 
presence of five independent witnesses. Often it is difficult to find independent witnesses at 
encounter spots (lonely and late at night), or those who are willing to be drawn into police 
business of their own accord. As a result police officers often have to resort to ‘creating’ panchas 
(as they are called) or calling upon the services of ‘professional’ panchas, who have made this 
their livelihood.
40 The hand wash taken immediately after a shooting has taken place would show residual traces 
of gunpowder on the palm and fingers, of the criminal if he had just fired a weapon. This would 
help in proving that the criminal had attacked the police and they retaliated by shooting back in 
self-defence.
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defence. In Mumbai, it appeared as if the repetitive encounter story had become 
part of police lore, to be accepted uncritically by all the officers. Holdaway 
(1983: 138-9) describes ‘folk narratives’ and ‘keeping the tradition alive’, and 
adds that although the stories are frequently “exaggerated, highly dramatic and 
probably inaccurate, their power is considerable”. He cites Hannerz (1969:111) - 
“An individual’s vision of reality is often a precarious thing; we can find comfort 
in the knowledge that it is shared by others, thus acquiring social anchoring in an 
objective truth”, which explains how the encounter story became ‘official’ in 
Mumbai.
An ‘incident specific’ definition sought to explain what an encounter was by
describing a particular incident or experience. One officer said,
“Encounter means-1 had gone to investigate a murder. I learned that 
somebody has killed a person and left the dead body in a certain 
place. When I went there, the people who had killed him had come 
there to take the body for disposal. They did not know that the police 
were going to come there and suddenly it all happened. Then they 
attacked us, we did cross firing, in which I killed two [people]. I did 
not have much idea, in Mumbai city. It was my first experience, why 
mine, anyone around that time had very little idea about it. It was the 
first encounter in Mumbai city in (A date in the 1980’s)41. That time 
(XYZ)42 was the Commissioner, he was very much pleased. Then we 
recovered bombs from there, recovered the dead body, one accused 
escaped. We had no idea how to conduct the case. Now encounters 
have become very regular- there is a standard procedure to be 
followed. That time, I did not know much, no experience, not maiw 
had any experience, but we somehow got through it. Then the CP 3 
was very pleased, he said put this up for a medal... that is how I got 
my first Gallantry medal”. (T 7: Lower Middle Management)
This story gives the first hint that with increased experience, the police from the 
latter half of the 1980s onwards arranged events and appearances so that they 
could be represented as completely justified encounters. The minority of officers 
who used stories to explain their understanding of an encounter, lends strength to 
Shearing and Ericson’s contention that “police references to ‘experience’ as the 
source of their knowledge, and their persistent story-telling, appear as glosses
41 The date is not mentioned as it might compromise the identity of the officer concerned.
42 The name of the Commissioner is deliberately anonymised.
43 The Commissioner of Police is generally referred to as CP by officers and citizens alike.
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that arise from their inability to identify and articulate the rules that generate 
their actions” (1991: 321). Perhaps this indicates that either there are no fixed 
rules, or that the rules are very crude, or the officers do not think the rules and 
principles that actually guide police actions in encounters are legally or morally 
acceptable, or that the rules are such that they are either unable or unwilling to 
articulate them44. It could also be the case that these officers could not think 
nomothetically in terms of patterns but only ideographically in terms of 
individual cases. On the other hand, these officers might have used stories from 
personal experience as illustrations to explain what encounters were.
Alternatively, officers may have described their own experience in response to 
questions about encounters as a safe way out of answering what they might have 
perceived as being a tricky question. By doing so they could avoid making the 
distinction between genuine and fake encounters. Their stories almost always 
involved a ‘genuine* encounter that occurred in the pursuance of self-defence by 
the officer. By telling a ‘thrilling’ story of their chase and hunt of a ‘wanted’ 
criminal, they relived an exciting moment in their career and also, by restricting 
their answers to personal experience, they sought to avoid speaking about 
encounters in general terms and comment on their perception of encounter 
experiences of others.
Yet there were some officers who deviated from this general pattern and defined 
encounters, in what I thought were, ‘unusual’ ways. This indicates that there 
wasn’t total connivance on the part of all officers to cite the standard story, but 
officers did improvise, and in some cases, openly discussed what actually 
happened in encounters. These officers gave creative answers to the question and 
in doing so diverged from the above two kinds of responses. Examples of 
unusual definitions were, “Aborted Arrest” (T 28: Inspector), indicating that it
occurred as a result of a failed arrest operation. Another example that was 
reminiscent of the ‘Dirty Harry’ talk was,
“That criminal, who has been committing as many crimes as possible
by using the loopholes in the law, if he is not stopped now or jailed
44 Indications that there are corrupt and unethical reasons why some officers are more prone to 
‘doing’ encounters were evident in many interviews. (See Chapter 5)
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now, then he will become a great burden on society. To act against 
him, whatever steps we take are known as encounters " (T 14: Lower 
Middle Management).
Only six of the thirty eight officers talked about encounters without invoking 
self-defence. These officers also directly admitted that encounters involved some 
amount of illegality in police actions (admitted to wrong-doing on the part of the 
police in the legal but not the moral sense). Tensions between the moral, ethical 
and legal dimensions of encounters are discussed further in Chapter 6.
A few officers defined encounters by distinguishing between ‘genuine’ and
‘fake’ or ‘false’ encounters. As one senior officer explained,
“This word encounter has taken a big, devious meaning. Encounter is 
-  it is an encounter between you and me today, ok? One-to-one.
Police, for example, the way in newspapers it is printed that 
encounter has taken place, and this and that; and the way it is printed 
and the way the public also began thinking is- encounter is where a 
person is lifted, brought and shot, and put somewhere. I call that a 
fake encounter. An encounter is one where we go for a search or a 
raid on a place or premises - they attack us, they fire at us, and we 
fire back at them. In the process, the chances are we can get injured, 
they can get injured.” (T 24: Senior Management)
The distinction between ‘fake’ and ‘genuine’ encounters existed in most of the 
interviews; officers were equally certain that their perception of what constituted 
a ‘genuine’ (and by corollary, ‘fake’) encounter was different from what they 
thought was the general public’s perception of a ‘genuine’ encounter.
According to officers’ viewpoint, a ‘genuine’ encounter had the following 
features-
• It involved ‘hardcore’ criminals who had notorious criminal records. 
Officers used this term without recognizing or appearing to acknowledge 
that a person is only ‘allegedly’ a criminal, unless he has been convicted 
in a court of law of the crimes he is accused of or charged with. The 
police description of someone as a hardcore criminal was deemed to be 
accepted as uncontroversial and no officer even exhibited awareness that 
the use of such a term was problematic.
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• Occurred in the presence of the public, or in locations with high 
visibility. An encounter in the presence of witnesses or in a very public 
place was considered to be genuine, even though there was no discussion 
about the extent and seriousness of the threat posed to the lives of 
officers or others, the proportionality of force used by the police and 
whether firing was the only or last resort.
• Occurred while chasing a dangerous criminal, or while responding to an 
actual crime in progress. Officers seemed unaware that even in these 
circumstances if the police had made use of unjustified excessive force 
or no one’s life was endangered it was not a justifiable or legitimate use 
of deadly force. Since the police response depends on whether officers 
genuinely believed they or others were under threat at the time, and not 
on how reasonable this belief was when looked at after the event, officers 
felt that it is hard for courts, tribunals or anyone else to second-guess and 
find officers to have behaved illegitimately.
• A significant proportion of officers expressed the view that if an 
encounter was ‘well managed’ i.e. if the legal requirements were 
fulfilled, the paperwork was in order and no messy incriminating 
evidence was left unaccounted for, then the encounter was to be counted 
as ‘genuine’ (even if they knew it wasn’t). Thus a ‘good story’ 
(Chatterton 1979: 94) even if the person offering an account may not 
himself regard it as true, will be accepted by colleagues and supervisors, 
because it is what ‘everyone knows’ and has accepted ( Scott & Lyman 
1968).
• A majority of officers felt that an act committed in good faith, with good 
intentions, and in the interests of society, that involved controlling 
criminals, was legitimate. Therefore, if the acting officers’ intentions 
were deemed to be good, then the encounter was considered to be 
‘genuine’. Delattre (2002: 201) echoes a similar sentiment when he 
claims that even if officers have employed illegal methods in ‘hard’ or 
‘Dirty Harry’ situations, they are neither morally tainted nor necessarily 
to be condemned in any subsequent legal proceedings.
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Officers were almost unanimous in what constituted ‘fake’ encounters, and 
acknowledged encounters occurred that possessed one or many of the following 
characteristics -
• Involved a person with no criminal history;
• Resulted from a mistaken identification of the person killed;
• Employed blatantly excessive use of force;
• Emerged from a ‘catch-and-kill’ policy - this involved the suggestion that 
the police actually place a target (the criminal they have chosen to focus 
upon) under surveillance, follow him for a few weeks or months, build up 
a case against him, he is then picked up by a unit of plain clothes officers, 
kept in a safe place overnight or for a few days, and after questioning, is 
taken to a lonely spot, late at night, and executed;
• Resulted from bad faith or malice on the part of the officer concerned. 
There were suggestions of corruption -  of certain officers being hired 
hands for particular gangs, taking money from one gang to eliminate 
members of its rivals. It was alleged that some ‘encounter specialists’ 
specialised in eliminating members of certain gangs45. It was also 
suggested that under the guise of encounters some officers eliminated 
people against whom they had a personal grudge, or for revenge 46
• Involved personal gain for the officer doing the encounter, for example 
ego gratification, anticipation of gallantry medals, promotions47, or
45 This allegation was refuted by other officers, who explained that officers acted on the 
information of informants and sources, certain officers had links or contacts in certain gangs, 
which meant that their ‘operations’ were limited to taking action against those particular gang 
members only.
46 Needless to add, there was no proof of any particular case of this kind, but there certainly were 
hint of murkiness of this kind in the narratives of more than a few officers.
47 Some state police forces follow a policy of one encounter- one rank promotion. For example, 
in Punjab during the heydays of terrorism (in the 1980s and early 1990s) the government had 
announced a policy to this effect and there were some cases of officers who had risen from the 
rank of Sub Inspector to Deputy Inspector General of Police (something that is impossible under 
the usual scheme of promotions) depending upon the number of encounters they were involved 
in. States like Uttar Pradesh still follow this policy, though this has been much more restricted in 
recent years. The Government, however, still presents Gallantry Medals to officers who have 
been involved in acts of bravery, above and beyond the call of duty. One of the more noticeable 
things about this entire procedure is that a proposal for a Gallantry medal has to be put forward 
by the Department and goes through to the Government for its approval. It is significant that none 
of the encounters done by the officers of the Crime Branch in Mumbai are ever put up for Medals 
and so far only those encounters that were done in public presence or during an unplanned 
interface with criminals have been approved by the department for Gallantry medals. This, in my 
view, is tacit acknowledgement that the ‘operations’ conducted by the Crime Branch are
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enhanced status within the department and in society, of the kind the 
‘encounter specialists’ enjoy.
Despite their personal feelings and moral compunctions about illegalities and 
wrongdoings, officers generally agreed that if an encounter was well-managed 
and/ or was committed in good faith for noble ends, then even if it did not fulfil 
any of the other conditions, it would be treated as a ‘genuine’ encounter.
Officers tended to obfuscate the borders between what they personally 
considered ‘genuine’ incidents and what as an organisation, or in their official 
capacity, they would accept as ‘genuine’ incidents. For example one officer gave 
the standard definition of what an encounter was and then added, “That is what is 
said in the FIR (First Information Report) in these cases. And experts in this area 
will tell you that this is the only way you can justify an encounter” (T33: Upper 
Middle Management). When I asked if that is what actually happened in an 
encounter, he replied, “As I said, that is what the FIR says happened and that is 
what is relevant. However, in real life many times even the basic procedures are 
not followed”. Since the First Information Report is legally a very important 
document, and the information contained in it is treated as sacrosanct by the 
courts in India, the police tend to be very careful while drafting it. The above 
comment of the officer suggests that while he personally did not think that most 
cases were ‘genuine’ encounters, but for the organisation, good paperwork would 
satisfy the criteria for being one. Good paperwork here included among other 
things the fact that the official police story, its timing and other details are 
corroborated by all the relevant police documents and wireless messages. It also 
ensures that there are no discrepancies in the various versions of the officers and 
‘independent witnesses’ (if any) involved. A good paper trail would ensure that 
all the relevant procedures and follow up reports were filed on time and without 
flaws or unexplained gaps.
Another officer said,
“The basic point is not what actually takes place in an encounter
situation- what is important is how it is represented on paper, because
considered suspect even by the department and thus not deemed to be acts of bravery above and 
beyond the call of duty.
after all, all the inquiries, and all the courts, and all are going to 
examine the documentary evidence and all the paperwork done by 
the police. If you are careful then anything can be managed”. (T 35:
Senior Management).
It was clear that these officers were more interested in the ‘recipe rules’, which 
would guide a police officer on “how to get the job done in ways that will appear 
acceptable to the organisation... how to avoid supervisors and various 
organisational checks, and when it is necessary to produce ‘paper’ regarding an 
incident or complaint” (Ericson 1982, reprinted in 2005: 224).
4.4 Officer Involvement in Encounters
This section examines to what extent officers admitted and/or were aware of 
serious issues concerning the legality of encounters. Rank, gender, and 
involvement in encounters were key factors affecting officer responses on this 
issue. Officers could be categorised into three types depending upon their role or 
involvement in encounter experiences - Active Participants; Facilitators and/or 
Supervisors; and Non-Participants. Huggins et al (2002: 1) have similarly 
categorised police officers interviewed as “direct perpetrators ” (active 
participants) and “atrocity facilitators ” (facilitators and/or supervisors) in their 
attempt to “reconstruct social memory about state-sanctioned violence in Brazil”. 
However, they did not have the third category of officers (non-participants) who 
had no connection to ‘violence work’ in their sample of interviewees.
4.4.1 Active Participants
Fifteen of the thirty-eight officers interviewed had been active participants in 
encounters. They had ‘done’ encounters and grappled with the legal, moral, and 
ethical issues involved. Nine of the fifteen active participants were posted at that 
time of interview, or previously, to the Crime Branch. Only some of the active 
participants belonged to the select group of self-styled ‘encounter specialists’, 
who had made encounters the mainstay of their policing career; others had had 
limited experience and involvement in these operations. One of the ‘specialists’ 
said he had used firearms in over fifty encounters, most of them fatal, as casually 
as if he were discussing trips to the vegetable market. Active participants were 
concentrated in the Inspector rank (8), while some belonged to Lower (2), and
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Upper Middle Management ranks (2), the remaining (3) were of the rank of Sub­
inspector. Officers who belonged to Lower Middle Management at the time the 
research was conducted, admitted to having done encounters prior to promotion, 
i.e. while they were still Inspectors or even Sub-Inspectors. This is the cutting- 
edge operational rank at which officers actually carry out encounters. Active 
participants in the Upper Middle Management Ranks admitted to having been 
part of encounter operations, mainly during their posting in the Naxal prone 
areas of the State of Maharashtra.
4.4.2 Facilitators and/or Supervisors
Ten officers, including all the Senior Management officers, had at some point 
been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or aftermath, in ensuring that 
encounters were conducted with efficiency and minimum disruption to ‘normal’ 
policing. Five of the facilitators / supervisors were connected to the Crime 
Branch either in the past or were posted there at the time of the research. One 
officer (T 35: Inspector) described the type of facilitating he had been involved 
in, saying that he trained police officers in the police stations by making them 
aware of the steps to be taken and procedures to be completed when an encounter 
case is being investigated. He described himself as an expert on the paperwork 
in encounters and said he was consulted, particularly in complicated cases to 
ensure that all the correct paperwork was done, all the guidelines were followed 
(on paper), and no mistakes were made.
While the paperwork and procedural steps to be taken by the police that follow 
any action have to be correct and in accordance with the requirements, in this 
context, on the basis of what the officers said about encounters, it is my 
interpretation that this officer was trying to imply that regardless of the actual 
facts of the case, his job was to ensure that the paperwork reflected that all the 
proper procedures had been followed by the police. This manipulation of the 
‘paper reality’ (Goffman 1961) is almost a universal feature of police work, 
which Manning (1997: 166) describes as, “writing the proper paper in order the 
construct the appearances”. The officer went on to describe similar sorts of 
vertical and horizontal situational negotiations and collusions with supervisory 
officers and colleagues in order to manipulate written records to protect oneself
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from superiors and legal proceedings that Manning (1997) describes in his work 
and which is part of the audit trail that officers have to ensure as protection from 
punishment.
4.4.3 Non-Participants
Thirteen of the officers were ‘non-participants’, and had no involvement in 
encounter situations (all five women officers interviewed belonged to this 
category). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the significance of gender was primarily 
in the fact that all actors involved in encounters (police and ‘criminals’) were 
male. Why women officers were never part of the Crime Branch team of 
specialist officers, or why they were not included in police station encounter 
teams may be partially explained by the dominant male attitude towards women 
officers universally found that they are less likely to be suitable for certain types 
of policing tasks, especially in situations calling for violence. Boni’s (2000: 89) 
suggestion that informal practices such as discouraging women candidates from 
applying for specialist positions and misplaced gallantry in protecting them could 
be applicable even in India as part of the explanation for why women officers did 
not play a significant role in encounters. Also previous studies in other contexts 
have suggested that women officers do engage in more ethical behaviour and one 
of the reasons for this could be “because male officers do not accept them - 
hence they are not incorporated into the male ‘brotherhood’ of officers” (Brown 
and Heidensohn 2000: 102, citing Miller and Braswell 1992). Brown and 
Heidensohn (2000: 102) cite other research where women officers were found to 
be no more virtuous than their male counterparts in the countries observed. In the 
context of the Mumbai police, either hypothesis remains untested as women 
officers had not yet been placed in a position where they had to use deadly force 
in an encounter situation. This is an area of the research that requires further 
exploration.
The majority of this group of non-participants were officers from the ranks of 
Sub-Inspector and Lower Middle Management. Typically a non-participant’s 
attitude was, “I’m lucky, I’ve not had to use my weapon. Without firearms only, 
I could control difficult situations, and I could arrest many criminals with just a 
warning.” (T 3: Lower Middle Management). The officer’s comment gives rise
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to the notion that non-participation could be a matter of choice or opportunity. 
Some officers may have deliberately chosen not to participate in encounters, 
others may just never have been in a position where they would have to resort to 
the use of firearms in any situation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the sample was 
skewed towards officers who had experience of encounters. However, non­
participants represent the bulk of the police force who have had little or no 
contact with encounters. The only knowledge about encounters they possessed 
was second hand. Many among these said they had no information about what 
actually happens in an encounter and refused to speculate or admit that there 
could be any ‘wrong doing’ involved.
4.4.4 The Crime Branch
Of the thirty eight officers I interviewed, fifteen (all male) had connections with 
the Crime Branch and were at the time of the research, or had been in the past, 
active participants, facilitators, or supervisors. Four of the officers were 
‘encounter specialists’ who openly acknowledged their special status. I got 
different versions of what these officers thought actually happened in encounters 
depending on their different roles, and in relation to the amount of trust and 
rapport I developed with them. There was often a difference between what 
officers initially said in response to the question- ‘what do you understand by the 
term encounter’- and how they subsequently talked about it during the course of 
the interview about what they thought actually happened in such cases. When 
formally defining the term, the language used by most officers was careful, and 
the story constructed in a way that it could stand up under scrutiny in any 
inquiry. However, as some of the active participants and facilitators admitted, in 
most encounter situations the police ensured that there were no witnesses to 
contradict their account. A majority of the encounters were committed in lonely 
spots, in the early hours of the morning, with only two parties, the police and the 
criminals, involved. The police control on the narrative was maintained by 
ensuring that the ‘criminals’ involved in encounters did not live to tell their side 
of the story. The ‘low visibility’ of police work combined with the high levels of 
discretion vested in the cop on the street allows for opportunities for the police to 
control and transform the nature of any incident and its official accounts 
(Holdaway 1983, Manning 1977, Skolnick 1994).
135
During the course of the interview, I asked officers whether they thought the 
official story in the documents and in the press releases ipost-encounter reflected 
actual events. How it was possible that the same story was repeatedly put 
forward encounter after encounter with just the names, places and times 
changing in every incident? Did they think it was realistic that these accounts 
were identical? I got a range of responses from ‘there can be no other story’; to 
‘that is what actually happens’; ‘how could there be any change since it is what 
happens every time’; and finally ‘there is this standard formulaic story which is 
carefully constructed and checked by experts to see that all the requirements and 
formalities are completed as per the directions of the High Court and the 
National Human Rights Commission’. However, the degree and extent to which 
officers were willing to admit that there was more to encounters than appeared 
on the surface, was largely dependant on the role they played, and the position 
they occupied in the organisation, as I describe below.
4.5 Police Attitudes toward Legality of Encounters
An encounter has two components - the act itself, and the motivation (or moral 
force) behind the act. Any opinion on whether a particular encounter is ‘fake’, or 
not, could be referring to either the nature of the act (its legality), or the nature of 
the motivation behind the act (its morality). Illegalities in encounters range from 
-  excess use of force; ‘catch-and-kill operations’; mistaken identity or the wrong 
person being shot; and fudging official records and papers. Immorality of the act 
would refer to the intention behind the encounter, thus encounters that resulted 
from corruption (killing for a price), to killing for the sake of personal 
advancement, ego gratification, or simply excess use of force - are not only 
immoral, but also involve illegal or extra-legal actions on the part of the police.
Officers were asked directly, or subtly, whether they thought there were any 
illegalities involved in encounters. While a majority of officers (25 out of 38) 
were willing to concede the illegality of the act, some of those were not willing 
to concede the immorality of the act. Thus, officers who accepted that an 
encounter was ‘fake’ in the legal sense, tended to justify it as being ‘genuine’ in 
the moral sense. Officers tended to merge themes of illegality with immorality
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and separating the two was quite an analytical challenge. I found that largely 
when officers talked of acceptance of wrongdoing, they really meant acceptance 
of the illegality of the act. In many cases this might or might not have involved 
acceptance of the immorality of the act (moral aspects of the issue are discussed 
in Chapter 6). Officers tended to justify the appropriateness of encounters as a 
crime response putting forward one or more of several arguments discussed in 
Chapter 6, and that made it difficult to gauge the degree to which they accepted 
wrongdoing on the part of the police.
Officers’ responses to the question of police ‘illegalities’ in encounters tended to 
fall into four categories: direct admission, indirect admission, denial, and 
evasion. However, the picture is not as clear-cut as appears on first glance, 
because apart from a few offices who took up entrenched positions of direct 
admission or direct denial, the vast majority of officers vacillated between 
admitting illegalities at one point and denying them at another. This confusion 
arose out of the problem discussed earlier of officers not drawing clear 
boundaries for themselves, about what they thought were ‘bona fide’ encounters, 
and what they considered ‘justified’ encounters. Officers tended to veer 
inconsistently between adopting various frameworks while talking about 
encounters, showing that their feelings on such a complex subject could scarcely 
be unambiguous and could not easily be compartmentalized into neat categories. 
Most encounters in the accounts fell into an intermediate grey zone - 
transcending, crossing and recrossing moral, ethical and legal boundaries.
4.5.1 Direct Admission
Fourteen officers said they thought there were illegalities in police encounters. 
For example, one officer said, “Last year alone, we killed nine people in my area. 
We got them, we picked them, they were wanted criminals- we shot them”. T1 
(Inspector, Active Participant). Another officer said that almost none of the 
encounters were genuine. In every case the ‘criminal’ was watched, his 
movements observed for many days, even months. The police then picked him 
up when it was safe to do so, i.e. no witnesses or other obstacles are present. 
Usually the ‘criminal’ was taken to a chosen place, usually secluded, and late at 
night, and killed. The officer added,
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“Otherwise why would you find such a big criminal hanging around 
in these lonely places in the middle of the night, and many times, 
alone? In such cases the places are also fixed, every officer 
[‘encounter specialist’] has his own favourite spot in a favourable 
police station area. They have the whole system set up - they have 
their ‘setting’ with the doctors in the hospital where the post mortem 
will be conducted. Some of these officers have a lot of money to 
spread around- they can ‘manage’ virtually anything”. (T35: 
Inspector, Crime Branch Facilitator, from verbatim notes made 
during the interview)
As a police officer, I was aware of this behaviour within the police organisation 
but did not have any direct contact with encounter specialists; even so, actually 
hearing another officer openly declaring how these operations were conducted 
made me quite uncomfortable, especially since the admission was made in such a 
nonchalant, matter-of-fact way. This was one of the few interviews that was not 
recorded at the request of the officer concerned, who frankly told me at the 
beginning of the interview that if I wanted to hear the truth, I should not record 
the interview; otherwise he would give me standard, officially approved answers, 
which, he felt, would not help my research. The officer however, did not have 
any objections to my taking extensive notes as he was speaking.
4.5.2 Indirect Admission
Ten officers indirectly admitted to illegalities in encounters, for example a senior 
officer said,
“After all why give a weapon in the hands of the police? You want 
that in certain situations the police should use it, that is why you have 
given the weapon. I am not endorsing a police act of catching and 
killing- that is very bad and very dangerous. But, let me tell you why 
it has become necessary for the police to become proactive and 
aggressive- you may call it just a euphemism, this proactive and 
aggressive policing and all that. But this would not have been 
necessary if our legal system had worked effectively and was seen to 
be punishing the wrong doers...” (T 31: Senior Management)
The officer went on to list a number of reasons why the police needed to be 
‘proactive and aggressive’. These included the negative impact of rising crime on 
the economic and social well-being of Mumbai; rising insecurity and fear of 
crime that was said to have gripped its citizens; pressures on the political party 
in power to remedy the situation, who in turn demanded and effective police
138
response to organised crime. It was clear that the officer was acknowledging 
excess use of force and other illegalities, while trying to minimise the negative 
import of the words by justifying why the police had to use these measures.
4.5.3 Denial
Twelve officers denied that there was any wrongdoing, but only three officers 
maintained denial right through the interview. The reason why officers denied 
any ‘wrongdoing’ could be partially attributed to what Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 
(1983) call cop’s code, whereby part of the street cop culture is ‘don’t give up 
another cop’, or what are considered to be key cultural characteristics of the 
organisation, secrecy, solidarity and the ‘operational code’ which enshrines the 
‘rule of silence’ (Westley 1970, van Maanen 1978, Punch 1985, Reiner 2000a).
A majority of the officers initially denied ‘wrongdoing’ strenuously. They later 
modified their position saying though there were illegalities, these were ‘minor’ 
illegalities or mere technicalities (for e.g. use of excessive force), but that they 
did not consider these to be either serious or worth consideration. One officer 
said,
“Encounters - every person is not encountered. If only he attacks us 
too much or fires on us, only then an encounter happens. And 
normally if you feel that if a person can be subdued then he is 
arrested. But if you know that this person has a weapon and will use 
it, then we kill him.” (T 19: Sub-Inspector, Active participant)
The officer did not specify which ‘criminals’ can be arrested and which ‘have to 
be killed’. This talk is redolent of the notion of ‘victim precipitation’ or ‘victim 
blaming’ that was invoked not only in incidents of homicide and rape (Wolfgang 
1959, Amir 1971) but a form of early ‘proto-victimology’ literature that 
discussed the functional responsibility of the victim (Rock 2002). Police officers 
in India have a tendency to blame the victim. It was my experience that the work 
load on police officers in police stations, be it the rural or urban areas is so high 
and there is so much pressure to respond to the large number of crimes, that the 
police have a instinctive reaction to blame everyone else, including 
complainants, for what they see as failing to take basic precautions against being 
victimized, leading to a worsening crime situation. This tendency to shift
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responsibility from themselves onto others might have led the officer to suggest 
that when certain criminals ‘had to be killed’, it implied that it was their own 
conduct that led to a situation where the ‘criminals’ had to be eliminated rather 
than arrested.
In effect, this officer denied that the intention of the police was to inevitably kill
criminals, but that arresting them was a viable and vigorous option exercised.
However, just a few minutes later the same officer went on to say,
“Today those who are really hard core criminals and who are 
constantly committing crimes and are not reforming - then finishing 
them is the best. It is no point in keeping them around. It 
unnecessarily wastes the government's time, court's time and our 
time.... As a result there is a sort of terror of the police and the others 
do not have the guts to commit such crimes. So it is in the society's 
interests to finish them.” (T 19: Sub-Inspector, Active participant)
Here the officer does not mention the possibility of arresting ‘hardcore’ 
criminals, instead, clearly shows his preference for extermination in the social 
interest. The contradiction and complexity of denial comes through in these two 
quotes, where initially the officer denies that killing criminals is the primary aim 
of the police, but later goes on to extol the virtues of a ‘policy’ of encounters. 
While this officer does not exemplify denial in the literal sense of the word, the 
justifications and arguments put forward by him fit into the wider denial 
framework (Cohen 2001) discussed in Chapter 6.
4.5.4 Evasion
Two officers evaded giving any kind of direct answer to the question of police 
wrongdoing in encounters. These officers were uncomfortable in committing to 
any clear position. I took this to indicate that they actually thought there were 
illegalities involved, but just did not want to accept it, nor did they want to 
blatantly or self-delusionally say that all encounters were above board. There is 
also the possibility that an evasive response might be an artefact of the interview 
situation. I recognize that people often deal with morally difficult or 
incriminating issues by not talking about them. One officer gave an answer so as 
to neither deny nor acknowledge questionable conduct on the part of the police 
thus,
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“Just because nobody questions, one would think that there would be 
a sort of a free situation of people getting knocked out, but I haven’t 
got the statistics offhand with me- but we have had less number of 
shootouts and encounters- which means obviously we are not talking 
about it as a policy- that we must kill so many this month and so 
many in the next, no, not at all. The reduction in the number of both 
(shootouts and encounters) itself shows that the problem has been 
contained”. (T 30: Senior Management)
This officer did not directly answer the question whether he thought there was 
police wrongdoing in encounters, but appeared to say that the police were not 
going berserk, killing ‘criminals’ randomly but were, carefully and in a 
controlled manner, striking at specific targets in order to reduce the number of 
crimes committed by the organised gangs. The officer seemed to suggest that 
since encounters were declining, it showed that the police were not killing for the 
sake of it (implying that there was no ‘wrongdoing), but were doing so in 
response to crime trends, which vindicated any kind of ‘wrongdoing’ (if any) that 
might have occurred. Thus he did not answer the question of whether there was 
any wrongdoing in his opinion, but evaded commenting on it by saying that since 
they were effective crime control measures, encounters were justified. I also 
thought that the officer spoke about controlling the number of shootouts as 
opposed to other organised gang crimes like kidnapping and extortion, for they 
provided the clearest evidence of the activities of the organised criminals, and 
those which were also the most likely to be definitely recorded by the police48.
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between the active participants, facilitators 
and/or supervisors, and non-participants and those who admitted either directly 
or indirectly to illegal encounters, and denied or evaded the question of illegal 
encounters gives a clearer picture of the situation
Table 4.1: Officer Involvement and Attitude Towards 'Wrongdoing1 in 
Encounters
48 Levi and Maguire (2002: 804-5) suggest that cultural, legal, perceptual, and temporal factors 
affect the definition of violent crime. However, though problematic, homicide figures are still the 
most commonly comparable figures to make judgements about the ‘level of violence’ in a 
particular society and between societies. Thus implying that of all the recorded crime figures, 
homicide figures could be considered to be the most reliably recorded comparatively over time 
and culture.
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ACTIVE
PARTICIPANTS
FACILITATORS/
SUPERVISORS
NON­
PARTICIPANTS
TOTAL
DIRECT
ADMISSION
7 3 4 14
INDIRECT
ADMISSION
2 6 2 10
DENIAL/
EVASION
6 1 7 14
TOTAL 15 10 13 38
It is significant that around half the active participants (mainly from the rank of 
Inspectors) did not have any problems with making a direct admission and 
together with those who indirectly admitted to illegality on their part, constituted 
close to two thirds of the total group. On the other hand a majority of the non­
participants (Sub inspectors, and Lower Middle Management) tended to opt for 
denial or evasion as a response to this question. This may have been because 
they did not have the experience to either confirm or deny illegalities in any 
authoritative way. The majority of supervisors and facilitators tended to 
indirectly admit to transgressions.
That almost half the active participants accepted wrongdoing was surprising, but 
perhaps it showed their confidence and belief in the ‘correctness’, or 
appropriateness of their actions. However, it was the strong element of moral 
rectitude, which allowed officers to have no qualms about accepting that there 
was overuse of deadly force because they were convinced it was done for social 
good and to fight crime. They felt that there were many limitations placed on 
them by the requirements of the law, their general lack of faith in the Criminal 
Justice System, and the sheer lack of resources, infrastructure and manpower to 
tackle large-scale organised crime (See Chapter 6).
Some of the active participants I interviewed did not see that there was any cause 
to question either their motives or actions as they were perfectly justifiable - 
from their viewpoint. According to them, organised crime could not be 
controlled through the legal means available to them; however, the police were
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expected by society at large to deal with it effectively, regardless of the means 
adopted to do so. Foster cites Hunt and Manning’s (1991) study which found, 
“police lying and how the nature of police work, and officers’ responses to it, 
opens up a moral and practical minefield and, in so doing, creates the backdrop 
for a range of illegitimate behaviour and abuse of the rule of law” (2003: 205). 
Thus powerful forces that motivated officers in Mumbai to adopt illegal means to 
do what they perceived was their job, operate even in other police contexts and 
circumstances. Studies in the UK also revealed similar pressures on the police, 
especially the lower ranks to adopt whatever measures they felt they needed, 
even illegal ones to do their job (James 1979, Chatterton 1979, Settle 1990). 
Officers in Mumbai were remarkably confident that nothing could ever go 
wrong, that they could never make a mistake that they would get the ‘right’ man 
every time. They had spent so much time and energy on covert surveillance, 
collecting intelligence and keeping track of a particular individual that there were 
very little chances of any mistakes occurring. Also since the police controlled 
information about encounters, they did not feel threatened by media exposures or 
scandals.
The reasons why officers tended to deny any ‘wrongdoing’ were more 
straightforward. There must have been some amount of distrust not only of the 
researcher (me), but also of the purpose of the research and what the research 
material would be used for. In general it is part of the police culture to be 
suspicious and distrustful of others (Reiner 2000a: 91). This was especially 
understandable because the topic under discussion was so sensitive and any 
misuse of the information could have drastic consequences for the individual and 
the organisation (though I suspect they did not consciously think about the 
welfare of the organisation).
Denial of illegality also resulted because a large number of officers preferred to 
stick to the official police version of encounters as a matter of policy. This made 
them feel safe and they probably were not interested in either introspecting or 
discussing a topic in detail and honestly because either it was too sensitive for 
them or they felt guilt. There might have been an element of guilt on the part of 
the active participants -  a feeling that despite all their bluster and justifications,
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there was at another level, some recognition that what they were doing was 
illegal and tantamount to murder. As for the non-participants, I suspect there 
were feelings of guilt that they themselves were incapable or unable to take this 
decisive action, so they did not want to ‘rat’ on others who did. Some of the non­
participants who did not have any direct contact or experience of encounters 
might have denied because of lack of adequate and reliable knowledge about 
what actually happens in these situations and may, therefore have refrained from 
making claims about ‘wrongdoings’. Facilitators and supervisors may 
themselves be complicit in some ‘wrongdoing’, or may just have turned a blind 
eye to knowledge of some ‘wrongdoing’ being done in an encounter situation. 
For this reason they may be unwilling to admit their guilt. The police sub-cultural 
values of secrecy and loyalty to colleagues are “central to controlling the flow of 
potentially explosive material and hence each other” (Brogden et al 1988: 39). 
The sub-culture also fosters a group solidarity that punishes whistleblowing with 
a ‘cold shoulder treatment’, dismissal, demotion, discrimination, ostracism, even 
assault (Chan 1996: 121, Kleinig 1996: 187); and worse still, being set up in a 
shooting incident without back-up as alleged by officer Serpico who broke the 
‘rule of silence’ and deposed before the Knapp Commission (1972) in New York 
(Maas 1974). alleges to have faced in life threatening situations. This has been 
well-documented in the UK and several other police studies across the world.
There also must have been an element of fear for the officers who refused to 
accept any wrongdoing for fear of the repercussions. They could not be sure that 
the material would not be ‘misused’ and used to implicate them in any legal or 
departmental action49 as was evident in the reaction of some of the officers to 
their interviews being tape recorded, but did not mind discussing some of these 
issues openly once the recorder had been switched off. Some other deniers were 
perhaps careful enough not to commit themselves either on tape or off it.
There certainly was evidence that loyalty towards colleagues and the department 
meant people denied illegality per se, or even if they admitted illegality, tended
49 These last two factors are surmises and I don’t really have concrete evidence from the 
interviews. However it would seem plausible that fear and guilt would be some of the reasons for 
their refusal to discuss this issue openly.
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to support the action out of a sense of loyalty or duty for their colleagues or the
department as a whole. As one officer put it,
“We are still a team.... We have been doing it [encounters] for the 
past 10 or 12 years and I think it is enough. But even then I will do 
whatever I can. I am not doing a favour to anybody -  they are my 
colleagues- good luck to them! I am simply doing what I can to see 
that the department does not get a bad name. This department has 
given me a lot- status and respectability, and I will do whatever I can 
to protect the reputation of the department- not any one person or 
officer.” (T35: Inspector, Facilitator; from verbatim notes)
The denial mode was more in keeping with my expectations of how police 
officers would react before I started my field-work because they had no reason to 
trust me and no obligation to do so.
When I looked at the patterns of Denial or Admission based on officer ranks the 
majority of Upper Middle Management tended to directly or indirectly admit 
illegality. I suggest that it was easier for them to do so since neither the ultimate 
responsibility for formulating and directing policy, nor its actual execution was at 
this level, officers at the middle managerial levels could afford to criticise and 
question encounters. It is unclear whether it was easier to accept wrongdoing 
when the responsibility could be passed on to others. Alternatively, it could be 
that middle management officers were able to be more objective and think 
through the consequences of police actions as they were not directly involved in 
encounters.
Most Upper Middle Management officers were very unsure of the long-term 
effects on crime control and whether it would prove to be fruitful for the long­
term control of organised crime. They were also unsure of what the 
consequences of such a policy would be, given the changing climate of growing 
human rights awareness in India. They did seem willing and able to reflect on the 
effects and consequences of a policy that was considered by all others as being 
very effective. Upper Middle Management, as future leaders of the force, were 
worried about the impact a policy of deliberate encouragement of encounters 
would have on the officers involved in particular and on the force in general. 
They were also worried about the impact ‘out of control’ officers, or the
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‘encounter specialists’ could have on the general morale and reputation of the 
force in the years to come.
Finally, Upper Middle Management officers were directly recruited, young 
Indian Police Service officers with a more critical attitude towards the 
established attitudes of deference and unquestioning acceptance of ‘tried and 
tested’ standard police policy decisions made by the Senior Management. They 
were the proverbial ‘piggy in the middle’ (Punch 1985: 75), sandwiched between 
the lower ranks and the elite senior management. In Mumbai, I found that these 
officers like to think of themselves as ‘thinking cops’ who were (at least 
theoretically) open to new methods and ideas of dealing with traditional 
problems.
Senior Management took a different stance and opted for official denial, but 
diluted it with indirect acknowledgement of some transgressions. It is 
incontrovertible that as facilitators, if Senior Management had not been complicit 
in the actions or decisions taken by the lower ranks, or had not given directions 
to that effect in the first place, such a large number of encounters could not have 
taken place, without serious consequences for the active participants. However as 
facilitators (either directly, or indirectly by turning a deliberate blind eye to the 
actions of the subordinates) Senior Management were not in a position to openly 
admit any transgressions on the part of the police. The fact that they were 
ultimately responsible for all actions (encounters included) and inactions 
(disciplinary proceedings to discourage abuse of force) of their subordinates at a 
force-wide level, they could scarcely openly accept that there was any illegality 
being condoned or encouraged by them.
Also, being the highest authority responsible for formulating policy and taking 
the decision that encounters would be one of the measures used to combat 
organised crime, Senior Management could not then accept that there were any 
illegalities involved. The fact that a policy of encounters prevailed can only be 
inferred indirectly from the complete confidence the active participants seemed 
to have in the support and backing of their senior officers. There were obviously 
no written instructions or guidelines that openly articulated such policy.
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Senior Management officers interviewed felt a compulsive need to justify their 
actions as being an effective response to the threat of crime out of control. It was 
their experience that encounters were one of the most effective responses to 
combat organised crime and this justified their use as a crime control mechanism. 
As one very senior officer admitted, while he felt that some encounters might not 
have been in accordance to the law in the strictest sense; however, as a leader, he 
needed to take effective action against crime that had spiralled out of control. He 
could not afford to be known as the officer during whose regime, crime reigned 
uncontrolled. This senior officer was influenced by the occupational culture, 
which also influenced Skolnick’s patrolmen and led him to observe that they had 
an ‘overwhelming concern to show themselves as competent craftsmen’; to being 
a ‘skilled worker’ as opposed to ‘a civil servant obliged to subscribe to the law’ 
(Skolnick 1966:231, 111). Senior Management needed quick and immediate 
results to prove their leadership capacities. As these officers had only a few 
months left in the job, it appeared as if they could not afford to think of the 
interests of the force, or society, in the long run. Several officers echoed the 
opinion, “senior officers feel that during my tenure, crime should be under 
control” (T 22: Upper Middle Management), as being responsible for the 
adoption of short cut methods like encounters.
It also seemed to me that Senior Management felt it incumbent upon themselves 
not to admit that their subordinates had been indulging in illegal actions; had 
abused the use of deadly force; and that they, in turn, had supported or 
encouraged this apparent abuse. Thus, they probably felt that it would be 
irresponsible on their part to openly admit that the force was countenancing such 
gross misconduct on the part of some officers, as they were the public face 
representing the organisation.
When I looked at gender as the defining feature for analysing officer responses to 
this question, there were no significant changes in the pattern of acceptance or 
denial. Of the five women officers - three opted for direct admission of, one 
indirectly admitted to, whereas one officer staunchly denied illegalities on the 
part of the police. There were also no significant patterns created across ranks of
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female officers, in terms of their opinion. However, I must admit that the number 
of women officers in the sample was very low and thus was inadequate to make 
any kind of generalised extension of gendered patterns.
4.6 Police Attitudes towards Effectiveness of Encounters
Despite any reservations officers had about the legality and morality of 
encounters, and in spite of disagreements over what constituted ‘genuine’ or 
‘fake’ encounters, every single officer agreed that encounters were effective. 
There were no significant differences across either ranks, gender, or on officer 
involvement in encounters. There were however, different criteria by which 
effectiveness was construed.
4.6.1 Crime Control
It was universally held that encounters had a dramatic and instant impact on the
criminal activities of gangs operating in the city.
“If a criminal is killed, then his followers or those crimes which he 
would have committed in the future, those would definitely be 
reduced...So many criminals have fled away from this Bombay city, 
they now have shifted their headquarters. Otherwise in Mumbai there 
would have been a great deal of unrest- gangsterism, extrortionists, 
kidnappers- a lot of the percentage of serious offences has gone 
down”. (T 17: Inspector; Non Active participant)
Newspaper accounts of the crime statistics for 2003 presented by the Police 
Commissioner to the media in January 2004 report “Murders dropped from 365 
in 1998 to 242 last year, shootouts declined from 101 in 1998 to 10 in 2003 and 
extortion complaints came down from 987 in 1998 to 273 last year”50.
4.6.2 Impact on Gang Activities
Officers were convinced that encounters had a knock-on impact on recruitment,
and movement of gang members within the city. As one officer explained,
“The fact is that if one encounter in one gang is done, then all the 
members of that gang in Mumbai ... in one encounter, for example, 
of the Abu Salem gang, we killed four people. Now for the next six 
months there will be no activities of that gang- because basically that
50 Times o f India: (2004), ‘I want more cops to be nabbed by ACB: Pasricha’, January 15th, 
2004.
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Abu Salem is from Azamgarh (in Uttar Pradesh) and he mainly uses 
shooters from there... for some days people will not get recruited to 
that gang. And for some days he [the leader] will have to provide 
money to their families. In this a few days will pass, then he will 
recruit and train new people - that takes time”. (T 27: Inspector; 
Active participant)
This is a very brutal form of disruption of gang activities. Perhaps the officer was 
speaking on the basis of insider knowledge about these gangs, but there is little 
independent evidence to support this viewpoint.
4.6.3 Establishing Power and Supremacy of the Police
Most officers felt that encounters had the power to create and establish the
ultimate superiority of law enforcement over organised crime. This was
expressed by one officer,
“It is my opinion that criminals, he could be a pickpocket or an 
organised criminal, or top gangster, criminals are not worried about 
courts- they are not worried about the system, or cases against them.
They are worried only about the police and bullets. What hammering 
they get from the police and their bullets- they are only worried about 
those two things”. (Tl: Inspector; Active participant)
The conviction that criminals are only afraid of the police and not of the courts or
the criminal justice system was widespread among the officers interviewed and
also officers I have interacted with over my own police career.
4.6.4 Reassuring the Public and Warning Criminals
Most officers felt that encounters sent a clear warning and an unambiguous 
message to the public and criminals, that the police was taking ‘proactive and 
aggressive’ action to prevent crimes that were becoming the trademark activities 
of organised gangs in Mumbai. One officer expressed it as “the police send a 
message that if you do anything wrong there is no escape. You will be subject to 
the bullet.” (T 7: Lower Middle Management). This ostensibly also reassured the 
public that the police were active and effectively tackling crime.
4.6.5 Immediate Impact
Officers believed encounters were an effective, shortcut method to get 
immediate, visible results for the public. In the words of one officer,
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“Yes, it has an impact on crime. The only thing that the criminals 
fear is an encounter. They know that if they are caught, they can get 
the best lawyers, they can get bail, they can try to manipulate the 
system, they can even jump bail. But they are really scared of 
encounters, so it does have an impact. That is clear.” (T33: Upper 
Middle Management)
Officers’ opinions differed on the extent to which they thought encounters were
effective and the time span for which it would prove to have a beneficial impact,
but on the whole, apart from a few Upper Middle Management officers, not
many officers actually considered the negative impact a policy of encounters
would have on the organisation and society as a whole. These issues are explored
in the next section.
4.7 Individual Attitudes toward Desirability of Encounters
In this section I discuss what officers as individuals thought about the desirability 
of pursuing a policy of encounters as an organisational goal. Individual attitudes 
towards encounters have been categorised by me as - approval; disapproval; and 
neutral. A closer examination of individual attitudes towards desirability of 
encounters in terms of rank or gender did not reveal any distinct patterns. Of the 
five women officers interviewed, two officers approved, one officer disapproved, 
one officer denied any need for approval of, and the remaining officer did not 
offer any opinion on encounters.
Whereas all the ranks broadly approved of encounters as an organisational goal, 
the disapprovers were mainly from the ranks of Inspectors (two officers) and 
Upper Middle Management (three officers). Those officers who maintained a 
position of neutrality were actually the Deniers of ‘wrongdoing’ and were mainly 
from the ranks of Lower Middle Management (three officers), one Inspector and 
one officer from the Upper Middle Management. One Sub-inspector and one 
Lower Middle Management officer did not offer any opinion on the desirability 
or otherwise of encounters.
4.7.1 Approval
This was the most complex emotion officers had toward encounters. Twenty-six 
officers of the thirty-eight interviewees, approved of the encounter ‘policy’ since 
they thought it was an effective method of controlling crime. However, some of
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these officers approved of encounters with certain reservations - i.e. they 
explicitly mentioned that they did not approve of ‘fake’ encounters (mainly 
implying killing an ‘innocent’ person). Even when officers acknowledged that 
corruption and ignoble intentions on the part of some active participants existed, 
they tended to approve of the action, as long as the target was a hardened 
‘criminal’. A few of the officers admitted that they would not themselves like to 
be active participants, but that they approved of the fact that others were willing 
to do this job. However, the picture was more complex than these numbers seem 
to suggest. Officers often expressed contrary views, and shifted perspectives and 
positions on this and other issues. For example, one officer (a Sub-Inspector with 
over 25 years of service, and a non-participant) whom I have classified as being 
one who indirectly admitted to illegalities, and who, I concluded, personally 
approved of encounters, held an interesting take on denial of agency when he 
said,
“Encounters are not conducted, police don’t do them, they happen.
Like how it is not in your hands whether it should rain or not -  it is a 
natural phenomenon -  like that whether encounters should be done or 
not is not in our hands -  they occur! (T2: Sub-Inspector)
JB: “Sometimes encounters are done, aren’t they?”
T2: “If they are done, then it is a crime”. (T2: Sub-Inspector)
The officer seemed to deny that encounters were staged and felt that they were a
crime, if not done in self defence. Just a few minutes later, the same officer while
lamenting the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system and the restrictions
placed by the courts, Human Rights organisations and NGO’s on the police, said:
“Nowadays the police no longer have an upper hand; there is no fear 
of the police. The reason for that is the increasing fear of goondas51.
You ask me, why is this so? Because the goonda takes hold of you, 
breaks you hand, leg, murders you. So if a goonda demands anything, 
people comply. What can the police do if they pick you up? They 
cannot break your hands or legs, cannot do anything, cannot hit you, 
cannot even abuse you. He is like a bound down tiger, cannot even 
roar. The police are completely tied down, cannot do anything, 
cannot even stare intimidatingly at anyone- there will be an allegation 
that he was looking at me angrily! The policeman has become a 
blind, immobile, useless oaf -  merely existing. But the goondas are 
not like that- they are very powerful and can do anything. In such a
51 Ruffians, or gangsters.
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situation if encounters take place then they are good for the police 
and for society. It will give the bound down tiger an opportunity to 
strike!” (T2: Sub Inspector; Non Participant)
While on one hand the officer denied that the police engineered encounters, on 
the other hand, he felt that for the police to be in a dominant position against 
hardened criminals, encounters were not only effective but also ‘good for the 
police and for society’. The officer subsequently went on to laughingly recount 
an incident where he had the opportunity and the means to shoot a dreaded 
criminal, but had desisted. He also admitted that his senior officer had half 
seriously questioned him later, as to why he had missed such an opportunity. His 
explanation was that he did not believe in using unnecessary force, thus making 
his own moral views on the subject clear.
Though this officer said that if encounters were ‘done’, it was a crime; at the 
same time, he also felt that encounters would help re-establish the superiority of 
the police and restore their bruised and battered self-image. I could only 
conclude that the officer personally approved of encounters but realized that they 
could not be officially condoned, and certainly would not want to be personally 
involved in one. The same officer was also aware that encounters were not the 
chance happenings they were portrayed to be, but continued to maintain that they 
were not ‘done’. This was just one example of the kind of complexity and 
different levels of approval of and acceptance of wrongdoings in encounters 
exhibited by officers. Some of the non-participants approved of encounters as 
long as they did not have to do any ‘illegal’ or ‘dirty’ work. For example, one 
officer admitted,
“I cannot do it myself, my conscience does not permit that I should 
kill- but if someone else does it then it is a good thing as all the future 
procedures and complications are avoided- and it prevents another 
big criminal from being created”. (T 12: Sub-Inspector, Non- 
Participant).
Others, it appeared approved of encounters as an institutional practice, without 
really having thought deeply about what it entailed and the seriousness of the 
consequences for the alleged criminal, the organisation, and the faith reposed in 
the criminal justice system by society. It also appeared that some of the
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supervisors and facilitators approved of encounters merely as an effective crime 
control measure, and did not want to reflect on its adverse implications for 
protecting the fundamental Right to Life, or how a police organisation that 
wields deadly force unethically would be perceived by society. Active 
participants, it may be deduced, approved of encounters to the extent of being 
able to pull the trigger on more than one occasion without qualms.
4.7.2 Disapproval
As opposed to these officers, five officers in the sample disapproved of 
encounters on legal as well as ethical grounds, as they were unsure of the long­
term impact of such a policy on the morale of the organisation as a whole and 
particularly on the active participants, in the long run. One officer said,
“After the last case, the Fawda case, we were in so much trouble and 
have just escaped narrowly. It was luck or the judges’ or God’s will, I 
don’t know, but we were very, very lucky. I don’t think these people 
know how lucky we were and this is so dangerous, it could turn on us 
at any time. As I said, it is like sitting on a time bomb which could 
blow up any minute.” (T 34: Inspector; Facilitator, from verbatim 
notes)
This particular officer had been closely involved with the fallout of the alleged 
false encounter case of Javed Fawda in 1997, and subsequent police efforts to 
contest the finding of the Augiar Commission. Thus, he was in the best possible 
position to comment on the panic that ensued following the adverse finding of 
the Commission. A few other officers also closely connected with the case 
mentioned the ‘narrow escape’ the police had at that time and disapproved of 
continuing along this self-chosen path strewn with landmines and pitfalls - ‘a 
ticking time bomb’.
It is significant to note that almost all those officers who disapproved of 
encounters, or whose conscience did not permit them to normalize these actions, 
were facilitators and supervisors (Inspectors and Upper Middle Management) 
who nevertheless said that they would continue to facilitate and provide support 
to the active participants out of a sense of loyalty for the department, or because 
they were afraid of whistle blowing, or turning traitor.
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4.7.3 Neutral
Five officers, who strenuously denied that encounters were ‘done’, continued to
maintain that they ‘happened’. Thus, they felt that it was not for them to either
approve or disapprove of any policy of encounters, because they denied that such
a policy existed in the first place. These were the actual deniers in the whole
sample, and as one of the officers said,
“Police is not, at no point of time, no police officer would like to kill 
a criminal because he is a criminal. Unfortunately in exchange of fire 
somebody dies, it is a totally different act. ...It is sometimes clear 
from the media or people speaking that police are killing the 
gangsters or police are killing criminals, but I don't think it is a 
permitted goal, or it is doing something for the sake of killing”. (T 
14: Lower Middle Management)
According to this officer, there was no question of him personally approving 
encounters as an organisational goal, because it was not deliberate police policy. 
Two officers did not express any opinion on whether they approved or 
disapproved of encounters, although they accepted encounters happened, but did 
not say whether they felt them to be either desirable or not, policy goals. They 
just did not answer this question. One of the officers just stared at me when I 
asked her whether she approved of encounters as a crime control measure and 
replied that she did not understand the question. Rephrasing the question was just 
met with silence from her. The other officer went on to talk of something quite 
irrelevant to the question, thus indicating that he was unwilling to comment on it. 
Refusal to answer the question was thus a different response from the position of 
the deniers, who maintained that encounters were chance happenings and thus 
the question of whether they personally approved or disapproved of them did not 
have any bearing. These officers might not have wanted to comment on what 
they saw as a potentially controversial issue or may have felt they did not know 
enough about it in order to express any opinion of approval or otherwise.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter I have described the complicated network of terms associated with 
the core term encounters, and the interrelationships that exist between them. 
From the police perspective, there were four different types of definitions of an 
encounter. There was recognition that there were ‘genuine’ encounters and
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‘fake’ encounters, despite a general awareness that the term encounter itself had 
dubious connotations. This indicated that there were different situations and 
conditions under which particular incidents would be seen as acceptable or not 
by the officers and by the public. The research shows that police officers’ 
perception that their own understanding of the difference between ‘genuine’ and 
‘fake’ encounters is different from their understanding of the public’s perception 
of the same. The confusion in the way in which particular incidents are viewed as 
‘genuine’ or not by different social actors merely serves to indicate that despite 
the awareness that encounters are questionable police conduct, there is a lot of 
effort put into trying to put forward reasons and scenarios for justifying police 
use of deadly force against ‘alleged’ criminals.
It was also clear that there were differences in opinion about the degree, extent 
and indeed existence of ‘wrong-doing’ in encounters by officers depending upon 
their involvement in encounters, their rank, and the rapport I was able to 
establish with the interviewees. The research also produced evidence to show 
that despite differing personal attitudes towards encounters being an approved 
method of crime control, there was near universal unanimity in the perception of 
officers that encounters were effective in more than one way.
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5 CHAPTER 5: OFFICERS’ PERCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC MOOD 
AND POLICE ROLE IN SOCIETY
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we explored officer perceptions of the types of 
encounters, their attitude towards their legality and efficacy, as well as their 
personal preference for encounters as an organisational policy in the ‘war on 
organised crime’. Bayley (1996: 285) puts forward examples of countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Jamaica where ‘police executions’ of ‘undesirables’ has 
been justified by officials, elected politicians, media commentators and the 
public generally, thus consolidating public sympathy for police excesses which 
“creates a grim world of vengefulness in which persons accused of crime are 
literally outlaws, subject to execution by everyone, official or private” (citing 
Chevigny 1990: 412). Bayley’s observations might apply equally to the situation 
in Mumbai, as the perceptions of the officers to the public’s attitude towards 
encounters revealed.
The first section in this chapter examines officer perceptions of what they think 
is the public reaction to encounters as a phenomenon. The second section 
examines how officers viewed their role in society; what they expected of 
themselves and what they thought society expected of them as police officers. A 
clearer understanding of how officers perceived society’s reaction to encounters 
and how they constructed their own roles provides the essential background to 
the analysis in the next chapter exploring police officers’ articulated motivations 
and justifications in explaining encounters, and connected moral and ethical 
issues.
5.2 Officers’ Perception of Reaction to Encounters: an Illustrative Case
A first person account of one of the most talked about encounter cases in 
Mumbai (Khan 2004) is illustrative of officers’ perception of reaction to 
encounters. This incident, which took place in 1991, and now the subject of a 
major Bollywood film (Shootout at Lokhandwala 2007), is of special
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significance to me as I was living in the area at the time it took place, and was
witness to the police presence and the immediate aftermath of the encounter, in
which seven members of a gang were killed by a huge party of policemen. Little
did I imagine on that day as I stood outside the police barriers, that I would be
joining the police, let alone researching encounters and writing about this
particular incident! Khan, a senior IPS officer, whose claim to fame, amongst
other things, proudly proclaimed in the Endnote to his book being “the fact that
44 hardcore criminals had been slain by him, [but he] was not indicted by any
commission of inquiry.” (Khan 2004: 136), describes this encounter and the
political and public fallout of the incident. According to this account, the police
received a tip-off from a ‘petty-gangster-tumed-informer’ that Maya Dolas,
alleged hit-man, extortionist and core member of the Dawood gang, who apart
from committing heinous crimes had also assaulted police officers and escaped
from police custody and his cronies were holed up in one of the flats in
Lohkandwala complex (an enclave of closely spaced buildings) (Khan 2004: 69).
The police surrounded the buildings in the afternoon and began a stake-out.
When adequate reinforcements were in place they warned (through a bullhorn)
the ‘gangsters’ and asked them to surrender. In return the police were attacked by
a ‘strategically placed machine gun’ and were simultaneously fired upon by the
gangsters. The police too returned fire and after a thrillingly described exchange
of fire, lasting over four-and-a-half hours, all seven members of this gang were
shot down by the police. Khan then describes the ‘bouquets and brickbats’ that
followed in the aftermath of this operation:
“The initial applause was overwhelming. The Chief Minister of the 
State of Maharashtra, as well as a lot of political bigwigs, called to 
record their appreciation. We were congratulated, felicitated by the 
grateful residents, by the Lions, the Rotarians and several other social 
organisations. Warm letters poured in from unknowns, whose faith in 
the state machinery and its ability to bring offenders to book had 
been reinstated.. .Since the entire episode that been witnessed by 
hundreds of eyes, it was difficult to dismiss it as yet another staged 
encounter... Despite the presence of concrete proof, some accusations 
were hurled at us, even from within the force.. .jealous fangs were 
bared.. .A few of these debunkers actually implied that like Dolas or 
Buwa [his cohort], we too were on the don’s payroll, settling scores 
on his behalf because some goons were getting too big for their 
boots, Others hinted that it was the builders’ lobby which had hired 
us to finish off the extortionists.. .1 requested the state government to 
reward my boys with some special compensation, and I am glad to
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report that [they received monetary rewards and bravery medals].. .in 
spite of all the positive reactions we got from the majority of the 
press, the public, and even the local political party in power, we still 
had to undergo a trial by fire before the fingers pointing at us were 
finally put to rest. We had to submit our self-esteem for cross- 
examination by the special enquiry officer who was appointed to 
investigate the legitimacy of our actions.. .During the hearing in court 
however, many senior journalists testified in our favour.. .both cases 
were eventually dismissed, but... this case taught me that you are 
forever guilty, until you are proved innocent” (Khan 2004: 73-76)
This account alludes to several themes of interest to this research, the vilification 
of the ‘gangsters’ and unquestioned acceptance of their ‘criminal record’ by all; 
the description of the encounter situation; the fact that thousands of bullet rounds 
were fired but there was no allusion to concepts of proportionate or reasonable 
force; the public outpouring of felicitations; political approval to police 
encounters; the outrage of officers at having to account for their actions; 
recognition of divisions within the organisation and envy of elite squads; 
accusations of police corruption; justification that presence of several witnesses 
meant that it was not ‘another staged encounter’; and finally officers’ sense of 
being betrayed by a system of accountability that is considered unnecessary and 
stressful and not a normal, procedural matter of establishing accountability. This 
incident is an example of how an encounter went well, was then considered to go 
pear-shaped when criticisms were made and inquiries instituted, and finally 
ended well.
On the other hand, there have been encounter cases that have run into trouble 
with the authorities and the media have raised questions and doubts. For 
example, one particular encounter, in which an officer gunned down 7 persons in 
an alleged encounter in Dombivili, a suburb adjoining Mumbai, raised a few 
questions even in police circles . During my field work, officers cited this case 
as being excessive and discussed rumours regarding the criminalisation of the 
‘victims’ and the previous history of the officer involved . The case was
52 The Times o f India: (2002), ‘7 gangsters gunned down in encounter’, February 27th 2002.
53 Khomne R.: (2002), ‘Dombivili encounter deaths get curiouser’, The Times of India, 23 March 
2002 .
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referred to the Criminal Investigation Department for further investigation54. 
However, since then I have been unable to trace the result of this investigation 
and whether any official action was warranted or taken against the errant 
officers. Such information was not available or forthcoming. The important 
thing, as officers discussed, was not whether a particular officer had acted 
irresponsibly, but since no immediate accountability mechanisms kicked in 
automatically to ensure a scientific and thorough investigation into the case, the 
resulting systemic failure could lead to miscarriages of justice.
Recently there have been examples where legal action has actually been taken 
and officers arrested in 2003 to be tried in criminal proceedings for ‘fake’ 
encounters that occurred in 199255. But this trial is still pending and the outcome 
might probably get buried under a fresh avalanche of disasters and scandals that 
periodically rock Mumbai. Interestingly in this case, one particular Inspector 
arrested, “has been conferred the best policeman award twice by the President of 
India”56.
The encounters described above illustrate the layers of complexity that surround 
them. Given the lack of reliable information, the dominant public perception 
becomes very important in determining how encounters will be viewed. 
Encounter cases have given rise to public outcries and demands for inquiries or 
judicial probes. These demands for accountability have not always resulted in 
successful criminal prosecutions of errant officers, but have succeeded in making 
officers aware of their own fallibility and in the importance of ensuring that the 
‘paper trial’ is properly maintained. However, on balance none of the allegations 
and counter arguments really made any difference to the public perception in the 
Lokhandwala shootout case and other similar cases that since Dolas was a 
‘feared’ criminal, there would be no sympathisers to support his case. Police 
conviction that this public perception will prevail every time gives them the 
confidence to repeatedly ‘do’ encounters.
54 Indian Express'. (2002), ‘CID to probe Dombivili police ‘encounter” , February 27th 2002.
55 The Times of India: (2003), ‘Police official held in fake encounter case’, January 15th 2003.
56 The Times of India: (2003), ‘Inspector arrested for 1992 encounter’, January 17th 2003
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It therefore becomes important to understand how officers’ perceived the 
response of ‘claimsmakers’ (politicians, the media, the public) as well as 
colleagues, the police organisation, and other relevant agencies, whose opinions 
would have a bearing on encounters being an accepted response to organised 
crime. While analysing these officer perceptions, gender, rank and involvement 
in encounters have been mentioned only when I felt they were significant to the 
analysis.
5.3 Attitude of Colleagues
Apart from talking about their own attitude, officers also expressed their 
perceptions of other officers’ attitudes towards encounters. Sensitivity and 
awareness of other officers’ reaction was important because of the negotiation 
required with colleagues and supervisory officers while creating the written 
records for ‘situationally justifying action’ (Manning 1997: 131) in encounter 
cases where ‘management of appearances’ was of vital significance. Of the range 
of opinions expressed, on the one end of the spectrum was the view that 
everyone in the organisation approved and supported encounters as they 
functionally contributed to maintaining and increasing solidarity within society. 
At the other end was the view of some disgruntled officers that just a few chosen 
individuals had monopolised the use of deadly force and were a highly privileged 
and pampered group who had gained undeserved recognition and position within 
the organisation and in society. A majority of the officers, however, held the 
moderate position that most of their colleagues disapproved of ‘fake’ encounters 
but on the whole supported actions that were deemed justified if not legitimate.
There was a distinction between how officers from the Crime Branch as opposed 
to all other officers talked and thought about encounters. Regardless of whether 
they adopted the position of denial, indirect, or direct admission, it was clear 
when I was speaking to them, that officers connected to the Crime Branch were 
in the ‘know’- i.e. were aware of the exact nature and extent of the illegal and 
unethical practices involved in these operations. Officers gave more than a hint 
of the murkiness that lay beneath what was ostensibly portrayed as proactive 
action in the pursuance of social good. Active participants were proud of the 
image they had cultivated and fed the media image that portrayed them as
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‘cleaners of scum’ One ‘encounter specialist’ is recorded as having claimed, 
“Criminals are filth. And I’m the cleaner” (Perry 2003); talk reminiscent of what 
Hughes (1961) has referred to as ‘dirty work’ in policing.
Officers boasted of the number of ‘scalps’ they had to their credit, one officer 
described his first encounter thus, “That was my first. Since that day I have not 
stopped killing...My name is a brand today. Prisoners stick my photos on the 
walls of their cells” (Lakshmi 2003). The ‘active’ active participants did not 
show much remorse or regret for the actions taken by them, which seemed 
logical when one considers that they were still managing to motivate themselves 
to continue this course of action. By comparison, a small majority of the 
‘dormant’ active participants, it seemed, had had more time to reflect on the 
implications of their actions and were more questioning of the ‘policy’ of 
encounters. Active participants enjoyed a special status within the organisation, 
and this was resented as well as coveted by other officers. The former were 
aware of this and had a somewhat patronising attitude towards the ‘lesser 
mortals’ who were stuck with the banalities of everyday police station routine 
duties. Some of these dynamics are captured in the police literature on what is 
considered to be ‘real policing’, the emphasis that officers like to place of ‘action 
oriented’, ‘macho’ aspects of police culture that has been documented in various 
studies (Reiner 2000a: 89: citing works of Holdaway 1977, 1983; Skolnick and 
Fyfe 1993, Geller and Toch 1996, Crank 1998) as opposed to routine and regular 
policing tasks that comprise of a majority of any police officer’s job which is 
non-crime related. Morgan and Newbum (1997: 81) also cite that studies have 
shown that “this ‘service’ work is widely regarded by the mainstream police 
occupational culture as ‘bullshit’ and very much the poor relation of ‘real’ police 
work”.
A large majority of the non-participants who had no connection with the Crime 
Branch, on the other hand, only had an inkling of the illegalities and corruption 
that existed in these operations. There was envy of their more flamboyant
57 Active Active participants were those who were then still actively doing encounters around the 
time of the interviews as opposed to the dormant ones, who had ceased such activity for a few 
years.
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colleagues in the Crime Branch but there was also a feeling of ‘better them than
me’ doing this dirty job! One officer, a dormant active participant with no
connection with the Crime Branch, and who had run into legal difficulties during
two encounters he had been involved with, added as a post interview comment,
“However having said that [encounters are effective] I feel that it is 
better that encounters are left to the Crime Branch rather than the 
regular police. They are better trained, they have the time and 
resources for the planning and cultivating their sources. This is their 
entire job so they are the professionals and should do it.” (T 38: 
Upper Middle Management)
5.4 Organisational Attitude
While officers, by and large, felt that there was general organisational approval
and support for encounters - “Our force believe that they are into encounters, I
think, irrespective of the government support. There is no alternative to control
crime in an effective manner” (Tl: Inspector) - a few officers felt that this
approval was not always to be taken for granted, but was conditional upon the
merits of each individual case, and in some instances, upon the personal relations
of the officers involved in them. It was generally felt that if the paperwork was in
order, i.e. all legal requirements were fulfilled in the written documentation that
followed an incident, and there were no major procedural lapses, the organisation
tended to support encounters. However, a few officers mentioned that in case
there were any problems, public protests, or inquiries ordered - the officers
concerned would then be on their own - to defend themselves and their actions as
best as they could. However the Javed Fawda case was an exception as the
officers involved had full support from all elements of the hierarchy.
Nevertheless, the officers actually involved in that operation still faced many
months of agonising uncertainty and underwent tremendous mental stress and
anguish for ten months in the year 1999. One officer said,
“When the Augiar Commission was supposed to look into 100 cases 
of encounters done by the Mumbai police, we had nightmares putting 
up those cases. The paperwork was incomplete, the formalities had 
not been followed and it was such a big problem. We could have 
been in very serious trouble, but we just managed to miss it because 
the High Court took a favourable view of the police action. The 
Fawda case was a terrible experience Mumbai police went 
through...People now just don’t seem to appreciate what a narrow 
escape they had and they just don’t seem to be learning their lessons”
(T33: Upper Middle Management, verbatim notes from interview)
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None of the officers talked about this stress openly, but experience of working in 
the police organisation made me sensitive to the unspoken trauma that the 
officers had undergone. Clearly, it appeared as if the effect of the Augiar 
Commission inquiring into the encounter of Jawed Fawda on the Mumbai police, 
was similar to the impact of the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen 
Lawrence, that had wide ranging repercussions on, and generated considerable 
negative feelings in, not only the officers indicted by the inquiry, but were more 
widely felt by officers of the Metropolitan Police in particular, and police forces 
in England and Wales, in general (Foster, Newbum and Souhami, 2005: 19-20). 
However, the above comments of the officer indicated that Mumbai police did 
not seem to have learned their lessons from this experience.
5.5 Attitude of Other Related Agencies
I asked officers whether in their opinion other agencies, including medical
C O
departments (who play a vital role in producing the post-mortem report ), 
forensics (who produce the ballistics report59), the administrative bureaucracy 
(responsible for conducting magisterial inquiries- mandatory in every case of 
custodial or unnatural death) and the courts (conducting judicial inquiries and 
criminal cases against the police) supported the police in encounter cases. It was 
intentionally a loaded question, obliquely implying that the police needed ‘extra 
support’ to justify encounters. The aim was to elicit whether officers thought 
other agencies supported police ‘wrongdoings’ (for either moral or corrupt 
purposes), making it easier for them to get away with killing alleged criminals, 
and indicating wider support for such actions. A few officers (mainly the
58 The Post-mortem report is of the most vital significance in establishing the cause, mode and 
time of death. Any discrepancy in this report from the official account given by the officers, can 
land them in serious trouble. The courts tend to hold this document sacrosanct and thus 
undisputable. For e.g. if any signs of scorching or blackening round the wound are indicated in 
the report, it would be damning evidence that the encounter was conducted at very close quarters 
or point blank range and raises questions on the veracity of the self defence account given by the 
officers. One officer recounted his personal experience where the post-mortem report indicated 
such black scorch marks around the bullet wound and this created endless hassles for the officer 
and his team to get second and third opinions on this report that contradicted the findings of the 
original report.
59 Forensics have to provide the hand wash report of the criminal, providing evidence that the 
‘criminal’ had indeed attempted to fire on the police party; ballistic report on all the weapons 
used during the encounter, belonging to the ‘criminal’ (had been recently discharged) and to the 
officers (matching the bullets with the weapons and the number of shots the officers claim to 
have discharged) etc.
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Deniers) spotted the trap and replied that other agencies did their job according
to the merit of the case -  so there was no question of ‘support’ of any kind. A
typical Denier had this to say,
“There is no support as such from them. They have a very indifferent 
attitude. What the police have done, whether he [the victim] was a 
big criminal, a small criminal- they have nothing to do with that...
And basically we [the team doing the encounter] don’t keep the case 
with us. Immediately we have to refer it to the nearest police station.
Then they have all the control, it is not under our control.” (T 28: 
Inspector, ‘encounter specialist’)
In contrast to this, it was generally felt that the Crime Branch had good 
connections and requisite resources for the purpose of ‘managing’ the aftermath 
and subsequent investigation into encounters (see pages 138, 162). Another 
officer from the Crime Branch felt that other agencies were not providing as 
much support or co-operation as extraordinary encounter situations demanded. 
He felt,
“We have difficulties with them (other agencies)...They may not be 
doing it intentionally but it is our expectation that - we have done this 
for (the country). It is a unique occasion, it is a life and death 
situation for the policeman, so the reaction from other agencies 
should also be fast. But they treat us as a normal thing, ‘Let it be, 
leave it. Today the doctor is not there. It cannot be done today’. 
Magistrates ask them (encounter specialists) to line up, routine 
enquiries go on. This is, for the force, it is slightly demoralising.”
(T26: Upper Middle Management)
This officer continued to make the extraordinary suggestion that specialist 
officers should be treated, “Like (in) the armed forces, where all their actions are 
in-house; in-house doctor, in-house court martial and where you have dignity as 
an officer. Here, you are exposed to civil agencies like doctors and magistrates - 
it is demoralising”. Given the general opinion that these situations could be 
‘managed’ either on grounds of personal rapport between officers and other 
agency officials or as a result of money being exchanged, the officer wanted to 
take the level of management to a new dimension, where there would be no 
‘civilian’ involvement in the investigation of encounters thus avoiding any 
accountability to outside agencies. The language of militarization, and the 
distinction between the police and ‘civilians’ (a term used rather disdainfully) by
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this officer, is reminiscent of similar talk by officers in studies conducted in other 
countries (Chevigny 1995, Huggins et al 2002).
Other officers felt that relevant other agencies approved of police action and thus
co-operated or supported in whatever way they could. Still others, honestly
admitted that money ruled - and that if the authorities concerned were paid
enough, they would write a report as per your specifications. Eleven of the thirty-
eight officers said that these things could be ‘managed’, an opinion expressed
unequivocally by one officer,
“They co-operate, but it all works on money. In the districts there 
may be a case of personal relationships and rapport making a 
difference but here in Mumbai only money speaks. So yes, they do 
help and co-operate, but it has to be managed. It has to be done by 
the people involved, co-operation is not assumed or automatic” (T:
38: Upper Middle Management).
As far as the attitude of the courts was concerned - officers tended to feel that
while on the whole the courts were very tough on officers and came down hard
upon them in other matters, they too tended to give a bit of space to officers in
the matter of encounters. The Javed Fawda case clearly demonstrated the power
of the courts and individual judges in interpreting events in favour of (or against)
the police, as one officer said,
“Now if a sessions court convicts in a particular case, the High Court 
acquits, if the High Court convicts, then the Supreme Court acquits.
The law is the same, the arguments are also more or less the same, 
they just study the papers ( in the Appellate courts) and decide and 
give different decisions... judges have a different viewpoint and they 
have different interpretations for the law... they have 
discretion...There are some judges who have this fixed feeling that 
they will trouble the police, then they do cause trouble. The doctors 
are also like that”. (T 7: Lower Middle Management)
Clearly, officers were aware of the power of the courts to punish, if they failed to 
‘manage appearances’ or slipped up in creating a credible ‘paper trail’.
5.6 Attitude of Politicians
Officers’ perception of the political reaction to encounters in Mumbai was 
mixed. The majority of officers felt that while there was some interference in the 
matters of transfers and postings, there was no political interference in policing
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operational matters. Sub inspector and Inspector ranks were mainly of this 
opinion, presumably because at that level they would not have been subject to 
political pressure of this kind, as one officer said, “In Maharashtra there is little 
political interference in general. They have to govern and by doing encounters if 
activities of criminal gangs are dampened, then in Maharashtra there is no 
political trouble about encounters. They support the police” (T 8: Sub-Inspector). 
Another officer felt, “Action is supported also (by politicians) and not also. 
Because they have to continue ruling, so from that viewpoint they do what is 
suitable. There is pressure to control crime” (T 15: Sub-Inspector).
There appeared to be political support for encounters in Mumbai60, as it did in 
some other states in India. For example, in my own state (Uttar Pradesh) 
erstwhile Chief Ministers have made public announcements on several occasions 
(some attended by me) that the police should control crime by increasing the 
number of encounters.
Almost all the officers believed there was political support, if not open
encouragement for encounters as an effective policy to counter organised gangs.
Senior officers admitted that at various points in time, especially between 1998-
99 when heightened gang activity was apparent in the city, there was a lot of
political pressure on the police to be seen as being effective and proactive in the
war on crime. One officer said,
“When the situation became grim and things became uncontrollable 
in the city. Businesses started closing, the multinationals started 
packing up, capital inflow had stopped, share market had reacted, 
real estate collapsed, hotel industries, car purchases had stopped, then 
the whole thing had come to a grinding halt- obviously the society 
wanted some desperate help to be rendered by the police. The state 
government, no-confidence motion was brought; the traders called 
the Chief Minister and told him that we are not going to pay you 
taxes... Then they said we will celebrate black Diwali 1, instead of 
bursting crackers in all the houses and business establishments we 
will all put up black flags and protest... Then the Government of
60 See for e.g.: Aiyar S. & Koppikar S.: (1997), ‘Triggering Controversy’, India Today, 
December 22, 1997, where the Deputy Chief Minister is reported to have “admitted that he 
favoured the policy of encounters”.
61 Diwali, the festival of lights, is celebrated all over India. A Black Diwali, i.e. Diwali without 
lights is the ultimate form of protest, signalling society-wide unhappiness and resentment.
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India was thinking of dismissing this government belonging to the 
other party and applying 356 [section of the Constitution of India] for 
collapse of law and order. So obviously under such circumstances, 
any measure which was legal, which was giving help, was all right - 
the press and the judiciary .. .would welcome any medicine given to 
this uncontrollable, galloping disease.” (T 24: Senior Management)
The officer essentially described the state of law and order and the resulting 
economic and political crisis as the reasons for why the public, press, judiciary 
and politicians approved of encounters. Officers either did not perceive it as 
such, or did not want to admit that they were receiving direct political directives 
regarding encounters. However, in interviews with senior members of the ruling 
government and the opposition (see Chapter 7), they admitted in the conversation 
following the interview that they had given directives to Senior Management 
officers to ‘take care o f  members who were on the ‘wanted’ list of criminals and 
that they would monitor police action against such persons on a regular basis. 
The overall impression that I received was that officers were at pains to convince 
me that while they had no political interference as such, they had political 
support for these actions.
One senior officer remarked-
“The Law and the Constitution are like God, you cannot touch them, 
or see them, but they are there. The politicians are like priests and 
you do their bidding, that’s all. We should work according to the law 
- but we don’t -  because of personal glory and somehow we feel 
obliged to please our political masters - that is how we are moulded 
or trained.” (T 6: Upper Middle Management)
Following this logic it becomes clear that the police would not pursue such a 
potentially controversial policy if it did not have the political mandate, as one 
Crime Branch officer clearly admitted that they would not be able to continue 
operating the way they had been, if political support were withdrawn. This is 
manifested in the fact that the state government has the power to order 
magisterial or departmental inquiries into alleged misconduct of police officers. 
Also, according to Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no criminal 
proceedings can be brought against a public servant for alleged offences 
committed or purported to be committed in the discharge of his/her official duty
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except with the sanction of the concerned Union or state government. Neither 
could the investigation of such cases be transferred to the Criminal Bureau of 
Investigation without the prior approval of the state government. Thus the 
political party in power wields considerable powers to either protect or prosecute 
police officers, making their approval for encounters of utmost importance.
5.7 Attitude of the Media
The attitude of the media towards encounters was summarised by one officer as:
“Generally they are not adverse. After about 200 encounters somebody may
complain about a single case or in one or two cases they make allegations, but
basically they are not against” (T 1: Inspector). Another officer felt, “Encounters
make good news and that is how the media looks at them” (T 32: Inspector).
While a small proportion of officers felt that the media unconditionally approved
of encounters, a majority of others felt that media reporting displayed a mixed
attitude - approval if the encounter was perceived to be ‘genuine’ and criticism if
the dead person was not a ‘hardcore’ criminal.
“In the beginning 1992, ’93, up to ‘97, they used to feel that 
encounters are big news. Now encounters are not that sensational.
There are some press people who are directly or indirectly connected 
with these gangs, their viewpoint is different, so there is a mixed 
reaction. But overall there is less criticism, for encounters”. (T 27: 
Inspector, Doer)
This officer recognized the ‘normalization’ of encounters by the press and 
alleged that the media had vested interests and links with gangs, which coloured 
their coverage of encounters. While a majority of the officers maintained that the 
press was neither prejudiced nor biased either against or towards the police and 
reported facts as they saw them, there was a subtext, which implied that the 
media reported events only to sensationalize, not as responsible reporting but as 
commercialised packaging of news. From the interviews it emerged that while 
the officers realized the importance and impact of the media on public opinion, 
they nevertheless did not consider it to be of any intrinsic value in itself, in fact 
there was more than an undercurrent of contempt for the media, their perceived 
irresponsibility, and lack of integrity. (See section on condemnation of 
condemners in Chapter 6).
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Nearly 40% of the officers felt that the media was mainly interested in
sensationalising the issue, and serving their own interests, as one officer said,
“There are categories in the press- you can read the same news in 
four different ways. Some newspapers are always publishing anti­
police stories and they have a habit of printing everything negative in 
every matter... They have a habit of exaggerating... the journalists 
that I have come across, none of them have any professional 
knowledge of their job...Here the journalists are really petty and 
amateurish”. (T 20: Inspector)
When asked about the reports of the police achieving a set target of conducting 
100 encounter deaths in one calendar year, a very senior officer felt that it was 
mere speculation on the part of the press; there were a 100 or just over, encounter 
deaths in the year 2001, and the 100th person being killed on New Year’s eve was 
a mere coincidence; however, the officer felt this was sensationalised by the 
press as being a target set by the organisation for itself.
Some of the officers verbalised the awareness that the reporting of an incident
was largely dependant upon the reputation and personality of the officers
involved and their personal relations with the reporters, in other words, “If your
work is good and if you have good relations, good contacts with them then they
publish favourable news.” (T 31: Senior Management). Other officers implied
that that the so-called ‘encounter specialists’ had established good personal
networks with media reporters and enjoyed a good rapport, ensuring that they did
not get negative press coverage or elicit too close an inquiry into the background
and circumstances of the incident.
“Press have both reactions- they are against it in some cases and in 
favour of others. But it depends on the officers who did it, how they 
‘managed’ it. There is a group of officers, if they do it («encounters) 
then there is always a positive coverage for it, but if anyone else does 
it then they allege that the police picked them up and killed 
them”(Laughs). (Ti l:  Sub-Inspector)
However underlying all these conflicting opinions was the firm conviction that 
the press and media on the whole approved of encounters and that this provided a 
morale boost to the organisation. One officer mentioned that in the 1980s a 
reporter had tried to probe into an alleged ‘fake’ encounter case, one of the
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earliest in Mumbai. His editor was flooded with angry letters from the public and 
it had generated a lot of public anger against the reporter who dared to question 
the ‘effective action’ taken by the police! The reporter and the editor had to 
abandon their approach. Since then there have been articles and editorials 
questioning police encounters but on the whole these have not appealed to the 
masses and one can only infer that they have not made much of an impact on the 
general attitude towards encounters as there have been few serious investigations 
into these cases since. Officers remained secure in their knowledge that they 
could continue to manage appearance and ensure that there would be no danger 
of the media raising uncomfortable questions. (See Chapter 7 for further 
discussion on media presentation of stories).
5.8 Attitude of the Public
Twenty-five of the thirty-eight officers in the sample felt that the public attitude
towards encounters was one of unconditional approval. Speaking of the
‘extraordinary’ situation that prevailed during the late nineties, and especially
during the period when encounters were at a standstill while the Mumbai police
appealed to the High Court against the Augiar Commission’s verdict that the
Javed Fawda encounter was ‘fake’, one officer said,
“See, till 1998, the general public was not very much concerned with 
these, what you call, police encounters. But when in 1998, these 
shootouts became on the higher side, when it started affecting the 
local masses... Because all these local henchmen also started 
extorting money from the people, there were calls in marriages, even 
when you purchased a new car you would get a threatening call, ‘I 
am from this gang, or from that gang, give me money, and this and 
that’. Even people have cancelled marriage celebrations, in fear of 
these calls... Then people realized that someone has to do something.
Then there were these shootouts, and escape from police custody, FK 
case, and other cases62: in courts also there were shootouts. People 
were reading that a lot of big fellows, builders and businessmen were 
getting shot dead, it created a lot of feeling among the people that 
someone has to deal very firmly against these gangs. These gangsters 
also, were freely moving around the city, extorting money, doing 
dadagiri and goondagiri63 in local areas, using their weapons to 
threaten people...so after 1998, society in general, is supporting
62 Referring to certain celebrated cases where the accused person escaped under dramatic 
circumstances from police custody.
63 Dada- means elder brother, hence ‘dadagiri’ implies bossiness or dominating behaviour. 
Goonda means ruffian or hooligan- so goondagiri refers to hooliganism.
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police for taking this stem action against gangsters. If there is no 
stem action or proactive action by the police then questions are 
raised- ‘what are the police doing’?” (T 26: Senior Management)
Describing the situation in the early 1990s, when the scope and extent of the
activities of the big gangs and the menace created by small time operators riding
on the coat tails of the established gangs was at a peak, this officer felt that the
general public demanded stringent police action. In fact, the officer seems to be
saying that if the police had not obliged with encounters, it would have created
widespread dissatisfaction among the public.
Of the whole sample, ten officers felt that there was conditional approval on the 
part of the general public towards encounters, on a case-by-case basis. One 
officer said,
“General public don’t support any kind of encounter deaths if they 
feel they are false or fake or that the person has been framed. But 
when there are genuine instances, which are 99.9% cases, they 
support the action by the police because... large number of these 
goondas have a very high criminal record, they are wanted for big 
crimes and in certain cases they are anti-nationals [terrorists] also”.
(T 37: Lower Middle Management)
Officers concluded that encounters perceived to be ‘genuine’ by the public were 
applauded. The lack of public outcry or sustained campaigns against this policy 
might have been the result either of public apathy or a sort of resigned 
acceptance of other ‘fake’ encounters as ‘collateral damage’. There occasionally 
were some mutterings of dissatisfaction but rarely a public call for further inquiry 
or investigation into the matter.
Three officers interviewed were convinced that the common man was indifferent
to encounters, as it did not affect him (the common man) personally and that he
was too immersed in his own problems and with the day-to day struggles of
surviving in the city. One officer said,
“They (the public) are in no way concerned. They are not interested, 
except the family of the person killed. It has become an everyday 
occurrence because, in general, the public has become insensitive 
towards others’ problems in Mumbai. Insensitive. If it is my problem, 
it will pinch me - if it is somebody else’s problem, it will not pinch 
me. I am not going to ponder over it because my life is so busy, I
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don’t have time for that. Bombay life is such - even if you ask a 
beggar how much time he can spare from begging? He will say, ‘I 
have very little time’. (Laughs).” (T1: Inspector).
Some active participants and Deniers felt that the reaction of the public was
immaterial to police actions, since encounters would occur regardless of public
approval. However, they felt that it did help the police case if by and large the
public approved of encounters and there was not too much organised opposition.
Significantly, officers felt that the only public opposition to encounters came 
from ‘fringe’ Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) whose credentials, 
political affiliations, integrity and intentions were suspect. Officers, almost 
unanimously, regarded the few Human Rights organisations and NGOs working 
in this area with some degree of contempt and did not think that they had a wide 
enough following or sufficient popular appeal to make any significant impact on 
policing policy. However they were recognized as having sufficient ‘nuisance 
value’ to cause discomfort and inconvenience to officers, who would otherwise 
have gone about doing encounters with less hindrance and more efficiency. One 
officer (T1: Inspector) described NGOs as a ‘hindrance’, peopled by officers who 
had ‘ample time but no knowledge of the system’, and ‘only causing nuisance’ 
(see Chapter 6).
This contempt on the part of police officers for ‘do-gooders’ is reflected in wider 
policing literature and has been observed in various studies. Holdaway (1983: 
71), for example, calls such people or groups ‘challengers’, consisting mainly of 
lawyers, doctors and to a lesser extent social workers, who offer a threat to the 
secrecy and interdependence of policing.
In conclusion, officers overwhelmingly believed that there was social consensus
and approval for encounters. Officers accepted that there might be anomalies and
mistakes committed, but these are largely accepted as by-products of human
error, which are avoidable but inevitable, by the ‘claimsmakers’ and the public.
A very senior officer summed up the attitude of the majority of officers,
“There is a silent and now no longer silent, rather, vocal, acceptance 
of this police approach [encounters] from the public at large. In the 
debates in the State Assembly, the people’s representatives have 
defended this, rather demanded it openly from the floor of the house.
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The media has also supported it and the public at large feel relieved 
that these dangerous elements are given a dose of their own 
medicine”. (T 30: Senior Management)
Not only was the propensity for the police to use deadly force influenced by 
external situational determinants which included social approval of, as well as 
organisational attitudes towards encounters, but internal influential factors 
concerning how officers understood, perceived and internalised their role in 
policing society were equally important. The next section examines officers’ 
perception of their role, their attitudes towards their job and how they define the 
boundaries within which they operate. To what lengths police officers would go 
to do their ‘duty’, depended on what they considered to be their ‘duty’; how 
much responsibility they took upon themselves as the law enforcing agency; and 
how much responsibility they perceived society placed upon them to fulfil this 
function.
5.9 Police Perception of their Role in Society
The following themes emerged as the most significant in response to my question 
“what do you think is the role of the police?” - Crime Control; Detection and 
•Investigation of Crime; Crime Prevention; Law and Order; Maintenance of 
Security; Public Service; and Social Work. These themes were not pre-formed 
categories but largely emerged out of the officers’ responses to the question 
concerning their policing role. Police functions described by the officers, related 
to three main police areas -  crime related, keeping the peace, and service related 
functions. The number of officers who mentioned one or more of these 
categories as being the role of the police is mentioned in brackets, and indicates 
the number of times each of these categories was mentioned by officers.
• Crime Related functions - Crime control (12), Investigation and Detection 
of Crime (16); Crime Prevention (5).
• Keeping the Peace functions - Law and Order (16), Maintenance of 
Security (6); and
• Service Related functions - Public Service (17) and Social Work (9).
It is essential to clarify that the officers’ conception of themselves as ‘social 
workers’ is not the same as what is traditionally understood as the role of a social
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worker. Officers tended to categorise ‘helping an old lady cross the road’ or
‘preventing a bullying landlord from forcibly evicting a poor tenant from a slum
hut’ as ‘social work’. As one officer evocatively described,
“There is no other social worker like the police...If an unidentified 
dead body, or a beggar’s body or anything is found then there is no 
person in society who will say that, ‘Sir I will do his last rites, if it is 
a Hindu, then a cremation’. In the end this has to be done by the 
police. So in my opinion, there is no other social worker like the 
police”. (T10: Sub Inspector)
When officers spoke of social work, therefore, they referred to an assortment of
functions that were performed by the police when no one else could be held
accountable for or volunteered to perform them. Westley (1970:19) refers to this
as ‘dirty work’ that is “exceedingly unpleasant and in some sense degrading”.
Often, officers were referring to actions they thought were service functions,
regardless of whether they were within their legal limits to carry these out. One
officer talked about his work in the following terms:
“Police department does more than just enforce the law. I worked for 
the neglected and downtrodden people. I did a lot of work and helped 
the people and took decisions on my own which the senior officers 
would like. ... I did as much as I could, we are police officers but we 
are social workers. My reputation spread as one who would help the 
poor and not entertain all the other useless people, like fraudulent 
social workers and political people”. (T17: Inspector)
The mixed bag of responses was perhaps because not only is the police role so 
diffuse, but also because officers’ answers were very influenced by the topic 
under discussion just prior to the question, or the tone of the interview as a 
whole. Officers’ answers were also clearly linked to the officer type as explained 
by Reiner (2000a: 102). Drawing parallels between ‘officer types’ analysed in 
the works of other police researchers (Muir 1977, Broderick 1973, Walsh 1977, 
Shearing 1981, Brown 1981), Reiner identified four basic types of officers from 
his own research: the ‘bobby’, who applies the law with discretionary common 
sense and is essentially a peace keeper; the ‘uniform carrier’, a cynical and 
disillusioned time server; the ‘new centurion’, a dedicated crime fighter and 
crusader against disorder; and, the ‘professional’, ambitious, career conscious 
and poised for largely public relations functions of a senior rank. In my own
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work, the more ‘action oriented types’ talked mainly about crime prevention and 
maintenance of law and order; the more ‘professional’ officers responded in 
terms of ‘investigation and detection of crime’; and the practical ‘street cop’ 
emphasised ‘keeping the peace’. Those officers who emphasised values of care 
and service talked of ‘service’ and ‘social work’ as main functions. As with all 
other questions, officers mentioned one or more of these categories in direct 
response to the question but then elaborated upon, contradicted or retracted their 
opinions in response to other questions in the interview. For example, focusing 
on service functions, only nine officers specifically mentioned social work as one 
of the main roles of the police in direct response to this question, but during the 
course of the interviews a large majority of the officers said that their main role 
consisted of social service functions. This demonstrated the difference between 
service role as ideal versus service being the reality of police work.
In terms of actually how much police time is spent in service activities as 
compared to crime related functions, various observational studies in other 
countries have revealed patterns that are similar across different contexts (Punch 
& Naylor 1973, Ekblom & Heal 1982, Skogan 1990, Shapland & Hobbs 1989), 
as cited in Bowling and Foster (2002: 987). However police studies in the UK 
and the US concluded that despite the ‘proportion of time spent on ‘service’ or 
order maintenance roles, these aspects of police work are devalued by the police 
themselves’ (Bowling and Foster 2002: 988, referring to Holdaway 1983, 
McConville & Shepherd 1992, Fielding 1995, Waddington 1999b). Unlike 
Bittner’s (1990: 268) conception of the policeman who believes that his real 
function is to pursue the likes of Willie Sutton, while feeling “compelled to 
minimize the significance of those instances of his performance in which he 
seems to follow the footsteps of Florence Nightingale”64, most officers I 
interviewed were actually proud to emphasise the service aspect of their job. I 
believe this might have been because the police in India have traditionally not 
been perceived as service providers but have historically been seen as the 
repressive arm of the state, the image lingering on as a colonial legacy that they 
are desperately trying to change. As this officer said,
64 Bittner (1990) explains in an endnote- “Florence Nightingale is the heroic protagonist of 
modem nursing; Willie Sutton... was in his day a notorious thief’
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“From the times of the British, the police were seen as oppressors, 
and that image is fixed in the minds of the people. So once the image 
was spoilt, till the end the police image is tarnished. From British 
times, the police were considered to be bad. But even with today’s 
improved and reformed police, even when officers help and co­
operate with the common man, help them... In those days it was the 
police of the rulers, so the same image continues... We have brought 
about an improvement. Now the police are co-operative and polite 
and help in every way”. (T5: Upper Middle Management)
Reiner’s (2000a: 112) conclusion that “most police work is neither social service 
nor law enforcement but order maintenance -  the settlement of conflicts by 
means other than formal policing”, seems apposite even in the Mumbai context. 
However, although as he goes on to say that this raises important ethical 
dilemmas in terms of accountability, equity and fairness (Reiner 2000a: 114), 
these did not seem to trouble the Mumbai officers, who saw no conflict between 
their roles as crime fighters and service providers. In fact they tended to see their 
crime-fighting role (encounters) as contributing to their service role, as it 
provided instant justice and relief to the public. This contrasts with how service 
functions were perceived by officers for example, in Cain’s study (1973:74) as 
‘being officious’ or in Bittner’s study (1970:42) as being ‘nuisance demands for 
service’.
It was clear from the interviews that the officers were passionate about their role 
and took their job very seriously. Reiner (2000a: 89) mentions that for the 
police, their work is not just another job, but a way of life, a vocation to be 
pursued with evangelical zeal (Mills 1973, Reisman 1979). Even in the Indian 
context we see that officers considered their role to be very important and took 
upon themselves a lot of responsibility to fulfil it. The ‘working personality’ of a 
policeman, sketched by Skolnick (1966: chapter 3) referred to a ‘socially 
generated culture’, which was in response to the combination of ‘danger and 
authority’ facets of the police role. This combined with the constant pressure put 
upon individual policemen to produce results, leads to policemen preferring to be 
“efficient rather than legal when the two norms are in conflict” (Skolnick 1966: 
231). There is plenty of research evidence which shows that the police employ 
various stratagems like, “lying, perjury, undue violence, planting evidence,..., 
altering documents, manipulation of suspects and informants, falsifying
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evidence, intimidation, and a battery of seamy tactics are resorted to by some
policemen in some situations as legitimate techniques in getting their work done”
(Punch 1985: 203, referring to the work of Ericson 1981, Skolnick 1975).
Evidently, that Mumbai police officers also exhibited this pragmatic ‘working
personality’, was suggested by the fact that a majority of the officers did not feel
hampered by the restrictions placed upon their powers by the law and considered
it fully justifiable that under the guise of helping people or solving problems,
they could go beyond their legal mandate. As one officer put it:
“The police are the biggest social workers. He can give more justice 
than any other person. Any other kind of social work has limitations, 
that is not so in the case of the police. People bring grievances to us 
of all kinds, and we have the backing of the law and the authority of 
the khaki uniform, that is why people are afraid and they listen and 
obey, even though it may not be strictly within the framework of our 
powers. Anything done in good faith is accepted. If there is a dispute 
between two brothers, it is a NC [non-cognisable] matter65, we can 
just take down a report and send them away. But the quarrel does not 
stop. But if I call both of them and try to make them see a few points- 
I can do two things, either explain or threaten -  this work can be 
done only by the police, to solve the issue” (T7: Lower Middle 
Management)
When I asked whether this approach went beyond the law, he replied:
“What is the aim of the law? To preserve peace and maintain order. If 
I can do something to preserve peace at my level only. That is why 
100 Indian Penal Code is included as a section, which says anything 
done in good faith is no offence. If my intention is good and if no one 
has any objection to it, then why should I not do it?” (T7)
Here we can clearly see that the officer had no qualms about overreaching his 
mandate, or taking on a role that was beyond what was officially expected of 
him, all in the cause of being the best possible ‘social worker’. This officer’s 
comments were typical of those who believed their main role was public service- 
i.e. providing the public with the service they needed. It is unclear whether the 
officer invoked section 100 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as justification for 
encounters or generally to cover any acts committed ‘in good faith’. Incidentally,
65 The Indian Penal Code categorises most offences as ‘cognizable’ i.e. offences that the police 
have to take cognizance of and act thereupon; ,and some small, petty offences as ‘non 
cognizable’, which may be registered at the police station, but the police need not take any 
further action on it.
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Section 100 actually refers to “When the right of private defence of the body 
extends to causing death”, under certain conditions66. The words ‘acting in good 
faith’ do not appear in this section but in Section 99 of the (IPC) which deals 
with “Acts against which there is no right of private defence” and refers to the 
fact that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not 
reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous bodily hurt, if done or 
attempted to be done by a public servant or under the direction of a public 
servant, if the latter has been acting in good faith under the colour of his office, 
though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law. The officer had obviously 
(or conveniently) mixed up the wording and misunderstood the meaning of the 
two sections and drawn a totally erroneous conclusion that allowed him to 
exceed his legal powers and mandate. While police officers operate more by 
discretion than the letter of the law, they prefer to invoke the law and be seen to 
be working within its limitations.
The above quote also exemplified the spirit of the sentiments other officers 
expressed generally about their work, their role, and their attitude towards the 
law. It appeared as if officers felt that as ‘reproducers of order’ (Ericson 1982) 
their main task was to implement the spirit of the law, which was intended to 
ensure peace and security was maintained and that people’s problems were 
solved. Perhaps they believed that in the process of implementing the spirit of the 
law, if the law itself was infringed or set aside, then as long as the police action 
was in ‘good faith’, all would be forgiven and their actions would be accepted.
In the same vein, another officer saw his own role as that of the ‘elder brother’,
“People think that the police should help them in distress. Any man 
in distress will look to the police for relief. Police is the protective 
arm of the state... how a small child looks up to his elder brother to 
protect him from bullies or from being beaten up, in that way the 
common man looks up to the police to protect them from the bad 
guys”. (T29: Sub Inspector, ‘encounter specialist’)
66 Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code specifies these conditions as: when there is apprehension 
that death, or grievous bodily hurt will be the consequence of the assailant’s action; when the 
assault is done with the intention of committing rape; gratifying unnatural lust; kidnapping or 
abduction; or with the intention of wrongfully confining a person under circumstances that cause 
him to reasonably apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for 
his release.
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This attitude also extended to the use of deadly force. A large percentage of
officers were convinced that since their main aim was to control crime and to
ensure that the people received appropriate service, then, if eliminating
‘criminals’ was the best way to do what they saw as their job, and ‘ if no one has
an objection to it, then why should I not do it?’ typified their attitude. The
connection between the self-image of ‘elder brother’ and the use of deadly force
was clearly visible in another ‘encounter specialist’s views,
“In my opinion the main job of the police in society is to protect them 
[the public] from people with goonda67 tendencies. Maintaining law 
and order etc. is the job of higher ups. Our job is to control the dadas 
68 in the slums ...The main role of the police is that of a dada among 
these goondas. Now, I have done many encounters, more than 85, so 
these criminals are scared of me. If someone gets a [threatening] 
phone call and I go to his house, if that goonda gets to know that I 
had gone to this house then he will never phone that house again. So 
in my opinion protecting public from these goondas is the main role 
of the police.”. (T 27: Inspector, ‘encounter specialist’)
It was evident that this officer’s self image, of the policeman being a bigger bully 
than the criminal ‘goondas’ in society, clearly influenced his decisions and 
actions to invoke deadly force. The officer visibly revelled in his self-image as 
‘one who struck terror in the minds of the criminal elements’, and the assumption 
that his mere presence in someone’s home was a guarantee of protection for that 
person, actually gave him a sense of power. Very few officers expressed this 
sentiment quite so openly, but it was clear from the interviews that most officers 
preferred to think of themselves as being more powerful than the criminals. 
There were repeated references to the perception that the police were, in a sense, 
official ‘dispensers of justice’ and ‘providers of relief to the common man. 
Given the failure of the criminal justice system there was also a tacit conviction 
among officers that there was nothing wrong in actively pursuing a policy of 
encounters as a popular crime control measure to secure the confidence of the 
public. Khan (2004: 74) expresses similar sentiments when he describes the 
aftermath of the Lokhandwala encounter, “These [positive] reactions from
67Goonda meaning hooligan or ruffian.
68 Literal meaning- Elder brothers, but the term is often used colloquially as a euphemism for 
big, bad guys and/ or bullies, a sort of ‘Godfather’.
179
grateful people more than made up for the trauma of being ‘on call’ day and 
night and living from moment to moment, while conducting dangerous 
operations like the grisly drama at Lokhandwala”.
It was ironic that while most officers were aware that people who were most
affected by the rise of organised gang activities were a handful of rich, successful
businessmen, building magnates, film personalities, or industrialists, and not the
common man, only a few of them actually acknowledged that this was the case.
Most officers glossed over this reality, suggesting that the common man was also
affected, in that, they were the victims of extortion phone calls and threatening
messages from groups of petty criminals, masquerading as the ‘big boys’.
However, officers did not attempt to make explicit the connection between how
the encounters of a few criminals belonging to the big gangs would be reassuring
for the multitudes that were far removed from the reach of these gangs.
Presumably, the theory was that the atmosphere of terror and fear that encounters
created in the minds of the criminal classes, would have an adverse effect on the
desire of petty criminals to boast of their (mythical or otherwise) connections
with the big gangs and thus control their criminal activities, in general. It was
convoluted logic, but it appeared to work for this officer, who said,
“Encounters provide a good amount of terror. Everybody, in the lanes 
and by-lanes was wearing a white shirt and saying, ‘I am from the 
Dawood gang’. That practice has stopped as a result of encounters, it 
is a big benefit... There is a good impact. Because these two or three 
boys, who have no work, are wandering around, wearing a white 
shirt, saying they are attached here or there. Locally, they used to 
extort from the small grocers and shopkeepers, all that has stopped, 
they were never attached with any gang, but just boasted about it..”
(T21: Sub Inspector)
Officers judged their own policing performance by the impact it had on the 
activities of criminals. It seemed that if a particular police action created panic 
and terror in the criminal classes, and dissuaded them from further indulging in 
crime, then it was considered to be particularly effective and was valued that 
much more.
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In the previous section I examined what officers thought the responses of various 
significant other social actors to encounters were and I have tried to draw 
indirect inferences about what society’s expectations of police officers might be 
with respect to fulfilling their role specifically as law enforcement agents in a 
society perceived as riddled with organised criminal gangs. Thus, looking at how 
officers understood their role and responsibility in general, and taking into 
account how they interpreted the expectations that society placed on them, 
specifically with respect to dealing with organised criminal gangs, one can begin 
to understand the justifications the police in Mumbai put forward for the use of 
deadly force in encounters.
5.10 Summary
The interview data made it amply clear that police officers were convinced that 
they had a mandate from and had the support of the press, politicians and the 
public, i.e. society as a whole (officers did not consider organised criminals to be 
part of legitimate society, hence their disapproval did not matter), for the 
measures they adopted to control organised crime. In their perception, however 
flawed, they felt justified that the strategy of combating the menace of increased 
criminal gang activities with encounters was just, fair, and correct.
In this chapter I also examined how officers perceived their role within society; 
their self-image; the expectations of others; and those they felt society placed 
upon them. That gave them a sense of righteousness in performing their role. 
Officers admitted that their actions were not always within the confines of their 
legal powers and obligations, but justified their actions by the belief that they 
were undertaken, for social well-being. Priding themselves on the ‘social work’ 
component of their role, they appeared convinced that there was no conflict 
between upholding the law and serving the public.
A closer examination of how police officers justified encounters, used techniques 
of neutralization, and employed denial tactics to explain, legitimise, and condone 
their conduct follows in the next chapter.
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6 CHAPTER 6: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ENCOUNTERS: DENIAL 
THEORY
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I described officers’ perceptions of outside attitudes 
towards encounters. In this chapter I explore, how police officers justified the use 
of deadly force. The analysis focuses on the way officers talked about encounters 
and put forward, what they thought were plausible accounts to explain their 
position on the issue.
Examining officer justifications for encounters involved distinguishing my 
views of the actual reasons why officers thought encounters occurred from the 
reasons that officers put forward for public consumption. Distinguishing between 
the actual and articulated reasons required drawing upon my own personal 
experience and knowledge of police working and culture, and relying on relevant 
police literature supporting the analysis. There was always an element of 
speculation in this aspect of the research. However, I found that analysing how 
officers articulated their reasons and justified the use of deadly force against 
‘criminals’ using the Theory of Denial, provided an explanation of how officers 
explained to themselves and to others acts that were legally and ethically 
prohibited, and helped in understanding how a phenomenon like encounters 
remained relatively unchallenged in a free and democratic country.
6.2 Why Encounters Occur
Research on police decision to use deadly force has identified various factors that 
influence police shooting behaviour, including: “environmental, organisational, 
and situational” (White 2001: 131). These factors comprise the ‘external and 
internal police working environments’: external factors such as crime rates, 
degree of danger to the police; situational factors such as citizens’ demeanour, or 
the presence of a weapons; and internal factors such as administrative policy, 
informal peer group norms, policies and philosophies of the chief. (White 2001: 
131-2, citing Fyfe 1987). White (2001) suggests that there are two types of police
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shootings - ‘elective and non-elective’. Non-elective shootings are influenced 
mainly by situational and environmental factors. On the other hand, as the
amount of danger that the police officer has to face decreases, the decisions to
use deadly force become more elective. Internal working conditions and culture 
largely affect such ‘elective’ decisions to invoke deadly force. They also affect 
perceptions of situational/environmental circumstances.
In my research, officers gave several explanations for why they thought 
encounters occurred, or were ‘done’:
• Social Good,
• Crime Control,
• Police Work, or part of job description,
• Faulty Criminal Justice System,
• Organisational Directives,
• Personal Responsibility,
• Hindu Philosophy and the Doctrine of Karma69,
• Personal Interest or Private Gain, and finally,
• Good Intentions on the part of the officer.
Using White’s (2001) terminology, the first four reasons given by the officers for 
invoking deadly force can be termed as environmental factors. The next two are 
organisational factors. The only situational factor (self-defence) mentioned 
invariably as part of the standard self-defence story has already been examined in 
Chapter 4. However, in my data I found that officers articulated a new set of 
variables, what I call ‘moral’ (or ‘immoral’ as the case might be) factors, i.e. 
good intentions, Hindu philosophy, and personal gain or corruption, that 
influenced their decision to ‘electively’ invoke deadly force.
In-depth reading of the interviews revealed contradictions and confirmation of 
the opinions expressed overtly by officers in response to the question I asked
69 This doctrine says that you will get the appropriate rewards for your deeds, which, when 
intended for the ‘criminal’ means since the criminal commits bad deeds, he will meet a bad end, 
and that will be fitting. On the other hand the same doctrine for the officer could imply that he 
should continue to do his duty (karma) according to Dharma (the righteous deeds) and not worry 
about the consequences that follow. Further discussion on page 189.
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them, ‘why do you think encounters happen?’ As with other issues discussed in 
previous chapters officers gave conflicting and contradictory opinions and 
justifications, some of which were not logically compatible. This made the task 
of analysing and deciphering how police officers as social actors and society as a 
whole understood and responded to encounters, more complex.
6.2.1 Social Good
This all-encompassing phrase was the dominant theme that ran through almost
all justification accounts for encounters. ‘Social good’ was defined in different
ways, one officer said, for example:
“Sometimes if a criminal is arrested, he is wanted for many murders 
and crimes and if he is not punished by the courts, or he is released 
early, or he kills others and though we try our best to capture him, but 
he escapes and runs away. In such a situation, keeping in mind the 
interests of society, of peoples’ lives and property, then you have to 
do encounters”. (T 9: Sub Inspector, female)
This quote shows the intermixing of two themes, the inadequacy of the criminal 
justice system and the resulting harm to society if the police do not take decisive 
action (i.e. encounters) to remedy the situation. Most officers tended to assert 
that police actions in encounters were selfless, were motivated by the desire to 
achieve social good, were in public interest, and to safeguard life and property. 
Officers invoked the utilitarian argument that in the interests of the society, in 
order to engender a sense of security and reducing fear of crime in the minds of 
people, the death of a few men was not a large price to pay. Thus, they spoke of 
the necessity of eliminating ‘hardcore criminals’ as ‘justified homicide’ and in 
the process, if by accident or mishap, a few ‘not so deserving’ people were 
killed, this ‘collateral damage’ to serve the interests of the larger majority was 
well worth the effort. This sentiment not only relates to policing culture in India 
(discussed in Chapter 3), which still follows the militaristic colonial model 
(Arnold 1986; 1992, Das 1993, Dhillon 2005, Verma 2005) and is based on an 
adversarial mode; but also reflects the social and political culture of the society 
within which such police actions are accepted, if not welcomed, as I shall discuss 
in Chapter 7.
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Another way of understanding social good was in terms of responding to the 
demands made by the public, the representatives of the public, and the media. 
Officers felt that since the public, media, and politicians approved of and asked 
for more encounters in the public discourse (media reports, the state legislative 
assembly, public speeches) and in private communication with police officers, 
they obviously were beneficial to society as a whole. Reducing the fear of crime 
and boosting public confidence in the pro-activeness and effectiveness of the 
police were also considered to be contributing to social good by some officers.
6.2.2 Crime Control
We saw in chapter 4 that almost all the officers interviewed were unanimous in 
their opinion that encounters were effective, in that, following these incidents, 
there was a direct, visible, and substantial impact on the criminal activities of 
organised gangs. None of the officers were able to quote exact statistics, but 
almost all of them were convinced that an increase in the number of encounters 
resulted in a proportional decrease in the number of shootouts, kidnapping for 
ransom cases, extortions, and other related crimes.
Following from the earlier discussion on how officers perceived their role, some 
officers felt that since crime control was their primary role, all actions taken in 
pursuit of fulfilling this duty were legitimate; hence encounters were justified 
because they helped fulfil one of the core police functions of crime control.
6.2.3 Police Work and Personal Responsibility
As I described earlier, officers defined their role rather broadly and considered
themselves to be solely responsible for dealing with crime and maintaining law
and order. Thus, all measures taken in the pursuit of that aim were considered to
be part of their job and were legitimate police work. There were officers who
mentioned that encounters ‘happened’ in the course of their work. Others seemed
to think they were personally responsible and accountable for the crime situation
and that their own reputation as leaders and senior managers of the force was at
stake if the police were not seen as being proactive and effective in controlling
organised crime. As one senior officer described it,
“There is no escape. You are placed in a situation where you cannot 
say, ‘thus far and no further’. If there is a problem and people are
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getting killed, and people are getting extortion threats, how can you 
say that I am doing my best, but beyond this I cannot do anything?
You see you will not be spared. There is no running away from this 
situation. You, and only you are responsible for this...See, you may 
even be charged with dereliction of duty, cowardice, or maybe even 
prosecuted for deliberately neglecting your duty” (T31: Senior 
Management).
There was some amount of exaggeration in the rhetoric employed by the officer, 
but it served to underline the sense of responsibility he and others felt towards 
controlling the crime situation and the importance they placed on own role in this 
process.
6.2.4 Organisational Directives
Certain officers said in the interviews that even if it was not explicitly 
formulated, clearly, there was an organisational policy whereby encounters were 
encouraged and supported by senior officers as one of the crime control 
measures. The inference that senior officers’ approval of encounters motivated 
officers in actively engaging in them can be drawn from the periods of intense 
activity or inactivity in this field that followed regime change in the organisation, 
thus allowing for the possibility that certain senior officers approved of and 
encouraged encounters and others did not.
Since 2003, following a major overhaul in the senior ranks in the service and 
reorganisation of the Crime Branch, the number of encounters has drastically 
reduced, giving rise to the conclusion that subsequent police chiefs and senior 
officers were perhaps not in favour of encouraging such actions. However, 
officers, when questioned, expressed the view that the reason for a reduction in 
encounters even in the first half of 2002 was because they had managed to 
dampen the activities of organised gangs, and not because of some unwritten 
departmental policy. Interestingly, following the bomb blasts in New Delhi in 
November 2005, there has been resurgence in the demand for encounters and 
‘encounter specialists’ in some official circles and sections of the media 
(Balakrishnan 2005). Such media reports could add pressure on the incumbent 
police leadership to rethink their policy on controlling the number of encounters 
when faced with increasing terrorist activities in Mumbai in recent years.
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6.2.5 Faulty Criminal Justice System
For a majority of police officers interviewed, one of the most powerful reasons
for encounters was the inadequacy of the criminal justice system. Talking about
its effectiveness, one officer’s words summarized the feeling that prevailed in the
force as a whole about why encounters were valued,
“It [crime control] depends on the whole criminal justice system and 
is not the sole responsibility of the police. Witnesses will not come, 
witnesses will turn hostile, documentation is faulty, whether he [the 
investigating officer] has collected ample evidence -  there is not 
enough supervision...The delay between the crime and the hearing is 
so long that the complainant loses interest then there is no reason for 
the investigating officer to retain interest, because he has at least 
investigated 25 to 30 cases after that. At least if the courts accept that 
we have a pendency [sic] [meaning a huge backlog of pending cases]
-  that we must stop it now... When people’s wounds are fresh- a 
person whose brother or husband or son has died will not feel 
anything about it 8 years down the line, frankly speaking. They get 
used to it and start living in the normal flow. So when they have to go 
to court after such a long time, it is more of a hassle than anything 
else.” (T 21: Sub Inspector)
Many officers provided anecdotal evidence of how witnesses were intimidated, 
or silenced into turning hostile, or had moved away, moved on, lost interest in or 
could not recall the incident, or in some cases had died in the many years it took 
for the cases to come up for hearing and the final judgement be reached. It was 
clear that officers thought that the cumbersome processes of the criminal justice 
system put a severe toll on the limited resources and manpower that could be 
devoted to successful prosecutions of cases. Officers bemoaned the quality of the 
public prosecutors and the way in which many cases were prepared and 
presented in court.
The judiciary in India, as also in Mumbai, is heavily overburdened with an 
excessive backlog of pending cases, which runs into tens of thousands as Table
6.1 shows.
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Table 6.1: Disposal of IPC Cases by the Courts for Country as a Whole
Year Total No. o f  Cases for 
Trial (Including 
Pendine Cases!
Compounded 
or W ithdraw n
Convicted % Convicted Acquited %  Acquited Total Cases 
Disposed
%  Disposed Pending
Cases
% Pending
1993 4,504,396 137,875 345,812 7.7% 407,040 9.0% 752,852 16.7% 3,613,669 80.2%
1994 4,759,521 148,231 316,245 6.6% 420,552 8 8% 736,797 15.5% 3,874,493 81.4%
1995 5,042,744 158,357 321,609 6 4% 442,335 8.8% 763,944 15.1% 4,120,443 81.7%
1996 5,297,662 201,156 318,965 6.0% 524,623 9.9% 843,588 15.9% 4,252,918 80.3%
1997 5,461,004 185,432 336,421 6.2% 543,507 10.0% 879,928 16.1% 4,395,644 80.5%
1998 5,660,484 179,511 335,036 5.9% 560,378 9 9 % 895,414 15 8% 4,585,599 81.0%
1999 5,890,744 185.130 369,005 6.3% 561,724 9.5% 930,729 15.8% 4,775,216 81 1%
2000 6,023,134 168,938 390,223 6.5% 542,958 9 0% 933,181 15.5% 4,921,710 81.7%
2001 6,221,034 171,966 380,505 6 1% 551,388 8 9% 931,892 15.0% 5,117,864 823%
Source: Crime in India 1993-2001
From 1993 to 2001 (figures are available till 2001), the courts in India have on an 
average disposed of 15% of their trial cases (the average rate of convictions 
being 6% and acquittals being 9%), and carry over an average backlog of 81% 
pending cases each year70. As the officer’s quote indicates, there is a long delay 
in cases coming up for hearing in the courts. Then there are many adjournments, 
delays, and a long appeals procedure. This means that it can take anything from 3 
to 20 years for the courts to give a final ruling on any particular case. All these 
factors contributed towards an increasing sense of frustration and despair on the 
part of the police and the public with respect to the processes of the criminal 
justice system. However, this sense of the “legal order as too slow, too 
ponderous, too indolent, too unaware or too constrained to deal with ‘the 
problem’” is not unique to Mumbai. In other countries too the police generally 
tend to view the administration of justice as “weak, inadequate or inefficient” 
(Skolnick and Fyfe 1993: 24-5). Given the inefficiencies of the system and the 
loss of time, energy, resources and manpower involved in vainly trying to 
prosecute criminals, there appeared to be a general gravitation towards adopting 
easier, short-cut and more effective methods of dealing with ‘hardened’ criminals 
or what Skolnick and Fyfe (1993: 25) call “taking the law into their own hands”. 
Holdaway (1983:112-3) quotes a similar view of one officer in his work, “when 
you have a legal system that allows people to get off and makes you break the 
law to get convictions, then you have to be slightly bent”. Thus, a majority of 
officers I spoke to justified their actions by attributing moral responsibility to a 
faulty legal system. Probably this struck a resonating chord in the audiences to
70 Source: Crime in India series, 1993-2001, New Delhi: National Crime Records Bureau.
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whom it was addressed and in the public discourse on the subject (see Chapter 
7).
6.2.6 Hindu Philosophy
This was one of the more controversial reasons that officers articulated for the
use of encounters. Four officers said that their job was to do their duty (and
clearly their duty was crime control) and not worry about the consequences of
their action. One officer quoted these verses from the Bhagvat Geeta71, to
illustrate his point:
“I firmly believe in the Geeta quote. “Yada yada hi dharmasya...”
There is a reason that my birth has taken place, there is a reason why 
I must have come into the police service. So if great injustice is going 
on, I am not going to sit and think about means and ends... I am not 
going to have a dilemma like this. I have to achieve at that moment 
of time and see justice is done” (T25: Upper Middle Management)
Another officer felt that Hindu mythology idealized their Gods and heroes as
no‘vanquisher of the evil’. Most Puranic stories have the theme of ‘good versus
evil’, with the inevitable result of the ‘good’ triumphing over the ‘evil-active
participant’ by killing him or her. The interviewee believed this to be the reason
why officers were lauded by the organisation and the public as heroes, who, by
killing evil, active participants, were ridding society of a menace and were,
ultimately, righteous in spirit. One officer said:
“Some people do not deserve to stay on this earth, then by hook or by 
crook they should be eliminated in the interest of society. Sri Krishna 
told Arjuna during the Great War that he had to go out and fight and 
kill, even if the enemy were his own kinsmen”. (T7: Lower Middle 
Management, Active participant)
71 The Bhagvat Geeta contained within the Mahabharata is one of the oldest Hindu texts. A 
philosophical work, it “is the instruction given to the great bowman Arjuna by his kinsman and 
charioteer Krishna. Just as the great battle is about to begin, Arjuna feels unable to fight his 
cousins and teachers on the opposing side. Krishna teaches him that it is his caste duty to fight, 
and that in any case the self is eternal, and therefore no lasting damage will be done to the 
enemy”. (Smith 2003: 40).
72 The Puranas are sacred repositiories of story, legend and other religious information. It is 
believed that some of the Puranic mythical stories reflect historical events, and are the source of 
much of popular Hinduism as these texts codify practices, often incorporating local folk 
practices. (Smith 2003: 43)
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Killing in the name of ‘dharma’ for the king (as protector of the people) or the 
ascetic warriers dedicated to the protection of the people has been an acceptable 
and revered feature of Hinduism (Vidal et al 2003, Biardeau 2003, Bouillier 
2003).
The other strand of this argument stresses the concept of ‘Karma’ (or deeds) and 
it was the opinion expressed by some officers that bad deeds committed by the 
criminal were responsible for the bad ending that he deservedly got in an 
encounter. At this stage it could tentatively be said that the belief in the cycle of 
birth, death and rebirth that is the cornerstone of Hinduism, may contribute to the 
blithe disregard for human life that some officers expressed and that prevails in a 
large section of the society. This may be the reason police show disregard for the 
life of ‘criminals’. Vidal et al (2003) allude to certain Hindu traditions, where 
violence is justified in terms of a global order and the resulting peace enjoyed by 
people. This, combined with the absence of the ‘rights of man’ in the 
Brahmanical tradition (Biardeau 2003) results in a situation where “violence is 
not so much thought of in universal, ‘moral’ terms in relation to its victims, but 
rather in the context of a problematic directed towards limiting its inauspicious 
consequences for the perpetrators” (Vidal et al 2003: 19).
As compared to countries that are predominantly influenced by the Christian 
ethic, where a person only has one life. That life is precious and has to be 
preserved and protected at all costs. Life in India, by contrast, appears to be 
cheap for a large majority. A few deaths shock and sadden, but do not rock either 
the system or the social conscience. It can be surmised that contempt for Indian 
lives and the repeated use of high levels of state violence sanctioned by 
departmental custom were entrenched in police procedures and mentality in the 
colonial era (Arnold 1986: 233) and this spilled over in police attitudes of 
contempt towards the ‘others’ (criminals) even in latter day policing. (See 
Chapter 8 for impact of India’s colonial inheritance on the police).
The sense of calm and inevitability with which India responds to human fatalities 
resulting from disasters (earthquakes, floods, heat waves, landslides), accidents, 
terrorist attacks, communal violence and riots, contrasts sharply with the
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demands for inquiries, commissions, changes demanded by groups and interested 
parties as well as the media attention that accompany similar events in, for 
example, the UK.73 Whether the sheer volume of population has engendered an 
attitude that a single life is not all that precious and worth protecting under all 
circumstances, requires further investigation that is beyond the scope of this 
research. There is need for further research (of a more religious-philosophical 
nature) to comment on whether some lives are considered to be more worth 
preserving than others (‘criminals’) that are deemed less deserving; and whether 
this has made officers more blase towards the loss of lives of ‘hardened’ 
criminals than would be expected. Since these arguments and sentiments were 
expressed by some police officers and were also reflected in some of the 
interviews with ‘claimsmakers’ (See Chapter 7) they merit further research.
6.2.7 Personal Glory
A few officers admitted that encounters were not necessarily altruistic, but were
‘done’ either in the pursuit of medals, promotion, status enhancement, or
personal ego gratification, as the officer who articulated his self-image as being a
bigger bully than any criminal illustrated. One officer unhesitatingly admitted
police encounters were conducted,
“Because we are idiots. We are doing it for personal glory. We are 
neither doing it for the nation, nor for the state, we are doing it for 
personal glory- period! .. .Other officers have two or three encounters 
to their credit. I have none, because it has never happened that 
somebody has drawn a pistol on me, and I am not going to get the 
man in the night and kill him... I am criticised in every meeting [by 
senior officers]. But how many people are like me to whom it makes 
no difference how much you are abused. I’ll not do it. I am a rogue,
I’ll not do it, and you can go on criticising”. (T 6: Upper Middle 
Management)
Although this quote suggests that the officer disapproved of the general 
organisational attitude of encouraging encounters, and was an individual who 
stood firm against the organisational pressure to conform, the same officer went
73 A striking example was the Hatfield rail tragedy, which is considered to be one of the worst in 
recent British rail history and continues to arouse passions and is commemorated three years after 
its occurrence. There have been several disastrous railway accidents in India within the same 
period (with a much higher fatality rate) that seem to have been all but forgotten by the collective 
social conscience.
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on to admit, later in the interview, that when he had to supervise encounter cases
that were done by other subordinate officers, despite evidence of ‘wrongdoing’,
he did not officially, either condemn the incident or take action against the errant
officers concerned. When asked why he did not do so, he replied frankly:
“I have no guts, it is cowardice. We are responsible for the decline in 
the system. We have lost the courage to stand up and say we will not 
do these things. We take a certain pride in being able to say we can 
manage under all situations and conditions... I will not quit the 
system because I do not believe that leaving the world and going to 
the forest or to the mountain will improve the system. If things have 
to change then I have to stay in the system to be able to effect any 
change. I could have got a job in the corporate sector at any time...
But here I am able to do some good work rather than selling some 
useless thing to other people. Ninety per cent of my time I am 
working like a bloody pimp doing all sorts of dirty jobs that I don’t 
want to. But at least ten per cent of the time I can stand up to 
anybody and take some bold decisions. Even if I can prevent one old 
woman from being unfairly thrown out of her home in a year, it is 
better than selling thousands of Cherry Blossoms [shoe polish], isn’t 
it?” (T 6)
Basically the officer was saying that being within the system and doing some 
good (helping the weak) was worth having to bow down to all sorts of pressures 
in the organisation, and was preferable to working in the corporate sector, which 
he perceived as not contributing to social welfare. This officer sought to excuse 
his lack of opposition to encounters by convincing himself that if he chose to 
question encounters and the conduct of the active participants and ‘specialists’, 
he would be isolated and would perhaps have to leave the organisation in the 
end. He therefore was actually complicit in their continuance.
Very few other officers were willing to admit that encounters were the result of 
corruption, either moral or material. However, there were hints of this in many of 
the interviews and one Senior Management officer (T 24) actually listed out 
officers by name who had been involved in either “talking to Chhota Shakeel 
about killing some people on his behalf’; a constable who “was involved with 
the Arun Gawli gang”, another constable, who “used to go and kill people while 
serving on the police force and was killed in an encounter”, yet another officer 
“who used to be shooting people left, right and centre... the allegation was he 
had been doing it on behalf of some interested groups”, and elaborated upon the
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kind of departmental actions he initiated against these policemen which ranged 
from being transferred out of Mumbai, unpopular postings as punishment, one 
rank demotion, and even dismissal from service in rare cases. However, he was 
also very clear that he did not believe criminal proceedings were necessary 
against these officers. When I asked him why in the case where clearly he 
believed one officer was acting as a ‘hired gun’, that officer had merely been 
posted out and banished from ever working in Mumbai, whereas an ordinary 
civilian would have been held up on a murder charge in a similar situation, he 
replied,
“My only point is a civilian is not supposed to have a weapon and 
supposed to shoot at people unless he is covered under 100 IPC. 100 
IPC is equally applicable to the civilian also. Like the policeman 
doing it, the civilian also has to prove that he is doing it in the interest 
of saving somebody else’s or his own life” (T 24)
The officer conveniently ignored the fact that he had just listed out the names and
offences of officers who had killed for reasons other than self defence, and
equally contradictorily went on to add:
“There is a kind of exceptional viewing a policeman’s conduct comes 
in for, i.e. rape in custody, you are liable for more punishment than 
the normal other. So the policeman is kept under a scrutiny, or a 
microscope, or a glasshouse. You are under constant scrutiny of the 
law and you are treated in a different way of giving you exemplary 
punishment because you have additional responsibility.” (T 24: 
Senior Management)
It almost seemed as if the fact that policemen were under greater scrutiny than 
ordinary citizens, seemed to be justification for the officer to condone and 
minimize their offences in cases where this could be ‘managed’. Cultural factors 
like ‘solidarity’, ‘not spilling the beans’ and ‘sticking up for one another’ seemed 
to operate to facilitate this kind of thinking (Reiner 2000a: 92, citing similar 
findings by Punch 1985, Skolnick and Fyfe 1993, Kleinig 1996, Newbum 1999). 
There was little evidence to show that the organisation or senior officers 
considered transgressions by officers under their supervision as liable for 
criminal prosecutions. Another reason for this reluctance to prosecute ‘rogue’ 
officers in a public forum like the courts would be the fear of opening up
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Pandora’s box of ‘wrongdoing’ at several levels, as well as admitting that there 
could be errors in the way encounters were conceptualised and conducted.
Three of the four types of corruption that Punch (1985) outlines existed in the 
context of encounters in Mumbai. I found evidence in my data and reports in the 
media of accusations of what Punch calls *predatory corruption \  where the 
police stimulate crime, extort money and actively organize graft, i.e. the ‘meat 
eaters’ (Knapp Commission 1972) who exploit legitimate and illegitimate 
enterprises for pursuing illicit ends; ‘combative corruption’, falsifying or creating 
evidence, involve accommodations with some criminals and certain informants 
and uses “illicit means for organisationally and socially approved goals” (Punch 
1985:13); and finally, ‘corruption as perversion o f  justice ’, which involves lying 
under oath, intimidating witnesses, planting evidence on suspects, and involves 
“perversion of justice largely in order to avoid the consequences of serious 
deviant behaviour” (Punch 1985:14).
There is historical evidence to show that when the actions of special squads are 
left unsupervised and unaccountable, inevitably there is corruption and moral and 
ethical degeneration of work practices. Punch (1985) describes such corruption 
scandals that rocked the New York Police department (involving Serpico and the 
Knapp Commission, Leuci and the Special Investigating Unit); the London 
Metropolitan Police (involving the Times Investigation into the Criminal 
Investigation Department, the Drugs Squad, the Obscene Publications Squad); 
and the Amsterdam Police (involving the Plain Clothes Squad, the Drugs Squad 
etc.). Similarly it appeared that the actions o f ‘encounter specialists’ in the Crime 
Branch were open to doubts and questions, which incidentally, no one was 
raising openly. Developments in Mumbai post 2003 showed that corruption had 
spread to the highest level and the rot had set in deep.
6.2.8 Good Intentions
The all-enveloping argument that police officers only acted in good faith and 
with good intentions covered every other justification in the accounts. The 
preoccupation of officers of all ranks with the justification of good intention (in 
protecting the social interest) has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see Chapter
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5). However, it bears an important influence on the overall discourse on 
encounters in police accounts and served as a catchall phrase to excuse all 
mistakes and excesses on the part of the police.
Overall, there were no significant differences between officers’ justifications
regardless of their roles or extent of participation in encounters. Broadly similar
themes ran through all accounts across gender and rank - a significant finding
because it implies that these accounts had become so internalised within the
ethos of the organisation as to be accepted and retold by officers irrespective of
rank, gender or status. Shearing and Ericson (1991, reprinted 2005: 231) cite
Bayley and Bittner’s work (1984) which concluded that “The same stories crop
up too often, suggesting that they have become part of the mythology of policing
passed on uncritically from officer to officer”. On the other hand, one of the
officers interviewed had a more practical explanation for why he thought the
same encounter account was being re-used by the police:
“Sometimes you feel that ok, the last time this story sailed smoothly 
and then you are also under pressure of work. So when you want to 
file a case, make various reports which have to go to the government 
and all that, you tend to take the easier way out, a tried and tested 
method. Or sometimes a man thinks that this kind of story is liked by 
the press, so ok this puts me in a better light, makes me a hero... So a 
genuine thing gets distorted and as you rightly say people get into a 
right mess while trying to play around with the facts.” (T35: Senior 
Management)
Hunt and Manning (1991, cited in Foster 2003: 206) found that not only do 
officers whose conduct is questionable, lie, but their colleagues are also expected 
to collude with the lies. When accounts are used retrospectively as justifications 
and excuses, it may facilitate them being used prospectively to construct new lies 
and it would take a lot of self reflection on the part of officers to “tell the truth, 
rather than to passively accept and use lies when they are taken-for-granted and 
expected” (Hunt and Manning 1991, 2003: 151). Even in my sample, I found that 
only a few officers were willing to reflect on the truth and deviate from the 
‘standard’ encounter stories.
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Although justifications used by active participants and facilitators were similar, 
there were subtle differences in the way they talked about encounters. Active 
participants openly spoke of encounters or (what they perceived to be) more 
politically astute term ‘operations’, to denote cases where more planned, 
controlled and meticulously conducted processes occurred rather than hot­
headed, random violence by the police. The planning and meticulousness did not 
refer to cold-blooded plans for killing but were used to indicate that the police 
had identified and observed the target, convinced themselves of his ‘criminality’, 
had laid a trap to ostensibly arrest him, but had to unfortunately kill him in self- 
defence. There were no doubts; rather there was pride when they talked of 
encounters. The facilitators and supervisors, on the other hand, appeared more 
cynical about the use of the term operations, its implications and the underlying 
messages of professionalism that the use of the term was supposed to give out. 
This was indicated in the self-conscious way in which they used the term, as if 
not entirely convinced it was more politically correct.
6.3 The Denial Framework
In the previous two chapters I have looked at officers’ perceptions of a variety of 
issues and their understanding of the term encounters and its related ‘folk terms’. 
However, these need to be organised into a theoretical framework so that a 
coherent picture emerges to explain the existence of encounters in Mumbai.
It was evident to me that the main body of police justifications for encounters, 
and the overt, dominant public narrative, were one of denial of police excesses 
or wrongdoings. It is important to emphasise that despite growing evidence and 
awareness about the questionable and doubtful circumstances surrounding 
encounters, and the fact that encounters were a euphemism in many cases for 
police executions, police officers rarely accepted this overtly. Officers also used 
classic denial techniques (Sykes & Matza 1957) to account for and to justify their 
actions (Scott & Lyman 1968). Denial theory “claims to understand not the 
structural causes of the behaviour {the reasons), but the accounts typically given 
by deviants themselves {their reasons)”(Cohen 2001: 58). There are very few 
other sources of information to support my research on police encounters in 
Mumbai, for example academic studies, NGO reports and government reports.
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References to police encounters occur only in media reports and Bollywood 
films. I therefore had to depend solely on my interviews to construct the world 
vision of Mumbai police officers and ‘claimsmakers’ to understand ‘their’ 
reasons. By doing so, I intend to show that in Mumbai denial on the part of not 
just the officers, but in some ways also on the part of the ‘claimsmakers’, paved 
the way for police deviance to exist unchallenged.
Cohen’s (2001) analysis of the Theory of Denial is particularly apposite to 
explain how not just individuals, but organisations, governments, media, and the 
public, can simultaneously know and not know about atrocities committed by 
state actors and to identify the mechanisms that operate in normalizing such 
events in the social consciousness to the extent that they are not even recognized 
as being objectionable in a democratic society. Cohen seeks to understand how 
actors, agencies, and states live with the knowledge of atrocities around them and 
how do they explain it to themselves and to others. He uses the term ‘denial’ to 
cover a whole range of phenomena - from lying, repressing, blocking or shutting 
out, wilfully misunderstanding, ignoring the implications of the knowledge of 
suffering or atrocities, or finding convenient rationalizations to explain 
themselves and justify their conduct. His experience of working with an Israeli 
Human Rights Organisation, and being drawn into the politics of denial of 
human rights abuses, led him to observe that the immediate official mainstream 
response to accusations of abuses was outright denial, renaming, justification, 
but there was no outrage even from the liberals. He further observed, that soon 
there was a tone of acceptance towards these abuses. As a result of the report 
published by the Human Rights organisation, “a taboo subject was now discussed 
openly. Yet very soon, the silence returned. Worse than torture not being in the 
news, it was no longer news. Something whose existence could not be admitted, 
was now seen as predictable” (Cohen 2001: xi). These words could equally be 
applicable to the reaction and attitude towards encounters in Mumbai. The theory 
of denial tries to make sense of this apparent ‘normalization’ of atrocities. “The 
most familiar usage of the term ‘denial’ refers to the maintenance of social 
worlds in which an undesirable situation (event, condition, phenomenon) is 
unrecognised, ignored or made to seem normal” (Cohen 2001:51).
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Cohen begins his analysis by acknowledging that he uses the code word ‘denial’ 
to cover many different states and situations. Denial, he argues, occurs at 
different levels and on various dimensions. As in Cohen’s work (2001: 3-20), 
denials (of ‘wrongdoings’) in my data on encounters were analysed along the 
following dimensions described by him: psychological status of the denier; 
content of denial; level at which denial is being made (individual, organisational 
or societal); the time scale of the phenomenon (recent or historical); the agent 
doing the denying, and; the space and place dimension of denial.
According to Cohen, (2001: 3-6) based on whether the denier is conscious or 
unconscious of the position he/she is adopting, there can be three possibilities 
about the truth-value of any statement of denial:
• Either it is a true statement - Thus, those officers who genuinely believed 
that encounters were chance occurrences and happened in self defence 
were telling the truth when they denied that encounters are ‘done’; or
• It is blatant falsehood or lying- Those officers who were well aware that 
encounters were not quite the chance occurrences they were made out to 
be, but were the result of a deliberate strategy, were lying when they 
denied that encounters were ‘done’; or
• It is a strange combination o f  knowing and not knowing - in this case 
denial is understood as an unconscious defence mechanism of coping 
with guilt, anxiety and other uncomfortable emotions, - i.e. when the 
psyche blocks off unpleasant and uncomfortable information, but whether 
this is conscious or unconscious is debatable as it could even be ‘willed 
omission’ or inattention. In such situations “we are vaguely aware of 
choosing not to look at the facts, but are not quite conscious of just what 
we are evading” (Cohen 2001: 5).
Cohen (2001: 6) suggests:
“Government bureaucracies, political parties, professional 
associations, religions, armies and the police all have their own forms 
of cover-up and lying. Such collective denial results from 
professional ethics, traditions of loyalty and secrecy, mutual 
reciprocity or codes of silence. Myths are maintained that prevent 
outsiders knowing about discreditable information; there are 
unspoken arrangements for concerted or strategic ignorance. It may
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be convenient not to know exactly what your superiors or 
subordinates are doing”.
This could be accurately describing the situation in Mumbai. Unlike the few 
officers I term Deniers in Chapter 4, a majority of the officers, seemed to be 
resorting to this subtler version of denial, where either they deliberately did not 
want to know the details of the encounter but were vaguely aware that there were 
several lacunae in the official account given out in the press release or recorded 
in the First Information Report; or justified that the illegality was more than 
compensated by the ‘rightness’ of the action, leading to the conclusion that there 
actually was no ethical wrongdoing.
Cohen (2001: 7-9) explains that there are three possibilities as regards the 
content, i.e. what is being denied:
• Literal denial- officers (in possession of the facts of the case) denied that 
there is any sort of wrongdoing in encounters,
• Interpretive denial- officers did not deny that encounters could be more 
than just chance exchange of fire, but asserted that it was not what it 
looked like, or that the ‘criminals’ were a potential threat or were 
generally known to possess sophisticated weapons and hence were fair 
game to be eliminated first. Thus, by changing words, using euphemisms 
and technical jargon, officers tended to give the occurrence a more 
acceptable version (i.e. acceptable to the courts of law and the public).
• Implicatory denial - officers denied neither the facts nor the conventional 
interpretation of what an encounter actually was, but denied or minimized 
the psychological, moral or political implications of the act, for example, 
by saying that “the ‘criminal’ deserved it”, or that “the criminal justice 
system has failed” or that “the people and the politicians approve and 
demand police encounters”, or “what can I do about it?”
According to Cohen (2001: 9-11), denial occurs on three levels - personal, 
cultural or official. In my research data I found that denial was:
• Personal- when an officer denied any personal knowledge of
‘wrongdoings’ in encounters;
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• Official or institutional- when the police organisation, or the government 
as a whole denied there was any ‘wrongdoing’ in police encounters. In 
this case denial was built into the ideological fa?ade of the organisation 
and the state itself; and,
• Cultural - there was evidence of collective denial indicative of a broader, 
widespread failure by the public and media to openly acknowledge 
uncomfortable or discriminatory behaviour collaborated with official 
denial through the coverage of these events (see Chapter 7).
Cohen (2001: 12-3) suggests the time scale for the denial process can be either 
historical or contemporary. Encounters are a recent phenomenon, where denial 
can also be the result of information overload or compassion fatigue due to 
constant exposure to similar stories of atrocities within a short period of time. 
One officer said, “Initially encounters were few and there was media interest in 
them, but since then they have gone up, then the same-same news is repeated, 
probably they are not finding it newsworthy now”. (T28: Inspector: Active 
participant). Another officer said, “encounters are just one of the many problems 
around me, I cannot react to any more news items about yet another ‘hardcore 
criminal’ killed”. (T21: Sub Inspector). Some officers, on receiving news of yet 
another encounter tended to block it from their consciousness without really 
reflecting on the complexities of the situation.
Cohen (2001:14-8) recognizes that denials are part of the rhetoric not just of 
perpetrators, but of victims and bystanders too. However, my research deals with 
denial accounts of perpetrators (active participants, facilitators and supervisors) 
and bystanders (non-participants and ‘claimsmakers’). Denial accounts of both 
internal, immediate bystanders, for e.g. police officers not involved in 
encounters',; and external bystanders: i.e. external to the organisation but internal 
to the society, for e.g. accounts of encounters of social actors are included.
Cohen (2001:10-20) suggests that the space dimension, i.e. whether the denial is 
of events occurring within the society or on external territory, is of significance 
to the way the account is shaped and understood by the actors and their audience. 
My study deals with understanding how officers denied the negative associations
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of encounters as being atrocities committed by the state’s law enforcement 
agents against its own citizens, and how the society where this was occurring 
responded to it.
Cohen (2001:51) also distinguishes between micro denial that takes place at an 
individual level and macro denial that takes place at societal level. The 
phenomenon of encounters was never hidden, or unacknowledged in the sense of 
being absent from official records or media coverage, but it was hidden to the 
extent that no one other than the officers involved either directly or indirectly (as 
supervisors or facilitators) were really aware of the actual facts - to that extent it 
was normalized, contained and covered-up. My analysis focuses on micro denials 
- at the level of individual officers and individual ‘claimsmakers’ (Chapter 7). 
According to Cohen, micro denials are the individual’s way of being able to give, 
what they think will be acceptable accounts to victims, friends, family, 
journalists, other criminal justice professionals, public inquiries, human rights 
organisations, international queries, to the questions ‘Why would ordinary, 
decent people do something like that, and how can they then live with their 
conscience?’
Cohen’s model sees denials being part of wider motivational ‘accounts’- these 
accounts being, ‘not some mysterious internal states but typical vocabularies 
with clear functions in particular social situations’74. Agreeing with Cohen that 
“there is no point in looking for deeper, ‘real’ motives behind these verbal 
accounts”(2001: 58), I am looking at the interview material as ‘initial guides to 
behaviour’, where the account given by the actor is “not just another defence 
mechanism to deal with guilt, shame or other psychic conflict after an offence 
has been committed; it must, in some sense, be present before the act. That is, to 
make the process sound far more rational and calculating than it usually is” 
(Cohen 2001: 58). It is difficult to distinguish between rationalisations (that take 
place ex post facto) and justificatory accounts that existed when the action 
{encounter) was being contemplated or occurred, and I am aware that there may 
be differences of opinion whether what I judge to be accounts are not in fact,
74 Cohen citing C. Wright Mills (1940), ‘Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive’ American 
Sociological Review, 15, 904-13
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rationalisations. For example the justification that Hindu mythology and tradition 
eulogises ‘the good vanquishing the evil’, could be presented as a motivating, 
justifying factor to readily employ deadly force before the occurrence of 
encounters, or as a mitigating, rationalising factor, after the event in order to 
excuse it. It was also evident that accounts were used as devices before the act to 
lay the groundwork for making future encounters more acceptable and justifiable 
to the public, as well as after the act to protect the individuals from self-blame 
and blame from others. There could also be difference of opinion on whether 
certain accounts were justificatory devices presented before or after the act.
6.4 Police Officer Accounts: Justifications for Encounters,
Cohen distinguishes between accounts as justifications and accounts as excuses:
the former in which “one accepts responsibility for the act in question, but denies
the pejorative quality associated with it”, whereas the latter are “accounts in
which one admits that the act in question are bad, wrong or inappropriate, but
denies full responsibility”.75 Further the difference between excuses and
justifications are that the former are, as Cohen (2001: 59) says, “passive,
apologetic and defensive”, whereas the latter are “active, unapologetic and
offensive; they deny pejorative meanings, ignore accusations or appeal to
different values and loyalties”. However as Cohen found, this distinction does
not always work and what may be considered to be an excuse, may actually be a
justification. For example, one officer said,
“I am happy I am not part of that team that is doing the shooting. I 
am also glad I am not taking the decisions at higher levels- I am 
simply ensuring that the paperwork is done as best as possible to 
protect the department’s name. I am not doing a personal favour to 
anybody... I am doing what I can to see that the department does not 
get a bad name” (T34: Inspector, Facilitator, recorded verbatim in 
notes),
The sentiments expressed in this quote may actually be an active ‘appeal to 
higher loyalties’ -  an active and vigorous justification. On the other hand, the 
same account may actually be an excuse, (the real reason for facilitating may be 
inability to challenge the system and organisation), but could be presented by the
75 Cohen citing Scott M & Lyman S (1968), ‘Accounts’, American Sociological Review, 33,46- 
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officer or interpreted by his audience, as justification, in order to establish and 
reinforce the cornerstone of all justifications - i.e. the action (encounterj was 
done in good faith and for ‘noble’ reasons.
I found that the arguments put forward by officers to justify why encounters
happened, and were acceptable, were repeated often and sounded so well-
rehearsed that they had become part of the whole myth of effective policing.
Accounts aimed not only to make encounters acceptable but also to make them
credible and reasonable, especially those that invoked the notion of ‘self-
defence’. As this officer explained:
“Always the question is asked when gangsters fire, why no police 
officer is injured? There are always two or three instances in a year 
when police officers are injured or they get shot in police firing. 
[Contrast this with statistics quoted by him earlier claiming that 
nearly 300 criminals died in encounters between 1999 and 2001]
...So for a gangster... when the police announce their presence, 
morally he is always down, he cannot concentrate on his target, and 
that has an effect [on his shooting]. Whereas, on the other hand, the 
police party go with the determination of arresting him and they are 
mentally also in an advantageous situation at that particular juncture 
when the exchange of fire takes place. Whereas that fellow [criminal] 
is always under tension, he cannot concentrate, he always shivers, 
there is less chance of him hitting his target. But the policeman, when 
he is trained and when he is tuned and mentally prepared, he can 
always hit a target”. (T 26: Upper Middle Management)
The table 3.6 shows the official figures recorded by the National Crime Records 
Bureau of police personnel killed on duty, if we contrast these numbers with the 
statistics quoted by the interviewee earlier (also see Chapter 3) claiming nearly 
300 criminals died in encounters between 1999 and 2001, we see stark 
disproportionality.
The small number of police injuries and virtual absence of casualties in 
encounters were explained with reference to superior firearms training and 
professionalism on the part of the police. However, almost all the officers 
interviewed felt that the firearms training given to officers and lower ranks was 
inadequate and the weapons and ammunition, antiquated. It may be the case that 
‘encounter specialists’ received additional training, target practice, and protective 
clothing, and also that they were in a position of advantage as the ‘pursuer’ as
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compared to the ‘pursued. But there seemed to be little or no support for the 
claim that in general, police officers were better trained, prepared and equipped 
to react when under fire. On the other hand, many officers said that ‘criminals’ 
possessed sophisticated weaponry and methods of communication, which placed 
the police under an inherent disadvantage with dealing with organised criminals.
Cohen uses and expands upon Sykes and Matza’s (1957) analysis of 
justifications for deviant behaviour based on the techniques of neutralization and 
suggests that political accounts of atrocities follow the same logic as those of 
ordinary deviance. In Mumbai too, there was public knowledge that encounters 
between police and ‘criminals’ occurred, but there was generalised refusal in 
narratives to accept that any of these were deliberately engineered killings. Even 
those who admitted to encounters being engineered sought to diminish their 
illegitimacy by using various justifying factors that made such actions, not only 
inevitable, but also acceptable, as we shall see later in this chapter. Various 
rhetorical devices employed by the officers could be categorised under Cohen’s 
schema as:
6.4.1 Denial of Knowledge
The classic ‘I did not know’ defence was used by some officers, the Deniers, 
who maintained that only those actually involved in an encounter were aware of 
the facts of the case and were in a position to comment on whether a particular 
encounter was ‘genuine’ or not. Since they themselves had never been in an 
encounter situation, they felt that they did not have the requisite knowledge to 
say whether encounters were or were not deliberate police killings. As non­
participant bystanders, they could legitimately use this argument to deny 
knowledge of encounters. It is possible that there might have been a few officers 
genuinely unaware of the realities behind encounters, or were not in a position to 
know the exact details of any particular incident, but given how the organisation 
operates it would be reasonable to assume that even an ordinary constable was 
aware of the fact that there was more to encounters than was put forward for 
public consumption, not least because of the large death toll. However, by not 
having either the position, power or evidence to be able to do anything tangible 
on the basis of such rumours or grapevine information, these officers preferred to
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deny any knowledge of encounters, thus either suspending their judgement or 
avoiding facing any awkward issues of having to square their conscience with 
uncomfortable knowledge of ‘wrongdoings’. I am assuming that these facts 
would sit uncomfortably on the conscience of officers, but this may not be the 
case with all officers.
It was not just internal bystanders without any link to encounters who denied 
knowledge, but even some senior officers who acted as supervisors and/or 
facilitators also kept themselves shielded from the details of an encounter. Their 
arguments were akin to President Reagan’s classic defence of “‘plausible 
deniability’ in the Iran Contra case, which involved “giving general policy 
guidelines and letting the details without his specific knowledge be carried out by 
others” (Hagan 1997: 76, citing North 1991). Similarly, some of these officers 
were interested in the effective impact of police actions, and deliberately turned a 
blind eye to the exact nature of these operations just so they could soothe their 
own conscience about their lack of official sanction against illegal actions by 
their subordinate officers. Shielding themselves also meant that they were not 
lying when they said that they did not actually know whether any illegalities 
occurred during encounters. This is classic self deception at work - the officer 
obviously knows that something unsavoury is going on, but precisely because he 
knows it, he withdraws from asking for any details that would entail facing up to 
an unpalatable truth about the nature of encounters.
6.4.2 Denial of Responsibility
The classic denial of responsibility defence “It was an accident” or “ I don’t 
know why I did it” or “ I don’t know what came over me” were obviously 
denials officers could not use. They lack credibility and would not have been 
accepted or pardoned by the public, the criminal justice system nor the 
organisation itself. ‘Accidents’ that led to the loss of life at the hands of the 
police were just not acceptable For example, even when there have been cases of 
mistaken identity or accidental shooting, the police invariably tried to prove 
otherwise - as the Rathi case in Delhi demonstrated. In this case, Assistant 
Commissioner of Police (ACP) S.S. Rathi, faced murder charges along with nine 
other officers in the Connaught Place (New Delhi) encounter case for allegedly
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gunning down two businessmen in a case of mistaken identity in 1997. All 10 
officers were found guilty under sections 302 (murder), 307 (attempt to murder) 
and 193 (punishment for fabricating false evidence), read with 120-B (criminal 
conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Delhi High Court in October 
200776.
Officers were at pains to demonstrate that their actions were the result of
deliberate planning and careful targeting, but denied responsibility for encounters
in other indirect ways. This technique was the one employed for the most part in
accounting for encounters where officers accepted that the action was taken with
full cognisance, but the motivation for the action was provided by others i.e. they
were either provoked by the ‘criminal’ (victim precipitation) or had employed
deadly force in self defence, or were fulfilling the expectations that society
placed on them in terms of crime control. The ultimate responsibility for the use
of deadly force lay with others and not the active participants or facilitators. As
an extreme example, one officer sought to deny responsibility by saying,
“If a man has to die, God has already written it. A man is by birth a 
normal human being; circumstances and God has confirmed him as a 
criminal and he is not going to change and he has to die and he will 
die. I am not going to bother about the consequences of that act 
because I have done what is necessary”. (T25: Upper Middle 
Management)
Thus the officer made encounters sound almost as if they were fa it accompli, 
given that God and the deeds of the ‘criminal’ had condemned him to certain 
death at the hands of the ‘righteous’ police.
There was little overt articulation of officers doing encounters as a result of 
organisational directives - very few officers explicitly mentioned this as being 
one of the factors why they felt encounters were conducted. We can only 
indirectly surmise on the basis of statistical evidence that a tacit policy 
encouraging encounters was supported by some police chiefs (when encounters 
were high), and discouraged by some chiefs in the years there was a lull. One 
Crime Branch ‘encounter specialist’ had this to say,
76 See for e.g. The Hindu: (2007), ‘Shooting Case: 10 Policemen held guilty’, October 10th 2007.
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“Now the DCP (Deputy Commissioner of Police) here is posted since 
two or three years and the Joint Commissioner has been here for a 
time. In eight or ten months these people will go away and new 
people will be appointed. There will be a new set-up, they will look 
at us [‘encounter specialists’] differently, they will put a label on us 
that we are these officers’ men, this Commissioner’s man...So for a 
few months we will have some hassle. Then somebody big will be 
killed, they will feel the need for us, they will call us and say - now 
do this job... What is our fault in that?” (T27i Inspector, ‘encounter 
specialist’)
This officer was aggrieved about his experience of being unfairly labelled as 
being more loyal to the previous incumbents of the office by the new set of 
officers replacing them. He spoke of the suspicion and lack of trust that 
‘encounter specialists’ had to overcome before demonstrating that their loyalty 
was to the job and not to particular officers. The quote also revealed internal 
tension within the department where other officers tried to influence newly 
appointed senior officers against ‘encounter specialists’ who were presumably 
given special privileges. The officer appeared to be saying that encounters were 
‘done’ when senior officers demanded a suitable police response to some 
sensational crime. Whether officers actually carried out encounters on the 
directives of senior officers, i.e. whether these were ‘crimes of obedience’ was 
analysed using Kelman and Hamilton’s (1989) model. They suggest that crimes 
of obedience result from the three processes of authorization, dehumanization 
and routinization, factors that are very evident in hierarchical organisations like 
the police and the military. A closer look at the implications in some of the 
articulations of the officers’ accounts revealed that all these factors were present 
in the Mumbai police and contributed to some extent, to the situation in Mumbai.
Authorization
Statistics may be used to show that that encounters were responsive to changes in 
police leadership and police policy. Since 2003, accompanied by changes in 
police leadership, the number of incidents has fallen and activities of ‘encounter 
specialists’ curtailed. However, only a few officers specifically mentioned that 
they were involved in encounters as a result of organisational directives, “If the 
CP (Commissioner) says do it, then we will do it. As I said, it is a policy
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decision. It is not for me, it is the decision of the organisation” (T 27: Inspector, 
specialist).
I sensed during many of the interviews that officers were sure of their senior 
officers’ support and because the whole system tacitly encouraged encounters, 
this gave them the requisite backing to conduct these operations. One officer 
said, “In Mumbai our senior officers support us in a good way. In every case of 
encounter, they give us correct guidance and our colleagues also give help and it 
is considered good work” (T19: Sub-Inspector, Active Participant). The certainty 
that the organisation and senior officers sanctioned such actions, removed the 
moral element of decision making on the part of the individual officers: they 
were merely obeying orders of higher authorities and this was enough for officers 
to deny responsibility for the act. Even when officers denied responsibility, they 
remained aware of the moral and ethical dubiousness of the action. One officer 
claimed, “It hasn’t happened so far. I don’t think mistakes can happen, and even 
if they do senior officers will support us. So I am quite confident that we cannot 
get into any trouble because our intentions are not bad, we have no personal 
motives” (T29: Sub-Inspector, Active participant).
Dehumanization
Dehumanization is the process whereby enemies or ‘victims’ are placed outside
the one’s moral universe, thus making them fair game as victims of atrocities.
When officers expressed opinions such as -  ‘they deserved it’- or ‘ if they are
criminals what else can they expect’ -  they were effectively absolving
themselves of the need to accord alleged ‘criminals’ normal human rights and
obligations. Most officers suggested Human Rights organisations were, ‘only
concerned about the human rights of the criminals’ and not those of the victims.
Another viewpoint suggested was that supporting ‘criminals’ would only result
in encouraging further criminal activity,
“Now Human Rights and other social organisations, they should 
really think about this- this particular criminal, of what value or 
worth is he, how many people has he harassed so far and whether he 
is capable of attacking the police in this manner, these facts they 
should take into account. If you are planning to promote the cause of 
such criminals, or if you are going to provide them with all facilities, 
by maligning the police or demoralising the police, then it is natural
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that such criminal tendencies will be on the rise and the number of 
criminals will increase”. (T 17: Inspector)
This officer was making a value judgement that ‘criminals’ were not worth being 
supported by Human Rights organisations at the expense pf demoralising the 
police.
Routinization
Once initial moral restraints have been overcome, it becomes easier to commit 
atrocities routinely. This was true of the ‘encounter specialists’, the number of 
‘criminals’ killed by them is openly acknowledged in magazine and newspaper 
articles77. It was almost as if these officers did not think of their ‘victims’ as 
individuals with a personality and a life, but as one more notch on their belt. One 
‘encounter specialist’ is quoted as having said, “I don’t enjoy killing, but after we 
shoot some mobster, his victims look at me like God. That’s the best part of the 
job” (Time, Urban Cowboys’, January 06, 2003)
Cohen suggests two other processes that aid the denial of responsibility, appeals 
to conformity, and necessity and self-defence.
The appeal to conformity was not explicitly used by officers in general, but from
my own experience and from the informal talks I have had with police officers of
various ranks, it is clear that ‘everyone else was doing it’ is a powerful motivator
for actions as extreme as the use of deadly force. One senior officer said,
“Sometimes, we have to win a very important case, where if we 
don’t, the consequences can be disastrous. I find everybody else is 
doing it [using morally dubious methods]. In the sense all the other 
players in that game are doing it so the question is if you are bogged 
down by that then you are losing before your very own eyes.. .1 go by 
the philosophy of the Geeta- even killing was advised if it was part of 
your duty... The police have not hesitated to respond to it [encounter 
situation] when dealing with criminals who are daredevils and are 
armed with firearms. So that is a need based response of the police. I
11. See for example, Perry A.: ‘Urban Cowboys’, Time, Jan 06, 2003, Balakrishnan S.:
‘Encounter Specialist on cops’ wanted list’, The Times o f India, September 28, 2005; ‘Cop on the
run finds an ally in Bollywood’, The Times o f India, January 23, 2006
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suppose it happens in America and a few other countries also which 
face a similar kind of problem”. (T 31: Senior Management)
The officer is using the argument that because (in his perception) killing in the 
line of duty is - prescribed some religious texts; police in other countries are 
doing so in similar situations; and fellow officers are gaining fame and reputation 
(‘getting ahead’) by using deadly force, it becomes a matter of conformity to 
follow where others lead even in the illegal use of deadly force. There was also a 
feeling, not expressly articulated but hinted at in the interviews that some officers 
felt persecuted for engaging in encounters, when others were getting away with 
similar actions. Since a number of ‘encounter specialists’ existed, picking on one 
particular individual for disciplinary action ‘when everyone else is doing it’ 
becomes very difficult for senior officers who want to control abuse of force.
One officer told me there had been an encounter in her jurisdiction (by the Crime 
Branch) and she had been very unhappy about it and had made it clear to senior 
officers that she did not approve of these actions. Since then, “ they have ensured 
that there are no encounters in this area” the officer declared proudly. I wondered 
why the officer had not raised serious, official objections in that particular case in 
the first place but did not ask the question as I thought that it might be perceived 
as being judgemental. It could be either because she felt a sense of loyalty to the 
organisation, or because the officer just wanted to conform to the organisational 
culture and not rock the boat because she went on to say after the interview was 
officially over that she did often agonize over whether speaking openly about 
these issues was being disloyal to the organisation.
Another officer said,
“If I ever raised any objections to any of the actions taken while I 
was at the Crime Branch, they would have countered me with 
questions like- ‘were you present there, then how can you say this?
At each stage they would come up with an argument that countered 
my point. You must know that senior officers do not appreciate it if a 
junior officer questions their policy or decisions. So I would be told 
to just shut up and stay out if I was not willing to be party to it. And 
as far as doing anything about it was concerned- it was not the ‘done’ 
thing. I did not think it was in the larger interest to speak out against 
what was happening. You just flow along with the system. You do it 
because otherwise you would not have got support for your
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dissension or because there is some sort of loyalty towards your 
subordinates or the organisation.” (T 33: Upper Middle Management, 
verbatim notes from unrecorded interview)
The most common justification for encounters was the use of deadly force in
self-defence. Apart from being the only legal justification for this action, it also
takes away the responsibility for the act from the officer. By saying it often
enough some officers believed that the mere fact that ‘criminals’ were in
possession of a weapon, justified the pre-emptive use of deadly force. That
almost half the active participants accepted wrongdoing showed their confidence
and belief in the ‘correctness’ or appropriateness of their actions.
“If someone is caught with a weapon in his hand, then he is not 
keeping that weapon in order to go to the temple, is he? He is 
keeping it to murder someone. That is what our people say- if a 
weapon is found, then, it is not the case that he is an innocent person 
and you are planting a weapon and killing him, that is a personal 
issue. There is no question of making a mistake if they are carrying a 
weapon. Then there cannot be any ulterior motive. If we do anything 
in good faith then there will not be a mistake”. (T27: Inspector, 
encounter specialist)
The officer was establishing the ‘criminal’s’ guilt on the basis of, and also that 
acceptable ground for use of deadly force was, possession of a weapon, 
regardless of whether the ‘criminal’ had used it on that particular occasion. The 
use of deadly force against such a person was perhaps considered by the officer 
as justifiable. It was also my understanding of what the interviewee said that if 
any officer planted a weapon/s on the dead person then that was a personal 
decision or choice of the officer concerned, and might have been done to cover 
up errors that arose out of mistaken identity or excess use of force. The officer 
was merely engaging in what Young (1975) calls ‘negotiation of reality’ where 
the officer was jumping the gap between theoretical and empirical guilt by 
making assumptions, but what remained unarticulated was whether action taken 
in ‘good faith’ could be extended to actually planting evidence to prove what the 
officer was convinced of as the guilt of the encountered person. The justification 
cited by the officer is a travesty of the self-defence justification. Mere possession 
of a firearm, not use of it, and certainly not posing any hint of immediate danger
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to the life of the officer himself or others, is no crime, but was considered to be 
so by the officer.
The other aspect of denial, that of necessity is the one where officers expressed 
their opinion that this was dirty work which someone had to do; the ‘cleaning the 
scum off the streets’ sentiment was expressed by some of the officers in their 
interviews, embodying Hughes’ (1961) conception of police work being ‘dirty 
work’. One ‘encounter specialist’ reportedly declared in an interview for an 
international magazine: “A bullet for a bullet...It’s the only language they 
(criminals) understand...Criminals are filth...and I’m the cleaner” (Inspector 
Pradeep Sharma talking to Alex Perry, Time Magazine, 2003). Other officers 
interpreted that the action became a necessity because the police were perforce, 
solely responsible for crime control. The failure of the criminal justice system 
was the biggest factor contributing to the appeal of this argument.
Another mechanism described by Cohen (2001: 92) as aiding the Denial of 
Responsibility was: splitting. One of the ways an individual tries to deny 
responsibility is by ‘means-end’ dissociation, where individuals think of 
themselves as a cog in the machine, a cog that does routine tasks that may 
facilitate atrocities. However, not wanting to think of the resulting atrocities, they 
merely see it as doing one’s job. Thus when an Inspector (T 34) said that he was 
not aiding in the facilitation of encounters for the benefit of ‘encounter 
specialists’ but for the sake of the organisation; and also that he was glad that he 
was not personally doing encounters, he was not merely appealing to higher 
loyalties (see below), but was also denying responsibility. He seemed to be 
saying that he did not pull the trigger, but just ensured that the paperwork was in 
order, or manipulated to be in order, thus implying that his role in the process 
was not as morally loaded as that of the officer actually doing the killing. This is 
denial of responsibility in atrocities by splitting up the self s contribution to the 
process as being that of a mere facilitator, a passive vessel obeying orders, and is 
one way of dissociating oneself from the process.
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6.4.3 Denial of Injury
Gross political atrocities cannot easily allow for typical denial of injury 
justifications (‘no one really got hurt’, or ‘that was ordinary business practice’) 
used by ordinary delinquents (Cohen 2001: 95). However, the way perpetrators 
deny injury is by asserting that the victims belonged to a devalued group in 
society (usually an ethnic outgroup). In Mumbai the outgroup was organised 
criminals, who were perceived to deserve nothing better. Officers were obviously 
aware that their actions caused death but sought to neutralize this or turn it into a 
moral blind spot by emphasizing the beneficial aspects of encounters for the 
society. Getting rid of a few criminals brought safety and security to the larger 
society, and therefore, such an action was less injurious as they were acting in the 
common good.
Another officer sought to use the argument, “in the circle of life and death, this 
person’s bad deeds brought upon this bad ending to his life and that he ought to 
be relieved of this sinful existence and be given a chance to start again in a new 
birth”. (T 8: Sub Inspector). The Hindu doctrine of the cycle of birth, death and 
rebirth was effectively twisted around by this officer to give credence to his 
actions and deny moral injury to the victim from a broader perspective.
6.4.4 Denial of Victim
Cohen (2001: 96) describes the melodramatic discourse of political atrocities, 
where historically blaming the other is the dominant theme - “‘history’ proves 
that the people whom you call victims are not really victims; we, whom you 
condemn, have been the ‘real’ victims; they are, in the ‘ultimate’ sense, the true 
aggressors; therefore they deserve to be punished; justice is on our side”. This 
could be the story of the Mumbai police, when they talk about the damage done 
by ‘criminals’ to the social fabric and how the rights of the people need to be 
safeguarded against the activities of these criminals. Thus, when one officer said 
that “some people do not deserve to stay on this earth” (T 7: Lower Middle 
Management), he was denying them their right to existence.
It is my belief that this is a double pronged denial mechanism, where on the one 
hand officers denied the victims by saying that they deserved to suffer because of
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what they had done, and on the other hand skimmed over the number of 
‘criminals’ killed; talked in terms of ‘crime control’ as a desirable goal; how 
effective their actions were; and how dramatically they had succeeded in 
reducing criminal activities. In this way officers were unconsciously or 
consciously removing the human element from the discourse, by not recognizing 
the fact that human lives were involved in the ‘effective’ actions taken by them.
6.4.5 Condemnation of Condemners
This technique of neutralization questions the critics’ right to criticize.
Perpetrators seek to neutralize the legitimacy and authority of critics by casting
aspersions on the intentions and integrity of those who dare to question their
actions. As Cohen (2001: 98) points out, “the wrongness of others is the issue”
not the legitimacy of police actions. Officers strongly condemned the antecedents
of the Human Rights activists and NGOs who campaigned against police
encounters and questioned the integrity of journalists and legal practitioners who
had in some sporadic cases, dared to raise questions about the correctness and
proportionality of use of deadly force. Reiner (2000a: 94-5) categorises lawyers,
doctors, social workers, journalists, researchers, NGOs and anti-police activists
as ‘challengers’ and ‘do-gooders’, whom the police traditionally regard with
hostility and suspicion. Some officers were contemptuous of the critics, media
and NGOs. One said:
“Idiots, they are simply idiots and they are dishonest people. All 
media and all NGO’s are dishonest. With due regards there must be 
some honest, well-meaning people, the rest are poor jokers. Media is 
business. They are only interested in publishing what sells. They are 
not interested in anything beyond that - they do no social service or 
take up social causes, they are no crusaders - they just publish what is 
salacious and what sells...What are the NGO's doing - nothing...
They are interested in furthering their personal goals, and making a 
quick buck.” (T6: Upper Middle Management)
Another officer questioned the commitment and knowledge of people working 
for NGOs that were critical of police work, implying that they were only 
superficially involved in protesting about issues they had little understanding of 
(see page 172). While some officers were willing to concede that there might 
have been some ‘wrongdoings’ on the part of the police, they were almost united 
in their contempt for the activists and NGOs who were working in this field. A
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few officers even condemned what they saw as the hypocrisy of criminal justice
practitioners, who were supposed champions of Human Rights but were more
than willing to forget them, when they themselves had been victims of crimes.
“We have somehow double standards in society. If someone is 
affected, then he shouts. If my house is burgled and a suspect is 
arrested I will go and tell the police, ‘hit him, break his bones and 
recover my property’. But if it somebody else’s house and I see a 
policeman hitting, I will say ‘police are brutal”’ (T18: Inspector).
Officers implied in their interviews that not only did biased individuals with an
anti-police agenda use the rhetoric of human rights to further their personal or
political gains and to discredit or humiliate the police; but that the discourse-
makers themselves did not possess integrity or respect for rights. Officers clearly
reinforced Cohen’s (2001: 98) contention that “External critics are attacked for
being partial or are said to have no right to interfere”, to this officers added that
only those who had criminal interests and benefited from the labours of
criminals, could sympathise with their cause and question police actions. One
officer had this to say about public reaction to encounters, “Generally society
will not support such a man [criminal], but a person’s relatives or those who have
got some benefit out of the criminal, then they will feel bad... to those whom he
provides money by committing crimes, they will call it a bad thing and that the
police killed him” (T10: Sub Inspector). Internal critics on the other hand were
discouraged from speaking up against policies and forced into maintaining
silence, as was the experience of one Upper Middle Management officer (refer
page 210). The officer went on to add:
The greatest flaw with the police is that we think 'wisdom goes with 
rank’. Here it is believed that the more senior you are, the wiser you 
are and anybody junior to you knows nothing. Since in the police, 
hierarchy demands that command comes from the top, if you 
contradict seniors in public, then it creates a bad impression. And this 
is resented. I have never contradicted my seniors in public but even 
in private it is not appreciated.” (T 33 Upper Middle Management, 
verbatim notes from unrecorded interview)
6.4.6 Appeal to Higher Loyalties
In police culture, more than other institutions, solidarity is a prized value. 
Additionally, since danger and isolation are regular features of the work (see for
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e.g. Reiner 2000a, Bowling and Foster 2002) appeal to higher loyalties has a
strong impact on the actions of officers. Mutual support and protection of and by
fellow officers and the organisation is of overriding importance in police culture.
During the interviews, for example, even when officers disapproved of
encounters, they were very concerned about whistle blowing, or turning traitor
on their colleagues. One officer was very dubious of even discussing these issues
in the interview, though there was no doubt in her mind that police wrongdoing
clearly existed. Another officer explained that the only reason he continued to
support such actions was because of his loyalty to the department as he was
grateful to the organisation for providing him with a job, livelihood and status in
society (see Chapter 4, page 145). Another officer, who admitted to having a
supervisory role in an encounter case that he disapproved of, said:
“For me the dilemma would have been an ethical one- not a legal 
one. [He added, contemptuously] Law changes and has no meaning 
so I have no obligation to that. But yes, it would have been an ethical 
dilemma. But if I had to take a stand, I would support my men.. .Also 
if I had betrayed them, I would have been a traitor to the organisation 
and no one, no subordinate would ever have any faith in me. The 
subordinates are only following orders, not doing anything for 
personal gain and they look upon their seniors to support them. It 
would not have been correct if I had left their hand [meaning 
‘abandoned them’] when they were in trouble. But that does not 
mean that I approved of what they had done” (T25: Upper Middle 
Management)
The officer expressed his allegiance to the organisation in no uncertain terms. He 
saw his own role as that of a protector or guide for his subordinate officers and 
felt that his obligation to fulfil his role was greater than any obligation to the law 
or the victim, or indeed to what was ‘right’.
6.4.7 M oral Ambivalence
Cohen (2001:99) suggests that the moral indifference of the Perpetrators causes 
them to justify, not only to others, but also to themselves, the moral rightness of 
their actions. I found not indifference, but ambivalence on the part of the officers 
with respect to their understanding of the moral and ethical issues involved in 
encounters. Klockar’s (1980) classic ‘Dirty Harry’ dilemma that is inherent in 
police work, played itself out in this situation where an essential moral dilemma
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whether dirty means {encounters) justified good ends (controlling crime and
social good) existed. Some officers felt that means and ends discussions were for
others, whereas they were ‘men of action’ and had to face the situation and be
responsible for the state of crime situation, and thus had no choice in the means-
end debate. As one senior officer explained:
“I have seen many things going on, many wrong things being done.
But whenever, I mean, something, sometimes, we have adopted 
means, which are not exactly legal, but perfectly moral. So there is a 
difference. Everything, which is legal, is not necessarily moral and 
everything, which is illegal, is not necessarily immoral. Sometimes 
when achieving an end whether you adopt questionable means? I 
would not deny that yes, I had to sometimes resort to that - but never 
to serve my personal interest - strictly with a sense of duty” (T31: 
Senior Management).
It is evident that the officer, did not have any qualms in adopting means that were 
not strictly legal in trying to achieve what he thought were morally superior ends. 
Punch (1985: 13) calls this type of police deviance combative (strategic) 
corruption (see page 194). Numerous police studies have shown that such 
practices were standard procedure in many parts of the world.
Another senior officer reacted rather strongly to any suggestions that the police
might be involved in ‘illegalities’ in these words:
“But again I would like to reiterate that I don’t believe in encounters,
I don’t encourage encounters. But when bullets are flying all over the 
city, like in the Mahabharata78 they say that somebody fired an arrow 
and all the whole sky was covered in arrows, if that kind of scenario 
you are living under and if you don’t fire a single bullet and start 
giving lectures from your moral high pedestal, then you will be a 
nincompoop, you will be an ineffective, sermonising police officer 
and we don’t want you. You have no place, no relevance in the 
system - that’s it!” [T 24: Senior Management)
The officer seemed to be implying that the situation in Mumbai was 
extraordinary in the days when organised crime was at its peak, i.e. it was as if 
bullets were flying across the city and people were in constant danger. The
78 The epic Puranic text that is one of the cornerstones of Hindu mythology. The description is 
of the mighty war between the forces of good (the Pandavas) and the forces of evil (the 
Kauravas), where the allusion to the sky being thick with arrows indicated the intensity of the 
conflict.
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appropriate police response in the circumstances, according to him, seemed to be 
the use of deadly force with equal and opposite intensity as the criminals.
I am unsure if this officer was talking of the generic ‘you’, or whether he was 
irked by my questions (and perceived value judgement) and had responded in 
terms of what he thought about my ‘moral high pedestal’. The officer’s irritated 
response may be indicative of my interview technique lacking polish, or his own 
overly defensive attitude towards the whole topic. On the other hand, the use of 
strong language made it clear that the officer did not have much respect for those 
who asked difficult questions and agonized over moral dilemmas, when ‘decisive 
action’ was required to face the threat of increasing organised gang activities. It 
also is indicative of the fact that the officer approved of and would authorise 
‘effective action’ (regardless of the legality issue) under similar circumstances.
For others, dirty means were legitimate and justifiable if they provided a good
end result. This stance was repeatedly stressed by the majority of officers
interviewed, who emphasized the ‘good intentions’ of officers. In this context,
Cohen argues that perpetrators’ actions do not arise out of a state of mindless
conformity, but that:
“During the event, these perpetrators seem not to have reflected on its 
meaning; years later they may still profess not to understand why the 
event was so condemned. This might be an obvious lie... or a form of 
self-deception... The more frightening possibility is that they really 
saw nothing wrong at the time and behaved, like everyone else, 
without reflection”. (Cohen 2001: 100)
The situation in Mumbai seemed to link with Cohen’s second possibility, and 
displayed Cohen’s interpretation of Arendt’s concept of the ‘banality of evil’. He 
suggests that:
“Far from minimizing the evil, she (Arendt) warns that unimaginable 
evil can result from a constellation of ordinary human qualities: not 
fully realizing the immorality of what you are doing, being as normal 
as all your peers doing the same things; having motives that are dull, 
unimaginative and commonplace (going along with others, 
professional ambition, job security), and retaining long afterwards the 
fa?ade of pseudo-stupidity, not grasping what the fuss was about”. 
(Cohen 2001: 100).
218
In Mumbai, as in other places in India where encounters were a regular 
occurrence, the enormity of the moral and ethical implications of police 
executions were neither articulated nor understood by officers. So inured were 
officers in the macho police culture, which routinely condemned Human Rights 
and Human Rights activists as ‘trouble makers’ that they did not stop to think 
about what their actions actually meant and the extent to which they themselves 
had been infringing the law in the name of upholding it.
There are obvious important parallels here with other policing contexts in South
Africa, Brazil, Guyana, Jamaica, which along with other social, political,
structural and cultural factors is explored in Chapter 8. The situation in Mumbai
and the attitude of officers towards encounters was aptly described by Cohen as:
“ Between those who actively refuse to see anything wrong and those 
who see everything as wrong, the vast majority in between can be 
nudged into acknowledging that something was wrong- yet at the 
same time sustain their denials. Cultures of denial encourage turning 
a collective blind eye, leaving horrors unexamined or normalized as 
being part of the rhythms of everyday life”. (Cohen 2001 : 101).
In Mumbai too, the police acted within a culture of denial and sought to 
normalize encounters as part of their jobs.
6.5 The Discourse of Official Denial
Inferences about the official position on encounters have been drawn from the 
interview data, as senior officers often talked in terms of the official policy on 
these issues, and some middle and lower ranking officers also fluctuated between 
talking about their own understanding of encounters and the organisational 
discourse on them. I also draw upon media reports of encounters. I acknowledge 
that focusing on the interviews as the primary source within which to read the 
official or organisational discourse on encounters is fraught with problems - of 
selection, interpretation and of distinguishing between personal and 
organisational viewpoints. Others may take a different viewpoint from those 
presented here.
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The police organisation’s discourse on encounters generally mirrored the three 
types of official denial mechanisms Cohen identified, i.e. classic official denial, 
counter-offensive, and partial acknowledgement (2001: 101-16).
The literal component of classic official denial, i.e. encounters did not happen, 
was not the case in Mumbai, However, other strands of classic official denial - 
both interpretive and implicatory - are similar to the ones found in Mumbai. It 
was not denied that encounters took place, but that what happened was not a 
form of extra-judicial killing but officers responding bravely in a situation that 
posed danger to their own lives. As Cohen (2001: 101) suggests, “Harm may be 
acknowledged, but its legal or common-sense meanings are denied”. Thus, the 
organisation, by employing a combination of clever use of euphemisms (the use 
of the word encounter to suggest a chance or unplanned face-to-face coming with 
hardened, firearms-wielding ‘criminals’); legalism (ensuring that First 
Information Report describes the events in a certain sequence and all the 
subsequent paperwork is correct and accountable, thus implying that there can be 
no wrongdoings on the part of the police - what Cohen calls ‘magical denial’); 
denial o f  responsibility (since there is no official policy promoting encounters, 
subordinate officers cannot be said to have been authorized to conduct such 
actions, but instead derived their impetus from public expectation); and isolation 
(certain mistakes are acknowledged but are brushed aside as exceptions rather 
than the rule), sought to convey interpretive denial of police executions of 
alleged criminals.
Implicatory denials in officer accounts involved an acknowledgement that, 
encounters happened, but they ‘happened’ because they were in the interests of 
society at large; were necessary to control spiralling crime that threatened law 
and order as well as citizens’ sense of security and confidence in the system; 
were nothing more than what the victim deserved; and/or were not routine. 
Another way of strengthening implicatory denial was the use of “advantageous 
comparison” (Cohen 2001: 111). In terms of Mumbai, police actions (achieving 
the end result of making society safer) were asserted to be so much more morally 
superior to the actions of the ‘criminals’ (spreading fear and insecurity), as well
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as the actions of the critics who had some personal agenda and political 
motivation in discrediting ‘brave’ officers’ actions.
Classic official police denial is of mainly the interpretive and implicatory
varieties, but there were elements of literal denial - denial not of the existence of
encounters, but denial that there was any wrongdoing involved. As Cohen (2001:
103) suggests, literal denial is usually implied by attacking the reliability,
objectivity and credibility of the observers, victim/s, witnesses, journalists,
activists all of whom are in various ways biased, selective, politically motivated
or else naive, gullible and easily manipulated. As one officer said:
“NGO's vigorously pursue these cases. Why? Because they want to 
show that they have done some work. This because they get foreign 
funding- they don't get much funding from India. Indian people will 
not give them any money so lovingly.” (T4: Inspector, Active 
Participant)
The officer’s perception seemed to be that issues of human rights of ‘criminals’ 
appear to be of importance to NGOs funded by the West, to propagate their 
(western) conception of rights that considers everyone has an equal right to life 
and liberty. He appeared to suggest that Indian donors would support more 
worthwhile causes than those upholding the rights of hardened ‘criminals’ or 
those who criticize proactive police actions against the latter.
This perception is in turn linked to the next kind of official denial, which is 
‘counter offensive’ and calls into question precisely the above qualities in the 
condemners. As the quote demonstrates the officer concerned was dismissive and 
contemptuous of the efforts of the NGO that tried to intervene in a particular 
case. Similarly it was a generally held opinion that only those third parties who 
had a personal or political agenda in safeguarding the interests of a particular 
criminal or gang would question police actions in these cases, thus both 
dismissing the accusations as baseless and questioning the integrity of the critics 
themselves.
The third kind of official denial is ‘partial acknowledgement’ by employing a 
variety of techniques like ‘spatial isolation’ - there was grudging acceptance that
221
certain encounters might have been problematic, but that these were occasional.
It was the general opinion that ‘false’ encounters happened in other parts of the
country but officers pointed to the fact that no encounter in Mumbai had been
subject to major public or legal scrutiny and criticism, with the exception of the
Javed Fawda case, where police action was exonerated by the High Court (an
assertion that was not quite true). Another technique of denial adopted by some
senior officers was ‘temporal containment’, i.e. there might have been many
encounters in the past decade or so, but as a result most of the gangs had been
subdued and the number of encounters had gone down. Finally, even if some
senior officers accepted that there might have been wrongdoing in these
incidents, they asserted that they had taken stem action and disciplinary
proceedings against the transgressors in an effort to ‘self-correct’ the situation.
This final technique of denial was framed as a partial acknowledgement of
existing problems but mitigated by the assertion that it was also being corrected.
One senior management officer emphatically assured me:
“Certain aberrations which are committed by our own policemen, 
when it comes to taking action or not, there is a moral dilemma. As a 
force we defend, we do so much of defending [actions of subordinate 
officers], but when it comes to individual things, we pull them up 
hard, very hard, you know. We take action, we take various 
corrective steps”. (T24: Senior Management)
The officer then went to recount the number of cases in which he had taken 
official, departmental action against various errant officers, but did not favour 
criminal prosecution of the same (see page 193).
6.6 Summary
In this chapter I examined the language of denials and how the police, as 
individuals and organisationally, employed it to justify and present their actions 
as acceptable to themselves and to others. Denial theory was used to frame the 
analysis of the motivational and justificatory accounts of officers. Officer 
accounts of denial of encounters shifted along a spectrum, where on the one end 
they declared that all encounters were ‘bona fide’, so there was no wrongdoing; 
and on the other that encounters were justified on the grounds of being a 
‘necessary evil’ and employed similar techniques of neutralization.
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These accounts only partially answer the larger question - how do state actors 
commit acts of atrocities and how do they explain these to themselves and to 
others, and how do they get away with them? Wider situational, circumstantial, 
and cultural police related factors which led to encounters becoming a socially 
accepted phenomenon, will be identified and explored in Chapter 8. Drawing 
upon literature and theories related to police subculture, leadership, police 
brutality, and state violence, I attempt to present a wider picture of why and how 
a culture of police violence exists and flourishes in a democratic society. In 
order to do so, in the next chapter, I discuss public opinion on perceptions of 
encounters using a group I term ‘claimsmakers’.
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7 CHAPTER 7: A PERMISSIVE CULTURE: ‘CLAIMSMAKERS’ AND 
THE PASSIVE ACCEPTANCE OF ENCOUNTERS
7.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters focused on police officers’ perspectives on 
encounters and their use of the rhetoric and mechanisms of denial that made it 
possible for them to accept and present encounters to outsiders as a justifiable 
tool for crime control. In this chapter I examine encounters from the perspective 
of a few socially significant persons, whom I call ‘claimsmakers’, in an effort to 
construct a backdrop of discourses on encounters outside the police organisation. 
The intention behind interviewing these few people was to develop a sense of 
whether people who were in a position to influence public opinion agreed or 
differed, either wholly or partially, with the police perspective on and 
justifications for encounters, especially the police perception that society 
approved of and encouraged police use of deadly force in certain situations. 
Although the number of interviews conducted (eighteen) was too small to be 
representative in any way of claimsmakers as a whole, let alone wider public 
opinion in Mumbai, the interviews illustrated the opinions of some people in 
positions of power and influence. Moreover, the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed 
were drawn from groups that might be most likely to be critical of police 
encounters. To the extent that they were not critical is suggestive of a wider 
culture of complicity.
In this chapter I first examine perceptions of ‘claimsmakers’ on themes similar to 
those explored in interviews with police officers, focusing on - the individual’s 
perception of encounters',; distinction between fake and genuine encounters; 
effectiveness of encounters; personal, social, media and political attitudes 
towards encounters. In the second section I focus on ‘claimsmakers’ perceptions 
of the wider social culture within which encounters occur and whether these are 
deemed acceptable; if so, why? Interviewees’ perception of the police image in 
Mumbai, and other related issues such as fear of crime, the rule of law, and 
attitude towards human rights are analysed. In the last section I briefly examine
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the type of accountability structures that regulate police actions in Mumbai. 
However, I focus on perceptions of police officers and ‘claimsmakers’ about the 
efficacy of these structures, with the aim of demonstrating that not just the 
perception of public opinion favouring encounters, but also the perception that 
there is a permissive culture of accountability that together are partly responsible 
for the social acceptance of police encounters.
Finally, situating these internal bystander accounts -  i.e. internal to the society 
where the alleged atrocities are taking place, within the framework of denial 
shows how similar processes are at work in Mumbai providing the support 
network for the police to use deadly force with impunity and without 
accountability.
7.2 The Construction of ‘Claimsmakers” Opinion
Measuring public opinion can be a tricky and often elusive process, and some 
feel that opinion polls generally measure an aggregation of individual elite 
opinions to give the illusion of ‘public opinion’, which merely serves to further 
the interests of the political and journalistic elites (Bourdieu 1979). Social 
scientists have grappled with the concept of public opinion, calling it at various 
times -‘fiction’, ‘mere phantom’, or an ‘abstraction’; a ‘journalistic fallacy’ that 
is ‘confusing public opinion with public presentation of opinion’; ‘a 
homogenized definition’; an ‘artefact produced by the public opinion industry’; 
and ‘figments of our imagination’ (Lippmann 1925, Allport 1937, Converse 
1987, Bourdieu 1979 and Babbie 1986 cited in Bishop 2005). Aware of the 
difficulties in approximating public opinion, i.e. the public may be ignorant about 
the issue in question, the difficulties in the construction of the questions, and 
their form, wording and context being problematic (Bishop 2005), this research 
merely seeks to present a socially constructed view of encounters from the 
perspective of a few significant social actors and in no way claims to represent 
‘the public opinion’.
What is most remarkable about the interviews with ‘claimsmakers’ is the virtual 
absence of critique from people who could be expected to be the most likely to 
oppose encounters as illegitimate. These ‘claimsmakers’, part of the
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‘intelligentsia’, as they are called in India (Khare 2003), are popularly viewed 
with a certain degree of scepticism. They are generally not considered to have 
much impact “when it comes to help society acquire a sense of right and wrong”, 
and also “neither those in power nor those aspiring for it are bothered about the 
possible condemnation from these classes”, especially since they do not actually 
reflect the interests and concerns of the masses (Dhillon 2005: 101). Whether 
my interviewees were as powerless or marginalised as suggested by some is open 
to debate. It was nevertheless interesting that the interviews suggested that 
encounters took place in a highly permissive cultural environment in which 
groups of people that would in other countries and contexts question the ‘dirty 
hands’ methods of the police actually allowed such methods to be employed 
relatively unchecked in Mumbai.
The people I interviewed had constructed their perceptions and attitudes on the 
basis of the exposure they had to issues around encounters. Two interviewees 
admitted receiving extortion calls from gang members, and a significant 
proportion of them based their views on the policing of organised crime either as 
a member of the criminal justice system, the media, interested NGOs, or 
politicians taking direct decisions on related policy matters. I was convinced that 
with the exception of two interviewees, (a representative of an industrial 
association, and the criminologist), the other interviewees seemed to have the 
idea that something other than the public version of events might be going on 
behind the scenes in encounter situations, and the fact that the official police 
version might not necessarily be the correct one. But as the analysis shows, their 
understanding of encounters was neither uniform nor monolithic.
This group consisted of people who possessed the power, means, and resources 
to mobilise and influence public opinion. I suggest that the public in Mumbai 
were the backdrop audience to whom the accounts of the ‘claimsmakers’ were 
addressed. The main relevance of these accounts is as indications of elite 
intelligentsia opinion. Since such groups (the Guardianista in the UK context) 
are relevant to creating a climate of accountability for policing they are 
significant in themselves, even though the extent of their influence on public 
opinion is unclear.
226
I also drew upon media reports, journalistic accounts, academic work, popular
fiction, and Bollywood or Hindi films, (all of which are admittedly socially
constructed with all its associated problems), as illustrations of the general
discourse on encounters. Bollywood films appeared to have a significant
influence on the social construction of issues around organised crime and
encounters because as Mehta (2005: 454) suggests,
“There is a curious symbiosis between the underworld and the 
movies...Hindi film-makers are fascinated by the lives of the 
gangsters and draw upon them for material. The gangsters, from the 
shooter on the ground to the don-in-exile at the top, watch Hindi 
movies keenly and model themselves - their dialogue, the way they 
carry themselves - on their screen equivalents”.
The sheer number of Hindi films made in Mumbai (around 200- 300 per year), 
their immense popularity, and the fact that many of them are largely financed by 
the underworld who have a substantial say in the contents and presentation of 
these films (Kripalani 2005) also make them interesting sources to draw upon to 
explore the ways in which issues around encounters are constructed. While there 
have been countless films revolving around the police, organised criminals and 
encounters, I have focused on a few examples whose popularity and critical 
acclaim might be indicative of a substantial section of the public’s appreciation 
of the way the topic had been dealt with cinematographically. This did not mean 
there was general agreement about their contents but merely that people had 
connected with them at some level.
Prior to commencing this research I anticipated a simple causal explanation for 
encounters', the police act as they are expected to. The police do not operate in a 
social vacuum, but most of their actions draw legitimacy and strength from 
public opinion or lack of it, i.e. people get the police they deserve. My 
interactions with a vast array of people from all walks of life over the many years 
I lived in Mumbai convinced me that the public approved of encounters and the 
police were able to operate with impunity because no one was interested in 
demanding accountability, especially in encounters. How else was I, as a police 
officer, exposed primarily to the dominant police discourse, to explain not just
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the indifference in the media but the virtual celebration of encounters and 
‘specialist’ officers in public forums?79 However, a deeper examination of the 
discourse on encounters, while confirming my initial causal explanation, 
revealed some interesting insights into how people assimilated uncomfortable 
facts, how they could know and not know at the same time, and why particular 
denial mechanisms were employed.
7.3 What are Encounters: Genuine or Fake
All eighteen interviewees were asked to define what they understood by the term
encounter. Responses could be categorised as Naive (3), Realist (9) or Cynical
(6). The Naive response was to suggest encounters involved police shooting
hardened criminals in self-defence, where there was no room to acknowledge the
possibility of ‘fake’ encounters. One naive response displayed a touching faith in
the police and their intentions to control crime:
“You have to empower them [the police], to give them the power to 
use their own discretion. You have to believe and you have to have 
faith in the police official. I mean, out of a hundred, maybe one or 
two may be misusing it [their power], but overall I would like to 
believe that the person who is appointed by the government is a 
person we can believe in, who we can have faith in. So if he does 
something like that [talking about excess use of deadly force] I think 
it would be for the general good” (I 10, Public Relations Officer, 
Industrial Association).
One interpretation of this response could be that it was a cultural denial of the 
danger that police excess use of force could pose to the common man. It 
appeared as if the interviewee wanted to believe that the police were incapable of 
misusing their powers because they are there to protect the population and 
always act to promote social wellbeing. It might be an example of the 
manufacture of ‘convenient truths’ (that the police cannot misuse power, except 
in very few and rare cases), similar to that adopted by German Jews in the 1930s, 
who despite evidence to the contrary, did not believe the state to be capable of 
heinous acts. The explanation by Primo Levi in the German adage ‘Things whose
79 See for e.g. Najmi Q.: ‘Living on the Edge’, The Week, Feb 10, 2002; or Mark M. (Deputy 
Editor of Afternoon: Despatch & Courier- one of the two main daily tabloids in Mumbai): ‘ 
Bombay Police...better than Scotland Yard!’, writing on the Mumbai Police for the Crime 
Prevention Week 2000, (www.mumbaipolice.com/markmanuel.htm)
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existence is not morally possible cannot exist’ (cited in Cohen 2001: 141), 
applied most appropriately to the naive approach adopted by this interviewee.
Another naive response to the same question was,
“Encounters, actually, when police get information that a particular 
gang is there or particular gang members are there, then they search 
for and you can say, lay a trap for them. Once they find them, then 
they actually fire and in most cases they kill them”.
When asked what fake encounters were, this person’s response was,
“Fake encounters have not come to light. Fake encounters means 
they are running away and you kill them... So I don’t think there are 
fake encounters, at least no fake encounters have come to light here 
in Bombay...When I was studying the problem of dacoity in 
Chambal valley80 I found there were a number of fake encounters, 
and those fake encounters were done because the police were paid 
[by rival claimants] for the rifles that were left on the scene [by the 
dead ‘dacoits’].” (115, Academic).
One can see denial at work at the outset, the interviewee stated that the police 
killed criminals on finding them (without any reference to self defence) and yet 
staunchly went on to maintain that there were no fake encounters in Mumbai, 
adding that none had come to light. In this he presumably took a formalistic legal 
perspective, i.e. if no incident was proved to be a fake encounter, then the latter 
could not exist. It could also be that he had a formed a notion of what fake 
encounters were, based on his experience with a rural police force in another part 
of the country. The context and playing out of encounters in Mumbai would have 
been very different and perhaps the police had managed to maintain a tighter grip 
on the information flow making it difficult for this researcher to come across 
instances of blatant misuse of deadly force that his previous experience might 
have exposed him to. This individual was the only interviewee who steadfastly 
refused to accept any wrongdoing on the part of the Mumbai police and 
maintained that the police acted entirely within the bounds of law, even though 
he did not mention anything about them acting in self-defence. He justified his 
faith with the claim, “For the last thirty or forty years I am working with the 
police and I know what the situation is”. I strongly suspect that being closely
80 Dacoit infested ravines in the heartland of India, the state of Madhya Pradesh.
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associated with the police had imbued this individual with a sense of 
responsibility to adhere to the official police story of denying wrongdoing. The 
other explanation could be the shifting, fluid boundaries of the term ‘fake’ 
encounter, which allowed this individual to change his definition to suit the 
occasion.
The third naive response was from a politician belonging to the party in power, 
who, I suppose, had to stress (like the Senior Management Ranks of the police) 
that all encounters were ‘genuine’ as any other response would reflect negatively 
on his government, and be perceived as being openly supportive of illegal 
executions:
“Fake encounter? People call it that conveniently - say that the police 
caught him and then did this and that - they make up stories, but no 
one has till now spoken of fake encounters. Yes, sometimes in one or 
two places, there have been cases of mistaken identity. For example, 
in Bihar81, there have been mistakes on the part of the police, that 
happens, it is part of their job. But I don’t believe in the talk that it is 
a fake encounter. If the person who dies is a saintly person, if a 
decent person is caught and killed then you can say fake encounter, 
that he was killed. Who is the person who dies - there was something 
to him, wasn’t there? Otherwise why was he killed? Why don’t the 
police kill ordinary people?...So those should not be called fake 
encounters” (I 7, Politician)
Not only was the interviewee refusing to accept that the Mumbai police were 
capable of making mistakes in encounters, but was also using justifications 
(denial of victim, emphasis on social good) to support police use of deadly force. 
Strictly speaking, his response could not be called naive, but wilfully naive in 
order to be politically opportune and selective.
The Realist, on the other hand, accepted that there were some ‘genuine’ cases
where the police really did shoot in self-defence and in order to protect life or
property, but that there was a preponderance of others where some measure of
wrongdoing or excess use of force was involved. A typical realist response was:
“Genuine encounters? I think they are very few and far between.
They take place in the mofussils82, where the police are usually out in
81 The state with arguably the worst crime situation in India.
82 Rural areas are known as mofussils in India. (Oxford English Dictionary)
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villages where they will not find a single supporter, they are terribly 
outnumbered and in those situations encounters take place and I 
would say that those are more or less justified. But in places like 
Bombay there are small localities, the persons wanted may number 
anything from one to ten, if you come with a police force numbering 
twenty or twenty five, there is hardly any reason to take recourse to 
firearms.... The resistance that they are likely to put up is not going 
to be really serious, then use of deadly force is not necessary” (I 3, 
Retired Judge)
The Realist was aware of some amount of police wrongdoing, but accepted that it 
was not blatant, random, or rampant misuse of force, i.e. it was perhaps excess 
use of force, or that those killed were in some way connected to organised gangs.
The Cynics, in turn, were convinced that all encounters were staged events and
that the police managed to control the narrative and the evidence to suit their
story in every instance. All the journalists and activists interviewed were cynical
about encounters, as one of them described:
“They are rackets. There are no encounters, they are police killings...
All those stories we hear, we hear that they are not killed in 
encounters but police killed them and to save their skins from the 
courts, they [the police] say that they [the ‘criminal’] died in 
encounters.. ..A criminal is caught and when the police know that this 
man is likely to get bail or the court will not book him, then why take 
it up to court - eliminate, kill him.” (I 5, Journalist).
Another person described encounters as a ‘package’,
“Now encounter, as defined by the police, because that is how the 
whole society has accepted it. It is a definition given by the 
perpetrator, which everybody including the judiciary has accepted. It 
is a stereotyped definition... We go there - we challenge him - he fires 
- we fire back in self defence - he falls - we take him to the hospital - 
declared dead! The entire sequence and chronology, clubbed together 
as a package is called an encounter”. (I 2, Activist).
This interviewee used the concept of ‘interpretive packages’ to describe a police 
encounter, either intuitively or knowingly acknowledging the fact that this 
particular ‘package’ is the result of the use of particular frames by the media to 
make sense of the encounter story. A process in which, “media output may 
simply reflect the frames of the most powerful actors with little independent 
contribution from journalists” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993: 119). At the centre of
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the package is a core frame and a central organizing idea that gives meaning to a 
series of events or phenomena related to the social issue, and while (Beckett 
1997) feels that such ‘culturally available’ descriptive packages (she uses the 
example of ‘crime and drug issue’) typically do not appear in the media in their 
entirety, in Mumbai we find that they are repeatedly being used to describe and 
define encounters. This interviewee made some interesting observations 
regarding the absolute control on the narrative and discourse on encounters by 
the police, who as institutional ‘primary definers’ (Hall et al 1981) have managed 
to make their version of events in an encounter the definitive and authoritative 
account, accepted by all others, including the judiciary. This demonstrated how 
structural processes combined to construct plausible accounts of encounters. (See 
also Chapter 8). The Cynics were convinced that the police misuse of deadly 
force was authoritarian, politically motivated, and not always in the interests of 
crime control.
Thus, even within the small sample interviewed, there was no clear consensus 
about what encounters were and while only a very small percentage of the 
sample expressed the belief that encounters were chance occurrences, (and it did 
appeared some had chosen to deliberately adopt a position of denial) a majority 
of those interviewed were sceptical of the official police version of events. They 
acknowledged that there was lack of clear evidence about police wrongdoing, but 
various factors were put forward as indicative of police malpractice. These 
included:
“We have heard reports of police officers talking amongst 
themselves, constables and others and they say today we have to go 
for an encounter- so that means it is pre-planned” (I 8, Activist and 
Lawyer)
- indicating that these were not chance occurrences;
“Only once or twice I think a police constable is killed, but otherwise 
why nobody is even injured? Do you think that those criminals who 
otherwise shoot point blank, who are sharp shooters, they cannot hit 
even one police officer? So the criminal is caught, made to stand, and 
fired at!” (I 5, Journalist)
- implying that the lack of police injuries showed there was no cross shooting, 
but that it was a clear case of execution;
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“They had killed this peanut vendor in an encounter saying that he is 
a criminal. I went to his house, I mean, he lived in a shanty in 
Bandra, where there is absolute poverty. Now how could he afford 
[the weapons allegedly found on him], he was selling peanuts. It was 
a case of mistaken identity” (1 1, Journalist)
- circumstantial evidence and the fact that the ‘victim’ was too poor to have been
the ‘hardcore’ gangster he was alleged to be, was cited as being proof of
mistaken identity;
“From the spot where he [the ‘criminal’] has done rampant firing 
with an automated weapon, which can fire up to 30 shots a minute, I 
mean, how can they not find empty cartridges in any of these 
instances? Why is the spot report not made that 40 cartridges were 
found?” (12, Activist)
- highlights that there was no adequate ballistic and forensic evidence to prove
that the police were under attack at the time;
“More often than not, the information that so and so is coming here, 
is given by the rival gang [to the police]. So you have connivance 
somewhere. If one gang gives you information about the other gang, 
then you are doing that man’s job, and not your legal duty. So it has 
started becoming political” (I 4, Director Cultural Centre, ex- 
Commissioner); and
“Those big people who are abroad [referring to gang leaders who 
have fled to other countries], when people break away from their 
gangs, instead of killing them [the leavers] themselves, they [the 
latter] are made to be killed by the police... The police do encounters 
on behalf of some or the other gang or group”. (I 17, Politician)
- evidence of politicalisation and criminalisation of the force, and a general 
acknowledgement that rampant corruption existed had strengthened opinions of 
some people that the police were acting as hit men for rival gangs and politicians.
Similar doubts have been raised in other public discourses (such as media 
reports, fiction and numerous films) but somehow the overriding perception of 
encounters appeared to be that of the Realist, who despite being aware that there 
were police wrongdoings involved in encounters, was willing to accept these as 
‘collateral damage’ in the ‘war’ on crime. (See Chapter 8).
7.4 Are Encounters Effective
Opinions on the success of encounters were grounded in opinions about the 
nature of crime in general and the incidence of organised crime in particular.
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When asked about their perception of the general crime situation in Mumbai, a 
majority of interviewees thought that it had improved over the years, especially 
that organised crime had been brought under control. Interviewees’ perception of 
effectiveness of encounters roughly correlated to their perception of the crime 
trend in general. Those who thought that encounters were effective felt that 
crime was going down, especially organised crime. However, those who thought 
they were ineffective said they thought crime was on the rise over the past 10 
years.
In contrast to police officers interviewed, who shared a near 100% consensus that 
encounters were effective in controlling the activities of organised criminals at 
least in the short run, ‘claimsmakers’ were more divided on this issue. Ten of the 
eighteen interviewees felt that encounters achieved their intended effect of 
controlling crime; two thought they were effective only in the short run; whereas 
six felt they were ineffective. One interviewee articulated the reasons for their 
ineffectiveness:
“It is an admission of the failure of our professionalism. As a 
policeman everyone is trained to bring an offender to justice. And 
there is a legal system to do that. When we resort to the technique of 
encounter, apart from the fact that whatever it does to our psyche, it 
is also an admission that we have not been able to practice our 
profession properly...The question is, have we been able to put an 
end to the underworld and organised crime by resorting to 
encounters? The answer is no...and in the process you have 
dehumanised so many police officers. It is a pity that even politicians 
have said that this should be done... When the elected representative, 
who is also a Cabinet Minister says this is the only way we can deal 
with them - I think something has gone wrong with us. No 
government, much less a democracy can ever give a licence to 
anyone to kill, because this licence to kill can be very costly... The 
moment you give somebody the licence to kill, he can go and kill 
anyone for selfish purposes. [Also] in spite of encounters the 
underworld exists, we have not been able to eliminate it. You kill two 
people, there are four available to do the same job, because really 
speaking, you are killing menials. You are not attacking the source, 
no harm has been done to Dawood Ibrahim or Chhota Raj an. If they 
get killed, they will be killed by each other. Gangs after gangs after 
gangs... lots of gangs have come and gone, but other gangs have 
come up. So how do we say that this policy has succeeded? If it is a 
policy, even an unannounced policy, or a tacit understanding. The 
very fact that the problem exists is an indication of the failure of this 
policy” (I 4, Director Cultural Centre, and ex-Commissioner)
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The interviewee (possibly on account of being a retired police officer) identified 
almost all the problem areas that resulted from unaccountable use of deadly force 
by the police. Themes mentioned as evidence of the problems with encounters 
centred around -  the unprofessional nature of police practice; misuse of political 
and police powers; erosion of democratic values; adverse effects on individual 
officers and implicitly on the force; ineffectual culling of lower (and powerless) 
ranks of the gangs and inability to curb the real gang leaders; and finally, 
historical evidence showing that gang activities continued despite existence of 
tacit policy of encounters.
The perception of ‘the failure of this tacit policy of encounters’ was more 
prevalent among those who disapproved of encounters, again in contrast to 
police officers who, despite their personal opinion of the phenomena, nonetheless 
regarded them as very effective especially in the short run. This discrepancy 
arose perhaps because officers’ perception was influenced mainly by the 
operational and practical aspect of encounters as opposed to its long term ethical 
aspects. While admittedly, there appeared to be temporary gains in terms of their 
immediate impact on gang activities, (see Chapter 3) apart from a few Upper 
Middle Management officers most police officers were unable to assimilate the 
wider psychological, social and ethical impact of encounters extending beyond 
the boundaries of day-to-day policing. ‘Claimsmakers’, on the other hand, were 
not hampered by the expectations and restrictions placed upon police officers, 
and as outsiders were thus able to have a better appreciation of the overall impact 
of encounters.
7.5 Attitudes towards Encounters
When asked whether they personally approved of encounters as a crime control
measure, eleven of the eighteen interviewees said they did not:
“My personal impression of encounters is that it is rough justice, 
which police are attempting to enforce. And rough justice must, in 
any case, be rough, and in many cases may not be justice at all...I 
don’t approve of them. And I am afraid that it will come around and 
hurt a lot of innocent people, it may already have.” (I 16, Corporate 
Executive, Representative Industrial Association)
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Though expressed somewhat obliquely five interviewees approved of
encounters. One interviewee said,
“Well, if breaking the law occasionally is the only way of enforcing 
the law, then you have to break the law. Supposing a person finds 
that his servant is committing theft, what will be the reaction? Will 
you not beat him mercilessly? If he feels that the servant has stolen 
some jewellery or money, do you think the man is going to say -  
‘Oh, human rights - I will sit here and call the police’? He will first 
kick him, he will give him at least 10 slaps, even his wife will take 
the chance to beat him, which the woman would ordinarily never 
dare to do. But that is human reaction. Breaking the law occasionally 
is the only way, you know, to uphold the majesty of the law. That is 
why policemen do it - there is no other way”. (113, Retired Judge)
On the other hand, two of the interviewees said they disapproved, but made
subsequent comments that suggested secret approval of encounters of ‘genuine’
‘hardcore’ criminals:
I 3: “Desperate situations require desperate measures, but here the 
wrong people are getting eliminated- they are small time criminals.
The real big ones are getting police protection”
J.B.: “So do you think if big timers were eliminated, it would, in a 
sense, be justified, given the prevailing situation?”
I 3: “Looking at the havoc they [criminals] are creating, I think it is 
perfectly justified”. (I 3, Retired Judge)
However this same person went on to object to encounters on the grounds that:
“If someone is eliminated today, tomorrow it will be your turn. So 
this [social approval] is an attitude which has been inculcated by 
brainwashing, brainwashing carried out by the media, by the 
politicians, by the so-called society leaders. That is incorrect; people 
should start thinking for themselves.... Not allow their prejudice to 
colour their opinion. This is a serious matter and if there is 
deterioration in police efficiency and integrity, it is society at large 
which will suffer”. (I 3, Retired Judge)
There were several important themes in this statement; strikingly, the objection 
to encounters was not on the grounds of protecting human rights, but on more 
practical issues like the need for accountability in police actions and the danger a 
‘trigger happy’ police force may pose to ordinary citizens. Also the interviewee 
condemned what he perceived to be social approval for encounters arising out of 
a ‘herd’ mentality, which possessed people to be blindly led by influential public
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opinion makers. What the interviewee criticised as ‘brainwashing’ is similar to 
the structural processes described by Hall et al (1978) when they suggest that the 
‘mutually reinforcing’ relations between the primary definers (police officers, 
judges, politicians, spokespersons of associations) and the secondary definers 
(the media) reproduces and transforms controversial issues into a full blown 
social crisis, thus legitimising more authoritarian police actions. The interviewee 
also seemed to be referring to the possibility that a lack of accountability for such 
police actions would ultimately have a deleterious effect on the morale and 
professional efficiency of the force.
Though interviewees had different perceptions of encounters, there was a thread 
of consensus running through their discourse, that society appeared to regard 
encounters as a defensible crime control policy for the police. In the next section 
I look at ‘claimsmakers’ perception of others’ reaction to encounters in an 
attempt to draw out factors that might influence the wider social reaction to 
encounters.
7.5.1 Political Reaction
There was a near unanimous perception among most of the interviewees that 
strong political support and encouragement for encounters existed. One 
interviewee described the political attitude as “Very conniving, patronising, 
approving” (12 Activist). Another response: “They support if it suits them, if it is 
the opposition’s gang which is being exterminated or whose numbers are being 
brought down, they support it. Contrarily [sic], if their interests are affected, they 
will criticize” (I 4, retired Judge). This raises the issue of criminalization of 
politics, where political leaders associated with certain gangs not only provided 
patronage to their favoured gang/s, but actively encouraged the police to target 
criminals belonging to rival gangs. However, whether political affiliations were 
organised around communal interests has not been clearly established (and is 
beyond the scope of my research). There were also allegations that certain 
governments were predisposed to allow one or other of the major gangs to 
operate relatively freely, provided they did not run amok and cause political 
embarrassment to their patrons, an allegation refuted by a member of the ruling 
party in 2003,
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“Our government, we say that if the police are doing it [encounters], 
let them. We never interfere. Some people were alleging recently that 
people from a particular gang are being killed less, and more from 
the other gang, But it is not like that, if you see our record then you 
will find that only criminals have been killed, not really any 
particular group or community” (I 7, Politician).
This statement is an open acknowledgement of state sanctioned encounters, but 
when asked whether ‘false’ encounters occurred, the same interviewee said no 
incidents had occurred. This statement demonstrates my contention that even 
‘claimsmakers’ understood and talked about encounters in different, inconsistent 
ways. On the one hand they admitted that deliberate, cold-blooded killing was 
forbidden, but on the other they felt that ‘hard-core’ criminals deserved to be 
justifiably eliminated, an opinion that embodied denial of the victim.
However, despite claims by the politician that they did not ‘interfere’ in police 
encounters, public discourse supported the perception that there was political 
direction in the way the policy on encounters was formulated and executed. The 
growing trend of politicisation of organised criminals was also evident in the fact 
that organised criminals are increasingly participating in local democratic 
elections (see Chapter 3). Thus social awareness of the close nexus between 
politicians, organised criminals and the police, who act as a liaison agent 
between the two was acknowledged by interviewees, but this has not been 
proven. This nexus between organised crime syndicates, politicians and the 
police was demonstrated in the Telgi Fake Stamp Paper scam involving high 
ranking corrupt police officers and politicians that enveloped the city in 2003 ( 
see for example, Chaturvedi 2004). Almost all Bollywood films centred around 
the theme of organised crime also unfailingly depict the nexus between criminals 
and corrupt politicians (films such as Company, Ab Tak Chappan, Gangajal, 
Shool and others ). Though fictional representations, such films could be said to 
have a considerable impact on the construction of social meanings and relations.
Some ‘claimsmakers’ recognized that there were vested interests in maintaining 
the status quo, so that the government controlled the police force. One 
interviewee ironically remarked, “Every political party wants an independent
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police force, and an independent judiciary, which will have complete liberty to 
decide in their favour only. This is the definition of independence!” ( I l l ,  Retired 
Judge). Police officers had expressed similar sentiments acknowledging 
subordination of the police to the ruling politicians in Mumbai. The National 
Police Commission’s Reports (1978-81) have recommended that the police be 
freed of control by the political executive, but there has been little political 
movement towards accepting and implementing these recommendations. Since 
Policing is a State Subject83 implementing these recommendations is the 
prerogative of each of the 28 state governments. Even if the federal government 
at the centre were interested in implementing the recommendations of the seven 
National Police Commission Reports to reform and modernise the police, it 
cannot do so without the approval of every state government. Any such initiative 
to do so has met with resistance from state governments so far.
7.5.2 Media Reaction
In this section I examine media reaction as perceived by the interviewees and my 
own analysis of the media reaction to police encounters in Mumbai. I conducted 
a search on the words ‘encounter’, ‘encounter specialist’ and even names of 
some of the ‘encounter specialists’ on various search engines on the web and 
conducted an analysis of the kinds of reports generated that referred to 
encounters in Mumbai. I found three main types: the first, was a bare description 
of the ‘facts’ contained in the official police version; the second, was articles and 
editorials raising questions about ‘controversial’ police shootings, and reports of 
demands for inquiries and probes into some incidents, and the third, was the 
celebration of encounters and ‘encounter specialists’. This latter category is in a 
sense unique to Mumbai, in that it does not exist in the kinds of media reactions 
to incidents of police use of deadly force described by others in Western 
democracies (for e.g. see Lawrence 2000, Ross 2000, media reaction to the 
shooting of Charles de Menezes).
83 Article 246 of the Constitution of India distributes legislative powers between the Parliament 
and State Legislative Assemblies, and places police in the State List, whereby the State 
legislatures have exclusive powers to make laws pertaining to the police.
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Most interviewees said that initial encounter reports were invariably of the first
kind, which followed a standard format - described by Best (1999: 37) as,
“reflecting] the conventions of contemporary journalism.... the standard
formulas for news writing - that is, who-what-when-where presented with the
story’s most important aspects first, followed by increasingly specific items as
the story develops”. It was also observed by the interviewees that apart from
media reports of encounters being routine and standardized, with very little
analysis or in-depth investigation, they were also increasingly being relegated to
the back pages as a tiny news item, perhaps because as Best (1999: 45) explains,
“Every news story runs its course: when there are no remaining facts 
to uncover or angles to explore, once there is nothing left to say, 
interest in the topic seems to die down; what once seemed novel 
becomes ‘old news’, boring; and coverage shifts to a different topic.
By themselves, the media cannot and will not remain focused on a 
particular crime problem”.
The importance and extent of the role of the print media84, though vital in the 
social construction and acceptance of the encounter story, was not recognized or 
acknowledged by the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed, almost all of whom, 
(including the representatives of the media themselves) were contemptuous of 
the quality and integrity of the media in the portrayal of encounters. Adjectives 
employed by the ‘claimsmakers’ describing the media ranged from - ‘poor 
reporting’, ‘non critical reporting’, ‘sensationalist’, ‘flippant’, ‘playing a dirty 
role’, ‘glorifying encounters’ and ‘specialist’ officers’, ‘glamorising crime’, 
‘pathetic’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘populist’, ‘disinterested’, and ‘apathetic’. Evidently 
the media were not held in high esteem by those interviewed. One interviewee 
commented: “I suspect there is a certain degree of incompetence in the Indian 
media, every single person in the media can be bribed. I think that is the general 
problem.” (I 16, Corporate Executive)
Apart from incompetence, factors such as corruption and politicisation of the 
media led to the production of biased reports, not just by one particular 
newspaper mentioned by this interviewee, but by almost all newspapers:
841 will concentrate on the print media as the number of electronic and broadcasting media in 
India have proliferated to such an extent which makes it difficult to conduct a systematic 
assessment of how they report on encounters within the constraints of this research.
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“Media, unfortunately, take a hands-off approach. Not really 
concerned about it, they report the event without much research into 
the subject as to why the elimination [encounter] has taken place, 
whether it was necessary or not. Once upon a time the Saamna 5 was 
protecting people like Arun Gawli. Now because he has picked up a 
hassle with Bal Thackerey, he has become an enemy. So long as he 
was perceived to be a friend, doing anything against him or his gang 
was a crime in those people’s eyes. ... Media, by and large, is so 
apathetic and our reporters are so used to handouts that they don’t do 
any investigations... There is , in fact, an editorial policy that we 
should not get into a controversy...not get into the bad books of 
politicians or people who have any clout. We lose advertisements....
The better thing is to be inane and uncontroversial” (I 3, Retired 
Judge).
The journalists I interviewed acknowledged these problems, and not only 
recognized their own limitations, but also the limited sphere of their influence. 
“One should not have any illusions about the reach of the media. The [print] 
media has a limitation, given the levels of illiteracy, but maybe the electronic 
media may have a wider appeal and do more than the print media” (I 6, 
Journalist). This was recognition of what studies on the effects of media on 
public opinion have indicated, i.e. that the ‘hypodermic syringe’ effect (Reiner 
2002: 399) rarely operates and also that there is little evidence to indicate that the 
consistently biased impression of events presented by the media “is very 
influential on public perceptions of, and opinions about, these phenomena” 
(Roshier 1981: 51). On the other hand, I felt that journalists downplayed the 
power of the media to “reinforce and reproduce” the culture of denial and 
specific motivational accounts which moulded the public’s attitude towards 
crime. The media also provided an “organizing frame, the narrative structure, the 
story line” consistently for a number of years and “hammered home the notion 
that crime was increasing, that criminals were... ‘wicked people’, and that the 
Government...could not protect the people” (Cavender 2004: 346). Further, 
Beckett’s (1997) research on the media coverage of the crime and drugs problem 
in America found that it could even influence policy-making independent of its 
potential effect on public opinion.
85 Saamna- a fiercely right wing Marathi daily newspaper, considered to be the mouth piece of 
the Shiv Sena (fundamentalist Hindu Party) and its leader Mr Bal Thackeray, and considered to 
be influential in some sections of the citizenry.
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In Mumbai too, it could be said, that the media had an impact on perpetuating the 
police myth of what Reiner (2003) calls ‘police fetishism’ -  the idea of police 
indispensability, in the absence of meaningful public discourse on alternate 
social and cultural changes as solutions to the crime problem. Reiner (2003) 
suggests that although the media highlight scandals and controversies about the 
police and policing, they propagate the idea that policing solutions are the only 
conceivable ones for the crime and disorder problem. Thus, the image of the 
police as protective shields (‘thin khaki line’) survives and is propagated by 
journalists in Mumbai (Blom Hansen 2001: 185) through the acceptance of 
encounters as a policing policy in the discourse.
Journalists interviewed also admitted that there was a general unwillingness to
create controversy by raising uncomfortable questions, or to ‘rock the boat’ for
the establishment, as this quote illustrates:
“[Media reaction to encounters] is generally -  I would say, ‘passive 
acceptance’. There is a sort of apathy also. See, in these cases, there 
is a lot of police co-operation. They take these journalists to the spot, 
show them the [encounter] scene, the weapons - two shots fired by 
the criminal, two bullets will be lodged in the wall somewhere. And 
then they also take the reporters into confidence -  ‘Why are you 
asking so many questions? After all it was Amar Naik86, or ‘so-and- 
so’, who was killed. Leave it be’. The journalist also wants to keep 
good police relations. He is thrilled that a senior officer is talking to 
him so nicely, so he also does not ask too many questions” (I 5, 
Editor)
The intermingling of the two themes of the police ability and power to control 
the discourse and the necessity for crime reporters to be in the good books of 
police officers, demonstrates what Crandon and Dunne (1997: 91) call 
‘symbiosis at least and vassalage [a position of subordination or subjugation] of 
the media at most’ and has also been noted in the wider literature on policing and 
the media (Leishman and Mason 2003, Reiner et al 2000, Ericson 1989, Hall et 
al 1981). Research has shown that news media are often hesitant to report on 
systemic miscarriages of justice because of their heavy reliance on the law 
enforcement agencies for information and those papers who offer uncritical
86 A prominent gang leader, who was shot dead in an encounter by the Mumbai police in August 
1996.
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accounts of the police appear to have more inside information than others who 
are more questioning (Callanan 2005). Ross (1998, citing the research of Ericson 
et al 1989) draws attention to the fact that academic literature points to two major 
types of police reporters: those in the inner circle (who work in close co­
operation with the police and therefore seek stories sympathetic to the police) 
and those in the outer circle (who are more likely to report police deviance and 
use a wide variety of police sources and units). From the accounts of the 
‘claimsmakers’ crime reporters in Mumbai appeared to mainly belong to the 
inner circle and the few from the outer circle who raised questions about police 
deviance quickly found themselves marginalised (also see Blom Hansen 2001).
Another interviewee said:
“The first thing is that the Indian media, just like the Indian people, 
are great believers in the state and we tend not to oppose what the 
state says. We tend to accept what the state says, what the authorities 
say. Also, our notion of human rights does not extend to people we 
see as being grey or black. Thirdly, the quality of reportage in the 
Indian media is pretty low. So to expect us to stitch together and 
make a pattern, to join the dots out of something which is evident is 
expecting a little too much. We tend not to attack stories, we tend to 
wait for them to come to us and them maybe take them to the page”
(114, Editor)
Several interesting themes were raised: comments on the nature of Indian society 
and its attitudes towards human rights, its subservience to authority, the extent of 
control that people in power and authority (police officers and political leaders)
on
have on the discourse and construction of encounters in the social sphere . In the 
interviews there was awareness of the poor quality of reporters and reporting and 
anecdotal evidence of how ‘investigative’ journalism on encounters was not just 
discouraged but positively frowned upon by the authorities, and in many 
instances even the public. One journalist narrated his personal experience 
referring to one of the earliest encounters in Mumbai:
87 A situation which, as Hall et al say “ensures that the media, effectively but ‘objectively’ play a 
key role in reproducing the dominant field of the ruling ideologies”, thus they feel that the media 
play the subordinate role of secondary definer, reproducing the definitions of those who have 
privileged access, i.e. primary definers.
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“I gave a story that this was not a police encounter, but that the police 
killed XYZ88, and not even one bullet was fired by him. But he was 
killed point blank by the police. There was a hue and cry, there were 
so many letters [to the editor] against me. My readers never approved 
this line that the police killed him... Absolutely not, I would have 
been stoned to death if people knew who was writing the story... As a 
journalist I thought my job was over the moment I gave the story.
OK, now it was my responsibility to reflect public opinion on that, 
which was done. There was no clarification from the police... the 
police did not give their version because it was true [what I had 
alleged].” (I 5, Editor)
One of the police officers interviewed also referred to this incident, commenting 
that reports of ‘young, upstart’ journalists were disliked by the public (see pages 
169-170). The comments above raised the question: how much responsibility lies 
with the media to inform and/or to mould public opinion? It is the classic 
dilemma of which theoretical model drives the media: the ‘market model’ 
(giving the public what it wants) or the ‘manipulative model’ (giving the public 
what the establishment thinks should be given) (Surette 1998a). There was a 
general perception among those interviewed that the media was populist, but 
there ought to be greater involvement of the media in raising awareness and 
mobilising public opinion against such illegal use of force. The media can play a 
crucial role through editorials, and by providing “a crucial link between the 
apparatus of social control and the public” (Hall et al 1981) they can either 
reinforce the dominant ideology or mobilise public opinion against police 
actions. In Mumbai media reporting of encounters appeared to slant more in 
favour of reinforcing dominant ideology and were perhaps less inclined to 
mobilise public opinion against them.
However, it was recognized by the ‘claimsmakers’ that there were other 
influences governing media attitudes towards encounters. Factors identified 
included- sensationalism, described by one interviewee as “Media is not 
interested in telling the whole truth, they are more interested in the news value... 
everybody wants to make money by showing extravagant scenes and giving 
extravagant messages. The very role of the media has become suspect” (111,
88 Identity withheld in the interests of preserving anonymity of the interviewee.
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retired Judge). Another factor, populism was defined as, “At the end of the day 
newspapers tend to narrate the readers’ worldview more than their own” (I 14, 
Editor). Some suggested that perhaps personal animosity influenced the way 
encounters were reported, “Some people from the media play a dirty role in 
this...they lay the entire blame on the police, make it personal, then they talk of 
fake encounters” (I 7, Politician). Finally, one interviewee pointed to a lack o f  
journalistic integrity, “It is just ineptitude or laziness. [For raising awareness] 
you would have to create the situation and the space to write it... It would 
require a much sharper focus on the issue that I would have. I should be doing it, 
it is wrong for me not to do it”. (114, Editor).
The media in Mumbai had what Young (2003: 43) describes as an
“institutionalized focus on negative news”, where the fear of crime was
highlighted and public opinion whipped up in favour extraordinary powers for
the police. This role played by the media was similar to that reported by Young
(2003: 41) in the UK context, “given the direction of political leadership and the
prevalent mass media coverage of crime, (that) public opinion is pushed in a
pessimistic and vindictive direction”. Perhaps it might have been the case that in
India the media, taking their cue from political leaders, exaggerated fears of
crime during the nineties and beyond, but downplayed the abuse of deadly force
by the police. One interviewee summed up what he thought the media’s attitude
was towards encounters:
“I have a very strong feeling that the media has become very flippant, 
the media has stopped doing its homework, they are the yuppie types, 
who have no social concerns and no social obligations, who are the 
prime movers of the media circuit. All the pages can be called Page 3 
[society page] so whether it is the sports page, or obituary column or 
even the front page, everything is the projection of personalities. But 
issues are not debated or discussed. I have not seen a free and frank 
debate in this country for maybe the last 20 years on any given issue.
There is flippancy, also on the part of the readers because there is 
demand for that. Basically we as a society are lazy to think. We want 
clear-cut Nescafe solutions! Put in a spoon, stir, and the brew should 
be ready. Nobody wants to apply his mind. Tell me, in how many 
media stories do you see serious analysis of either the statistics or 
chronology of events or of the ups and downs of any social 
phenomenon? None”. (I 2, Activist)
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This quote illustrates the third type of media reporting that eschews serious, 
balanced analysis but eulogizes officers (ab)using deadly force. One political 
leader interviewed proudly claimed that he had invited some ‘outstanding 
officers’ to a special function to ‘felicitate’ them on their numerous successes. 
The fact that the media displayed a tendency to make them into Page 3 
(conventionally, the society page) heroes was acknowledged in a majority of the 
interviews, and considered to be an unfavourable development by some. The 
above comments also raise doubts about whether the press in India is truly free 
and whether it is capable of in-depth analysis and assessment of the crime 
situation and the police response to it.
7.5.3 Public Reaction
Ross (2000: 115) suggests that low level of public arousal, and reaction to events 
of police use of deadly force might arise out of three processes, “alienation, 
apathy, acynicism, non-participation, political inefficiency or avoidance; ... or 
automatic acceptance, obedience or deference to authority; ...or the product of 
sublimated frustration”. The processes that influenced public reaction in the 
Canadian context could be said to apply in the Indian situation according to the 
perceptions of ‘claimsmakers’ who showed awareness of one or more of these 
three factors operating in Mumbai.
There was near unanimous consensus among those interviewed of the perception
that the public at large approved of encounters in an unquestioning,
unconditional, and mostly apathetic manner. In fact the main public reaction to
encounters was perceived to be one of apathy. One interviewee, echoing the
sentiments of some police officers (see page 171) said,
“People are so desperate to survive, jobs are getting scarce, 
employment is not amenable. To make two ends meet, they have to 
struggle for at least 14 to 16 hours. In Bombay, commuting by public 
transport takes a sizeable portion of our time, then our family needs, 
the distances we have to travel, hardly leaves any time for 
contemplation, for reading. So how can people make up their minds 
[about serious issues]? They also believe that it is useless, the 
situation is much too powerful, the system is much too powerful and 
they cannot do anything.” (I 3, Retired Judge)
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This feeling that the system was too big, the problem too pervasive, and the 
judiciary too ineffective to deal with either the problem of organised crime or 
disciplining police deviance in encounters was one that was expressed by most 
interviewees on behalf of themselves and of the common man. The latter, they 
believed, burdened by the business of making a living, felt it was a losing battle 
to demand accountability from either the police or the judiciary or even the 
politicians, when obviously all three appeared to have a nexus and strong vested 
interests in maintaining the power balance and status quo. Experience in other 
countries has shown that even in states where the accountability systems are well 
developed, rarely have the prosecutions of police officers in abuse of force cases 
been successful (Blumberg 1989, Uldricks and van Mastrigt 1991, Geller & Scott 
1992, Pedicelli 1998).
However, not everyone felt that the public reaction to encounters stemmed from 
apathy. One interviewee felt that active agency was exercised by the people 
because he felt:
“We have accepted it to be a desirable or an acceptable norm. People 
want encounters - I ’ll tell you within my own family, my aunts and 
all, they consider me a chakram [weird], it is a Gujarati word, “You 
all are crazy, how else can you finish these people?” they ask.. .They 
are well meaning. Incidentally, my aunts are devout Jains89. . .but they 
are all for these encounters. It is not that they are dishonest people, 
not that they are villains, or that they are devious people. They are 
God fearing, religious minded, ordinary citizens, who are not 
political in the sense they do not have a public profile, but who 
instinctively in their heart of hearts feel that this is the way of 
handling the issue and there is nothing wrong in it. I mean, such 
decent people who have neither suffered nor have to face organised 
crime, they feel it is good. This sends two signals - the police feel 
that it has got social acceptability and secondly, police feel that - 
‘bloody, I handle this situation day in and out, I should know. If a 
person who does not even handle it feels that it is justified then I 
cannot say that it is less justified’ ”. (12, Activist)
The quote illustrates some key structural and cultural factors that shape the 
public reaction to, and in turn influence police perception of encounters. The 
interviewee went on to make the point that ordinary people considered organised
89 The basic tenets of Jainism as a religion are peace and non-violence towards all living 
creatures.
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gangsters as ‘evil or wicked’ or ‘beyond the pale of redemption’. He appeared to 
suggest that people made the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. Other 
interviews also revealed a perception reminiscent of Garland’s description (2001: 
184),
“They [criminals] are dangerous others who threaten our safety and 
have no calls on our fellow feeling. The appropriate reaction for 
society is one of social defence we should defend ourselves against 
these dangerous enemies rather than concern ourselves with their 
welfare and prospects for rehabilitation”.
It could be argued that the ‘social defence’ Garland refers to had taken the 
extreme form of elimination of ‘dangerous others’ via encounters in Mumbai, 
which, according to the interviewee, the police feel they are justified in using, 
given that they feel it has the approval of ordinary, peace-loving citizens. 
Similar sentiments appear to operate in two very disparate countries the UK and 
India, with differences in the scale and nature of the crime problem, the context, 
historical and cultural backgrounds. However, the question remained whether 
public tolerance towards hardened criminals was reducing (as research in the UK 
and US have found that it had for crime in general) or was the rising trend 
towards becoming a more punitive society “orchestrated by manipulative 
politicians and the media?” (Matthews 2003: 224). Incidentally the inclination 
towards greater punitive measures to deal with crime in the West resulted not just 
in the demand for more prisons and tougher sentences, but also sometimes in 
calls for ‘emotive and ostentatious punishments, which involved new forms of 
humiliation and degradation as well as public displays of remorse’ (Pratt 2001, 
cited in Matthews 2003: 225). This trend, however, appeared to have gone a step 
further to public approval of summary executions of who, they are told are 
‘hardened’ criminals, by the police in Mumbai.
The issue is not just whether people in Mumbai actually condoned police use of 
deadly force or whether they were apathetic towards it, but whether and why they 
felt it was the right and only solution to the problem. The entire discourse on 
organised crime in the public sphere in Mumbai revolved around what Cohen 
(1972) calls the construction of Folk Devils, and the subsequent creation of a 
Moral Panic that lends itself to adoption of extraordinary measures on the part of
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the authorities to deal with them. While there were no specific incident or series 
of incidents that sparked off a ‘moral panic’- the gradually deteriorating crime 
situation in Mumbai lent itself to a media generated ‘moral panic’ about 
organised crime and its impact on everyday life during the 1990s. This in turn led 
to moulding and sustaining public opinion against folk devils such as ‘hardened 
criminals’ and in favour of encounters, especially amongst the middle classes, 
who are seldom directly affected by organised crime, but have heard or read 
enough to fuel their fears of crime (Callanan 2005). Fear of organised crime 
combined with despair and frustration resulting from the perceived failure of the 
criminal justice system, might have led people to condone police use of deadly 
force to rid society of such ‘folk devils’ as ‘hardened’ organised criminals.
Another reason for why the public did not oppose police encounters was
articulated by one interviewee,
“In India our great notion of tolerance extends to cover these things -  
that a few good guys getting killed with a lot of bad guys is fine -  the 
price to be paid. The tolerance for mistakes is very high in India. We 
don’t expect ourselves to have the same sort of efficiency as others”
(I. No. 14, Journalist).
Dhillon (2005: 101) comments that because Indians are “blessed with unlimited 
capacity for patiently suffering indifference, callousness and hypocrisy from their 
rulers, has made the task of the political and bureaucratic classes so much 
easier”. This ‘capacity to endure’ allows for mismanagement and inefficiency in 
the state machinery to proliferate relatively unchecked. It is almost as if the 
public expect that the police cannot possibly be as efficient or accountable as the 
British police, whom they held up in reverence and as a role model to aspire 
towards. Almost everybody interviewed (officers and ‘claimsmakers’ alike) 
compared the Mumbai police with Scotland Yard, (mistakenly called Scotland 
Police, by some) which was universally considered to be the epitome of good 
policing (a hangover of the colonial days). However policing accounts of British 
officers (Sillitoe 1955, Mark 1978) show that the police in Britain in the 1940s 
and 1950s also had a history of using brutal and violent measures to control 
‘criminals’; a fact that received popular approbation in days when police 
accountability was not as developed as it is today and the breach of criminal’s
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rights was not a serious issue. It’s not clear that there was public approval of 
illlicit methods, which were kept under cover and only used against the relatively 
powerless. The change in the nature of policing in Britain did not happen 
overnight, but greater public awareness and activism, combined with a sense of 
social responsibility as well as other complex social and cultural changes 
engendered mechanisms to ensure that police excesses are made accountable if 
not entirely curbed (Reiner 2000a).
Having explored ‘claimsmakers’ perceptions on issues around encounters, I now 
analyse their perception of factors that affect the wider social culture within 
which the phenomenon of encounters appears to flourish. This, I hope, would 
serve to illustrate my commonsense notion that the police function as the 
democratic society it serves expects, and allows them to do so.
7.6 Wider Culture
The attitudes of the ‘claimsmakers’ towards the phenomenon of encounters were 
situated in the wider culture of Mumbai. The essence of this ‘wider culture’ was 
difficult to capture, and I have almost no evidence of this ‘wider culture’. 
However, I have focused on ‘claimsmakers’ perception of those aspects which 
had a direct bearing on the construction of attitudes towards police encounters, 
namely; police image, fear of crime, attitudes towards Rule of Law, protection of 
Human Rights and notions of justice. In order to understand how such police use 
of force was tolerated, it was important to understand how the Mumbai police 
was perceived by the interviewees.
7.6.1 Police Image
When asked what they thought was the image of the Mumbai police, a large
majority of the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed thought that it was a reasonably
efficient force, significantly better than other forces in the country, and though
corrupt, fairly effective in keeping Mumbai a safe city.
“Compared to the other police forces within India, they are far better, 
far more professionally managed, particularly at the higher levels, far 
more competent and diligent and sticklers for the norms. I mean, 
there might be rotten apples everywhere. Also it is fairly disciplined 
and accountable, perhaps on account of its size and the media 
exposure that Mumbai gets, and also on account of it being the
250
capital city, all the ministers and bureaucrats, so lot of indirect 
controlling....So though it is declining very rapidly and though it is 
going down from bad to worse, by comparison, it is still, in my 
opinion, a far better police force than including that of Delhi or other 
places...That is in comparison, but in isolation the public feels that 
they are the rotten ones. They do feel that they are corrupt and hand- 
in-glove with the criminals. ...That is precisely why many of the 
ordinary complaints are not even taken to the police. That is another 
reason why the local dons have all come up, because I will rather 
have them as my arbiter. They will take some money and sort out the 
things, rather than the policeman who will make me do chakkars 
(rounds) of the police station ‘n’ number of times and ultimately I 
may end up coughing out far more money and spending far more 
time” (12,  Activist).
Evidently the interviewee felt that though there were many problems with the 
Mumbai police, still they were better as compared to police forces in other cities 
and states. One of the main reasons for discontent with the police was the 
cumbersome nature of the bureaucratic procedure that takes up time, energy and 
resources (in the form of money to expedite matters in a corrupt police force) 
making them an unpopular ‘arbiter’ in many disputes. I was told that people 
approached gang leaders for relief, and, at the same time, feared their 
ruthlessness. Aware of the extent of their influence and political power, it 
appeared as if people were secretly happy when they were killed by the police, 
and this, combined with the knowledge that the existing criminal justice system 
would be incapable of delivering any sort of justice, implied greater support for 
police encounters.
More than one interviewee expressed the opinion that it was the only city in the 
country where women could safely travel even late at night and compared 
favourably with other large metros in the world in this respect. This was a source 
of pride to some of them, and they were willing to overlook the brutal and 
corrupt image that existed alongside. One interviewee said, “Parents find it a safe 
city. They say, ‘My daughter comes home alone at 11 o’clock and nothing 
happens to her. It is because the police are effective that is why my daughter 
comes home safe. Why should I complain against those policemen? They are
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killing only goondas” (113, Retired Judge)90. There was however, no evidence to 
support that the police were indeed effective in making communities feel safer or 
whether there were other factors in operation responsible for this situation. This 
could be one of the justifications for why people, though aware of police 
wrongdoings in encounters, were nevertheless unwilling to protest against them.
A few of the interviewees felt that the police were better in the ‘golden past’ but 
that their reputation for honesty, integrity and efficiency had declined in the past 
20 years. The phenomenon of harking back to what Pearson (1983) calls “a still 
unlocated ‘golden age’” is not unique to Mumbai but has been documented by 
Pearson as the ‘law-and-order’ myth in the UK. Celebration of the ‘old fashioned 
bobby’ amidst the policing crisis showed a break from historical reality which 
did not take into account the fact that the police had traditional employed ‘strong 
arm tactics and were accused of brutality and disregard for civil liberties’ over 
decades. Pearson (1983) suggests this form of historical mythology does not 
engender reform but merely a reaction that a return to the ‘good old days’ can 
somehow solve all current problems and dilemmas and is not helpful.
In terms of their respect towards the rule of law and their performance in the 
protection of human rights also, it was a source of pride for many interviewees 
that the Mumbai police were deemed to have a better record than other forces in 
the country. It would not require a great leap of imagination to surmise that this 
made encounters somehow more acceptable because they were conducted by 
police officers who otherwise respected human rights.
7.6.2 Fear of Crime
In Mumbai, although the discourse emphasized that organised gangs affected 
everyone and increased a general sense of insecurity in the populace, there was 
little or no discussion about patterns of victimization. I asked ‘claimsmakers’ 
how widespread the effect of organised crime was on people and their daily life 
in Mumbai? Most of them acknowledged that the ‘ordinary common man’ was
90 This confidence in the police has however been misplaced as there have been a few cases 
where policemen have been accused of rape in Mumbai in 2005. (Chada 2005, and ‘Protests over 
Minor’s rape continue in Mumbai’, The Hindu, 26 Apr 2005)
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rarely a direct victim of organised crime, but could potentially be indirectly
affected by it, as one interviewee said,
“The sense of security is affected. Now see Sumeet Khatau91 was 
killed in broad daylight on a chowk [major crossing] of the city. If 
unfortunately I were passing by and if even one bullet had hit me I 
would have been killed for no reason.... Secondly, because of the 
gang activity real estate prices had gone up. Builders had to pay up to 
these gangs and they would pass on these costs to the buyer. So the 
prices of flats went up tremendously. Also when I would manage to 
buy a flat, immediately there would be a telephone call to me saying 
that ‘you have paid 60 lakhs, now you pay me 5 lakhs’ “ (I 5, 
Journalist).
A few interviewees felt that only certain sections (builders, film-makers, 
businessmen i.e. the very rich) felt the impact of organised crime most directly, 
via threatening phone-calls, extortion demands, kidnapping for ransom, and 
being shot in broad daylight in case of non-compliance with their demands. On 
the other hand, as interviews with police officers showed, very few of the 
officers explicitly recognized this, instead they talked about the broad impact of 
organised crime and how it affected all sections of society. Interestingly, even 
those who were most unlikely prey for organised criminals, appeared to approve 
of encounters.
7.6.3 Rule of Law
An opinion expressed in many of the interviews was that Indian society did not 
respect the rule of law and it was generally expected that rules would/should 
apply differentially to people depending upon their status and wealth. As one 
interviewee said:
“They [police] have been very, very ineffective in [upholding the rule 
of law]. Why do we blame the police -  the society itself has no 
respect for the rule of law in general. So why do we expect 
policemen to - I mean, they have not descended from heaven in 
helicopters - they are the products of this very society. If journalists 
can park their cars wherever they want and get away with it because 
there is a ‘press’ sticker on the car, if bureaucrats and politicians feel 
that with my ‘red light’ on the car, I can park in the no-parking zone 
or go in the opposite direction on a one-way street, then you can’t 
isolate the police alone, because that reflects the mentality and the 
mindset of the society as such”. (I 2, Activist)
91 A businessman who was allegedly the victim of organised gangsters.
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There was overall agreement that Indian society was not egalitarian and everyone
expected rules to be applied uniformly to others, but not to themselves. One
interviewee said, for example,
“See people in this country are trained over centuries to take a great 
deal of nonsense without protest...We Indians have always felt 
insecure, we don’t want to rub anyone on the wrong side. The instinct 
for self-preservation prevents us from protesting. We have lacked a 
public spirit, or even social ethics, because if we were strong in social 
ethics, this caste system would not have been perpetuated or women 
pushed into backwardness...It speaks of a total lack of social ethics”
(14, Director, Cultural Centre)
In essence, the interviewee was claiming that over generations, society had 
accepted and propagated an unequal social structure, and the desire to live non- 
confrontationally had over the years leached away the ‘public spirit’ to defend 
social ethical principles and practices. This was a sweeping generalisation about 
the nature of Indian society, but not necessarily invalid because of it.
7.6.4 Human Rights: The Right to Life
As far as the Mumbai police’s record in upholding human rights was concerned,
while on the one hand some felt that compared to other forces in the country it
had a good reputation, on the other the majority opinion could be summarized in
the words of one interviewee:
“Very, very poor. In fact not only my perception as a human rights 
activist, but generally the perception of citizens is the same.. .There is 
a large chunk of our citizenry who believe that human rights are of 
no consequence -  ‘maaro saale ko’ [beat the rascal]. They approve of 
that - not upholding human rights, they condone it, they say it is good 
thing...They know that human rights are violated left, right and 
centre, critics like us also know that they are violated left, right and 
centre but our responses are different. People like us criticize it, 
others, like our opponents or our critics say, ‘well, so what?’ ” (I 2, 
Activist)
Three interviewees, who felt the police were effective in protecting human rights, 
were also those who had defined encounters in naive terms and who refused to 
admit to any wrong doings on the part of the police. Other interviewees covered 
the whole spectrum of opinions, beginning with - the police having an overall 
image of brutality and insensitivity; to a more moderate view in which the police 
only violated human rights of the poor and /or powerless; and extending to the
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other extreme where one interviewee argued that the police were bound to 
protect only the human rights of the criminals, whereas rights of the victims were 
neglected by the system. This also became one of the justifications advocated on 
behalf of one section of society, those who thought that the police, by doing 
encounters were recompensing victims of organised crimes.
This brings us to the next question: what in the perception of the interviewees
was society’s attitude towards equality and the right to life for all? One of the
difficulties of analysing the interview material of the ‘claimsmakers’ was the fact
that often they switched between articulating their personal opinion and what
they thought was the general opinion or the opinion of the common man, so it
was difficult to draw boundaries between whether they thought that Indian
society did not recognize the right to life or whether they believed it was the
generally held opinion. This dilemma was exemplified in the answers to the
question, “Do you think that as a society we believe that not everyone has an
equal Right to Life”? One interviewee replied, “ In India we don’t have things
like right to life at all. We simply just don’t recognize the right to life. I mean the
apathy is unbelievable” (I 6, Journalist), while another said,
“Have you read Orwell’s book ‘Animal Farm’? We do not believe in 
equality. We believe in equality on the basis of caste, creed and 
money. We feel that some people in this country are second class 
human beings therefore they can’t claim equal human rights - rather 
they should not claim any human rights - rather they should be used 
for protecting our human rights at the cost of their human rights” (I 
11, Retired Judge)
This Orwellian concept that all human beings are equal but some are more equal 
than others is not a phenomenon restricted to Indian society, as one interviewee 
said, “You see it everywhere, all over the world. Iraq is destroyed and thousands 
of Iraqis are eliminated and it is called collateral damage. And yet the few who 
died in the 9/11 incident, and American soldiers who die are more important ” (I 
3, Retired Judge). However, it was recognized by many of the interviewees that 
Indian society was unequal in essence, with its caste system and the hierarchical 
way in which society has always been organised, where all human beings were 
never considered equal. Hence, despite its allegiance to democratic principles 
and being a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights there was
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little acceptance on ground level that all people deserve an equal right to life. On 
the contrary, there was a widespread belief that criminals were fair game for the 
police, as they could otherwise not be processed satisfactorily through the 
criminal justice system.
In trying to understand the wider socio-cultural background that allowed the 
largely unquestioned existence of encounters, one could justifiably ask whether 
there were any accountability mechanisms in place to control police abuses and 
misconduct at all? Almost all the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed believed that the 
lack of rigorous accountability mechanisms and a lax attitude towards police 
accountability within the criminal justice system (including the police 
organisation) and more widely, was responsible for excessive use of deadly 
force. In order to explore ‘claimsmakers” perceptions of the accountability 
mechanisms I briefly describe the accountability mechanisms in Mumbai.
7.7 Accountability Mechanisms
In most democratic countries a three level policing accountability structure 
consisting of internal, governmental, and social levels of control, and in some 
cases a fourth category of ‘independent’ oversight by complaints agencies, 
ombudsmen or human rights agencies exists. Such a structure could be said to 
have global resonance across cultural and linguistic divides. A three or four level 
accountability structure would ensure that while the police may still be 
vulnerable to scandals, they would, at least, demonstrate political commitment to 
accountability that is structural and not imposed from above (Stone 2007).
The current accountability structure with respect to police encounters in Mumbai 
has four levels: there is an official internal mechanism of accountability in the 
form of departmental and governmental enquiries into encounters; legal 
mechanism of accountability resting in the courts and the criminal justice system; 
social accountability in the form of a ‘free and independent’ media; and 
independent accountability mechanisms in the form of National and State Human 
rights commissions and NGOs. In this section I do not examine and analyse the 
actual functioning and effectiveness of these mechanisms, but focus on 
perceptions of ‘claimsmakers’ (against the background of police officers’
256
perceptions on most of these issues in Chapters 4 and 5) regarding the 
effectiveness and performance of these accountability mechanisms. Perception 
that there was a lack of rigour in official accountability mechanisms to check 
police abuse of deadly force might be responsible for the apathy and sense of 
helplessness that interviewees or citizens felt in challenging police shootings.
When I asked whether they thought that encounters were the only solution to the 
problem of organised crime, twelve of the eighteen ‘claimsmakers’ disagreed. 
Apart from two interviewees who felt that encounters had no future, the others 
thought that they would continue to be used by the police to control crime. This 
prognosis resulted out the recognition of the fact that there were hardly any 
mechanisms functioning effectively to ensure police accountability. In fact one 
of the most dangerous developments was, as one interviewee said, “The police 
feel that we are exempted from the laws, that we have no accountability to 
anybody, that we can violate the laws which we are otherwise supposed to 
uphold and enforce. That is precisely what has happened” (12, Activist)
7.7.1 Internal Accountability
‘Claimsmakers’ expressed the opinion that formal organisational structures set 
up to ensure accountability in the police use of deadly force were restricted to 
paper rather than being actually functional. While few interviewees had 
knowledge about internal departmental police procedures and rules, most 
(magisterial and departmental) inquiries that followed all encounter incidents 
were seen to be a sham, in that, they said that no officer had publicly ever been 
found guilty of malpractice or misuse of force. Interviews with police officers on 
the other hand revealed that departmental inquiries initiated against errant 
officers generated tremendous anxiety and stress for the officers concerned, but 
officers also acknowledged that these generally resulted in little more than a 
symbolic ‘slap on the wrist’.
7.7.2 Legal Mechanisms of Accountability
There were two kinds of views expressed about the criminal justice system by 
the ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed. One strand referred to the inadequacies of the 
courts and the criminal justice system to convict criminals swiftly and surely to
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aid police efforts to combat organised crime; and the other referred to the 
perceived inadequacies of the courts, as an accountability mechanism, when 
dealing with cases relating to police malpractices in encounters.
As an integral and important part of the criminal justice procedure to control and 
prevent crime, the courts were seen to have failed dismally by almost all the 
interviewees. Echoing the sentiments of police officers, ‘claimsmakers’ also 
lamented the undue delays, corruption, inefficiency, and uncertainty in the way 
the courts dispensed justice. That the whole system was geared to be of 
advantage to the criminal was the general opinion expressed which was also
Q9reflected in the wider discourse on rights of the accused .
However one judge’s explanation for this state of affairs was: however effective 
the courts wanted to be in demanding police accountability; they were limited by 
the evidence that was presented before them. Since investigation of encounter 
cases was led by the police themselves, the courts did not have any say in the 
quality of evidence that was gathered. This limited their ability to ensure real 
accountability.
7.7.3 Social Accountability Mechanisms
Considering the news media as a form of social control over police (Stone 2007, 
Ericson 1989), ‘claimsmakers’ found them to be sadly lacking in either desire or 
‘teeth’ to demand police accountability. Journalists, as a part of civil society, 
were scarcely seen by ‘claimsmakers’ or police officers as mechanisms of social 
accountability, though there was an emerging breed of ‘socially aware’ media 
persons who periodically raised the issue, even though there was little public 
support in the past. As we have seen, the media’s intellectual integrity and 
honesty were not held in high esteem by interviewees.
7.7.4 Independent Mechanisms of Accountability
For a country estimated to have over 1 million NGOs, there has been increasing 
apprehension about their reputation and effectiveness (Sooryamoorthy & 
Gangrade 2001). It was generally held by almost all ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed
92 For e.g. see news analysis reports such as in The Pioneer (2002).
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that NGOs in India had a history and reputation of limited success in general, and
particularly in the context of encounters. Even activists associated with opposing
or questioning police actions in encounters admitted that their influence was
limited, primarily because NGOs were not seen as having sufficient legitimacy in
the eyes of the public. NGOs were either perceived to be ‘fly-by-night’ operators,
or furthering the agenda set by their foreign sponsors. Also NGOs themselves
had failed to provide the stimulus for awakening social conscience because they
were perceived by some as having vested interests in protecting the rights of
‘criminals’ and ‘mafia’ dons; and by others as being not committed enough to
appreciate the circumstances and police compulsions that legitimize encounters.
One activist said that NGOs and commissions had only what he termed as a
“ginger effect” (meaning just spicing things up marginally),
“Partly because, you know, the government and the police have 
become so insensitive to these things. Secondly, [the police say] ‘you 
[the public] could keep on shouting and screaming, after all I [the 
police officer] am not accountable to you, nor am I accountable to 
anybody. So what? You keep on barking, I don’t care’. They [the 
police] have this sort of nonchalant attitude, ‘it doesn’t affect me’. 
Thirdly, the social respectability and now the social glamour attached 
to such deeds neutralises all this shouting and screaming that we all 
do. They say for every activist and one NGO that is condemning 
encounters, there are 10 Rotary clubs willing to invite the encounter 
specialist to give talks on how to fight crime and there are three Mid 
Day’s and Bombay Times to take his exclusive interviews. So 
obviously he says, ‘what do I care for you?’. The NGOs are not 
having any public support”. (I 2, Activist)
Reference made by the interviewee to the ‘glorification’ and ‘glamourisation’ of 
encounter ‘specialists’ led him to believe that it resulted in the demonization of 
NGOs and activists who demanded accountability for the actions of these 
‘heroes’.
Others felt that, “If these NGOs thought that they could get mileage out of any 
case they would take it up. It has to be politically motivated”. (I 5, Journalist). 
Still others were suspicious of what they called the “foreign funding” that backed 
some NGOs, believing the latter to be a “money laundering kind of set up” and 
not “really committed or passionate about what they are doing” (I 10, 
Representative Industrial Association). In fact it appears that the term NGO itself
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has acquired a pejorative connotation in India, and working in the voluntary 
sector is considered the route to comfortable living, money and a secure job, so 
much so that leaders of these organisations live in palatial houses and enjoy a jet- 
setting lifestyle (Sooryamoorthy & Gangarde 2001- citing Roy 1994, Aiyar 
1998). The secrecy, lacks of transparency, misuse, and other corruption scandals 
surrounding funding have been well-documented (Das 1998, Prasannan 1996, 
Shourie 1995) lending support to the views expressed in the interviews.
A few of the interviewees agreed with the sentiments expressed by this person,
“These Human Rights Commissions and all - yes, we have to fight 
for our rights, we are all human - but the police are also human, and 
victims are also human. But only the rights of the accused are 
protected, why? ... What happens to a woman and her children after 
her husband is killed [by criminals]? If they open their mouth they 
will be harassed. What have we done to maintain these people who 
are bereaved? Nobody is taking up that issue. NGOs are not doing it.
But one small error and they attack the police.” (I 9, Lawyer)
This sounded remarkably like a justification for encounters - one that involved
condemning the condemner. By belittling the efforts of the commissions and
NGOs working to protect the rights of encounter ‘victims’, this interviewee
sought to justify police actions by saying that they were not only retributive
justice, but also aimed at protecting the family of the victims of organised crime
from being harassed or intimidated by the gangs preventing them from aiding the
prosecution of gang members. Another interviewee went to the extent of saying:
“After two or three incidents [of encounters] have gone up to the 
courts, the position of the police gets upset. When some commission, 
either Minority Commission or Human Rights Commission they 
question the police in front of the public, that is the main source of all 
trouble to the police. Then the fear of the police is finished for the 
criminal.” (I 8, Politician)
It was clear that this politician considered commissions and courts to be more a 
nuisance hindering effective police actions than actual functional accountability 
mechanisms. He felt that the democratic process of calling police actions to 
account in a public forum would in some way emasculate and humiliate the 
police, so that the ‘fear’ of the police would be lost.
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7.8 Bystander Denial at W ork
Situating these internal bystander accounts - ‘claimsmakers’ being internal to 
the society where the alleged atrocities are taking place - within the framework 
of denial shows how similar processes were at work here providing the support 
network for the police to use deadly force with impunity and without 
accountability. The term ‘bystander’ according to Cohen (2001: 140) has 
pejorative connotations of passivity and indifference as opposed to similar terms 
such as onlookers, audience, spectators, or observers. However, the question that 
merits more detailed research in the future is whether bystanders in Mumbai 
were merely passive and/or indifferent, or whether they were, (as some of the 
interview and anecdotal evidence showed), actively engaged in approving and 
encouraging police encounters. And if they were, what made ordinary, decent 
individuals (not just the elite ‘clamismakers’) approve of extralegal executions 
by the police?
Police encounters in Mumbai were not secret or unspoken operations like the 
‘disappearances’ in Argentina (Hinton 2006) and there was little mobilisation of 
public opinion against them for many years. Sporadic incidents have and 
continue to give rise to demands for inquiries or greater police accountability , 
in the media and other pressure groups. However, these disappear from the 
public domain rather rapidly. Whether the public did not know enough about 
encounters, or just lost interest in pursuing these cases, or whether there was a 
conspiracy to keep such items out of the public eye is debatable. However, the 
fact remained that there were no significant public protests, as compared to for 
example, the intense media, public, and official scrutiny that followed the Jean 
Charles de Menezes shooting by officers of the London Metropolitan Police. Of 
course the context of policing in London is very different from that in Mumbai, 
as is the issue of routinely armed policing and the number of police shootings 
every year. Also, in a country beset by grinding poverty and other social 
problems, and in a city where the struggle to make a daily living occupied most 
people’s energies, encounters might be of low priority. But one interpretation of 
the lack of protests in Mumbai could be that it was a form of moral passivity,
93 See ‘Encounter victim’s family seeks probe’ in The Times o f India, 26 Feb 2006;
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which often takes the form of denial to sustain it. Whether this was a form of 
moral passivity of bystanders in Mumbai, that resulted either out of active 
support for actions of the perpetrators, or from fear and/ or a sense of being 
helpless to fight it, is open to debate. Cohen’s (2001) analysis of both the 
situational and cultural causes of what he calls internal bystander passivity is of 
relevance to understanding the public reaction to encounters in Mumbai.
Situational causes enumerated by Cohen (2001: 143) for why people in Mumbai 
might have remained mute spectators to the phenomenon of police encounters 
were found in the interview accounts of ‘claimsmakers’. They put forward 
explanations for their own and the ‘ general public’s’ inaction in allowing 
encounters to happen, which ranged from: misperception -  not understanding or 
misunderstanding what is happening; diffusion o f  responsibility -  someone else 
can help; fear -  of reprisals; denial -  blocking out the significance of the event; 
lack o f empathy, boundaries -  victims (alleged gangsters who are in this case 
‘victims’ of the police) do not share the same moral universe; psychic numbing -  
lack of reaction due to overexposure to fact; routinization and desensitization -  
each further occurrence is predictable with no impetus to help; no channel o f  
help -  not knowing how to make a difference; and finally ideological support -  
sharing the world view of perpetrators.
Since the interviewees in my sample were people with some power and 
influence, they did not express their inability to stand up to the system, or 
challenge police actions as clearly as ordinary, common people might have done. 
People in Mumbai were certainly not living in a totalitarian regime, subject to 
direct state coercion or total information control. However, there might have 
been a certain resistance to getting involved in matters dealing with the police 
and the long-winded procedures of the courts. Another reason why people (and 
many of my interviewees) did not publicly denounce police encounters might 
have been because some sections of the public were not actually aware that 
encounters were a problem, or it might have been easier to pretend not to know 
than to acknowledge the existence of ‘wrongdoings’ and feel the moral 
compulsion to do something about it. There were voices within my small sample 
that were critical of police encounters but they realised that without evidence to
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prove police malpractices, these could scarcely be controlled. Analysis of these 
interviews revealed how not only situational factors, but also the political culture, 
even in a democratic state, can prove to be fertile ground for such denials to 
flourish. It could be argued that while there was support for encounters from 
some sections of society, there was perhaps indifference on the part of the 
majority that allowed for a discourse of denial to exist.
7.9 Summary
It was the perception of ‘claimsmakers’ interviewed that encounters were 
deemed acceptable by the public not only for the most part as passive bystanders, 
but were also actively encouraged by some sections of society. The interviewees 
displayed considerable knowledge about what they thought actually happened in 
encounters, but at the same time accepted that there was no discernible public 
protest against what they considered was the blatant misuse of deadly force. 
They enumerated factors such as - media, political and police spin which 
magnified the fear of organised crime; secrecy surrounding operational details; 
public apathy in Mumbai; despair at cumbersome and long delayed criminal 
justice processes; frustration with an elaborate bureaucratic machinery which 
impedes more than it facilitates; a tolerant attitude bom out of fatalism; the non­
egalitarian nature of Indian society which does not recognize an equal Right to 
Life for all; and finally, inadequate accountability mechanisms, as being 
responsible for the phenomenon of encounters being sustained and encouraged.
In the next chapter, I place the conclusions from the preceding 4 chapters of 
individual perceptions of (‘their’ reasons) why such police use of force was not 
only tolerated but encouraged in Mumbai, within a broader perspective 
incorporating structural, cultural and situational factors (‘the’ reasons) to show 
that the situation in Mumbai was both unique and yet, in some ways, not 
dissimilar to how some Western democratic societies reacted to cases of police 
brutality up to the early 1950s and 60s. By drawing upon research done in other 
countries on police shootings, I construct the theoretical framework that explains 
how and why police violence can continue unchallenged in a democratic country.
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8 CHAPTER 8: EXPLAINING ENCOUNTERS: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS
8.1 Introduction
This study has explored and analysed police officers’ and ‘claimsmakers” 
perspectives on encounters. While police officers perceived a social consensus 
supporting police use of deadly force to eliminate ‘criminals’, this conviction 
was not reflected unequivocally in interviews with ‘claimsmakers’. This research 
suggests that there wasn’t unanimity or consensus between the two sets of 
interviewees about the desirability, legality, morality or efficacy of encounters. 
Police officers believed that most of the public and politicians supported 
encounters, despite the fact that doubts and counterclaims by the media, activists 
and political opposition have questioned their legality in some cases (see Chapter 
3 and Appendix 4). ‘Claimsmakers’ too believed that general societal approval 
existed, despite some of the people interviewed having serious personal qualms 
about encounters as a policing policy to combat crime. The faceless, amorphous 
mass that comprises the ‘public’ have never been asked their opinion about this 
or indeed any other policing issue in any systematic, large-scale survey.
The main aim of my research was to answer the question, how do police officers 
explain the use of deadly force to eliminate ‘criminals’, to themselves and to 
their various audiences. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I analysed the perception of 
police officers on this and related issues and suggest that officers used denial, in 
its broadest sense as suggested by Cohen (2001), incorporating classic techniques 
of neutralization, to assuage their own conscience. They gave what they thought 
were plausible explanations for their audience (consisting of the media, 
politicians, the courts and the public) to account for encounters. Use of classic 
denial techniques by police officers in Mumbai was not unique, as Huggins et al 
(2002) and Foster et al (2005) also found evidence of the use of similar 
justifications put forward by police and state forces (violence workers) to 
account for state crimes in their studies. Cohen (2001: 58) explains that denial 
theory aims to understand the accounts of ‘deviants’ - 'their' reasons for why
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encounters occurred or were ‘done’. These were discussed in Chapter 6. In this 
final chapter I discuss ‘the' reasons (underlying structural causes) as they were 
understood and explained by my interviewees for why circumstances in Mumbai 
appeared to be so conducive for encounters. In this way I use findings from my 
data to link them with the wider theoretical explanations for police violence 
discussed in Chapter 1 in order to develop hypotheses for future research on what 
the structural causes for encounters might be.
A thorough account of ‘the' reasons for why encounters happened in Mumbai 
would require an extensive analysis of Mumbai’s political economy, social 
structure, culture and its recent history in particular (to explain the fall in 
encounters since the period under study 1993-2003), and would be a new project 
in itself. As a starting point to the agenda for future research, in this final chapter 
I discuss :
• the factors alluded to by respondents (officers and ‘claimsmakers’) in the 
interviews to explain encounters within the theoretical framework on 
police use of force set out in Chapter 1.
• The implications of past research in other locations and countries pointing 
to the same factors affecting police decisions to invoke force.
• The aim of this would be to indicate that underlying causes put forward 
by my respondents were neither whimsical nor particularly unique to 
Mumbai.
I use studies on police violence in other countries either to draw parallels, or 
differences between conditions in which the police used deadly force in those 
countries and the particular circumstances existing in Mumbai. I explore the 
different theoretical explanations put forward by scholars studying police 
violence in other countries and their applicability to the situation in Mumbai. I 
conclude by drawing mainly upon Janet Chan’s theory based on Bourdieu’s 
concepts of field  and habitus, which I suggest provides acceptable categories for 
the explanation for encounters. I also briefly examine what can be done to 
control the police abuse of deadly force, and issues around police leadership. 
Drawing upon the experiences of other countries that have tried to control police 
use of deadly force, I make some policy recommendations for controlling police
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abuse of deadly force in Mumbai. Finally, I highlight areas that need further 
research.
8.2 Explanations for Police Use of Deadly Force
As I have already described, denials of encounters cannot be dismissed as being 
fiction or simply rhetorical devices intended to exonerate deviant conduct. In this 
section, I identify what my interviewees thought were the factors that caused 
police to resort to the use of deadly force as a crime control measure. I have 
discussed explanations for encounters grouped as structural, cultural, 
organisational, and individual or psychological factors in Chapter 1. Theoretical 
explanations for police violence differ depending upon the emphasis of the 
particular approach and individually provide partial explanations for encounters. 
A synthesis of the various theoretical approaches, I suggest, best provided by 
Chan’s framework, would account for police encounters and also indicate how 
police reforms and policy changes can control police abuse of deadly force in a 
democratic society.
It is important to acknowledge that police encounters have not been perceived as 
a major ‘problem’ in India, barring a few cases (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 4) 
because they have not been labelled officially as deviant acts. Unless there is 
widespread recognition of encounters as police deviance, they will continue to 
recur as unproblematic, indeed, valued behaviour. The phenomenon is a 
demonstration of the classic labelling theory that proposes, ‘Deviance is not a 
quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application 
by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’... deviant behaviour is behaviour 
people so label” (Becker 1963: 9). In Mumbai, since encounters were not 
considered deviant behaviour, officers engaging in them have not been labelled 
deviant (see Chapter 1).
However, I argue that encounters should be seen as problematic and a 
manifestation of police deviance not only by universal standards but according to 
the legal, ethical and human rights standards that are notionally regarded as 
applicable for police actions in Mumbai. India aspires to achieve these 
international standards and in order to protect the police from litigation in the
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future, to maintain police legitimacy, authority and trust, and to protect citizens 
from arbitrary executions; encounters ought to be recognized as problematic. 
Police encounters need to be explained along two dimensions: what motivates 
officers to indulge in police killings (emphasizing active agency factors); and 
what allows such killings to continue unchallenged in a democratic society 
(emphasizing passive permissive factors). However, the boundaries between 
factors actively contributing towards the occurrence of encounters (motivations) 
and those that passively allow them to continue (condonation) are blurred. For 
example, bystander (public) silence or lack of condemnation may be taken as 
silent support or active encouragement, via ‘non-talk as (approval) talk’; or as 
apathy, as in ‘not bothered to protest’, thus allowing abuse to continue. Similarly 
the boundaries between ‘the' reasons for the existence of police encounters: 
structural, socio-cultural, organisational and individual: are also blurred, 
sometimes with no clear cut dividing lines between them. Thus, what may be 
perceived as a structural explanation (lack of accountability mechanisms) may 
also be a cultural or organisational explanation (lack of culture of accountability 
in the organisation) for encounters to occur.
8.2.1 Structural Reasons
Interviewees mentioned corruption, increasing class inequalities in Mumbai, and 
deepening divisions between communities in Mumbai as factors that increased 
social insecurity and fear of organised crime. Patel’s (2003: 345) analysis of the 
political economy of Mumbai suggests that the decline of Mumbai’s labour- 
intensive industries, the shifts to capital intensive industry and the uneven growth 
of economic activity as a result of the processes of globalization have furthered 
extreme social and spatial inequalities and have had “altogether negative 
implications for the poor and deprived in the city”. The Bombay textile mill 
strike (1982-4) where 75,000 workers lost their jobs, and the subsequent decline 
of organized industrial employment increased furthered economic inequalities 
(van Wersch 1992, 1995). Swaminathan’s (2003) study of poverty and living 
standards in Mumbai concluded that the city displayed wide disparities in terms 
of income, housing, employment, education, sanitation, water supply and 
nutrition. Others have also charted the complexities of globalisation, 
urbanisation, large scale migration, changing economic opportunities, and the
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growing divide between Hindus and Muslims that have contributed to the 
skewed nature of social, political and economic development in Mumbai (see for 
e.g. Nijman 2006, Varma 2004, Grant & Nijman 2003, Patel 2003, Desai 2003, 
Blom Hansen 2001). Corruption is endemic to all sectors in India, which is said 
to rank 73rd in the list of 102 countries according to the Corruptions Perception 
Index and the police are considered the ‘most corrupt’ sector in terms of public 
perception (Vittal 2003: 35, citing a survey done for Transparency International 
India 2002).
Similar conditions of structural inequalities were found to account for police 
violence in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Jamaica by Chevigny (1995). 
Chevigny (1995) found that although policing in the Latin American countries of 
Brazil and Argentina was different from that in Jamaica, and in the United States, 
there were several patterns of urban policing problems that were common. 
Problems arising out of immigration, colonialism, social dislocation and 
mobility, corruption, and a widespread fear of crime combined with 
disillusionment with the criminal justice system created an “explosive brew of 
state power and vigilantism” that allowed police to use extralegal methods to 
deal with crime (Chevigny 1995: 142-3). For similar reasons Harriott (2000) 
found that nearly 44% of the police force in Jamaica were in favour of retributive 
vigilantism in the form of summary execution of gun criminals. However, 
Chevigny attributes the difference between the levels of abuse of deadly force in 
the USA and its profligate use in Brazil, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent, 
Argentina, to social factors. All these countries experienced in common: strong 
class conflicts between the rich and the poor; impatience with the courts; a 
willingness to adopt extralegal methods to punish and deter combined with the 
government’s disinclination to stop this kind of vigilantism; and a weak sense of 
citizen participation. However, the “sense of frightening economic crisis, the 
constant threat of poverty with no apparent exit that haunts the third world,.. .the 
near-panic fear of crime, abetted by the mass media and political leaders” was 
more prevalent in the latter countries as compared to the USA in the nineties 
(Chevigny 1995: 129). Hinton (2006): 33) like Chevigny (1995) suggests that 
police abuse of force is much greater in developing countries because “social 
instability, violent crime and inequality are problems of a much larger magnitude
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than in advanced countries”. All these arguments apply equally to the situation in 
Mumbai (Shaban 2004).
8.2.2 Socio-Cultural Reasons
There were a variety of social and cultural explanations for police violence in 
Mumbai. Interviewees identified factors such as inadequate respect for the rule of 
law (preference for short-cut methods); the Hindu doctrine of karma and dharma 
and belief in cycle of death and rebirth (see for e.g. Malamoud 2003, Biardieau 
2003, Bouillier 2003); a culture of indifference and apathy; widespread 
corruption (Vittal 2003); and a culture of hero worship. These emerged as 
cultural factors contributing to the abuse of deadly force by the police, which in 
turn had an impact on social factors such as class and caste inequalities; inherited 
heritage of colonial policing; the impact of media-made moral panics; and rising 
public insecurity due to reported increase in organised crime activities that also 
encouraged police violence.
Hinton (2006) seeks explanations for the widespread existence of police 
violence in Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina in the socio­
political relations that emerged in the post colonial, military dictatorial regimes. 
Factors such as “uncivic attitudes towards public office, low levels of public 
accountability and destructive forms of political competition” were endemic in 
both states and this implied that the lack of horizontal and vertical accountability 
as well as corruption resulted in police reforms being thwarted (2006: 11).
Impact of colonial rule and consequences of the resulting policing style could be 
understood as structural factors affecting decisions to invoke force (see Chapter 
1), however, I think that the post-colonial police in India has inherited a certain 
mentality which has affected policing culture and attitudes (also see Verma 2005, 
Dhillon 2005), which is why I discuss it as a cultural factor affecting use of force 
decisions. Mars (2002) suggests that police violence in Guyana prior to 1966 was 
aimed at population control under a colonial state authority. However, even after 
independence, the local state authority chose not to redefine the role and function 
of the Guyana police. It continued to function as an instrument of public 
intimidation and was deployed to repress political opponents. Mars (2002)
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suggests that the enduring influence of colonial rule in Guyana has contributed to 
strengthening and legitimising police violence as part of active state repression 
and prevented the development of policing as a public service by allowing police 
forces to emerge as instruments to further political tyranny.
Arnold (1992) discusses a similar development in post Independence policing in 
India and suggests that once the Congress Party came into power at the Federal 
Centre “it sought to take over and strengthen the existing machinery of 
government, the better to consolidate its own position, reward its supporters and 
discomfort its adversaries” (1992: 52). He suggests that after Independence, the 
fledgling Congress government faced with a series of crises that threatened the 
unity and viability of the new nation state, such as - communal violence during 
and after Partition; communist insurrection in some regions; and unrest among 
industrial workers and peasants in many parts of the country. Governments at the 
Centre and the states indefinitely postponed any possibility of a radical overhaul 
of the police organisation they had inherited from the British. Governments 
preferred to take over the colonial police organisation (and its colonial mentality) 
largely intact and promoted Indian officers, habituated to colonial policing roles 
and attitudes, to vacant senior posts formerly held by the British. He concludes 
that there were no significant changes in police values and methods post 
Independence and that “the greatest value of the police to the new regime - as to 
its predecessor - was as an agency of coercion and intelligence” (1992: 58). 
Thus, police violence in Mumbai could be said to have its roots in its colonial 
past (Blom Hansen 2001: 151-2) characterized by: repression and coercion, 
belief in the value of periodic exhibitions of force, the interplay of police and 
military responsibilities, the equation of force with authority, the absence of 
public accountability, and the reliance upon supervisory and organisational 
systems of manipulation and control (Arnold 1986: 235).
Added to socio-cultural factors, religious influences in the form of Hindu belief 
in the cycle of death and rebirth might have led to a more permissive policy on 
police use of deadly force being acceptable to a large section of the population. 
However, this proposition is difficult to prove or evidence. Since Independence, 
India has expressed its commitment to protecting and upholding Human Rights
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as enshrined in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948). It could be argued that the ingrained inequality in the form of the caste 
system bred into Indian society for centuries combined with the doctrine of 
‘karma’ (one has to make reparations for one’s deeds of this life and of previous 
existences on this earth) subconsciously clashes with equal access to the right to 
life for all. Again, this might be a difficult proposition to test. I tentatively 
suggest that this is perhaps a clash resulting from a struggle between the 
universal conception of rights (predominantly a Western conception) versus 
cultural relativity of rights based on differences in socio-religious and cultural 
values. However, making any definitive statement would require further 
investigation into the link between religion and the use of deadly force.
Crime coverage occupies an important position in the media, and since a 
majority of people have no direct experience of crime (especially organised 
crime), the media provide important source of information and influence public 
opinion. Besides, Callanan (2005) suggests the crime situation is often distorted 
when portrayed by the media, which tends to promulgate simplistic ideological 
divides like good (the police) and evil (the alleged gangster), which gathers 
support for simplistic solutions like executing or incapacitating the criminal. 
During times of moral crisis there is increased legitimacy for both institutions of 
social control and the media. The latter, by “working in the best interests of the 
public by ‘discovering’ a potential threat, by alerting citizens to the issue, and by 
demanding government action” gains legitimacy, whereas “institutions of social 
control are legitimised as a necessary force to combat such menacing threats to 
public safety” (Callanan 2005: 68).
Extrapolating the results of studies on the effect of the media in other countries 
directly to the Mumbai is fraught with methodological and practical pitfalls. 
However given that I was unable to find references to studies on the media and 
crime coverage in Mumbai, it would be for further research to see whether 
factors identified by Callanan existed, and how they operated in a culture of 
corruption and where a rigorous commitment to the rule of law appeared not to 
exist (according to my interviewees).
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8.2.3 Organisational Reasons
Organisational reasons are of two types: external factors affecting the 
organisation’s operational functioning and internal factors affecting the 
bureaucracy of the police.
External factors affecting the organisation
Factors such as an overburdened criminal justice system; imbalance between the 
massive volume of crime and available police resources; lack of accountability 
structures; police subordination to the political executive; and the role and 
structure of the police, emerged from the interviews as reasons that led to police 
use of deadly force in encounters. The inability of the criminal justice system to 
cope with the demands of the crime situation is amply evidenced in the large 
number of cases pending final disposal in the courts throughout the country (see 
Chapter 3). Interviewees (police officers and ‘claimsmakers’) expressed 
widespread frustration resulting from the slow moving processes of the courts. 
Similar problems in other countries have sometimes led to police adopting other 
extral-legal methods to deal with crime (Chevigny 1995) but the inadequacies of 
the criminal justice system combined with other factors discussed might have 
created a situation in Mumbai which expressed itself in the unique form of 
encounters. Also possibly, the desire on the part of officers to adopt short-cut 
solutions and deliver instant justice might have gained the approval of a large 
section of society. There is however, little evidence to support this claim.
A majority of the officers interviewed had the perception that the volume of 
crime was very high as compared to the manpower and infrastructure provided to 
cope with it, and the extraordinary circumstances of a city gripped by organised 
crime demanded extraordinary measures to tackle it. It is questionable whether 
citizens actually shared this perception, due to the lack of public opinion surveys 
to establish the existence and depth of the ‘fear of crime’. However, interviewees 
felt that the media conveyed the impression from the mid-to late 1990s that 
organised crime was out of control and that drastic measures were needed to 
control it.
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Accountability structures in Mumbai (Chapter 7) though rudimentary, 
nonetheless existed. Whether they were functioning as they ought to was 
doubtful, given the lack of faith expressed in them by ‘claimsmakers’ and the 
dismissive attitude towards them expressed in the interviews with officers. 
Besides, there exists no external or civilian oversight to the police complaints 
process. Though, the National Crime Records Bureau maintains records of all 
complaints against police personnel, as the following table shows, complaints 
have seldom resulted in conviction for officers.
Table 8.1: Complaints against Mumbai Police Personnel and their Disposal
Year Number o f 
Complaints 
received 
during the 
year
Departmental
Action
Judicial
Action
Found
False
Number
of
personnel 
sent up 
fo r  trial
Number
of
personnel 
in whose 
cases trial 
was
completed
Number
o f
personnel
convicted
Number
of
personnel
acquitted
1995 146 59 87 0 87 1 0 1
1996 100 47 53 0 53 8 0 8
1997 73 27 46 0 46 17 2 15
1998 52 20 32 0 32 7 0 7
1999 59 22 37 0 37 7 0 7
2000 44 18 26 0 26 8 0 8
200194
Source: Crime in India 1995-2001
Judicial inquiries and the courts are a formidable forum demanding 
accountability for police actions, but these are few and far between and as part of 
the accountability mechanism are often capricious and politically expedient. Also 
since investigations into police misconduct are invariably conducted by the 
police agencies themselves and because courts and commissions can only 
adjudicate on a case based on the facts and evidence placed before it, there is 
scope for a great deal of manipulation (see Appendix 4). The lack of an
94 From 2001, complaints against specific city police forces stopped being published. However, 
Crime in India 2001 shows that for the state of Maharashtra only one case of fake encounter was 
registered. No officers were reported to either been chargesheeted or convicted, as perhaps the 
case was still under investigation.
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independent investigative agency makes it easier for officers to get away with 
abuse of force.
The police in Mumbai are not just formally accountable to the political executive 
(see Chapter 3), but even operational decisions defer to political compulsions. 
This implies that they carry out the wishes of the ruling executive but are not 
open to public scrutiny. It also means that politicians have a great deal of power 
in protecting officers by disallowing scrutiny by other Central Police agencies, 
by not commissioning a judicial inquiry into alleged misconduct, or by not 
sanctioning permission to prosecute officers under section 197 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (though this last power is rarely invoked). As a result, police 
officers remain confident that if they ‘act in good faith’ and follow the tacit 
policies of the political party in power, they will be protected. The close nexus 
between the police and politicians and how it affects accountability was recently 
demonstrated when the Home Department in Maharashtra, acting on a 
recommendation of the Maharashtra State Human Rights Commission, had 
declared that inquiries into encounters would mandatorily be conducted by the 
State Criminal Investigation Department (CID). However, senior police officers 
appealed to the Minister in charge to reconsider this decision because of the 
“humiliation and embarrassment” that officers had to face in a number of cases, 
where the CID hastily arrested senior officers on registration of an offence but 
had to discharge them later (Marpakwar 2007). The government is said to have 
accepted the suggestion of senior police officers and reportedly plans to issue 
fresh guidelines that in certain disputed cases special inquiries into encounters 
will be conducted by senior police officers rather than the CID95. However, 
political patronage for police use of force is fickle and could give way to public 
pressure should the occasion arise.
The way in which officers interpreted and constructed their police role and their 
perception of society’s expectations from them clearly indicated that crime 
control was considered to be primarily the responsibility of the police as people’s 
expectations from the criminal justice system as a whole were very low. This
95 The Times o f India : (2007), ‘Encounter deaths: Now cops to probe’, July 17th 2007
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created a sort of structural imbalance and placed undue pressure on the police as 
sole agents to control crime, who were then forced to resort to extra legal or 
‘innovative’ methods. I suggest that Merton’s anomie theory (1938) when 
applied to the circumstances in Mumbai, could contribute to explaining 
encounters thus: crime control is a culturally approved goal for the police, but the 
means for achieving this goal are limited (in terms of inadequate infrastructure, 
manpower, criminal intelligence and a tardy criminal justice system). As a result, 
the police seek innovative measures (encounters) to achieve a culturally 
approved goal (crime control). At a very superficial level, this theory perfectly 
explains why police officers are motivated to use illegal means to do what they 
clearly see as ‘doing their job’. Various ‘justifications’ put forward by the 
officers would be their explanation for their desire to adopt deviant means to 
achieve their approved goal. Merton isn’t offering an account of the experience 
of deviance, but of its structural/cultural sources. He is concerned also with the 
issue of how cultures, subcultures, individuals assess the importance of achieving 
goals only via legitimate means. The relevance in this case seems to me that the 
Mumbai police interviews suggest not only a particular salience of crime control 
as a goal but less concern with the legitimacy of means, in their eyes and also in 
those of the ‘claimsmakers’ and perhaps wider society. But the theory cannot 
explain why only a few officers feel the need to adopt deviant means, or that a 
few officers might specialize in encounters for reasons other than fulfilling the 
goal of crime control.
Internal bureaucratic reasons
The reasons why the police organisation might implicitly condone encounters 
included: public expectations that the police solve the crime problem;
inadequate resources to professionally tackle the serious nature of organised 
crime; a lack of emphasis on proper internal accountability structures; a policing 
style driven by ego / personality based cult; a preference for easy, short-cut 
methods to deal with complex problems. The Mumbai police organisation may 
not be unique in these respects. However, given the reasons why Mumbai police 
officers might be working within an organisational culture which upheld the use 
of deadly force as desirable for dealing with gangsters, the classic ‘obedience to 
authority’ thesis (Milgram 1974, Kelman & Hamilton 1989, Zimbardo et al
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1973) could be advanced to explain encounters. This approach emphasizes the 
link between authority and violence, strengthened further by the processes of 
routinization and dehumanization that ‘weaken the usual moral inhibitions 
against violence’ (Kelman & Hamilton 1989: 15). I certainly found evidence 
(See Chapter 6) that similar processes worked in Mumbai to make the use of 
deadly force acceptable. By tacitly authorizing violence, senior police officers 
made it possible for subordinate officers to routinely (ab)use deadly force against 
‘criminals’ and ‘villains’ who were deemed worthy of execution.
My own experience of policing and the interviews with officers led me to 
conclude that a ‘personalistic’ style of policing prevailed in Mumbai, which 
meant personal preferences and styles of individual police leaders influenced 
organisational attitudes towards encounters. Officers mentioned that some police 
Commissioners encouraged encounters, leading to higher numbers of police 
killings, while others did not approve of them. This may be an important factor 
why since 2003 Mumbai has witnessed fewer numbers of encounters every 
year96. The impact of police leadership on controlling police killings is discussed 
later in this chapter.
However, these theories provide only a partial explanation for police violence, 
primarily because they consider individuals indulging in ‘evil’ acts doing so as 
puppets of their ‘circumstances’ and do not stress the ‘agency’ or volition of 
individuals (Foster et al 2005). A contrasting approach is adopted by Goldhagen 
(1995) who suggests with respect to the Holocaust that perpetrators may be
07willing, self-initiated and active agents rather than victims of circumstances . 
There does appear to be some credence to the concept of volition as one 
explanation for why some officers are more prone to use deadly force as against 
others who would prefer not to do so. The contrast of situational determinism 
versus free choice is unnecessarily stark and surely there is an interdependence of 
structure and action (choice). Thus, not all police decisions to use force can 
simplistically be explained by the ‘obedience to authority’ argument, but under
96 See The Times o f India (2004), ‘Encounter killings down to a trickle’, December 9th 2004.
97 Goldhagen (1995) also looks at aspects of German history that might have contributed to 
participation in the Holocaust.
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similar circumstances, some officers choose to, while others refrain from, the use 
of deadly force. The reasons why this might be so are discussed in the next 
section.
8.2.4 Individual -  Psychological Reasons
In this section I look at various theoretical approaches to explain why some 
officers were ‘encounter specialists’ and why they chose to employ violence. The 
discourse around encounters was such that only a few officers were portrayed as 
being responsible for a majority of encounter deaths. ‘Encounter specialists’ in 
Mumbai did not appear to be publicity shy and were quite open about their 
excessive involvement in encounters and the media gave them celebrity status. 
This provided the motivation for a few officers to repeatedly use force. It also 
provided the opportunity for some senior officers and politicians to blame a few 
individuals in case things went wrong and there were inquiries into police 
actions. Thus, ‘heroes’ would become ‘rotten apples’ in the official and/or media 
discourse as responsible for abuse of force when convenient or necessary.
However, the ‘banality of evil’ thesis refutes the need for an individualistic 
theory of some special pathology to explain violence, instead it emphasizes the 
ordinariness of those involved in ‘evil’ practices (Huggins et al 2002, Conroy 
2000) and argues, “ordinary people are transformed by particular practices in 
their routine work environments into killers and murderers -  they are not 
dispositionally predisposed towards violence” (Foster et al 2005: 56). In 
Mumbai, police officers and even ‘encounter specialists’ were ordinarily 
recruited from among the general population and were not characterized by any 
particular preference for power or displayed any special inclination for violence 
before induction. However, there exists a possibility that people with a certain 
authoritarian personality type were attracted to police work. Alternatively, it 
could be the case that the organisational and social context within which police 
officers in Mumbai operated allowed ordinary individuals, who were so inclined 
to do so, to indulge in or support illegal killings. However, I cannot claim to say 
this definitively since an analysis of officers’ background, life experiences or 
personality has not been studied in the Indian context, nor was it the focus of my 
research. It is however, a definite direction for future research on the police.
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Foster et al (2005) prefer to adopt what they call a ‘relational’ model to explain 
police and military violence in apartheid South Africa. In their approach, the 
emphasis on structural factors is counterbalanced by the concepts o f ‘entitlement’ 
and ‘interplay of multiple subjective identities’. Thus the ‘relational’ approach 
suggests that a sense of entitlement [which “permits actors to do otherwise 
indefensible acts with a sense of righteousness” (2005: 328)] combined with the 
complex interplay of various identities that officers have [nationalism, racism, 
anti-communism, Afrikaner identity, masculinity and militarism (2005: 290-91)] 
act in ways that justifies the use of deadly force to the perpetrators in the South 
African context. Further research could explore how officers’ perception of their 
own role; social expectations from the police; and their professional, personal 
and religious subjective identities provide the ‘entitlement’ to use deadly force in 
Mumbai.
Huggins et al (2002) seek explanations for use of torture and abuse in types of 
‘masculinity’ in their study of Brazilian ‘violence workers’(state officials 
involved in killings and torture). During the fieldwork, I did not intend to focus 
on or study the personalities of the officers interviewed, but though “issues of 
masculinity do not readily leap off the pages of these accounts” as Foster et al 
(2005: 286) remark about their work with officers in South Africa, there is a 
subtle sub-text and I could not help remarking the presence of all three 
masculinity types (Huggins et al 2002, see chapter 1) in my sample. Active 
participants with ‘personalistic’ masculinity talked in terms of caring for and 
providing relief for the ‘victims of organised gangsters’, of ‘doing good’ by 
cleaning ‘scum off the streets’ and did not like to think of themselves as 
murderers but as the friend/ protector (elder brother) of people. Officers (active 
participants and facilitators) who stressed achieving organisational targets and 
who compartmentalized work and self into separate categories, ‘institutional 
functionaries’ who thought of encounters purely as a means to control crime 
(thus rationalizing the achievement of good ends even at the cost of approving 
bad means) displayed a ‘bureaucratic’ personality. Also officer accounts about 
their colleagues who were neither committed to society nor to the organisation 
but acted completely in ways that promoted their self-interest (hints of corruption
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in police killings and officers suspected of being ‘hired’ hands to eliminate rival 
gang members) fell into the category of those who possessed a ‘blended’ 
personality. Huggins et al (2002: 232-69) put forward their conception of 
violence workers as ordinary men doing evil deeds and where the ‘interplay and 
interdependence’ of historical and political factors, sociological and 
organisational influences and social-psychological processes create the right 
circumstances for the resulting violence.
8.3 The Synthesis
A more rounded explanation for police violence would necessarily be complex 
and multidimensional. It ought to involve explanations at the individual, 
organisational, situational, political and social levels and the various theoretical 
approaches described above combine some or all of these factors to account for 
police violence. One of the many useful approaches to ‘understanding what the 
problem is’ and to answering ‘what can be done about it’, is Janet Chan’s 
exposition of the field  and habitus approach based on Bourdieu’s original 
concept. Developing the thoughts of previous policing scholars (for e.g. 
Skolnick’s 1961 work on police deviance) Chan (1996, 1997) suggests that the 
field  of police work consists of the historical relations between certain social 
groups and the police, anchored in the legal powers and discretion police are 
authorized to exercise and the distribution of power and material resources 
within the community. Habitus, on the other hand, is closer to what has earlier 
been described as cultural knowledge. It is a system of 'dispositions', which 
integrate past experience and enable individuals to cope with a diversity of 
unforeseen situations; dispositions can be either coherent and systematic, or 'ad 
hoc’ when triggered by particular ‘encounters’ in the field (Wacquant 1992: 18- 
19, cited in Chan 1996: 115). Habitus allows for creation and innovation within 
the field  of police work (1996: 115), while at the same time being limited by the 
field. Thus, Bourdieu's (1996: 115) theory recognizes the interpretive and active 
role played by police officers in relating policing skills to the social and political 
context of policing. It also allows for the existence of multiple cultures since 
officers in different organisational positions operate under different sets of field  
and habitus. Applying Chan’s framework to explain police use of deadly force in 
Mumbai suggests the following interpretation: use of violent, short-cut methods
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are ‘dispositions’ (habitus) affecting police behaviour that emerged in response 
to the particular socio-cultural and historical conditions created by burgeoning 
organised crime in Mumbai (field). The perspective stresses the impact social, 
cultural and historical factors have on the police organisation and individual 
officers which lead to the abuse of deadly force becoming an acceptable crime 
control measure.
Following Chan’s theory we can see police violence as the result of the 
interaction between society’s demand that the police control crime (social, 
structural and cultural factors), the interests of the police organisation to be seen 
as being effective (organisational, cultural factors), and inclinations of certain 
officers to employ deadly force more readily than others (individual, 
psychological factors), that result in encounters. Chan uses old arguments 
explaining police deviance with new terminology to combine structural, cultural, 
organisational and individual factors to account for police violence.
Change strategies according to Chan (1996) involve organisational restructuring, 
changes to recruitment and training, development of community-based 
programmes as well as broader socio-legal changes. The debate is not whether 
rule-tightening or changing culture is more important (both clearly are) and while 
tightening the law might be easier to achieve than changing police culture, the 
results of both could be unpredictable (Chan 1996: 131).
The concept of field  extends beyond the formal rules and laws governing 
policing and includes socio-cultural conditions in which policing is conducted. 
Policing a society that upholds a punitive culture, encouraging retributive use of 
deadly force against ‘criminals’, and does not emphasise police accountability 
for such actions, is conducive to cultivating a disposition to readily employ 
deadly force as a solution to the crime problem. Thus the question of reforms, of 
what can be done about police violence, begs a multi-pronged approach. In 
Mumbai, in order to change the habitus (encounters can be envisaged as a form 
of behaviour that is informed by a particular habitus) dispositions to use violence 
and illegal short-cut methods) conditions in the field  (socio-cultural and legal 
factors) also ought to be changed. This would involve large-scale social
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transformation, which includes police reforms, legal reforms, as well as an 
attitudinal change in the way society perceives and reacts to encounters. Chan 
gives an agenda for change but there is need for further research to see what it all 
means in the Mumbai context.
8.4 Police Reforms
Solutions to tackle the problem of police violence and the extent to which they 
will be successfully adopted will depend upon the kind of policing system 
involved. Reiss's (1995) analysis of comparative policing systems distinguishes 
between policing centralized under a single state authority (for e.g. France) and a 
largely decentralized policing system (for e.g. the USA). Since centralized 
systems are highly bureaucratic and highly resistant to changes in structure and 
authority, innovation and change can be initiated and proceed only from the top 
downward and discretionary decisions of lower officers is not permitted. 
However, some amount of discretion is inevitable as resources never permit full 
enforcement; controls are always patchy in practice and because of the nature of 
the low visibility of street level policing. But when centralized systems are 
corrupted, though rarely, the entire system is corrupted by central government 
corruption. On the other hand though decentralized systems are largely 
autonomous, they are vulnerable to electoral politics and thus prone to 
allegations of favouritism and corruption of authority. Such systems also have 
the advantage of being more innovative and are free to adopt and adapt changes 
and respond to outside influences, but this is strictly voluntary. Though 
corruption is endemic in decentralized forces, it is more localized and contained, 
and the top is rarely corrupted (Reiss 1995). The literature on controlling police 
use of deadly force has to be understood within this framework. The Indian 
police combine features of both centralized and decentralized systems (see 
Chapter 3), which means that they enjoy and suffer the advantages and 
disadvantages of both.
Most of the studies on police use of deadly force have been conducted with the 
intention of finding solutions to curb this phenomenon, making the studies 
largely prescriptive in nature. Solutions to the problem of police violence are 
offered at the individual, organisational and situational level depending upon the
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theoretical approach of a particular study. Thus studies advocating the ‘rotten 
apple’ or ‘fascist pig’ explanation for police violence advocate reforms at the 
level of the individual officer prescribing attitude and psychological tests to be 
included as part of the recruitment process to ensure only the most ‘suitable’ 
candidates are chosen for the job. Better training and sensitising programmes are 
also part of the solution to ensure that individual officers are given an 
opportunity to renew their commitment to the rule of law and human rights 
(Grant & Grant 1996). However Worden (1996) found “little consistency 
between officers’ attitudes and behaviours and little consistency in each officer’s 
behaviour from one incident to another” which ties in with Waddington’s 
(1999b) view that police canteen culture need not and does not in actual fact, 
affect behaviour. Thus solutions that sift out ‘unsuitable’ candidates at the 
recruitment stage (via psychological tests) and emphasise training and sensitising 
officers though useful, are not the whole solution to curbing excessive use of 
force.
Research that locates the source of violent behaviour of officers in the police 
subculture and organisational ethos, either put forward solutions that emphasise 
training and placing administrative controls to ensure no abuse of force is 
tolerated, or suggest that real change can come about only when police culture 
can be changed to ensure that tolerating or encouraging deviant behaviour is 
prohibited (Fyfe 1986, Chan 1997, Reiner 2000a). Some studies concluded that 
introduction of administrative controls via new guidelines and procedures 
succeeded to a large extent by bringing down use of deadly force in New York, 
Kansas City and Atlanta (Fyfe 1979, Sherman 1983). Sherman’s (1983) research 
showed that the reduction in shooting was only in dubious cases, but shots fired 
in more serious, life-threatening circumstances (what might be termed as ‘non­
elective’ shootings in Fyfe’s terminology) obviously remained the same. There 
is, nevertheless, general agreement among policing scholars that cultural change 
possibilities are very limited without structural change. There is also recognition 
in the literature that traditional organisational reforms may not bring about such a 
change as the culture originates in the nature of police work itself and not 
particular forces or organisations (van Maanen 1974, Toch 1976).
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Klockars (1996: 16) mentions three obstacles that stand in the way of restricting 
excessive use of force by the organisation: the first is the ‘code’ (Muir 1977); the 
second is the ‘CYA’ (cover your ass) syndrome endemic in police organisations, 
which means officers will behave in ways that will not expose them to criticism; 
and the third is the widely held belief that a ‘good’ supervisor is one who will 
‘back up’ an officer in a tight situation or when he/she makes a mistake. But 
Klockars feels that these obstacles are difficult to remove because of the 
fundamentally punitive orientation of the quasi-military administrative structure 
of police departments, where violation of rules leads to punishment every time. 
Also the occupational culture is such that a supervisor will earn the loyalty and 
support of his colleagues and subordinates if he covers for them and protects 
them when they flout the rules. Klockars’ (1996) solution is simple, not every 
instance of use of excessive use of force need be punished, but the way forward 
in controlling its use is in identifying instances of use of force on every occasion.
Studies that focus on analysing the situational aspect of the violent police-citizen 
interaction advocate solutions whereby officers have better control on the nature 
of the encounter, are able to process information better and take adequate 
precautions to ensure that the outcome of a chance encounter is not violent 
(Scharf & Binder 1983, Fridell & Binder 1992). Fyfe (1986) suggests that in 
order to reduce unnecessary violence, the police role must be defined as one of a 
diagnostician and they must learn that role thoroughly as well as use the 
principles of tactical knowledge and concealment to reduce the likelihood of 
having to resort to deadly force, before they actually confront someone who may 
be armed and dangerous. Klinger (2005) applies Perrow’s Natural Accident 
Theory to explain violent outcomes to police-citizen interactions. Recognizing 
police-citizen interactions as social systems Perrow’s (1984) argument, that 
systems are more likely to have problems that lead to negative outcomes as their 
elements become more tightly coupled and interactively complex, can explain 
how officers can avoid using violence by concentrating on tactics of police work. 
By keeping things simple, involving as few people as possible, and not getting 
too close, cops can avoid unnecessary shootings (Klinger 2005). These micro- 
situational analyses seem directed at factors that make some officers 
unnecessarily prone to shoot {habitus) compared to others in fundamentally the
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same position (field) because of these informational and tactical deficiencies and 
are thus, complementary to the broader explanations for police violence.
A final category of studies that look at use of force decisions by police officers in
moral terms - as a moral dilemma between bad means and good ends - advocate
more ethical policing to ensure that officers choose the most appropriate
solutions to the ‘dirty Harry’ problem. Klockars’ (1996) makes the point that
there that the ‘dirty Harry’' dilemma is a genuine ethical problem, that cannot be
ultimately resolved. As a result, officers violating legal rules must accept that
they will be held to account, as with conscientious objectors, civil disobedience,
or say mercy killings by doctors. But if the authorities and public concur with the
moral and situational assessment of the police, the verdict will not be punitive.
Dellatre (2002: 197) feels that
“Once we go beyond the law for a noble purpose rather than a selfish 
one, we may feel that we have committed ourselves to illegal means, 
as further extremes become natural...This can be the beginning of 
substantial erosion. There is a fine line in these things, but once you 
step over it, you tend to justify subsequent acts by the former one”.
Thus refusing to step over this line would not be morally tainting, in Delattre’s 
opinion. But it can lead to tragic outcomes in specific cases, which is why it is a 
genuine dilemma. On the other hand, he feels that even officers who have 
employed illegal methods as a last ditch attempt - at great personal sacrifice, 
without regard to self-interest cannot be regarded as tainted, because the nature 
of police work sometimes demands such actions (Delattre 2002). It is only 
flattering and arrogant self-appraisals that justify actions as being entirely noble 
that are the cause of noble cause corruption. Kleinig (1996) feels that while going 
down the ‘slippery slope of corruption’ may be dangerous, it need not imply an 
inevitable descent to the bottom, as officers are capable of judging when to draw 
the line.
Tackling the problem of police abuse of deadly force has been attempted by 
developed countries like the USA, the UK, and Canada as well as developing 
democracies like Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. The difference in the 
approach has been at the various levels at which the problem is perceived and
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addressed. For example in the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, which have 
more established democratic traditions, accountability mechanisms exist but the 
emphasis is on fine-tuning them or making them more refined to suit the purpose. 
In developing countries in the Latin America or South Africa, the problems are 
more fundamental, of propagating a culture of democratic accountability to the 
rule of law and the people, of setting up proper accountability mechanisms in the 
first place, and also reforming management and supervision practices to ensure 
greater independence from political interference and ensure more 
professionalism in policing. Such reforms would require changes in the field  i.e. 
the social context and problems facing the police.
The studies discussed are useful in their applicability to the Indian police if the 
‘problem’ of encounters has to be tackled not just symptomatically but by 
addressing the root causes of illegal use of deadly force. We have seen that the 
causes of abuse of deadly force are embedded in the individual and 
organisational level, flowing from the socio-political and cultural environment in 
which policing is conducted. Recognizing that the discourse of denial at 
individual, organisational and societal levels masks a deep-rooted problem in the 
role and public expectations from the police in a democratic society is the first 
step in controlling encounters. While some of the justifications in police 
discourses may be anchored in fact, (for example, frustration arising out of an 
ineffective criminal justice system) this study seeks to show that the dominant 
discourse on encounters is fundamentally a form of denial that allows extra-legal 
use of police force to exist and be acceptable.
Changes have to be introduced within the police organisation and at the 
leadership level, as a first step towards addressing the problem of excessive use 
of deadly force. In order to do so, one must look a little deeper at the malaise that 
grips policing in general in the Indian context. The main problems with the 
Indian police have been identified by Verma (2005: 163) as: “the elitist nature of 
the police leadership, the politicization of the department, unaccountability to the 
people and outdated management practices have all combined to make corruption 
endemic and even acceptable within the organisation”. Verma goes on to suggest 
that change can be brought about by “major transformation of organisational
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structure, management practices, supervision procedures, decentralization of 
power, creation of local accountability system, even a change in role and 
functions of the police in society” (2005: 163-4). Issues that have been identified 
and sought to be addressed in the eight National Police Commission Reports 
submitted between 1978-81 and other committees such as the Padmanabhaiah 
Committee Report (2000) and the Soli Sorabjee Report on Police Reforms 
(2006). These reports have recommended specific reforms in diverse areas such 
as recruitment, training, promotions, tenure, transfers and postings of officers, 
increasing functional autonomy of officers, encouraging professionalism, 
enhancing credibility, addressing politicisation and criminalization of the police, 
introducing a new system for evaluation performance and new accountability 
structures. However, these recommendations have remained a paper exercise, 
with state governments being unwilling to implement wide-ranging changes that 
would shift the balance of power away from politicians and in favour of police 
officers (Verma 2005). A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) requesting 
implementations of police reforms filed by a few high-profile retired senior 
police officers in the Supreme Court has after 10 years resulted in a historic 
decision by the Court in September 2006 directing the Union of India to 
implement the recommendations of the National Police Commission in order to 
ensure that the police are accountable primarily to the law of the land and the 
people (Raghavan 2006). Despite judicial activism police reforms in India 
remain unaddressed even in 2007. However, hope remains, as compliance with 
the Court’s directives has to be ensured by the Union Government, sooner rather 
than later.
Many of the recommendations given by these committees address some of the 
basic problems that lead to poor policing practices in India. Unless some of the 
fundamental issues in reforming the police organisation and expectations from 
the police are addressed - for example, introducing an independent accountability 
structure - more refined recommendations that lead to fine-tuning accountability 
structures or introducing specific controls on individual use of force incidents 
would be premature. A review of various police accountability structures in 
places as wide ranging as Philadelphia, Abuja and Sao Paolo, all conclude that a 
strong system of police accountability with well-functioning structures at
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internal, governmental and societal levels is essential to control use of force and 
should be part of regular governance of police powers and not merely a result of 
a demand of the aggrieved (Stone 2007). Lessons that India can draw upon in its 
reform process.
It would appear that specifically controlling deadly use of force would be easier 
to achieve if some of the requisite police reforms already recommended are put 
in place. However, as the experience of introducing police reforms in Brazil and 
Argentina show, the failure to professionalize the police is closely linked to 
enduring political patterns of patronage, unholy alliances and impunity, where 
political self interest is paramount and successive governments are quick to 
introduce new policies without addressing deficiencies in the old ones (Hinton 
2005). Without political support and the will to introduce reforms and make them 
successful, change is unlikely to occur even in the Indian context as has been 
demonstrated by the past record of state governments since Independence.
The experience in South Africa shows, despite organisational and environmental 
imperatives to improve management and supervision of the South African Police 
Service, the requisite change from traditional styles to more participatory forms 
of management has not occurred due to its militaristic legacies, traditions of 
contestation and non-corporate cultural conventions (Marks & Fleming 2004). 
The colonial legacy of police violence, strict adherence to a traditional 
hierarchical command and control structure combined with subordination to 
political wishes has additionally weakened organisational and environmental 
imperatives to adopt changes that remain weak in the Indian context.
8.5 The Role of Police Leadership
It is clear that there is a definite relationship between the top police leadership 
and the emphasis placed on encounters as a method of dealing with organised 
crimes. There have been some Police Commissioners who openly declared their 
support for officers who were involved in ‘genuine’ encounters and it seemed to 
be the case that there was a special dispensation to certain officers to carry out 
these activities unimpeded. In their interviews, some officers admitted as much 
to me. It might have been the case that the nature and extent of organised crime
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group activities were such during the late 1990s that they demanded drastic 
measures to be taken by the police to reassure the public. On the other hand, it 
may just have been the nature of leadership, which encouraged the use of 
encounters in preference to processing these ‘criminals’ through the criminal 
justice system. However, since a change in the leadership in 2003 and subsequent 
corruption scandals that rocked the Mumbai police, there has been a curb on 
encounters whose numbers have reduced drastically (though they have not been 
completely eliminated). One explanation could be the fact that the new 
leadership has posted the so-called encounter ‘specialists’ out of the Crime
Q O
Branch to regular police stations . Another explanation given by the police for 
the fall in encounters has been that they had already eliminated a whole cadre of 
criminals, so much so that very few active members remained. Also the fear of 
encounters, officers were convinced, meant that there was a slowing down in 
new recruitment to the organised gangs. There is, however, no evidence to prove 
this. The fear and insecurity of crime that appeared rampant in the late 1990s also 
seems to have abated judging from the newspaper and media reports on the 
subject, being now replaced by the fear of terrorism and terrorist attacks that 
have besieged Mumbai in the past few years", culminating in the powerful serial 
blasts affecting 6 commuter trains and one railway platform on 11 July 2006 
killing over 200 persons and injuring more than 714 persons100. Thus, the nature 
of crime and security concerns has changed in Mumbai over the past decade.
Whatever the explanation for the fluctuations in the numbers of encounters over 
the period under study (1993-2003), a direct link between the priorities of the 
leadership of the police organisation and the use of encounters as a crime control 
measure cannot be ruled out. Though some commentators suggest that changes in 
legislation and rules are more effective in reducing officer discretion and 
increasing accountability (Foster 2003, citing her own forthcoming work, Marks 
1999, Brogden et al 1988, Grimshaw and Jefferson 1987), a change in leadership
98 See for example '‘The Times of India'. (2006), ‘Encounter cops among 120 shuffled’, June 29 
2006.
99 See for example The Times of India : (2003),‘Chronology of Mumbai blasts since December 
2002’, July 29th 2003
100 See for example: ‘Mumbai blasts death toll reaches 200’, posted online by the Press Trust of 
India, July 12th 2006.
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style can be instrumental in bringing about a change in police culture and 
practices more effectively, and without which additional legal restrictions or 
more stringent accountability mechanisms may not work as well. However, 
police organisations the world over have struggled to break with leadership styles 
based on ‘authoritarian, centralised control of mindless subordinates’ (Cowper 
2004: 113), and it is difficult for police leaders with little effective leadership or 
management training to find alternatives to “top-down decision making and total 
submission to ensure their authority and status” (Cowper 2004: 119) when 
confronted with crisis situations. Marks (2005) suggests in the context of 
transforming the South African police that ‘directive leadership’ based on 
‘participatory management’ which involves “close and careful supervision 
coupled with clear and understandable directives during operations” and “agreed 
upon performance indicators, formulated with rank-and-file participation” (2005: 
251) would prove beneficial in transforming organisations via leadership 
changes. Similarly Long (2003) suggests a change of leadership style from 
‘transactional’ (emphasis on satisfying more bureaucratic and legal requirements) 
to ‘transformational’, (emphasising inspirational motivation and participatory 
change on a reciprocal basis between subordinates and leaders). Exploring this 
link further is one area of future research.
8.6 Future Directions
This study used a qualitative approach to understand police officers’ perspectives 
on issues around use of deadly force. The real question: ‘what actually happens 
in an encounter’ however, remains unanswered. It does not seem likely that if the 
police are involved in ‘wrongdoings’, especially of the illegal kind, the 
phenomenon would be open to participant observation research in Mumbai. But 
it would be useful to understand a little more about the dynamics of the 
encounter situation that results in the use of deadly force, analyse trends and 
patterns in police shootings in order to be able to recommend specific reforms in 
this area as well as to study the impact of these reforms on police practice. 
Quantitative studies that used the available, more detailed police and official 
statistics on citizen-police encounters that police forces in the USA, the UK and 
other countries maintained, and which included information about race, gender, 
age and class of the people (officers and ‘victims’) involved, allowed
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criminologists to theorize about the impact of these factors on the nature of the 
interaction. It also helped predict future trends, as well as providing solutions for 
improving performance in identified problem areas of police violence. Future 
research on police use of deadly force in India could proceed along similar lines. 
It would lead to better understanding of the problem and solutions specifically 
targeted to the peculiar nature of police violence in the Indian context could be 
devised.
Further research on public attitudes towards crime and police use of deadly force 
would be useful in raising the profile of an issue that has significant impact on 
the right to life. It would also let police officers, leaders, policy makers and 
politicians put public opinion in proper perspective before they permit ‘deadly’ 
crime control measures on the strength of the argument that they are in the 
interest of and are supported by the greater majority of the population.
8.7 Summary: A Final Word
The police use of deadly force in circumstances described as encounters in 
Mumbai have for many years now been widely and largely without question 
accepted as the correct and effective response to controlling increased organised 
crime. However, encounters which were once prized and acknowledged as 
individual and organisational achievements (during the period under study 1993- 
2003) are in the past few years gradually emerging as contested territory with 
questions being raised about whether officers abuse deadly force as a last resort 
to control crime or whether murkier motives (corruption and self- interest/ 
aggrandisement) are at work here. Since these developments have occurred in the 
recent past it is difficult to ascertain the precise reasons for the change, especially 
since there is no particular incident101 that marked a change in attitudes. 
However, factors such as increasing public awareness of Human Rights issues as 
a result of greater activism on the part of Human Rights Commissions and the 
Courts; changing political equations; conclusion of trials in older cases of 
encounters that ended in conviction of a few police officers; more awareness on
101 Incidents like the attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001 in the USA or the July 2005 
bombings in London that heralded a sea change, in the direction opposite to that in Mumbai, 
towards police use of force issues in these countries.
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the part of the media; and change in police leadership, might have been 
responsible for the change. The research suggests that in Mumbai police 
encounters were unquestioned and police officers continued to operate in an 
atmosphere that lacked rigorous accountability to either the rule of law or the 
public for a number of years. Interviews with police officers and ‘claimsmakers’ 
revealed a discourse of denial that existed: accounts that enabled officers to 
explain to their audiences why encounters were justified and inevitable in the 
effort to fight crime.
This research in one city of democratic India draws on Sykes and Matza’s 
original work on techniques of neutralization and fits officer accounts within 
Cohen’s framework of denial, making it one more example contributing to the 
literature that seeks to demonstrate that deniability is endemic to societies as 
diverse as Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, dictatorial regimes in Brazil 
and Argentina; societies that have something to deny, to justify, to cover up. 
Atrocities when committed by state actors and condoned by the political 
machinery, have to be explained and made acceptable to the public, and this was 
done in Mumbai, like in other contexts, by denying that encounters were 
unjustified either on legal, and/or moral grounds.
However, justifications put forward by police officers for the use of deadly force 
to control organised crime at a time when it was rampant might be grounded in 
fact and necessity of the circumstances in the city. The research showed that 
encounters might have enjoyed social approval or perhaps were unchallenged 
either because of apathy or lack of knowledge on the part of the wider public. 
Wider structural, organisational, socio-cultural and individual factors that 
promoted the use of deadly force present real challenges for the Mumbai police 
and need to be addressed if there is to be effective control on encounters.
When I started the research in 2001 encounters figured prominently in the news 
and print media, and the research was considered to be very topical in Mumbai. 
Even though the number of encounters have declined in Mumbai since then, the 
latest incident in Gujarat (see Appendix 4) and the criminal conviction of 10 
police officers in Delhi for criminal conspiracy and murder (see pages 205-6) has
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again made them the ‘flavour of the month’ and the need to address the problem 
of unaccountable police use of deadly force is once again at the forefront of 
public discourse in India. Encounters that appear to have been normalized and 
grounded in necessity in Mumbai, ought no longer to be so. The conditions that 
give rise to the necessity of encounters need to be addressed and unless the 
process of ‘normalization’ and ‘cover-ups’ is exposed, which means, unless 
encounters are seen as problematic and addressed as such, they will continue to 
occur (maybe not continually but in periodic cycles) and pose a danger to the 
right to life, one of the most basic of human rights that a democratic country has 
the obligation to secure, protect and promote.
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS W ITH POLICE
OFFICERS
Section 1: Work History
1. Could you tell me a bit about your career, so far? In which year did you 
join to police service?
2. Why did you join the police
3. Was a career in the police your first choice? What attracted you to this 
job?
4. Could you tell me a bit more about your educational background?
5. Which of your previous postings has been the most challenging? Why?
6. How do you view your current posting?
7. What are your responsibilities at present?
Section 2; Perception of Police Work
1. What are the main responsibilities of the police in society?
2. What aspects of your own work do you think are the most important?
3. Could you tell me a little bit more about your present responsibilities?
4. What has been the crime situation in Mumbai over the past 10 years?
5. How do you think the crime problem can be tackled effectively in 
Mumbai?
6. Do you have any suggestions for the government to make tackling crime 
easier?
7. Do you feel that there should be any changes within the police force 
itself?
Section 3: Role and Use of Firearms
1. Have you had to use firearms in your experience of policing Mumbai?
2. Do you think arming the police with more weapons, especially more 
sophisticated weapons is necessary?
3. What kind of firearms training have you received in your career so far?
4. Do you think it was adequate and appropriate?
5. In which situations do the police have to resort to the use of firearms?
316
Section 4: Police Encounters
1. What do you understand by the term ‘police encounters’?
2. Ho does the media normally react to incidents of police shootings?
3. What do you think is the public’s perception of encounter s i
4. (I mention particular political attitudes towards encounters in other states 
in India based on media reports and own experience) What has been the 
government’s attitude towards encounters in Mumbai?
5. Why do you think encounters happen?
6. Are encounters effective in controlling crime? How?
7. Do you personally approve or disapprove of encounters?
8. Do you think the police organisation and other related agencies support 
encounters1
Section 5: Changes and Reforms
1. What do you think about the laws governing the police use of firearms? - 
Are they adequate or in need of reforms?
2. Do you think there are adequate legal and departmental safeguards to 
ensure no misuse of police use of firearms takes place?
3. Do you think there is a need for police reforms in this area?
4. Are you satisfied with your job?
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INTERVIEWS W ITH
‘CLAIMSMAKERS’
Section 1: Views on Crime
1. What is the prevailing crime situation in Mumbai?
2. What is the meaning of organised crime?
3. Has organised crime affected you personally- either directly or indirectly?
4. Do you think organised crime has affected life in the city in any way over 
the past 10 years?
Section 2: Views about the Police
1. What is the main role of police in society?
2. Do you think the police alone are responsible for controlling crime?
3. How would you describe the Mumbai police?
4. What sort of reputation does the Mumbai police enjoy among the larger 
public?
5. Do you think the police have been effective in controlling ordinary 
crime?
6. Do you think the police have been effective in controlling organised 
crime?
7. What suggestions would you make for the police to be more effective?
Section 3: Views on the Police Use of Firearms
1. In which situations do the police have to resort to the use of firearms?
2. Do you think they have adequate training in the use of firearms?
3. How would you describe the past record of the Mumbai police, as far as 
the use of firearms is concerned?
4. Do you think arming the police with more weapons, more sophisticated 
weapons would make them more effective in controlling crime?
Section 4: Views on Police Encounters
1. What are police encounters?
2. Are they effective in controlling crime?
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3. Why do you think the numbers of encounters have been growing in 
Mumbai over the past few years?
4. What is the public’s attitude towards encountes?
5. What is the media’s attitude towards encounters?
6. What is the political attitude towards encounters?
7. Do you think the Human Rights Commissions or NGOs have been 
effective in putting a check on fake encounters?
8. What are your views on the protection of Human Rights of an alleged 
criminal?
9. What is your personal opinion on police encounters?
Section 5: Personal Information about the Interviewee
1. Age; Educational Qualifications; and Professional Background.
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APPENDIX 3: MANDATORY GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE MUMBAI 
HIGH COURT IN 1997 TO BE SCRUPULOUSLY FOLLOWED BY 
POLICE IN INCIDENTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH CRIMINALS
“While disposing the petitions (No. 1032, 1064 and 1146) filed against the 
Mumbai Police, the Mumbai High Court have issued the following mandatory 
guidelines to police while dealing with incidents of encounters with criminals, 
which result in injury or death of the criminal. All police officers should take 
note and follow these guidelines scrupulously.
1. Whenever police receive intelligence or tip off about the criminal
movements and activities pertaining to commission of grave crimes, it 
shall be entered into a case diary. If the receiving authority is the police 
officer of a particular police station, the relevant entry has to be made in 
the General diary (station diary) and if the receiving authority is a higher 
police officer, the relevant entry to the said effect has to be made in a 
separate diary kept and provided thereof and then pursue further in 
accordance with the procedural law.
2. Regarding any encounter operation, once it is over and persons are killed 
or injured and the same is reported, either orally or in writing, to the 
police in furtherance of section 154 Criminal Procedure Code, it shall be 
registered in the Crime Register of that particular police station and that 
further the said First Information Report (F.I.R.) along with copies to the 
higher officials and the Court in original shall be sent immediately 
through proper channel so as to reach the Court without any delay at all. 
A report as enjoined under section 157 (1) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure by the concerned police station shall also follow necessarily.
3. After setting the law in motion by registering the F.I.R. in the Crime 
Register by the concerned police officer of the particular police station, 
the investigating staff of the police shall take such steps by deputing the 
man or men to get the scene of crime guarded so as to avoid or obliterate 
or disfigure the existing physical features of the scene of occurrence shall 
continue till the inspection of place of occurrence takes place by the 
investigating staff of the police and preparation on spot panchanama and 
the recovery panchanama.
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4. Police officer who takes part in the operation encounter or the 
investigating officer of the concerned police station, shall take all 
necessary efforts and arrangements to preserve fingerprints of the 
criminals or dreaded gangsters who handled the weapons immediately 
after the said criminal was brought down to the ground and incapacitated 
and that the said fingerprints, if properly taken and preserved, must be 
sent to the Chemical Analyser for comparison of the fingerprints of the 
deadbody to be taken.
5. The materials which are found on the scene of occurrence or the 
operation encounter and such of the materials including the blood stained 
earth, and blood stained materials and the sample earth and other 
moveable physical features, shall also be recovered by the investigating 
staff under the cover of recovery panchanama attested by the independent 
witnesses.
6. To fix the exact date and actual place of occurrence in which operation 
encounter has taken place, a rough sketch regarding the topography of the 
existing physical features of the said place shall be drawn by the police or 
the investigating staff of the police either by themselves or with the help 
of the staff of the Survey Department even while the spot panchanama is 
being prepared.
7. The inquest examination shall be conducted by the investigating staff of 
the police on the spot itself without any delay and the statements of the 
inquest witnesses are to be recorded under section 161 Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the inquest panchanama shall also be sent along with the 
above case record prepared along with the First Information Report 
without any delay whatsoever to the Court.
8. If the injured criminals during the operation encounter are found alive, 
not only that they should be provided medical aid immediately but also 
arrangements and attempts shall be made by the police to record their 
statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure either by 
a Magistrate, if possible and if not, by the Medical Officer concerned, 
duly attested by the hospital staff mentioning the time and factum that 
while recording such statements the injured were in a state or position
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that they will be able to give statements and the concerned certificates by 
the doctors appended thereto.
9. After the examination of further witnesses and completing the 
investigation inclusive of securing the accused or accused persons, the 
concerned police is directed to send final report to the Court of competent 
jurisdiction as required under section 173 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure for further processing.
10. Either in sending the First Information Report or sending with the general 
diary entry referred in the guidelines numbers 1 and 2, the concerned 
police shall avoid any iota of delay under any circumstances whatsoever 
so also rough sketch showing the topography of the scene and the 
recovery of the materials and the blood stained materials with the sample 
earth with the other documents, viz. the spot panchanama, recovery 
panchanama - all very vital documents - the respondents police are also 
directed to send them to the Court of concerned jurisdiction without any 
delay.”
(Source: Crime Branch, Mumbai Police)
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APPENDIX 4: RECENT CASE OF ‘FAKE’ ENCOUNTER INVOLVING 3 
IPS OFFICERS
Police encounters were back in the public discourse recently (March 2007) and 
caused furore in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) when 3 high- 
ranking officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) were arrested for their 
involvement in the fake encounter of Sohrabuddin Sheikh in the state of 
Gujarat102. News reports of the case presented the facts as follows: Police 
officers stopped a tourist bus in the state of Karnataka, searched it and dragged 
three people, Sohrabuddin, his wife Kausar Bi and Tulsiram Prajapati off the bus. 
Three days later on the 26 of November 2005, Sohrabuddin was killed in an 
encounter and his wife was ‘missing’ (presumed killed, and the body disposed) 
since then. One year after this incident Prajapati was also killed in an encounter, 
when he was allegedly extorting money from a marble merchant. Deputy 
Inspector General Vanjara, who headed the Anti-Terrorist Squad that conducted 
these encounters, was claimed to have told the press, “It was the work of 
‘deshbhakts’ (patriots)”, and that the police by killing Sohrabuddin, had 
eliminated yet another ‘terrorist’ with ‘links to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (a terrorist 
outfit) and the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan)’, who was 
plotting to kill Chief Minister Narendra Modi (Bunsha 2007).
However, Sohrabuddin’s family petitioned the Supreme Court asking for the 
missing body of his wife, Kausar Bi. The investigation into the allegations was 
entrusted to the Criminal Investigation Department. The state home ministry was 
reported to have tried hard to scuttle the investigation and when it became 
difficult to conceal the government’s involvement in the case, the officer in 
charge of the investigation was changed. The next officer in-charge of the 
investigation, however, unearthed enough “damning evidence of reckless 
killings, phony investigations and zero accountability” (Bunsha 2007) to issue 
arrest warrants against three senior police officers on 27 April 2007. Media
102 See for example: ‘Gujarat fake encounter issue rocks Lok Sabha’, Press Trust of India Report, 
in India Today on the Net, 27 April 2007:
www.indiatoday.com/itoday/20070305/newsallFullStory.php?id=6209.
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reports claimed that other subordinate officers involved in the encounter of 
Sohrabuddin admitted to the deliberate murder of Kausar Bi. Media reports also 
claimed that the investigation had revealed that Sohrabuddin had a criminal 
record, but no terrorist links were uncovered. It was alleged that Vanjara 
eliminated Sohrabuddin at the behest of some political leaders, who in turn had 
been approached by industrialists who were victims of Sohrabuddin’s extortion 
schemes. News reports claimed that in his career, Vanjara had supervised nine 
encounters in which fifteen people were killed (Bunsha 2007). There is also a 
public interest litigation in the Supreme Court asking for an inquiry into 21 
encounter deaths between 2003 and 2006 in Gujarat. While political leaders were 
disclaiming any political involvement in these encounters, NGOs and activists 
are reported to have taken up the cause. There appear clear indications that these 
encounters were at the political behest of the politicians in power and the Gujarat 
government’s credibility is being questioned (Raghavan 2007). However, the 
investigating team has been unable to find evidence of government involvement 
in these encounters and though charges against the officers involved have been 
submitted to the court, the evidence is reportedly insufficient103. It raises doubts 
whether a systemic cover-up is underway and while the court may take a few 
years to reach the final outcome of the case, the prognosis for a full-fledged 
criminal conviction for senior officers involved is not very good, in the light of 
media reports about the poor quality of evidence collected.
However, this incident has served to raise the issue of police encounters once 
again in the public domain and activists and journalists are asking uncomfortable 
questions of the government and the courts.
103 See for example: ‘Sohrabuddin case falling apart?’, The Times o f India, 16 June 2007; 
‘Encounter probe now an eyewash?’, the Times o f India, 29 May 2007; and ‘Fake encounter: 
Gujarat CID rules out political link’, MSN India, 
http://content.msn.co.in/msncms/LinkPage.aspx7ID
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